Der Nachweis, dass sowohl die Einladung Peter Singers wie auch Thilo Sarrazins zu Vorträgen an deutsche Universitäten durch das grundgesetzlich verankerte Recht auf Wissenschaftsfreiheit gedeckt ist, kann sehr leicht geführt werden. Viele Menschen sind aber dennoch der Auffassung, Peter Singer sollte aufgrund seiner angeblich ableistischen Thesen an Universitäten keine Vorträge halten; auch sind viele Menschen der Auffassung, Thilo Sarrazin sollte aufgrund seiner angeblich rassistischen Thesen an Universitäten keine Vorträge halten. Es wird gezeigt, dass es keinen substantiellen Unterschied zwischen dem Fall (...) Sarrazin und dem Fall Singer gibt, der es rechtfertigen würde, in dem einen Fall die Einladung zu Vorträgen an Universitäten zu verteidigen, in dem anderen Fall aber nicht. Wer denkt, Singer dürfe an eine Universität eingeladen werden, muss auch denken, Sarrazin dürfe an eine Universität eingeladen werden; und wer das Recht verteidigt, Singer an eine Universität einzuladen, muss auch das Recht verteidigen, Sarrazin an eine Universität einzuladen. (shrink)

In the Introduction of the Tugendlehre, Kant identifies love of human beings as one of the four moral predispositions that make us receptive to the moral law. We claim that this love is neither benevolence nor the aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general (both are also called love of human beings); rather it is amor complacentiae, which Kant understands as the delight in moral striving for perfection. We also provide a detailed analysis of Kant's almost completely neglected theory (...) of moral predispositions. They are necessary conditions to be aware of the moral law and to be motivated by it. (shrink)

Kant is by no means the pure rationalist that Husserl and others represented him as being. To the contrary I claim that Kant is an ethical intuitionist when it comes to our recognition of the validity of the moral law. Interpreting Kant’s famous thesis about the “fact of reason”, I will first argue for three interpretative theses: 1. The factum theory explains our insight into the binding character of the moral law; it is a theory of justification. 2. In our (...) consciousness of the categorical imperative, the moral law is immediately given in its unconditional and binding validity. 3. The unconditional validity of the CI is given in the feeling of respect. Drawing on basic thoughts of Reformed Epistemology, I will then sketch a way to defend Kant’s theory. (shrink)

Die im engeren Sinne politische Bedeutung des Wortes „liberal“ und erst recht der Begriff des Liberalismus haben im deutschsprachigen Raum bekanntlich erst recht spät und jedenfalls nach Immanuel Kant Fuß gefasst. Es überrascht daher nicht, dass Kant in seinen Schriften von solchen Begriffen wie „liberal“ und „Liberalität“ nur sehr sparsam, beiläufig und in einer Weise Gebrauch macht, die zwar die.

Alvin Plantinga s Warranted Christian Belief has very quickly become one of the most influential books in philosophy of religion. In this collection of essays, German philosophers, theologians and a mathematician deal critically with several aspects of Plantinga s seminal work. In a long essay, Plantinga answers these critics.".

Recently, Uriah Kriegel and Mark Timmons have suggested a “phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons”. They offer a reconstruction of Kant’s own account of the phenomenology of respect for persons as well as a refinement of their own. I shall argue that at least with regard to their reconstruction of Kant’s account, they do not succeed. There are a number of shortcomings, the most grievous of which is that Kant does offer a detailed phenomenology of respect in his second Critique (...) which Kriegel and Timmons, however, pay no attention to. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 1 Seiten: 68-77.

Esse paper pretende introduzir alguns argumentos no debate atual em Filosofia da Religião, especialmente na controvérsia contra o Naturalismo. Nossa abordagem irá focar no significado moral da ideia de Deus, bem como em outros conceitos morais relevantes, a saber, os conceitos de consciência moral, mundo moral e a ideia mesma de “bem”. Em suma, é nossa intenção demonstrar que a maioria de nossas ideias morais está relacionada a uma Pessoa: Deus. Essa conclusão, como pretendemos demonstrar, refuta o Naturalismo.

