Estudio Bibliográfico de / A Bibliographical Study of: Juan Bosco Díaz-Urmeneta, Pedro A. Jiménez Manzorro, La tercera dimensión del espejo. Ensayo sobre la mirada renacentista, Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla, 2004; pp. 396.

T echnocrati c fundamentalis m (neocons ) an d theocrati c fundamentalis m (teocons) ar e t w o manifestation s o f politica l though t v e r y restrict i v e o f democra c y . Th e f irst on e ha s a highe r incidenc e i n th e f iel d o f econo m y an d th e secon d on e i n tha t o f the (...) religion , bu t bot h imp l y a stron g challeng e fo r th e democrati c State . Thi s a r ticl e deals wit h th e mor e o r les s fo r ma l conjunctio n bet w ee n bot h kind s o f fundamentalism , that appear s an d acts , e v e n a t a globa l l e v el , a s a v e r y conse r v at i v e reactio n agains t the mai n demand s o f c i vi c laicis m an d o f pr o g ress i v e policies . Th e autho r maintain s that th e an s w e r t o thes e n e w fundamentalisms , li k e t o th e ol d d o gmatisms , i s no t a t all th e relat i vism , bu t th e critica l an d aut o critica l thought . Th e poin t i s t o ad v ance , with thi s critica l attitude , i n th e const r uctio n o f n e w democrati c fo r mulations , pr o vided wit h a mor e stron g fundamen t i n te r m s o f ethica l l e gitima c y an d socia l l e gitimation. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende dar continuidad a un proyecto piloto llevado a cabo en el Máster en Formación del Profesorado de la Universidad Internacional de Valencia durante 2021-2022. A partir de su implementación, análisis de resultados y evaluación, se decide mejorar el proyecto este curso académico 2022-2023 e introducir una serie de cambios metodológicos y dinámicas de seguimiento al alumnado de postgrado que cursa la asignatura de Trabajo de Fin de Máster en esta titulación. Se espera que dichos cambios redunden en (...) la calidad de la docencia en el marco de esta asignatura y puedan ser extrapolables también a otras titulaciones. (shrink)

Fanny Bré was a volunteer nurse in the International Brigades, who fought in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) on the side of the democratically elected Republican government. The objective of this study is to understand the relationship between Bré's antifascist ideas, her conception of care and the activities she carried out in the Spanish hospitals of Casa Roja (Murcia), Villa Paz (Selices, Cuenca) and Vic (Barcelona). We use narrative biography to describe Bré's personal, political and professional trajectory. To do so, (...) we conducted a content analysis of primary sources archived in Spain, Russia and France and secondary sources that emerged from a thorough literature review. We identified three thematic axes: (1) a concept of nursing in the service of the antifascist struggle, (2) nursing activity for high‐quality care and (3) political action for improving hospital organisation and care. The interest of Bré's texts transcends the war in Spain because, in them, Bré questions the neutrality of care by revealing that care can itself be a political act. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the historical and philosophical context that led to the basic concepts of stereochemistry proposed by Van’t Hoff and Le Bel. Although it is now well established that the key idea of tetrahedral carbon, and in general a geometric view of matter, was pioneered by other chemists, Van’t Hoff and Le Bel used this idea to solve the puzzle of optical activity, thereby establishing a direct linkage between structure and physical properties. It is also interesting to note that (...) their proposals came without experimental verification and they were largely based on experiments conducted by others. Philosophical arguments can, however, be invoked to satisfactorily validate this deductive reasoning. (shrink)

Articles on spiritual philosophy and various aspects of Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Hindu mythological text; previously published in various newspapers and magazines.

The development of time which becoming more modern, exposes married couples to various opportunities and challenges to build Christian family life. The development of the modern world which is marked by very rapid progress in the fields of science and technology not only has a very positive impact but also has a very negative impact on the realization of Christian family life. The magnitude of the negative impact that has occurred has resulted in many Christian families, especially Christian husbands and (...) wives, experiencing difficulties in realizing their essence as a communion of love. Responding to situations like this, the Church is required to continuously proclaim and awaken Christian families, especially married couples, about the love of God as the basis, power, direction and goal of Christian family life. Pope Francis through the Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia invites married couples as main actors in building a Christian family to always cultivate their love as the foundation of Christian family life. Because the strength of the Christian family lies in the ability of married couples to experience and manifest and teach God's love in Christian family life. That means, God's love which is manifested in the love of husband and wife becomes the determining foundation in building the Christian family as a communion of love. (shrink)

Thoughts on education; comprises excerpts from his writings and an exhaustive study on his educational philosophy.

On concept of love from Islam perspectives.

Portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi dealing with the essential nature of a proposition (Pakṣatā) and portion dealing with the definition of fallacious middle term (Hetvābhāsasamanyanirukti); Sanskrit text with commentary and translation.

