Explores the biographical, historical and philosophical connections between Jacques Derrida and Michel FoucaultBetween Foucault and Derrida explores the notorious Cogito debate and includes: the central articles, an important piece by Jean-Marie Beyssade, along with a letter Foucault wrote to Beyssade in response both these pieces available for the first time in English translation. In the second part of the book, 10 essays written by some of the most well-known scholars working in contemporary continental philosophy address the various philosophical intersections and (...) divergences of these two profoundly important thinkers.Key FeaturesThe first collection of the central essays involved in the Cogito debate between Foucault and DerridaIncludes the first English translations of Jean-Marie Beyssades important 1973 article on the debate and Foucault's letter in responseSome of the best-known scholars working in continental philosophy today examine where Foucault and Derrida converge and diverge, and how they ultimately shaped each others projectsContributorsAmy Allen, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, USA.Ellen Armour, Vanderbilt Divinity School, Tennessee, USA. Yubraj Aryal, University of Montreal, Canada and New York University, USA. Jean-Marie Beyssade, University of Paris IV, France.Vernon W. Cisney, Gettysburg College, Pennsylvania, USA.Fred Evans, Duquesne University, Pennsylvania, USA.Peter Gratton, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada.Leonard Lawlor, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, USA.Edward McGushin, Stonehill College, Massachusetts, USA.Nicolae Morar, University of Oregon, Oregon, USA. Jeff Nealon, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, USA.Christopher Penfield, Purdue University, Indiana, USA.Arkady Plotnitsky, Purdue University, Indiana, USA. Paul Rekret, Richmond, The American International University in London, UK. Alan Schrift, Grinnell College, Iowa, USA. (shrink)

When shared decision making breaks down and parents and medical providers have developed entrenched and conflicting views, ethical frameworks are needed to find a way forward. This article reviews the evolution of thought about the best interest standard and then discusses the advantages of the harm principle (HP) and the zone of parental discretion (ZPD). Applying these frameworks to parental refusals in situations of complexity and uncertainty presents challenges that necessitate concrete substeps to analyze the big picture and identify key (...) questions. I outline and defend a new decision-making tool that includes three parts: identifying the nature of the disagreement, checklists for key elements of the HP and ZPD, and a “think list” of specific questions designed to enhance use of the HP and ZPD in clinical decision making. These tools together will assist those embroiled in complex disagreements to disentangle the issues to find a path to resolution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Gilles Deleuze’s monograph on Michel Foucault has often been construed as a “metaphysical fiction,” to use Frédéric Gros’s sympathetic phrase. This article takes a different approach, arguing that Foucault’s microphysics of power and Deleuze’s metaphysics of the virtual in fact share a common ontology of forces. In addition to enriching understanding of the two thinkers’ philosophical relation, the article argues that this virtual force ontology clarifies the continuity between Foucault’s earlier and later formulations of power, from microphysics to governmentality. (...) Reading Foucault in this way not only challenges the dominant view in Foucault studies but also suggests the continued relevance of his work for grasping the contemporary exercise of power. By acting on the conditions of possible action, power performs an anticipatory function, intervening, as Foucault puts it, “at the point when the virtual is becoming real.” This is precisely how techniques like algorithmic policing function today. (shrink)

This paper charts the course of Deleuze and Foucault’s philosophical friendship or ‘block of becoming,’ showing the series of reciprocal determinations through which each philosopher’s thought develops in response to the other’s. Specifically, I will argue that the concept of transversal resistance is fundamental for the political thought of both Foucault and Deleuze, allowing us to reconstruct the basis and trajectory of a shared political theory. This concept emerges in Deleuze and Guattari’s schizo-politics, which advances the central aim of Foucault’s (...) earlier History of Madness while accounting for why Foucault’s particular politics of literary transgression had failed. The question then becomes one of conceiving and creating transversal forms of struggle that would respond to the problem of capitalism—a question which Deleuze poses to Foucault, and which prompts and orients the latter’s micro-political analytic of power. In turn, Foucault’s analysis of the anti-transversal operation and economico-political function of power provides the critical groundwork for a theory of transversal politics. Such an affirmative project takes form in Foucault’s late ethico-politics. (shrink)

