Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...

The essays in this collection are the outgrowth of a workshop, held in June 1976, on formal approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages. They document in an astoundingly uniform way the develop ments in the formal analysis of natural languages since the late sixties. The avowed aim of the' workshop was in fact to assess the progress made in the application of formal methods to semantics, to confront different approaches to essentially the same problems on the one (...) hand, and, on the other, to show the way in relating semantic and pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena. Several of these papers can in fact be regarded as attempts to close the 'semiotic circle' by bringing together the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of certain constructions in an explanatory framework thereby making it more than obvious that these three components of an integrated linguistic theory cannot be as neatly separated as one would have liked to believe. In other words, not only can we not elaborate a syntactic description of (a fragment of) a language and then proceed to the semantics (as Montague pointed out already forcefully in 1968), we cannot hope to achieve an adequate integrated syntax and semantics without paying heed to the pragmatic aspects of the constructions involved. The behavior of polarity items, 'quantifiers' like any, conditionals or even logical particles like and and or in non-indicative sentences is clear-cut evidence for the need to let each component of the grammar inform the other. (shrink)

Mark Coeckelbergh starts his book with a very powerful picture based on a real incident: On the 9th of January 2020, Robert Williams was wrongfully arrested by Detroit police officers in front of his two young daughters, wife and neighbors. For 18 hours the police would not disclose the grounds for his arrest (American Civil Liberties Union 2020; Hill 2020). The decision to arrest him was primarily based on a facial detection algorithm which matched Mr. Williams’ driving license photo with (...) the picture of a man who was suspected of watch theft two years earlier. Not only did the computer ‘get it wrong’ as one of the detectives said, when Mr. Williams made them aware that the picture of the suspect obviously wasn’t resembling him, the probably unreliable algorithm very likely contributed to racial discrimination (Hill 2020). It is well documented that many available facial detection algorithms at this time had significant problems (e.g. a comparably high false positive rate) with respect to black persons, like Mr. Williams (NIST 2019). Multiple causes may exist, such as unbalanced training datasets and insufficient optimization. Coeckelbergh compares the disturbing case of Mr. Williams with a political interpretation of Franz Kafka’s The Trial, where the protagonist, Josef K., is accused of an unspecified crime by an opaque, oppressive and absurd bureaucracy: “In the 21st-century United States, Josef K. is black and is falsely accused by an algorithm, without explanation” (p. 2). (shrink)