I argue that many interpretations of Kant’s philosophy suffer from what I call “Textvergessenheit,” and that the remedy against it is what I call “kommentarische Interpretation.” By “Textvergessenheit” I mean that, despite all appearances, there are no really close, detailed, exegetical and reconstructive interpretations of Kant’s texts; and by “kommentarische Interpretation” I mean interpretations that are just this: close, detailed, exegetical and reconstructive. The main purpose of “doing history of philosophy” and thus the main purpose of interpreting philosophical texts is (...) to understand what they mean; it is not to find out whether what the text claims to be true really is true . The ultimate aim of reading a philosophical text is to understand, and this means: to reconstruct the theory and arguments put forward by its author. Once it is clear what an argument says, we can relate to it, critically or affirmatively, or whatever; but what exactly the argument really says, is never obvious. Of course, no one will argue that we should not read Kant’s text carefully. Yet, since it is a widely held belief that, contrary to what I claim, there are close readings of Kant’s text, I will provide examples that, as a matter of fact, this is not the case; Textvergessenheit is a fact of philosophical life. Key words HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. (shrink)

When in doubt, for the embryo. New arguments on the moral status of human embryos. - In the first part of our essay we distinguish the philosophical from the legal and political level of the embryo debate and describe our indirect justification strategy. It consists in renouncing a determination of the dignity-giving φ-properties and instead starting from premises that are undoubted by all discussion partners. In the second part we reconstruct and criticize the species, continuum, identity and potentiality arguments. The (...) species argument only has a certain plausibility, if at all, as a critical argument. From the continuum argument and identity argument we take over the idea of numerical identity (NI) and link it with the core idea of the potentiality argument (P). So we come to the NIP argument: -/- (NIP) -/- (1) Every living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ-properties has dignity. (2) Every viable human embryo is a living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ properties. Therefore, (3) Every viable human embryo has dignity. -/- Reversibly comatose people and newborns are protected because they have the potential to have actual personal characteristics in the future; our thesis is that embryos that are capable of development also have the same potential in moral terms. The basic idea of numerical identity, with which we support the second premise, is that every human being, from embryonic existence to adulthood, forms a physical unity. In a detailed part, we deal with the crown princess, gametes, parthenogenesis, somatic cell, pronuclear stage, biological heteronome early embryo, multiple, fusion, Siamese twin, hydatidiform mole and finally trophoblast problems. In a third part, the indirect argument is supplemented by a metatheoretical cautionary argument. It states that in situations where there is doubt as to whether a being falls within the scope of a moral norm, but there are sufficiently strong reasons for this subsumption, it must be assumed that this is the case if the contrary assumption and the positive effects it may have are in no acceptable proportion to the moral harm that would result if that subsumption were not made. The main result of our considerations is therefore: When in doubt, for the embryo. (shrink)

Two issues are at the core of a seemingly never-ending debate about Groundwork III: First, does Kant in GMS III still think he has to deduce the moral law partly from non-moral presuppositions by making a transition from theoretical to practical freedom, as Schönecker argues? Or does Kant already regard the categorical imperative as grounded in a fact of reason, as Puls argues? It is, secondly, no less unclear what exactly is meant by the “deduction” Kant mentions in three places (...) in GMS III. While Puls claims that Kant is referring to the deduction of the idea of freedom from the unquestionable consciousness of pure practical reason, Schönecker contends that GMS III is ultimately about the deduction of the categorical imperative. Schönecker takes issue with Puls’s position as developed, and Puls replies. (shrink)

There is hardly an analogy in the history of philosophy that has been referred to as often as the one that Kant himself draws in the second preface of the Critique of pure reason between Copernicus′ revolution in astronomy and his own revolution in metaphysics; and yet there is to the present day no detailed analysis thereof. The analogy is much more complex than meets the superficial eye: In the first passage , Kant does not draw a simple comparison to (...) Copernicus′ famous heliocentric hypothesis . In the second passage , Kant connects the reference to Copernicus with a reference to Newton by drawing an extremely rich analogy between the law of gravitation and the moral law of freedom. The revolution in metaphysics is related to the revolution in ethics; that famous analogy of Kant really is a Copernican-Newtonian analogy. (shrink)

De acordo com um preconceito bastante difundido no meio filosófico, a filosofia prática de Kant não levaria em consideração os sentimentos e emoções. Uma análise cuidadosa dos escritos de Kant revela, no entanto, o papel central exercido pelos sentimentos em sua ética. Neste artigo examinaremos o conceito de amor em Kant e tentaremos aproximá-lo da discussão sobre o amor na tradição analítica contemporânea, especialmente na filosofia do amor de Harry Frankfurt.