Professional providers of mental health services are motivated to help people, including, or especially, vulnerable people. We analyse the ethical implications of mental health providers accepting employment at detention centres that operate out of the normal regulatory structure of the modern state. Specifically, we examine tensions and moral harms experienced by providers at the Australian immigration detention centre on the island of Nauru. Australia has adopted indefinite offshore detention for asylum-seekers arriving by boat as part of a deterrence strategy that (...) relies on making detainment conditions harsh. This has known deleterious mental health effects. As a token to fiduciary care obligations, Australia employs mental health professionals to work on Nauru. These providers are often motivated to make a positive difference for detainees’ lives. We examine the overall impact of the providers’ work with detainees and the implications of their presence. The strongest evidence supports that the small mitigation of harms offered by these providers does not outweigh the harms of supporting a system designed to perpetuate human suffering. For mental health professionals considering working in offshore detention, we offer specific topics to scrutinise and weigh prior to employment. Because optimising detainee’s mental health is beyond the capacity of individual providers, we call for the organisations standardising and supporting mental health professionals to oppose employment of their associates in offshore detention. Lessons from this case study are generalisable to other jurisdictions to help inform organisations that licence and support mental health providers and individual providers considering work in similar settings. (shrink)

Downie and Schuklenk1 provide a clear narrative of the development of Canadian policy on medically assisted dying. This is very helpful for considering specific aspects of the continuing deliberations in Canada. This commentary presents an alternative perspective on the authors’ argument that narrow eligibility criteria for medical assistance in dying are discriminatory and unjustified. I argue that disability or mental illness as sole reason for accessing MAiD removes protections for all people who have times in their life when they have (...) mental illness or disability combined with intolerable suffering. I claim that individuals do not make their best, self-actualising decisions at those times and the supposed protections of vague terms such as incurable, advanced and decline are not clinically useful for evaluating eligibility for individuals with chronic health conditions. Within discussion of the impact of social determinants of health on access to MAiD, the authors present the argument that decisionally capable people with mental illness or disabilities as their sole underlying condition should be allowed to access MAiD. The authors state that opposing this access sacrifices patient rights and strips people of their agency. To support their argument, they embrace the idea that people with mental illness or disabilities belong to an identifiable cohort. They claim that …. (shrink)

Explores the biographical, historical and philosophical connections between Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault Derrida and Foucault are unquestionably two of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. Both share a similar motivation to challenge our fundamental structures of meaning - in texts, political structures, and epistemic and discursive practices - in order to inspire new ways of thinking. Between Foucault and Derridaexplores the notorious Cogito debate and includes: the central articles, an important piece by Jean-Marie Beyssade, along with a (...) letter Foucault wrote to Beyssade in response - both these pieces available for the first time in English translation. In the second part of the book, 10 essays written by some of the most well-known scholars working in contemporary continental philosophy address the various philosophical intersections and divergences of these two profoundly important thinkers. The first collection of the central essays involved in the Cogitodebate between Foucault and Derrida Includes the first English translations of Jean-Marie Beyssade's important 1973 article on the debate and Foucault's letter in response to it Some of the best-known scholars working in continental philosophy today examine where Foucault and Derrida converge and diverge, and how they ultimately shaped each other's projects Contributors Amy Allen * Ellen Armour * Yubraj Aryal * Jean-Marie Beyssade * Vernon W. Cisney * Jacques Derrida * Fred Evans * Michele Foucault * Peter Gratton * Leonard Lawlor * Edward McGushin * Nicolae Morar * Jeff Nealon * Christopher Penfield * Arkady Plotnitsk * Paul Rekret * Alan Schrift. (shrink)

If ever I summon before me my highest ideals of men and medicine, I find them sprung from the spirit of Osler. —Wilder Penfield, M.D. Neuroethics is a recently coined term that is shaping our cultu...