Belum begitu lama dua buah berita menggoncangkan dunia (astro-fisika). Yang pertama, CERN, Pusat penelitian atom di Geneva, yang dalam dua eksperimen berturut-turut menemukan bahwa neutrino (bagian mikro paling kecil) bergerak dengan kecepatan sedikit melampaui kecepatan cahaya. Yang kedua, pada minggu kedua Januari yang lalu pengamatan astronomis mutakhir menengarai bahwa dalam Bimasakti kita rata-rata setiap dari 10 milyar bintangnya mempunyai sekurang-kurangnya satu planet yang mirip dengan planet kita, bumi. Berita pertama begitu dahsyat sehingga para ahli fisika yang membuat eksperimen itu belum (...) mau mempercayainya, karena kalau amatan mereka betul, salah satu pilar fisika modern—teori relativitas khusus Einstein— runtuh. Sebuah revolusi baru dalam fisika. Salah satu implikasinya: kemungkinan menjalin komunikasi dengan extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI)—kalau ada—bertambah besar. Berita kedua lebih dahsyat lagi implikasinya. Sampai sekarang banyak astronom berpendapat bahwa probabilitas terjadinya planet dengan ciri-ciri seperti bumi adalah sedemikian kecil sehingga tidak mustahil kalau manusia merupakan satu-satunya makhluk berakal-budi di alam raya. Tetapi kalau di Bimasakti kita saja—satu di antara (diperkirakan) 1011 Bimasakti di seluruh alam raya—terdapat 10 milyar planet mirip bumi, adanya makhluk berakal budi di luar bumi (aliens) merupakan kemungkinan kuat. Dua penemuan ini mengangkat salah satu tantangan paling serius bagi teologi Kristiani: kalau ada makhluk berakal budi di tempat lain di alam raya, apa implikasinya bagi inti iman Kristiani, peristiwa Yesus Kristus? Apakah mereka juga perlu ditebus dari dosa? Dan kalau perlu, apakah karya penebusan Yesus juga berlaku bagi mereka? Kalau penyelamatan ilahi di planet-planet tidak berkaitan dengan Yesus Kristus, apa Yesus Kristus masih mempunyai relevansi universal dalam rencana penyelamatan ilahi? Pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini bukanlah pertanyaan iseng-iseng, melainkan menyangkut hakikat iman Kristiani. Persis masalah inilah yang dibahas oleh Armin Kreiner—guru besar teologi fundamental pada Fakultas Teologi Katolik Universitas München—dalam bukunya (yang, sayang, baru tersedia dalam bahasa Jerman). Buku ini membahas tantangan bagi teologi Kristiani andaikata ternyata selain manusia ada makhluk berakal budi lain di alam raya......................................... Apakah Kreiner berhasil menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan teologis berat yang diajukannya sendiri? Inti masalahnya adalah bagaimana dua keyakinan berikut dapat dipersatukan. Pertama, bahwa kalau ada ETI di alam raya, mereka tidak kurang dicintai oleh Allah dari pada manusia bumi dan karena itu inkarnasi ilahi tidak mungkin merupakan kejadian hanya di planet bumi. Kedua, bahwa dalam manusia Yesus Allah mewahyukan diri sendiri secara unik dengan makna penyelamatan universal. Dan hal itu perlu dijawab tanpa jatuh ke dalam pluralisme relativistik àla Knitter, Hick dan Schmidt-Leukel di mana Yesus hanyalah salah satu dari pewahyuan diri Allah yang pada hakikatnya semua sama derajatnya. Kiranya Kreiner berhasil merumuskan tantangan. Ia menunjukkan arah pemecahannya, tetapi ia belum memecahkannya. Bisa diteliti apakah pemecahan dapat dicari ke arah pemikiran baru tentang Pan-en-teisme sebagai pola yang lebih cocok untuk memahami hubungan antara Sang Pencipta dan ciptaan, sebagaimana akhir-akhir ini diangkat oleh beberapa teolog (Herderkorrespondenz Spezial 2-2011). Yang jelas, kemungkinan adanya aliens menghadapkan teologi Kristiani dengan tantangannya yang barangkali paling berat, yang sampai sekarang pernah dihadapinya. Sebagai catatan penutup, tetap benar bahwa probabilitas adanya ETI, melawan segala tulisan populer dan ilmiah (sampai sekarang), tetap minim! Probabilitas matematis bahwa di sebuah planet dengan kondisi-kondisi seperti bumi kita terjadi evolusi sampai ke kehidupan intelektual adalah kurang dari satu di antara 10100 (bdk. Erbrich, 1988, dll.). Kalaupun dalam setiap dari seluruh 1011 Bimasakti terdapat 10.000 planet mirip bumi, maka jumlah planet di alam raya yang kondisi-kondisinya mirip bumi adalah 1015. Jadi probabilitas adanya ETI tetap teramat rendah. Kemungkinan besar kita tidak pernah akan mengetahui apakah ada ETI. Selama itu pertimbangan-pertimbangan dramatis di atas bisa saja hanyalah sebuah permainan teologis, namun dengan daya tantang yang memang tinggi. (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Program Pascasarjana, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

The central importance of Marx's concept of nature in the formulation of historical materialism has been largely neglected in the extensive literature on Marx. Alfred Schmidt, philosophical successor to Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Frankfurt, seeks to elucidate it in this original study.