La obra compuesta de dos (2) partes, permite conocer acerca de los avances de la linguística contemporánea, en diversos aspectos de investigación sobre la mente humana, en que medida la mente y el le nguaje se cosideran fenómenos naturales, profundización en lo supuestos e implicaciones del programa minimalista y temas relacionados.

Within post - Kuhnian, philosophy of science, much effort has been devoted to issues related to conceptual change, such as incommensurability, scientific progress and realism, but mostly in terms of reference, without a fine - grained theory of scientific concepts/senses. Within the philosophy of language and of mind tradition, there is a large body of work on concepts, but the application to scientific concepts has been very tentative. The aim of this paper is to propose a general framework for a (...) theory for the individuation of scientific concepts. The general view about the individuation of concepts favored here is the possession - condition approach: to individuate a concept is to identify its possession conditions. The general metascientific tools for the analysis of scientific theories are model - theoretic, more specifically, structuralist: scientific theories, the entities to which scientifc concepts belong, are model - theoretic theory - nets. The general idea about the content of scientific concepts that inspires this proposal comes from: (i) our grandfathers’ "laws - plus - correspondence rules", (ii) Kuhns "laws applied to exemplars" views and (iii) moderate operationalism. The aim is to show that some clarification can be gained applying the possesion condition appproach to (an expansion of) these three elements using structuralist metascientific tools. First, I briefly present the two main structuralist ideas I shall use: the difference between observability and non - theoreticity, and the notion of theory - net. Second, I informally introduce the five components that come from my reading of the three traditional elements; these components are, or are not, plausible independently of how they will be integrated within a theory of concept - identity. Third, I present the kore of the theory of possession conditions for concept - identity that we shall use for the integration of such components. Finally, I propose the general traits of the possession condition that corresponds to each of these five components, I present some problems and point out some possible ways of dealing with them. (shrink)

Fundamentos de filosofía de la ciencia es una obra de carácter general destinada principalmente a servir de guía a alumnos y profesores en la ensañanza universitaria de esta disciplina, en especial para los estudios de Filosofía, pero también para los de Humanidades y Ciencias Humanas y Naturales. La obra está estructurada en diferentes niveles para facilitar su utilización como libro de texto, tanto en cursos introductorios generales como en seminarios específicos. Aunque el público universitario es su principal destinatario, se ha (...) concebido para que cualquier lector interesado en la disciplina y con determinados conocimientos previos pueda acceder, con provecho, a las diversas partes de la misma. Ha diferencia de la mayoría de introducciones a la Filosofía de la Ciencia, la orientación de esta obra no es histórica sino temática, cubriendo los diferentes ámbitos conceptuales de la disciplina. Su contenido, dado que su finalidad es presentar los fundamentos de la materia, se centra en los grandes temas clásicos de la disciplina. El núcleo temático lo conforma la triada "conceptos-leyes-teorías" en torno a cuyos componentes se presentan los restantes temas: contrastación de hipótesis, medición, explicación, relaciones interteóricas, el problema de la inducción y el cambio teórico. En tanto que introducción general de la disciplina, en esta obra no se pretende ninguna tesis metacientífica o metafilosófica sustantiva, sino exponer de forma clara los principales problemas filosóficos que plantea la actividad científica y discutir las diferentes aproximaciones a los mismos.. (shrink)

José A. Díez examines the reasons for claiming that models involve fictions. He opposes the claim that, in order to account for some key features of the practice of modeling in science, such as the existence of unsuccessful representations and also of successful yet inaccurate or idealized ones, it is necessary to accept fictional entities. In resisting such a view, he sketches an account of scientific modeling and argue that according to such account there is no need for strong (...) factionalism, only a weak, unproblematic fictionalist component is needed. (shrink)

En la actividad científica se pueden distinguir tres tipos principales de representación científica: proyectiva, subsuntiva y reductiva. Tras unas breves considcraciones introductorias, se presentan las características más destacadas de cada uno de estos tres tipos principales de representación científica y se abstrae a partir de ellas el esquema al que toda Teoría General de la Representación Científica (TGRC) se debe adecuar. A continuación se exponen las lineas generales de la principal propuesta presente en la literatura para desarrollar TGRC y se (...) hacen algunas consideraciones criticas. La conclusión provisional es que esta propuesta tiene, al menos por el momento, el problema de ser, o bien demasiado liberal, o bien demasiado conservadora. Por último, se propone un enfoque alternativo a explorar que pretende estar libre de los problemas deI anterior.We can distinguish three main types of representation in scientific practice: projective, subsuntive and reductive. After some brief introductory remarks, we present the more salient characteristics of these three main types of scientific representation and we abstract from them a scheme that any General Theory for Scientific Representation (GTSR) must fit. Then we offer the general traits of the main existing proposal for a GTSR and we make some criticisms. The provisional conclusion is that this proposal is, as it stands, either too liberal or too conservative. Finally, we propose to explore an alternative approach which intends to solve these difficulties. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the special issue of the Spanish journal Ágora-Papeles de Filosofía (31/2, 2012) devoted to new Ibero-American contributions to metatheoretical structuralism.