Indepth analization of three states of Consciousness in spiritual life.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Review of Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology:A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇiMichael Williams (bio)Stephen Phillips presents a translation and commentary on Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's Tattvacintāmaṇi, which is widely regarded as the foundational text of the Navya-Nyāya tradition. The importance of Gaṅgeśa's work to subsequent philosophy in India can hardly be overstated. In the centuries after his death, countless commentaries and dissertations were written (...) on the Tattvacintāmaṇi by Nyāya scholars in Mithila and Bengal. Recent [End Page 510] scholarship (David and Duquette 2021) has highlighted how the work of the Navya-Naiyāyikas came to influence intellectuals from all over the Indian subcontinent. The theories of Gaṅgeśa and his followers shaped discussions in diverse scientific fields, including Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, grammatical science, and literary theory.Despite its pervasive impact on Indian thought, Navya-Nyāya has frequently been portrayed in a negative light by scholars. The Indologist Arthur Berriedale Keith (1921, p. 35) described the commentaries on Gaṅgeśa's work as "a vast mass of perverted ingenuity worthy of the most flourishing days of mediaeval scholasticism." Meanwhile, Swami Vivekananda bemoaned the "never ending Avacchinnas and Avacchedakas" of Navya-Nyāya prose.1Jonardon Ganeri (2011) has discussed how these negative stereotypes reach back to the political agenda of the British colonial government in India during the nineteenth century, and his work highlights the vitality and diversity of the discussion of metaphysics in the Bengali tradition of Navya-Nyāya. Nevertheless, there is no denying that much Navya-Nyāya work is extremely difficult to discuss and translate comprehensibly. Many scholars still think of Navya-Nyāya works as untranslatable, at least in the sense that their meaning could not be effectively communicated to a modern audience who are not already deeply familiar with the tradition. This would be tragic, given the potential of Navya-Nyāya philosophy to contribute to the growing cross-cultural conversation in philosophy.Phillips is the first scholar to translate the entire Tattvacintāmaṇi into another language. His work attempts to communicate the foundational text of the Navya-Nyāya tradition to a broad audience. In his introduction, Phillips says that his work aims to speak to analytic philosophers, Sanskritists, and "specialists whose interests span issues in contemporary philosophy and Gaṅgeśa's achievements" (2020, vol. 1, p. 1). Phillips worked with the late Ramanuja Tatacharya to read the Tattvacintāmaṇi's chapters on perception and inference. Tatacharya was recognized as one of the leading experts on Navya-Nyāya philosophy in the world during his lifetime, and Phillips' translation distils many of his insights into the text.Phillips' goal is to translate the Tattvacintāmaṇi into lucid English. He eschews what he terms the "error of literalism" (2020, 1:xvi), instead using idiomatic translations that draw on concepts from contemporary analytic philosophy. Unlike Daniel Ingalls (1951) and Cornelius Goekoop (1967), Phillips uses formalization in Property Predicate Logic comparatively rarely, deploying it selectively in contexts such as the discussion of the nature of pervasion (the Vyāptivāda) and the discussion of the "inferential undercutter" (the Upādhivāda), for instance. The introduction to the work is extremely clear and explains the translation using terms of modern analytic philosophy. Phillips presents a perspicuous introduction to the theory of inference, [End Page 511] which is necessary to understanding Gaṅgeśa's work, which constantly employs inferential arguments.Phillips' introductions to the individual chapters of the text are also very illuminating, and often contain original insights into the philosophy of the Tattvacintāmaṇi. For instance, his introduction to the Īśvaravāda argues, contra John Vattanky ([1989] 2011), that Gaṅgeśa himself was not entirely persuaded of the strength of the proofs for the existence of god (īśvara) that he puts forward in that chapter. Phillips argues that Gaṅgeśa may actually have sympathized to some extent with the Mīmāṃsā views he ultimately critiques there, detecting on Gaṅgeśa's part a "sympathy for certain atheistic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Ideas Concerning Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology:A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇiEberhard Guhe (bio)Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology (see Phillips 2020) is surely a landmark achievement in the realm of research on Navya-Nyāya. It is a work of reference not only for specialists but also for a broader audience of philosophically interested readers. Phillips has demonstrated (...) his expertise on Nyāya in general in many previous publications. At present, there is probably hardly anybody else who would have been better qualified to accomplish the mammoth task of translating and elucidating such a complex and voluminous Sanskrit work as the Tattvacintāmaṇi. It should however be noted that there is another edition and annotated translation of the Tattvacintāmaṇi (excluding the Upamānakhaṇḍa) by V.P. Bhatta (see Bhatta 2005, 2012, 2021), which is rather addressed to specialists, who are proficient in Sanskrit. The two volumes on the Anumānakhaṇḍa were published in 2021 (one year after the publication of Phillips' three volumes). Considering the enormous size of such a book project, the result cannot be expected to be completely flawless. The present review focuses on the introduction in volume 1 and on volume 2. I will address some minor issues, primarily methodological ones, but I will also address a few more serious (albeit surely accidental) translation errors (especially in the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-section of the Vyāptivāda), which can lead to a misunderstanding of Gaṅgeśa's stance on a pivotal topic of the Navya-Naiyāyikas, namely the correct definition of the concept of pervasion (vyāpti).IThe introduction is very insightful. However, logicians will probably stumble over Phillips' methods of formalization. Some