If ever I summon before me my highest ideals of men and medicine, I find them sprung from the spirit of Osler. —Wilder Penfield, M.D. Neuroethics is a recently coined term that is shaping our cultu...

The idea that the brain is a representational organ has roots in the nineteenth century, when neurologists began drawing conclusions about what the brain represents from clinical and experimental studies. One of the earliest controversies surrounding representation in the brain was the “muscles versus movements” debate, which concerned whether the motor cortex represents complex movements or rather fractional components of movement. Prominent thinkers weighed in on each side: neurologists John Hughlings Jackson and F.M.R. Walshe in favor of complex movements, neurophysiologist (...) Charles Sherrington and neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield in favor of movement components. This essay examines these and other brain scientists’ evolving notions of representation during the first eighty years of the muscles versus movements debate (c. 1873–1954). Although participants agreed about many of the superficial features of representation, their inferences reveal deep-seated disagreements about its inferential role. Divergent epistemological commitments stoked conflicting conceptions of what representational attributions imply and what evidence supports them. (shrink)

While neuroethics is generally thought to be a modern addition to the broader field of bioethics, this subdiscipline has existed in clinical practice throughout the course of the 20th century. In this essay, Fins describes an older tradition of clinical neuroethics that featured such physician-humanists as Sir William Osler, Wilder Penfield, and Fred Plum, whose work and legacy exploring disorders of consciousness is highlighted. Their normative work was clinically grounded and focused on the needs of patients, in contrast to (...) modern neuroethics, which is more speculative and distant from the lived reality of the clinic. Using recent developments in the diagnosis and treatment of disorders of consciousness, and the history of the vegetative and minimally conscious states, Fins asks why modern neuroethics has taken this turn and what can be done to restore clinical neuroethics to a more proportionate place in the field. (shrink)

En este artículo abordo críticamente la aseveración de David Papineau según la cual la evidencia fisiológica acumulada es suficiente para adoptar razonablemente el Principio del Cierre Causal de lo Físico y la vía negativa, viz. entender físico como no mental, como solución al dilema de Hempel. Comenzaremos restando fuerza a tal afirmación revisando el trabajo de W. Penfield y J. Eccles, dos importantes neurocientíficos y declarados dualistas. No obstante, luego nos centraremos en el trabajo de B. Libet en el (...) que se demostraría que los movimientos voluntarios están realmente determinados por causas enteramente fisiológicas, lo cual constituiría una pieza fundamental de evidencia a favor de Papineau. Nuestro análisis mostrará que no se siguen tales conclusiones. Esto tendrá consecuencias negativas para el Cierre Causal de lo Físico y con ello para el Argumento Causal para el Fisicalismo del cual el mencionado principio es premisa clave. (shrink)

What are the epistemic bases of the knowledge of the reality of our own body? Proprioception plays a primordial role in body representation and more particularly at the level of body schema. Without proprioception people can feel amputated and the mislocalization of proprioceptive information through the remapping of the Penfield Homonculus induces illusions of phantom limbs, illusions that contradictory visual feedback cannot erase. However, it turns out that it is not as simple as that and that vision also intervenes (...) in body knowledge: vision of one's own body allows deafferented patients to move and phantom limbs to disappear. Finally, the existence of phantom limbs in aplasic patients as well as studies on neonates provide evidence of an innate component of body representation. (shrink)

Although the behavioral effects of damage to the frontal lobes date back to at least the late 19th century even midway through the 20th century very little was known about human frontal lobe function and there was a general consensus that the frontal lobe did not play a key role in cognition. This all changed when Brenda Milner published a chapter in a 1964 volume entitled: The Frontal Granular Cortex and Behavior. Milner’s chapter, “Some effects of frontal lobectomy in man,” (...) was the first systematic study of the effect of frontal lobe excisions on cognition in human patients. Milner had access to a unique population of frontal excision patients at the Montreal Neurological Institute that were being treated by Wilder Penfield and his associates for a wide range of neurological disorders, including intractable epilepsy. Milner and her colleagues engaged in a more than 50-year study that has had a formidable impact on our understanding of frontal lobe function. Paralleling studies of frontal lobe function in non-humans they influence on understanding the evolution and function of the prefrontal cortex of mammals. Thus, although Brenda Milner is best known for her studies of human memory, she has had an equally important contribution to our understanding of the frontal lobes. (shrink)

