El propósito de este texto es mostrar que dos de los más conocidos paradigmasdel mal en la historia de la filosofía moral no son excluyentes. A partir deljuicio que Bartolomé de Las Casas emite sobre la institución delrequerimiento, en la primera parte del trabajo se intenta explicar el origendel mal a partir del paradigma platónico de la ignorancia. En la segundaparte, y teniendo en cuenta la descripción que hace Las Casas de la formacomo es aplicado el requerimiento, se aclara aquella (...) otra fuente del mal que,según Aristóteles, tiene lugar en la disposición incontinente de un agente. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es dar razones para defender la posición que advierte sobre los riesgos morales de la compasión. Además del argumento que, para sostener esta posición, apela al valor de la autonomía, hago referencia al debate sobre el contenido cognitivo de actitudes como la humillación. Las referencias a este debate junto con algunos ejemplos de la historia y de la literatura colombianas servirán para trazar el vínculo entre la creencia sobre la inferioridad de algunas personas y el (...) trato paternalista, condescendiente y humillante que puede llegar a ser constitutivo de la compasión. (shrink)

En este artículo se dan algunas de las razones por las cuales promover un conjunto de valores específicos en las empresas no es un propósito claro si no se le entiende en su relación con el criterio moral, según el cual es deber de las directivas de las empresas promover una armonía en las relaciones de riesgo e interés entre las empresas y sus stakeholders. Para ello se tendrán en cuenta, por una parte, un concepto de cudaimonía, cuya justificación es (...) formal y pragmática y, por otra, un concepto de racionalidad no instrumental. Por último, se darán las razones por las cuales la capacidad humana de ponerse crítica y participativamente en el lugar del otro, si se promueve, puede ser una manera de realizar el propósito moral de procurar un balance en dichas relaciones. (shrink)

This article tries to a describe the moral point of view in organizations, throughan analysis of a case of corruption. To accomplish this purpose, the authortakesaccount of two perspectives from which the moral point of view can beunderstood, according to the terms in which justificacion level tooks..

RESUMEN El artículo responde algunas críticas planteadas por Ignacio Ávila a mi interpretación de la epistemología davidsoniana. Presento argumentos en contra de: a) que sea necesario distinguir entre representaciones epistemológicamente “peligrosas”e “inofensivas”; b) que el empirismo mínimo sea un tipo de realismo directo; c) que mi uso de la expresión “evidencia distal” y el interés por la teoría de la correspondencia sean asuntos ajenos a Davidson. Finalmente, sostengo que la triangulación es un elemento fundamental de la epistemología davidsoniana, pues permite (...) sortear la ansiedad realista manteniéndose en una postura no representacionalista. ABSTRACT In this article, I respond to some of Ignacio Ávila's criticisms of my interpretation of Davidson’s epistemology. I argue against: a) the need to distinguish between epistemologically “dangerous” and “harmless” representations; b) the idea that minimal empiricism is a kind of direct realism; and c) the claim that my usage of the expression “distal evidence” and interest in the theory of correspondence are issues that do not pertain to Davidson. Finally, I claim that triangulation is a key element in Davidsonian epistemology since it allows us to deal with the realist anxiety while maintaining a non-representationalist viewpoint. (shrink)