examples are given below. [End Page 498](1) The language of Phillips' formalizations looks a bit like a first-order language. Thus, for example, he uses "Ha" as a formal equivalent of the sentence "The mountain is smoky" (see vol. 1, p. 18). An obvious deviation from first-order conventions consists in the fact that Phillips uses at least two types of negation. Propositional negation is expressed by means of the symbol "~" (see vol. 2, p. 668; unfortunately, this symbol is not mentioned in vol. 1, pp. 18–19, where Phillips introduces his formalization techniques). Moreover, Phillips uses the negation symbol "¬," which he applies to capital Roman letters, in order to express a kind of term negation. Thus, for example, "¬H" may serve as a term referring to "the absence of the probans" (vol. 2, p. 623). To be precise, the type of absence which "¬H" refers to is a so-called "relational absence" (saṃsargâbhāva). Phillips formalizes the so-called "mutual absences" (anyonyâbhāva) differently (see below).Although "¬Hc" (see vol. 1, p. 18) looks like an ordinary first-order wff, it should more accurately be read as "The absence of H is located at c." Properly speaking, we should then also read atomic wffs like "Hc" as "H is located at c," where "H" should not be regarded as an expression of a predicate like "… is smoky," but rather as a general term, that is, as a formal counterpart of expressions like, for example, "smoke."Unfortunately, Phillips renders the meaning of wffs of the form "¬ϕx" not as "the absence of H is located at x," but in a somewhat simplified manner, which obscures the fact that he treats the negation symbol "¬" as a means to express a term negation: "And negation is term negation, not propositional negation [author's note: as we have just seen, this is not true of all kinds of negation which Phillips refers to in his formalizations, since he uses the "~" in a different sense]; thus, the negative sign '¬' in '¬ϕx' is defined as 'ϕ is absent at x'" (vol. 1, p. 19).Moreover, the use of different kinds of letters for the variables in "¬ϕx" (Greek and Roman) seems to suggest that the absentee should always be the referent of a general term. However, expressions of the form "the absence of a is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of GaṅgeśaStephen Phillips (bio)More or less happy with the reviews, I would like mainly, in response, to identify advances made in the study of Gaṅgeśa. Anand Vaidya articulates a clearer overview of Gaṅgeśa's theory of knowledge; Eberhard Guhe shows a better way to render the notion of vyāpti, "pervasion," which is central in the theory of (...) inference as a knowledge source; and Michael Williams, too, shows need for improvement on that score as well as for elaboration of matters taken up by classical commentators that are given short shrift in my running comments. For example, whereas long discussions are provoked by Gaṅgeśa's definition of "knowledge," pramā, major points in the purvapakṣa in the section on proving the existence of an īśvara, a "Lord," seem, as Williams says, "threadbare."Vaidya, following Burge (2003), introduces a distinction between entitlement and justification: entitlement is the kind of unreflective epistemic warrant delivered by Gaṅgeśa's pramāṇa, "knowledge sources," working automatically in our everyday lives, whereas justification requires self-conscious certification, prāmāṇya-jñapti. Thereby splitting the horns of a dilemma posed by internalist accounts of knowledge in opposition to externalist ones, Burge and Vaidya are able to incorporate the most [End Page 519] attractive features of each approach. The entitlement/justification distinction cashes out, I may add, to Vaidya's elucidation, Nyāya's deeply held doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇya, "certification by another," against the view of "intrinsic certification," svataḥ-prāmāṇya, of Prabhākara and others. As Williams notes, Prābhākara positions, for which Gaṅgeśa sometimes shows sympathy, may have led him to presume that an anubhava—"awareness" or "presentational experience" in my translation, "fresh news" in Matilal's snappy rendering—is an episode of knowledge, pramā, "unless one knows otherwise," bādhakam vinā.On reflection, one sees that such a presentation (it could be perceptual, inferential, analogical, or testimonial) has been produced by a pramāṇa, or, in abnormal cases, not, and so by a "pramāṇa-pretender," a pramāṇaābhāsa, as in seeing a mirage. Again, an anubhava is not just any old cognition or "thought" (pace Das 2021, p. 162); it is defined as nonrecollective. Unlike a deliverance of a genuine pramāṇa, some instances may, on examination, prove to be a-pramā, "non-knowledge," but are, nevertheless, at the animal level, sufficient to provoke and guide action that would not be unhesitating were there doubt in any way. A thirsty Maya, in Vaidya's example, would naturally move in the direction of the water she "sees." But she would hesitate were she to learn from her friend about the unreliability of water-perception in the current circumstances. At the reflective level, where she is unsure whether the anubhava she apperceives is pramā or apramā, her action, including speech (implying assertability), is altered.So far so good in Vaidya's reconstruction. But Gaṅgeśa does not himself pronounce on the question of whether, after learning about the defeater, Maya would still be entitled to her perceptual belief that there is water in the distance. In the volumes under review, I assumed that she would not be "justified" and indeed that she would no longer have the belief (if we may speak about "beliefs"). The defeater grasped at the reflective level would mean not only that she could not certify the perceptual deliverance but also that there would be no knowledge. Clearly, she can't certify it, and thus, as Vaidya reasons, loses the right to assert. But maybe he's correct that, according to Gaṅgeśa's sensibilities, she does not lose the perceptual knowledge. She would remain entitled to her belief.Personally, I think this is wrong, but Vaidya's understanding does have the merit of explaining why some later Naiyāyikas apparently took absurd positions on epistemic luck (Bhattacharya 1996, p. ix). I think that Maya would lose her entitlement, too, but what if, after being informed of the unreliability of water-perception... (shrink)