The years between 1833 and 1945 fundamentally transformed science’s understanding of the body’s inner senses, revolutionizing fields like philosophy, the social sciences, and cognitive science. In How We Became Sensorimotor, Mark Paterson provides a systematic account of this transformative period, while also demonstrating its substantial implications for current explorations into phenomenology, embodied consciousness, the extended mind, and theories of the sensorimotor, the body, and embodiment. -/- Each chapter of How We Became Sensorimotor takes a particular sense and historicizes its formation (...) by means of recent scientific studies, case studies, or coverage in the media. Ranging among a diverse array of sensations, including balance, fatigue, pain, the “muscle sense,” and what Maurice Merleau-Ponty termed “motricity,” Paterson’s analysis moves outward from the familiar confines of the laboratory to those of the industrial world and even to wild animals and their habitats. He uncovers important stories, such as how forgotten pain measurement schemes transformed criminology, or how Penfield’s outmoded concepts of the sensory and motor homunculi of the brain still mar psychology textbooks. -/- Complete with original archival research featuring illustrations and correspondence, How We Became Sensorimotor shows how the shifting and sometimes contested historical background to our understandings of the senses are being extended even today. (shrink)

Introduction to sensory psychology, by C. Mueller.--Some reflections on brain and mind, by R. Brain.--In search of the engram, by K. Lashly.--Cerebral organization and behavior, by R. W. Sperry.--Relations between the central nervous system and the peripheral organs, by E. von Holst.--Effects of the Gestalt revolution, by J. E. Hochberg.--Seeing in depth, by R. L. Gregory.--The stimulus variables for visual depth perception, by J. J. Gibson.--The elaboration of the universe, by J. Piaget.--Visual perception approached by the method of stabilized images, (...) by R. M. Pritchard, W. Heron, and D. O. Hebb.--Philosophy as rigorous science, by E. Husserl.--The "sensation" as a unit of experience, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--The phenomenology of perception: perceptual implications, by A. Gurwitsch.--The expression of thinking, by E. W. Straus.--The concept of group and the theory of perception, by E. Cassirer.--Norm and pathology of I-world relations, by E. W. Straus.--The metaphysical in man, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--Cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions, by M. H. Segall, D. T. Campbell, and M. J. Herskovits.--The interpretive cortex, by W. Penfield.--Recovery from early blindness: a case study, by R. L. Gregory and J. G. Wallace.--Visual disturbances after perceptual isolation, by W. Heron, B. K. Doane, and T. H. Scott. (shrink)

What's left of a dream is stored at the Stanford Law School library in 12 fat green loose-leaf binders and several legal boxes of supporting documents and briefs. They chronicle the 54 days that Lawrence Lessig, the Elvis of cyberlaw, helped Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson with the mother of all tech litigation: Department of Justice v. Microsoft. It was to be Lessig's greatest moment.

Religiosity is a prominent feature of the Geschwind syndrome, a behavioural pattern found in some cases of temporal lobe epilepsy. Since the 1950s, when Wilder Penfield induced spiritual feelings by experimental manipulation of the temporal lobes, development of brain imaging technology has revealed neural correlates of intense emotional states, spurring the growth of neurotheology. In their secular empiricism, psychiatry, neurology and psychology are inclined to pathologise deviant religious expression, thereby reinforcing the dualism of objective and phenomenal worlds. Considering theological (...) perspectives and the idea of cosmic consciousness, the authors urge a holistic approach to the spiritual events of epileptic aura, potentially leading to a deeper understanding of the mind and its transcendent potential. (shrink)