It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section (...) 2, first, I begin by briefly characterizing the relevant notion of inductivism that is at stake here; second, I present and discuss the main Popperian argument against it and show that in the only reading in which the argument is formally it is restricted to cases of predicted evidence, and that even if restricted in this way the argument is formally valid it is nevertheless materially unsound. In section 3, I analyze the desiderata that, according to Popper, any acceptable measure for evidential support must satisfy, I clean away its ad-hoc components and show that all the remaining desiderata are satisfied by inductuvist-in-strict-sense measures. In section 4 I demonstrate that two of these desiderata, accepted by Popper, imply that in cases of predicted evidence any measure that satisfies them is qualitatively indistinguishable from conditional probability. Finally I defend that this amounts to a kind of strong inductivism that enters into conflict with Popper’s anti-inductivist argument and declarations, and that this conflict does not depend on the incremental versus non-incremental distinction for evidential-support measures, making Popper’s position inconsistent in any reading.Keywords: Popper; Inductivism; Confirmation; Corroboration. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give one kind of internal proportional systems with general representation and without closure and finiteness assumptions. First, we introduce the notions of internal proportional system and of general representation. Second, we briefly review the existing results which motivate our generalization. Third, we present the new systems, characterized by the fact that the linear order induced by the comparison weak order ≥ at the level of equivalence classes is also a weIl order. We prove (...) the corresponding representation theorem and make some comments on strong limitations of uniqueness; we present in an informal way a positive result, restricted uniqueness for what we call connected objects. We conclude with some final remarks on the property that characterizes these systems and on three possible empirical applications. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give one kind of internal proportional systems with general representation and without closure and finiteness assumptions. First, we introduce the notions of internal proportional system and of general representation. Second, we briefly review the existing results which motivate our generalization. Third, we present the new systems, characterized by the fact that the linear order induced by the comparison weak order ≥ at the level of equivalence classes is also a weIl order. We prove (...) the corresponding representation theorem and make some comments on strong limitations of uniqueness; we present in an informal way a positive result, restricted uniqueness for what we call connected objects. We conclude with some final remarks on the property that characterizes these systems and on three possible empirical applications. (shrink)

In this book, two philosophers use their training in arguments and reasoning to uncover the role of ungrounded beliefs when we fall in love. They illustrate the fallacies of love by drawing on personal experiences, literary characters and two imaginary individuals, providing examples of ungrounded beliefs in Aesop's Fables, Cinderella and Don Giovanni amongst others to illustrate love as an inexhaustible source of misperceptions, misunderstandings and misconceptions.

En la actividad científica se pueden distinguir tres tipos principales de representación científica: proyectiva, subsuntiva y reductiva. Tras unas breves considcraciones introductorias, se presentan las características más destacadas de cada uno de estos tres tipos principales de representación científica y se abstrae a partir de ellas el esquema al que toda Teoría General de la Representación Científica (TGRC) se debe adecuar. A continuación se exponen las lineas generales de la principal propuesta presente en la literatura para desarrollar TGRC y se (...) hacen algunas consideraciones criticas. La conclusión provisional es que esta propuesta tiene, al menos por el momento, el problema de ser, o bien demasiado liberal, o bien demasiado conservadora. Por último, se propone un enfoque alternativo a explorar que pretende estar libre de los problemas deI anterior.We can distinguish three main types of representation in scientific practice: projective, subsuntive and reductive. After some brief introductory remarks, we present the more salient characteristics of these three main types of scientific representation and we abstract from them a scheme that any General Theory for Scientific Representation (GTSR) must fit. Then we offer the general traits of the main existing proposal for a GTSR and we make some criticisms. The provisional conclusion is that this proposal is, as it stands, either too liberal or too conservative. Finally, we propose to explore an alternative approach which intends to solve these difficulties. (shrink)