Los actos violentos que se narran en La cinta blanca (Michael Haneke, 2009) nos llevan a plantearnos ciertas cuestiones sobre lo que Hannah Arendt dio en llamar “banalidad del mal” y cómo dicho concepto se refleja en el filme. Retomando algunas de las cuestiones planteadas por la autora en sus obras Los orígenes del totalitarismo (1951), La condición humana (1958) y Eichmann en Jerusalén. Un estudio sobre la banalidad del mal (1963) trataremos de dar respuesta a las siguientes preguntas: (...) ¿son los niños/as incapaces de percibir la maldad de sus actos?, ¿son conscientes moralmente?, ¿la violencia se utiliza como una forma de revelarse frente a la autoridad o como un modo de poner en juego los valores que ésta les ha enseñado? Es decir, ¿podemos hablar de la banalidad del mal para describir los actos de los/as niños/as? La respuesta a esta pregunta parece ser afirmativa, pero cabe establecer una distinción importante entre los diferentes actos que se describen en el filme, para esto acudiremos también a las ideas de autores como Peter Sloterdijk y Jean Paul Sartre. (shrink)

Seminar papers on the philosophical thoughts of the people of Bangladesh.

The aim of this text is to explore and discuss the way in which both the commercial films and the auteur cinema made by Luis Buñuel in Mexico, introduce us to the production of new cinematic representations of poverty. In order to do this, the films El gran calavera, Los olvidados, El Bruto and Nazarín will be analyzed. It is argued that these films suggest different ways in which poverty is inscribed that put the hegemonic representation imposed by the golden (...) age of Mexican cinema under tension. Moreover, the ideal of desire is recognized as a common mechanism in the actions of its protagonists. (shrink)

Commentary on Avayava, portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi dealing with syllogism (avayava) work of the Navya-nyaya school in Indic philosophy by Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent.

Study of the seven classical commentaries dealing with definition of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) according to the Navya-Nyāya philosophy.

Contributed articles on the representation of death in different religion, with reference to Indic and European philosophy; includes articles on the representation of death in literature.

Supercommentary, with commentaries on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa of Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent., work on Nyaya philosophy.

For quite a while homo religiosus has been marginalized and trivialized by homo techno-economicus, which gives more emphasis to the corporal and material dimensions of humanity. The negative effects of the techno-economicus paradigm engender the reemergence of homo ecologicus, which offers wisdom of life. Homo ecologicus has also been quite marginalized from the life of humanity. The reemergence of homo ecologicus, in turn, would give a new hope for the reemergence of the face of the homo religiosus, because of its (...) interrelated characteristics with the homo ecologicus. In fact, humans can be called homo eco-religiosus. The close tie between the two needs to be investigated more deeply with the help of philosophy. But, the philosophy we need is not just a Cartesian analytical philosophy, which means a merely intellectual exercise in the public domain. What we need is a philosophy as a philo sophia, love for wisdom, which will lead to an exercise of both feelings and soul in the private domain. Keywords: Homo techno-economicus (techno-economic humans), homo ecologicus (ecological humans), homo religiosus (religious humans), homo eco-religiosus (eco-religious humans), modernitas (modernitiy), religiositas (reli- giosity), filsafat (philosophy), cinta kebijaksanaan (love for wisdom), Henryk Skolimowski. (shrink)