In this long and detailed book Bennett and Hacker set themselves two ambitious tasks. The first is to offer a philosophical critique of, what they argue are, philosophical confusions within contemporary cognitive neuroscience. The second is to present a ‘conceptual reference work for cognitive neuroscientists who wish to check the contour lines of the psychological concept relevant to their investigation’ (p.7). In the process they cover an astonishing amount of material. The first two chapters present a critical history of neuroscience (...) from Aristotle to Sherrington, Eccles and Penfield. Chapter three (to which I shall return), offers the philosophical basis for much of the book. Chapters four to twelve present detailed philosophical criticisms of a wide variety of neuroscientists (and some philosophers) on a large number of topics. These include: Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Marr and Frisby on perception (particularly the primary/secondary quality distinction and the binding problem); Milner, Squire and Kandel on memory; Blakemore and others on mental imagery; LaDoux and Damasio on the emotions; Libet on voluntary movement; and Baars, Crick, Edelman, Damasio, Penrose, Searle, Chalmers, and Nagel on consciousness (with a great deal on qualia and self-consciousness). Chapters thirteen and fourteen, along with the two appendices, contain an elaboration and defence of the book’s methodology and present explicit contrasts with the Churchlands, Dennett and Searle. Bennett and Hacker maintain that whilst neuroscientists have made significant discoveries concerning the workings of the brain, these discoveries have been obscured by their presentation within an incoherent conceptual framework. Their complaints, therefore, are often not with neuroscience itself but with what might be called its philosophical self image. (shrink)

The 21 selections are divided into three conceptual approaches to the study of perception: the neurophysiology, the psychology, and the phenomenology of perception, with a final section, some problematic studies. In effect, however, the editor is challenging the metaphysical position hidden in the attitude that behavioral physiology should be an "exact science" without philosophical commitments. Parts II and IV, no less than the explicit statements of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gurwitsch and Erwin Strauss in Part III, stand over against a point of (...) view which, beginning with Cartesian dualism, attempts to resolve it in a materialist reduction, a point of view in which behavior is always reaction, of nervous systems to physical stimulation from an "external," "real," world. Tibbetts is pressing two points--first, that all science must be based on some presuppositions or other and second, that any metapsychology ignores physiological and behavioral research only at its peril. In Part I, Bain, Lashley and Sperry are among the authors. In Parts II and IV Tibbetts brings together selections by Hochberg, Gregory, Gibson, Penfield, Donald Campbell, a bit of Piaget, team research reports, and more to provide in one place material not easily at hand. Some authors provide bibliographical references, and the editor gives nine more pages of bibliography.--M. B. M. (shrink)

Since antiquity, individuals have attempted to relate mental processes to circumscribed areas of the brain. In 1935 the neurologist Wilder Penfield purported to know, “the humming of the mind's machinery, and where words come from,” after he electrically stimulated areas of the exposed human cortex. Recent theories have suggested a functional separation of the dominant and the nondominant hemispheres, the right brain/left brain concept of thought and personality. One author has even proposed that human consciousness and modern civilization developed (...) when the bicameral mind broke down, and the left brain achieved mastery over the right nondominant temporal lobe.Compared to these mechanistic approaches to brain function and human personality, the Russian neurologist, Alesandr Romanovich Luria, and his American follower, Oliver Sacks, have developed a more intellectually satisfying and clinically useful approach which relies on a fuller understanding of the doctor-patient dialogue and the clinical tale. An analysis of Luria's writing about language reveals that mechanistic approaches to language are inadequate; a review of the work of several well-known poets confirms that knowing what a poem means involves more than a recital of its localized contents. Similarly, an examination of three of Sack's clinical tales suggests that even those patients who are grossly awry on a synaptic level can be understood on a personal level to be worthy of respect and even honor. “Man is to himself the most wonderful object in nature; for be cannot conceive what the body is, still less what the mind is, and least of all how a body should be united to a mind. This is the consummation of his difficulties, and yet it is his very being.”Blaise Pascal,Pensees, (11,72)1. (shrink)