The late John L. Mackie, formerly of University College, Oxford.

Annotation In this book Mr. Mackie selects for critical discussion six related topic which are prominent in John Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding: ...

1. Causal knowledge is an indispensable element in science. Causal assertions are embedded in both the results and the procedures of scientific investigation. 2. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the meaning of causal statements and the ways in which we can arrive at causal knowledge.

Mackie examines the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is argued that Locke's distinction supports the claim that he held a representative theory of perception. Mackie discussed Locke's arguments for the distinction. The relation of Locke's account to Molyneaux's problem is considered. Mackie critically compares his reformulation of the primary/secondary distinction with that of Jonathan Bennett.

In this chapter, Mackie presents a defence of Locke against Berkeley's attack on abstraction. It is argued that Locke's theory of ideas primarily concerns our ability to employ words and statements. Locke's theory concerning ideas of numbers is criticized. Three theories of universals are considered: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism; it is concluded, however, that the notion of there being distinct things with which we connect general words with particular things is mistaken. Mackie instead proposes a theory of general (...) words being ‘annexed’ to features of things. (shrink)

J. L. Mackie; XIII—The Possibility of Innate Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 245–260, https://doi.org.

First Published in 1980. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Mackie sets out Locke's general theory of identity and raises some difficulties with the account. Hume's claim that the notion of identity is a fiction is critically assessed. Mackie argues that there is a relation between Locke's notion of identity and the notion that individuals can have essences. He presents an argument for what he calls Locke's thesis about the relativity of identity. The relevance of Kripke's discussion of identity and named individuals is examined. It is argued that (...) Locke's thesis about the relativity of identity can provide a means of understanding some problems concerning identity through time. (shrink)

Mackie attempts to revise Locke's theory of the identity of persons. Locke's equation of personal identity with the unity of consciousness is set out. Mackie examines various objections to Locke's theory and his use of puzzle cases is highlighted. Recent theories of personal identity, such as Parfit's, are critically discussed. Mackie suggests that the equation of personal identity with the continuity of neurophysiological structure would resolve some of the difficulties associated with an account of personal identity.

Mackie outlines Locke's representationalist theory. He analyses the relation between representationalism and the picture theory of ideas. The theory's relation to the veil of perception doctrine is also critically examined. Mackie criticizes the verificationist theory of meaning and instead argues that ideas should be understood as intentional objects. Mackie introduces and defends a version of realism, which he calls ‘common‐sense realism’.

Examines the relation between empiricism and realism. Mackie criticizes Locke's arguments against innate ideas. He draws a distinction between ‘minimal’ and ‘authoritative’ senses of knowledge and claims that innate knowledge is only possible in the minimal sense. Mackie argues that there is no necessary conflict between empiricism and realism. He concludes that it is possible to endorse both an empirical basis for our actual knowledge of the world as well as to accept the importance of certain innate propensities (...) that contribute to that knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter considers both Locke's theory of substance and Berkeley's subsequent criticisms of it. Mackie discusses the difference between real essence and nominal essence. He argues that Locke should have equated substance with real essence and rejected the notion of substance as substratum. Mackie also argues that Locke invokes a theory of the use of language that anticipates the theory of natural kinds put forward by Kripke.

J. L. Mackie; XIII—The Possibility of Innate Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 245–260, https://doi.org.