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  1. Evidence of evidence and testimonial reductionism.William D. Rowley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):377-391.
    An objection to reductionism in the epistemology of testimony that is often repeated but rarely defended in detail is that there is not enough positive evidence to provide the non-testimonial, positive reasons reductionism requires. Thus, on pain of testimonial skepticism, reductionism must be rejected. Call this argument the ‘Not Enough Evidence Objection’. I will defend reductionism about testimonial evidence against the NEEO by arguing that we typically have non-testimonial positive reasons in the form of evidence about our testifier's evidence. With (...)
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  • Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.
  • Testimony and intellectual autonomy.C. A. J. Coady - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):355-372.
    Recent epistemology has been notable for an emphasis, or a variety of emphases, upon the social dimension of knowledge. This has provided a corrective to the heavily individualist account of knowledge previously holding sway. It acknowledges the ways in which an individual is deeply indebted to the testimony of others for his or her cognitive endowments, both with respect to capacities and information. But the dominance of the individualist model was connected with a concern for the value of cognitive autonomy. (...)
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  • Rational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of Fundamentalist Beliefs.Michael Baurmann - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):150-166.
    Abstract The article sketches a theoretical model which explains how it is possible that fundamentalist beliefs can emerge as a result of an individual rational adaptation to the context of special living conditions. The model is based on the insight that most of our knowledge is acquired by trusting the testimony of some kind of authority. If a social group is characterized by a high degree of mistrust towards the outer society or other groups, then the members of this group (...)
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