In this article I make references to a set of statements made by Albert Speer –Hitler’s architect–, about his situation in the Third Reich after the end of the Second World War. The heart of these statements is the term “self-deception”. Taking into account of Speer’s words, I emphasize on a feature which, as I see it, goes along with the process of self-deception: imposture. With the inclusion of imposture in the discussion on self-deception, I emphasize on the fact that (...) it frequently takes place in a context made not only by the self-deceiver alone, but by others as well. In this sense, the presence of the others or what I want to call “the audience” is a significant part of what makes self-deception more or less notorious, more or less easy to occur. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es fortalecer los vínculos entre las razones de justicia y las razones históricas para justificar el reconocimiento de ciertos derechos en favor de grupos culturalmente diferenciados. Intento con ello mostrar que a la lucha por la defensa de la preservación de ciertas culturas no es marginal, sino más bien esencial, el hecho de que dicha defensa provenga de una historia de exclusión. Acudiendo a ejemplos, en la primera parte del trabajo intentaré integrar algunos rasgos de (...) lo que Charles Taylor entiende por proceso de formación de la identidad al conjunto de etapas que, según Luis Villoro, dan lugar a la proyección de un modelo de justicia. En la segunda parte contaré algunos episodios del reciente proceso de recuperación territorial de la comunidad indígena U'wa en Colombia. El propósito de esta parte del trabajo es fortalecer el vínculo que establece Villoro entre las historias de exclusión y los procesos de consolidación de la justicia. A modo de conclusión y teniendo en cuenta la diferencia planteada por Ernst Tugendhat entre derechos generales y derechos especiales, mostraré en qué medida las historias tristes no dejan de constituirse en contenidos para la justicia una vez que la ley positiva ha consagrado una serie de derechos. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar cómo ciertos procesos de victimización condenan a quienes los padecen a una suerte de destierro del mundo y de la realidad. El caso de la larga presencia paramilitar en El Placer (Putumayo, Colombia) es un ejemplo de lo anterior. Con el uso que hacen los sobrevivientes en El Placer de los términos “el mal aire” y “los aires de la muerte” se expresan nítidamente dichas formas de destierro. El propósito general del texto se (...) cumple, en primer lugar, recurriendo al término ‘mundo’ tal como este es usado por Hannah Arendt y por Edmund Husserl y, en segundo lugar, al término ‘realidad’ propuesto por Arendt y por Somogy Varga. Para concluir, intento establecer una relación entre la pérdida de mundo, la pérdida del sentido de la realidad y lo que se conoce en fenomenología como‘despersonalización’. AbstractThe purpose of this article is to show how certain forms of victimization condemn those who suffer them to a sort of exile from the world and from reality. The case of the long paramilitary presence in the town El Placer (Putumayo, Colombia) is a good example of this. The use its survivors make of the words “bad air” and “the airs of death” neatly expresses the mentioned forms of exile. To accomplish this purpose, firstly, I appeal, to the term ‘world’ as used by Hannah Arendt and Edmund Husserl, and secondly, to the term ‘reality’ as usedby Arendt and Somogy Varga. I conclude weaving a relationship between the terms “no-world”, “loss of the sense of reality”and what in phenomenology is known as ‘depersonalization’. (shrink)

Giusti, Miguel. Disfraces y extravíos. Sobre el descuido del alma. Ciudad de México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2016. 248 pp.

Los textos de Ernst Tugendhat sobre mística están acompañados de una serie de referencias a la experiencia estética. Dadas estas referencias y la importancia que puede atribuirse a ellas en el propósito de Tugendhat de aclarar el sentido de lo místico, en este trabajo exploro la posibilidad de responder positivamente a esta pregunta: ¿Puede la experiencia estética comportar algunos de los rasgos de la experiencia mística? El punto de partida en mi propósito será atender a la reflexión de Tugendhat en (...) torno al término "asombro" en el contexto de la experiencia estética. A continuación doy las razones por las cuales, según el autor, la expresión "¡qué asombroso que exista el mundo!" tiene, en efecto, el sentido que Wittgenstein negó para ella. Concluyo mostrando que quien, con este tipo de expresiones, afirma la belleza del mundo no solo expresa la emoción que comporta el asombro; expresa también una disposición para asumir una actitud mística. Ernst Tugendhat's works on mysticism are provided of a series of references to the aesthetic experience. Based on these references, and the significance they may be attributed in Tugendhat's purpose to clarify the sense of mysticism, in this paper I explore the possibility to answer affirmatively the question: Can the aesthetic experience imply some of the traits attributed to the mystical experience? My starting point to get the answer is to focus on Tugendhat's reflections on the term "astonishment" in the context of the mystical experience. i then give the reasons that, according to Tugendhat and opposed to Wittgenstein, may make us think that the expression 'How astonishing that the world exists!' has indeed a sense. Finally, i conclude showing that anyone using expressions like this to affirm the beauty of the world, not only expresses the emotion implied by his astonishment: he also expresses a disposition to assume a mystical attitude. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza si la versión de la justicia como equidad, presentada en El liberalismo político, es genuinamente una concepción política. Se examina el problema de la razonabilidad de las doctrinas comprehensivas, y se indaga luego si el argumento en dos etapas afecta la integridad estructural del liberalismo político. Se concluye que J. Rawls fracasa en su intento de justificar un liberalismo independiente de una doctrina comprehensiva de carácter liberal. ABSTRACT The article analyzes whether the conception of justice as fairness, (...) set forth by Rawls in Political Liberalism, is a genuine political conception. It first examines the issue of reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines and then goes on to inquire whether the two-step argument affects the structural integrity of political liberalism. The paper concludes that J. Rawls fails in his attempt to justify liberalism independently of a comprehensive liberal doctrine. (shrink)