Una parte de la explicación del gran florecimiento en los EE. UU. de la filosofía analítica, particularmente la filosofía analítica del lenguaje, después de la segunda guerra mundial está sin duda en la amplitud de la comunidad de filósofos que un país grande en dimensiones permite. Pues conseguir un buen nivel de excelencia en la práctica de este modo de entender la filosofía requiere una amplia comunidad de colegas en que difundir y contrastar nuevas ideas. Conscientes de esto, los filósofos (...) analíticos continentales estamos embarcados en la tarea de ampliar recíprocamente nuestras comunidades, aprovechando el impulso del proyecto de mayor unión política europea. Aunque, a diferencia de lo que ocurría en EE. UU. en el tiempo a que nos hemos referido antes, existen importantes obstáculos culturales, hay buenas razones para ser optimistas. Existe claramente la voluntad, lo que ha permitido en la última década llevar a cabo con éxito proyectos tales como los de la European Society for Philosophy and Psychology y la European Society for Analytic Philosophy, así como establecer importantes lazos de conocimiento mutuo a través de pequeños seminarios bilaterales. Y existe también algo muy importante: el que los temas que más interesan a los filósofos del lenguaje continentales son muy próximos; algo que, aventuramos, lo explica parcialmente una formación que presta más atención a la tradición filosófica que la de nuestros colegas americanos. Estos temas incluyen típicamente la referencia, particularmente la referencia de expresiones indéxicas, así como cuestiones relativas a la objetividad, las condiciones de verdad, el realismo y el antirrealismo. (shrink)

Siebel's exposition of the Principle of Compositionality, the main argument against it and Fodor's reply and its virtues, is extremely clear, so I go direct to the problem. I'll make, first, some comments on ambiguity for I think that some aspects of the problem, and the persuasive part of Lahav's objections, have to do with it; then I'll focus on Siebel's worries about Fodor's reply, and I'll defend that an improved version of the Fodorian approach shows that such worries are (...) unsound. (shrink)

Can we dispense with mimesis in representation? Content Type Journal Article Category Essay Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9529-1 Authors José A. Díez, Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science/LOGOS Research Group, University of Barcelona, C/Montalegre, 6-8, 08001 Barcelona, Spain Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Diez, M.A. Discurso ... -- Urdaneta, A. Contestación ...

En este trabajo se asume: que una teoría factual es un sistema conceptual para representar parcelas deI mundo; que la principal manera de expresar tales sistemas es mediante el lenguaje; y que, consecuentemente, en la comparación de teorías rivales tienen importancia los factores de índole ontosemántica. Desde esa perspectiva se analizan dos problemas que surgen de la aceptación de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad, a saber: a) el de establecer las condiciones ontosemánticas que dan sentido a la comparabilidad de teorías (...) inconmensurables; y b) el de la consideración de un enfoque ontosemántico compatible con el hecho de que algunas modificaciones en una teoría no conlleven variación de significado y referencia, mientras otras sí.In this work it is assumed: that a factual theory is a conceptual system for representing patches of the world; that the principal way of expressing a system of that sort is by means of language; and that, consequently, factors of ontosemantic kind are important for the comparison between rival theories. Given this perspective, two problems, whieh come up from the acceptance of the incommensurability thesis are analyzed: a) to establish the ontosemantic conditions that give sense to the comparability of incommensurable theories; and b) to consider an ontosemantic picture compatible with the fact that some modifications in a theory are not followd by variance of meaning and reference, while other modifications are. (shrink)

En la actividad científica se pueden distinguir tres tipos principales de representación científica: proyectiva, subsuntiva y reductiva. Tras unas breves considcraciones introductorias, se presentan las características más destacadas de cada uno de estos tres tipos principales de representación científica y se abstrae a partir de ellas el esquema al que toda Teoría General de la Representación Científica se debe adecuar. A continuación se exponen las lineas generales de la principal propuesta presente en la literatura para desarrollar TGRC y se hacen (...) algunas consideraciones criticas. La conclusión provisional es que esta propuesta tiene, al menos por el momento, el problema de ser, o bien demasiado liberal, o bien demasiado conservadora. Por último, se propone un enfoque alternativo a explorar que pretende estar libre de los problemas deI anterior.We can distinguish three main types of representation in scientific practice: projective, subsuntive and reductive. After some brief introductory remarks, we present the more salient characteristics of these three main types of scientific representation and we abstract from them a scheme that any General Theory for Scientific Representation must fit. Then we offer the general traits of the main existing proposal for a GTSR and we make some criticisms. The provisional conclusion is that this proposal is, as it stands, either too liberal or too conservative. Finally, we propose to explore an alternative approach which intends to solve these difficulties. (shrink)