Vaccines are a powerful measure to protect the health of individuals and to combat outbreaks such as the COVID-19 pandemic. An ethical dilemma arises when one effective vaccine has been successfully developed against an epidemic disease and researchers seek to test the efficacy of another vaccine for the same pathogen in clinical trials involving human subjects. On the one hand, there are compelling reasons why it would be unethical to trial a novel vaccine when an effective product exists already. First, (...) it is a firm principle of medical ethics that an effective treatment or vaccine should not be withheld from patients if their life may depend on it. Second, since epidemic outbreaks often emerge in settings with less-resourced health systems, there is a pronounced risk that any trial withholding an effective vaccine would disproportionately affect the vulnerable populations that historically have been exploited for biomedical research. Third, clinical trials for novel vaccines may be at odds with efforts to control active outbreaks. On the other hand, it may be justified to conduct a trial for a candidate vaccine if it is expected to have certain advantages compared with the existing product. This essay discusses key factors for comparing vaccines against epidemic pathogens, including immunological, logistical and economic considerations. Alongside a case study of the development of vaccines for Ebola, the essay seeks to establish a general framework that should be expanded and populated by immunologists, epidemiologists, economists and bioethicists, and ultimately could be applied to the case of COVID-19 vaccines. (shrink)

Thomas Puttfarken was one of the most accomplished and original art historians of the last quarter century. His enormous contribution to the life and work of the University of Essex, where he spent nearly all of his academic career, included vigorous sponsorship of the arts on and off campus, and support for the preservation of the built and natural environments. He was a lover of good food, good wine, good company, and a wide range of music–as well as a talented (...) painter and furniture-maker. (shrink)

The paper addresses three late Hegelian philosophers from northern Europe: Norwegian M.J. Monrad (1816–97), Swede J.J. Borelius (1823–1909) and Finn Th. Rein (1838–1919). The focus is on their views on the crisis of Hegelian speculative philosophy. The popularity of G.W.F. Hegel's philosophy in Germany declined rapidly since the 1840s. The decline was influenced by e.g. new scientific discoveries. Hegelianism maintained a strong position in northern Europe (especially in Norway and in Finland) several decades longer than in Germany. Rein, (...) class='Hi'>Monrad and Borelius, all professors of philosophy, endorsed Hegel’s philosophy and agreed that it has to be reformed in order to meet the new challenges. They disagreed with each other, however, about the extent of this reform. They had conflicting interpretations of Hegel’s method too. (shrink)

The recent review by Monrad1 presents several issues about secondary vaccine trials. It lays out the case in which a vaccine has been tested through phases I–III and is being deployed. Subsequently, consideration is being given to conducting ‘trials for another vaccine for the pathogen’. Monrad states: ‘In summary, we may say that researchers have strong prima facie reasons not to conduct a secondary vaccine trial.’ Monrad discusses several factors meriting careful consideration about the need for developing and (...) testing more than one vaccine: relative efficacy, length of immunity, adverse reactions, ease of storage and administration, economic and logistical factors. What is not addressed are the ethical duties that exist when there are competing phase III vaccine candidates for COVID-19. We have serious concerns about potential ethical inadequacies about these ongoing trials and …. (shrink)

SUMMARYThe idea that the public needs enlightenment is generally formulated by people who consider themselves in possession of the enlightenment the public supposedly needs. Herein lies the paternalism problem of popular enlightenment. Some seventy years after Immanuel Kant formulated his famous answer to the question What is enlightenment?, a Norwegian philosopher reaches for his pen on a similar errand. The Norwegian context, however, is different, and the reflection takes a different turn. The questions become: What is popular enlightenment? Who is (...) in a position to decide what kind of enlightenment ‘the people’ need and to define what is enlightenment as opposed to darkness? The text takes a closer look at the Norwegian reflections, published as three articles in two newspapers in 1852 and 1855. The newspaper articles are written by the philosopher Marcus Jacob Monrad. He finds support in Kantian insights when reflecting upon how a concrete initiative for the enlightenment of the public, in which he himself participates, should be understood. Monrad addresses the problem of paternalism in popular enlightenment, and he does this by using his reason publicly, which is what is required, according to Kant, in order for man to escape from tutelage. (shrink)

In the young Henrik Ibsen's intellectual quarters, abroad as well as in his native Norway, Hegelianism was very much the philosophical systemde rigueur. Hegel's student Marcus Jacob Monrad taught phenomenology and aesthetics at the University of Christiania throughout the 1850s, and promoted a wider Hegelian way of thinking through frequent book reviews and newspaper articles. In Italy, soon to be his home away from home, Ibsen socialised with the art-historian Lorentz Dietrichson, whose views on the history of art were (...) outspokenly Hegelian. Ibsen was also in touch with the Hegelian circle gathering around the painter I. C. Dahl at the Academy of Art in Dresden. While Ibsen rarely engages in explicit philosophical discussion, he makes a significant exception when responding to the Danish translation of John Stuart Mill'sUtilitarianism. He admits that he has no professional expertise in this area but continues to observe that, insofar as ‘there are writers [like Mill] who lay down the law about philosophy without any knowledge of Hegel or German thought in general,’ it seems to him that ‘anything is allowed.’ To think philosophically without Hegel appears to Ibsen as tantamount to thinking without a reference point or standard. (shrink)