El ser en su riqueza se expresa en el lenguaje que emana también del ser. El lenguaje emergió de su olvido en la filosofía griega, gracias a las ideas cristianas de encarnación y trinidad que le hicieron más justicia. El mayor milagro del lenguaje no estriba en que la palabra aparezca en su ser externo, sino en el hecho de que lo que emerge y se manifiesta sea siempre palabra. La vuelta de Gadamer al final de Verdad y método, en (...) torno a la evidencia de que el ser de lo bello consiste en presentarse, ilustra la estructura universal del ser mismo. Apalabrar a lo que es el ser mismo. Lo que determina y hace posible la interpretación es el presentarse del ser de lo que es. Being in its richness expresses itself in language, which itself emanates from Being. Language emerged from its oblivion in Greek philosophy thanks to the Christian ideas of incarnation and trinity, which did it more justice. Language's greatest miracle does not rest on the fact that the word appears in its external being, but on the fact that that which emerges and manifests itself is always word. Gadamer's turn at the end of Truth and Method, regarding the evidence according to which beauty's being consists of presenting itself, illustrates the universal structure of Being itself. Bespeaking what is Being itself. What determines and make possible interpretation is the presentation itself of the being of what is. (shrink)

RESUMEN Largamente desatendida o malinterpretada, la noción de caos en la filosofía de Nietzsche es una pieza constitutiva de la particular concepción del ser que este autor habría dejado apenas esbozada. El artículo se propone elaborar este concepto en la obra nietzscheana, siguiendo algunas de las metáforas que lo iluminan. Desde allí se busca plantear los rasgos centrales de una ontologia del caos, de sesgo no metafísico, que, al afirmar el carácter acontecimental de la realidad, puede verse como precursora de (...) la ontología hermenéutica contemporánea. ABSTRACT The notion of chaos, which has long been neglected or misinterpreted, is a constitutive element of a peculiar conception of being that the philosopher only had time to outline. The objective of this article is to elaborate on this concept in Nietzschean philosophy, guided by some of the metaphors that shed light on it. This serves as the basis to set forth the main characteristics of a non-metaphysical ontology of chaos that asserts the eventful nature of reality and can thus be seen as a precursor of contemporary hermeneutic ontology. (shrink)

He leído el artículo de William Duica titulado “Redescribirnos: una alternativa pragmatista a la imposibilidad del perdón”, así como la crítica de Ángela Uribe; lectura que me ha movido a “meter baza” en el asunto.

In 2017, the National Prosecution Bureau of Chile created the Special Unit for Human Rights, Gender-Based Violence, and Sex Crimes, becoming a milestone for criminal prosecution policies as the first time a state institution in Chile used the term ‘gender-based violence’ explicitly in its title. There was no law in the country that addressed and sanctioned this behaviour—recognising it as a social phenomenon—at the time of the Unit's creation. What does the creation of this new Unit mean for access to (...) justice from a gender perspective? To answer this question, we have critically analysed the creation of this Unit as a case study from a feminist institutionalist standpoint. We found that this institutional change might bring a broadening in access to justice for women, girls and LGBTQI+ persons by implementing a gender perspective. (shrink)

Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture (...) different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. (shrink)

Science is the study of our world, as it is in its messy reality. Nonetheless, science requires idealization to function—if we are to attempt to understand the world, we have to find ways to reduce its complexity. Idealization and the Aims of Science shows just how crucial idealization is to science and why it matters. Beginning with the acknowledgment of our status as limited human agents trying to make sense of an exceedingly complex world, Angela Potochnik moves on to explain (...) how science aims to depict and make use of causal patterns—a project that makes essential use of idealization. She offers case studies from a number of branches of science to demonstrate the ubiquity of idealization, shows how causal patterns are used to develop scientific explanations, and describes how the necessarily imperfect connection between science and truth leads to researchers’ values influencing their findings. The resulting book is a tour de force, a synthesis of the study of idealization that also offers countless new insights and avenues for future exploration. (shrink)

En este ensayo se hace una crítica a la posmodernidad planteada por Lyotard, a la vez que se muestra cómo los pilares teórico-culturales que fundaron la modernidad se han hundido. Se sostiene que los actuales procesos técnico-científicos y de la información no representan algo nuevo: son la continuación de parte de los procesos modernos. Por último, se plantea en once tesis un manifiesto que contiene los presupuestos que deben regir el destino de América Latina. Esos presupuestos dan razón de la (...) especificidad cultural de Latinoamérica y sus tres culturas fundadoras. (shrink)

