Seit 1923 erscheinen in der Sammlung Tusculum magebende Editionen griechischer und lateinischer Werke mit deutscher bersetzung. Die Originaltexte werden zudem eingeleitet und umfassend kommentiert; nach der neuen Konzeption bieten schlielich thematische Essays tiefere Einblicke in das Werk, seinen historischen Kontext und sein Nachleben. Die hohe wissenschaftliche Qualitt der Ausgaben, gepaart mit dem leserfreundlichen Sprachstil der Einfhrungs- und Kommentarteile, macht jeden Tusculum-Band zu einer fundamentalen Lektre nicht nur fr Studierende, die sich zum ersten Mal einem antiken Autor nhern, und fr Wissenschaftler, (...) die spezifische Aspekte eines Werkes vertiefen mchten, sondern fr alle, die sich durch vertrauenswrdige bersetzungen einen Zugang zur Antiken Welt verschaffen wollen. In der Reihe wurden bisher ber 270 Titel publiziert, alle erhltlich als Buch und eBook. Dadruch werden bislang vergriffene Titel und Raritten wieder vollstndig verfgbar gemacht. Zustzlich zu der Buchreihe erscheint bei De Gruyter zum 90-jhrigen Jubilum das eBook-PaketTusculum Online, eine digitale Sammlung aller von 1923 bis 2013 erschienenen Titel -eine gebhrende Wrdigung eines wichtigen Stcks deutscher Verlagsgeschichte. Mehr Informationen rund um Tusculum erhalten Sie unter: www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat.

In this book, I offer an account of intentional action. The book has two main parts: in the first part, I discuss and criticize the currently prevailing account of intentional action—the Causal Theory of Action (CTA)—and, in the second part, I offer my alternative account. The CTA proposes essentially two conditions for something that you do to be an intentional action: (1) what you do is represented by your intention (or other mental attitudes), and (2) it is caused by your (...) intention. Against the CTA, I argue that, since it conceives of representation and causality as essentially separate conditions, it cannot explain why, when someone acts intentionally, it is not a mere accident that both conditions are jointly satisfied: i.e., that the intention causes the movement it represents. The CTA’s inability to rule out such accidentality is, as I argue further, the deeper source of the notorious problem of deviant causation. Given this diagnosis, I claim that the key for a satisfactory account of intentional action is to conceive of the essential unity of representation and causality in intentional action. Doing so, I suggest, requires understanding a distinctive sort of causality at work in intentional action. Following the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, I argue that what is distinctive of the sort of causal-explanatory connection captured in action explanations like “S is doing A because she intends to do B” is that it is essentially known by the acting subject. In the final sections of the book, I then develop and defend a conception of the sort of self-knowledge involved in intentional action. (shrink)

Recent debates about the metaphysics of mind have tended to assume that inter-theoretic reductions are the norm in the natural sciences. With this assumption in place, the apparent explanatory gaps surrounding consciousness and intentionality seem unique, fascinating, and perhaps metaphysically significant. Over the past several decades, however, philosophers of science have largely rejected the notions that inter-theoretic reduction is either widespread in the natural sciences or a litmus for the legitimacy of the special sciences. If we adopt a post-reductionist philosophy (...) of science, with a commitment to theory pluralism, the epistemic statuses of the standard positions in philosophy of mind (reductionism, non-reductive physicalism, dualism) are all significantly changed. Moreover, central problems of recent philosophy of mind – reducibility and the explanatory gap – seem themselves to be in need of rethinking if reductions are rare and the sciences have “explanatory gaps all the way down.” This article examines the prospects of the standard metaphysical positions, plus two types of pluralism, in light of post-reductionist philosophy of science. (shrink)

Since early modernity, it has often been assumed that miracles are incompatible with the existence of the natural laws utilized in the sciences. This paper argues that this assumption is largely an artifact of empiricist accounts of laws that should be rejected for reasons internal to philosophy of science, and that no such incompatibility arises on the most important alternative interpretations, which treat laws as expressions of forces, dispositions, or causal powers.

This paper presents the lineaments of a new account of concepts. The foundations of the account are four ideas taken from recent cognitive science, though most of them have important philosophical precursors. The first is the idea that human conceptuality shares important continuities with psychological faculties of other animals, and indeed that there is a well-distinguished hierarchy of such faculties that extend up and down the phylogenetic scale. While it would very likely be a mistake to look at some conglomeration (...) of these simpler abilities and assert that we have produced a reductive account of human conceptuality, an examination of these will lend insights into essential features of human conceptuality in a non-reductive, non-exhaustive manner. The second idea is that an important function of both human concepts and of their protoconceptual ancestors in the animal kingdom is to make distinctions or discriminations. We shall thus look at the human conceptual apparatus as being, in large part, a discrimination engine. How are these discriminations realized in humans and other beings? Presumably, some discriminative mechanisms are innate, while others are acquired through learning. But how is learning accomplished? The third idea from cognitive science is that adaptive discrimination is realized through neural networks, and that the properties of this realizing system explains familiar features of human thought that seem puzzling when viewed through other lenses, such as the logical analysis of language. The fourth and. (shrink)

The SPP is, among other things, a place where we discuss nagging and perennial problems on the bordermarches between philosophy and the sciences. Sometimes problems are nagging and perennial because they are deep and difficult. And sometimes they are merely an artifact, a shadow cast by our own way of formulating the problem. I should like to suggest to you that philosophy of mind suffers badly from being the last refuge of the best philosophy of science of the 1950's, and (...) that some of its problems are in fact illusions that could be dispelled by consideration of more recent developments in the philosophy of science. In particular, philosophy of psychology has been plagued by a famous contrast between its "ceteris paribus" laws and the "exceptionless" laws of the physical sciences. This has led to doubts about the scientific status of psychology, the status of psychological kinds as natural kinds, and even their ontological legitimacy. I argue here that this problematic is a consequence of assuming a particular analysis of scientific laws as (exceptionless) universally quantifed claims. This analysis has largely been rejected in contemporary philosophy of science. And more recent analyses that take notice of the role of idealization in scientific modeling both dissolve the nagging problem and shed new light upon differences between the sciences. (shrink)

In this article, the author intends to show the conditions which affect the formation of the person in the family, and how economic and cultural changes of modern society and the feminist movement affect the correct development of the child, which have repurcussions in the future behavior of an adult.

Observation of Reality and Theory Creation in Panagiotis Kondylis’ Thought In the first part of the paper the authors present an outline of the Polish perception of thoughts and ideas of Panagiotis Kondylis which has started to develop only recently. This is followed by demonstrating major issues present in the output of this Greek philosopher who was strongly linked both with Greece and with Germany. The paper closes with a discussion of Kondylis’ concept of theory creation demonstrated in his work (...) entitled Theorie des Krieges. Clausewitz – Marx – Engels – Lenin which was published in Stuttgart in 1998. Although the very foundation of his ideas is the theory of war by Carl von Clausewitz whom Kondylis perceived as a conceptual soul mate, the discussion per se is of a more universal nature and may pertain to the essence of developing any theory. The paper is to help the Polish reader to understand the ideas and thoughts of Kondylis, and thus to facilitate the perception of translations of his texts that were published in Studies in the history of philosophy. (shrink)