One of the great problems of caregivers and health professionals in recent times has been the so-called compassion fatigue and its association with burnout syndrome. Another pole of compassion has been described in terms of compassion satisfaction. Both propositions could be problematic in the caregiving setting. This is an analytical reflective article that through an apparent aporia tries to problematize and propose a theoretical synthesis that allows to denote compassion as a virtue in Aristotelian terms. To this end, it resorts (...) to etymologies, translations and mainly to the classical theoretical references regarding compassion fatigue, compassion satisfaction and, of course, Aristotelian ethics. This is a theoretical bet that leaves open the discussion regarding the dichotomies compassion fatigue and compassion satisfaction; apathy and hyperpathy; and proposes to rethink compassion as a virtue, a reasoned middle ground, contextualized in the framework of care between two possible excesses. (shrink)

There is increasing attention to the centrality of idealization in science. One common view is that models and other idealized representations are important to science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be an intermediary step between idealized representation and the traditional aims of science, including truth, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative interpretation of the relationship between idealized representation and the aims of science. In my view, continuing, widespread idealization (...) calls into question the idea that science aims for truth. I argue that understanding must replace truth as the ultimate epistemic aim of science. Additionally, science has a wide variety aims, epistemic and non-epistemic, and these aims motivate different kinds of scientific products. Finally, I show how these diverse aims---all rather distant from truth---result in the expanded influence of social values on science. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground (...) an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor. (shrink)

The concept of hierarchical organization is commonplace in science. Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells compose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; etc. Hierarchical organization is particularly prominent in ecology, a field of research explicitly arranged around levels of ecological organization. The concept of levels of organization is also central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of discrete hierarchical levels. In this paper, we show how these difficulties undermine (...) various implications ascribed to hierarchical organization, and we suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative to levels. Investigating causal processes at different scales offers a way to retain a notion of quasi-levels that avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of hierarchical levels of organization. Throughout, our focus is on ecology, but the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy in science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This article argues that resolutions are reason-giving: when an agent resolves to φ, she incurs an additional normative reason to φ. Resolution-making is therefore a normative power: an ability we have to alter our normative circumstances through sheer acts of will. I argue that the reasons we incur from forming resolutions are importantly similar to the reasons we incur from making promises. My account explains why it can be rational for an agent to act on a past resolution even if (...) temptation causes a shift in her preferences and even her judgment about what to do, and offers a response to a common objection to the normativity of resolutions known as the bootstrapping problem, on which if resolutions were reason-giving, they would problematically allow us to bootstrap any action into rationality simply by resolving to perform it. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge (...) to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. (shrink)

Using data collected at two phases, this study examines why and how ethical leadership behavior influences employees’ evaluations of organization-focused justice, i.e., procedural justice and distributive justice. By proposing ethical leaders as moral agents of the organization, we build up the linkage between ethical leadership behavior and the above two types of organization-focused justice. We further suggest trust in organization as a key mediating mechanism in the linkage. Our findings indicate that ethical leadership behavior engenders employees’ trust in their employing (...) organization, which in turn promotes their justice perceptions toward the organization. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and some directions for future research are suggested. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt has recently become fashionable among those who write on questions of moral responsibility to distinguish two different concepts, or senses, of moral responsibility via the labels ‘responsibility as attributability’ and ‘responsibility as accountability’. Gary Watson was perhaps the first to introduce this distinction in his influential 1996 article ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ , but it has since been taken up by many other philosophers. My aim in this study is to raise some questions and doubts about this distinction and (...) to argue that it has led to confusion rather than clarification in debates over moral responsibility. In place of the attributability/accountability distinction, I propose that there is a single concept of moral responsibility underlying our actual moral practices. This core notion of moral responsibility, which I call ‘responsibility as answerability’, is well positioned to explain thos.. (shrink)

Este trabajo es el resultado de una investigación que se hizo con estudiantes del grado undécimo bachillerato del colegio rural Pozo Nutrias Dos, del municipio de San Vicente del Chucuri, del departamento de Santander, Colombia. Consistió en indagar por cómo una propuesta pedagógica favorece la lectura crítica de textos filosóficos en la institución educativa. En ese sentido para su desarrollo se planteó como objetivo general el caracterizar una propuesta pedagógica para la lectura crítica de textos filosóficos en la institución, junto (...) con los objetivos específicos de identificar las prácticas lectoras de los estudiantes de undécimo en la asignatura de Filosofía, indagar por el concepto que tienen de lectura crítica estudiantes del grado undécimo y los docentes de Lenguaje de la institución y por último, caracterizar los textos filosóficos que permiten el accionar de una propuesta pedagógica frente a la lectura crítica de textos filosóficos en el aula. En cuanto al aspecto metodológico se recurre al paradigma cualitativo y al diseño de investigación acción en educación dentro del contexto de la maestría en Pedagogía ofertada por la UIS. (shrink)