The subject of this study is the relation between dialectic and dialogue. First an attempt is made to delineate a universe of discourse 'communication'. Mutual acknowledgement as a subject ('intersubjectivity') is proposed as a distinctive characteristic of the concept of dialogue, and a distinction is made between several classes of dialogue (see the diagram). Then the concept of dialectic is examined. Special attention is paid to the question what is to be understood by the term 'modern dialectical thinking' (from Fichte (...) onwards). Because it seems impossible to describe dialectic as a method in a methodical way, or to find some one characteristic common to such divergent dialectical philosophies as those of Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Marxism-Leninism and various forms of Neo-Marxism (L. Goldmann, Th. Adorno, E. Bloch), the proposal is made to stipulate that the terms dialectic, dialectical method and dialectical thinking in the modern sense should only be used when negation and/or contrast (in a specific sense, peculiar to the thinkers mentioned) characterize a mode of thinking in a more or less systematic way. After these preliminaries the relation between dialogue and dialectic is examined as it presents itself from an historical point of view. As regards Plato, it is contended that his dialektikê technê neither constitutes a dialogal philosophy, nor a dialogic (theory of the dialogue). His 'dialogues' rather are an instance of the 'literary dialogue' (with agogic intentions). Hegel's way of thinking is characterized as monological and speculative. Though his conception of thought as a process, as well historical as collective, does not logically exclude a dialogue, his attitude towards it seems to be rather cool (or at least ambiguous). With Marx the concept of the class struggle enters the dialectic and this concept is essentially inimical to the concept of the dialogue as a peaceful means of solving conflicts. In Marxism-Leninism the distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions (necessitated by the universalization of the dialectic by Engels and the Russian pretension of having founded the socialist state) implies the view that only in socialist and communist societies fundamental contradictions are absent and that consequently only within these societies there is no need for non-peaceful means of solving conflicts. In the thought of Th. Adorno, M. Horkheimer and H. Marcuse there seems to be no room for a dialogue, as a consequence of the Utopian implications of their concept of negation. Only in J. Habermas we meet with a positive attitude towards the (social-practical) dialogue. For him the dialogue even is 'the normative foundation' of his 'critical theory' of society. Dialectic is seen by him as a consequence of a repression of the dialogue (and so the dialogue as an antidote against the dialectic of ‘Verdinglichung’). The main conclusion drawn from this historical survey is that, as far as modern dialectical thinking is concerned, dialectic exhibits an antithetic relation towards the concept of dialogue generally, and more specifically towards the 'social-practical dialogue'. With all these thinkers a positive attitude towards dialectical thinking de facto implies a negative evaluation of the dialogue (or at least coolness towards it), or conversely (Habermas). Finally the author presents some considerations of a more general nature: that dialectic and dialogue are not to be considered correlative concepts, because contrasting opinion (not dialectic) is a sufficient condition for the dialogue; that the startingpoint for a social-practical dialogue may be found in the concept of 'problematic situations related to generally accepted ends' (such as e.g. well-being); that the socialpractical dialogue is directed at a consensus indeed, at least directly, but that this does not prevent it from being directed indirectly at the truth; that the concept of synthesis constitutes the normative foundation of the dialogue, because the ideal consensus consists in a synthesis of contrasting points of view. (shrink)

After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism (...) and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After a short interlude in which the conceptions of justice of Marx and Rawls are compared (IB) the author presents some considerations of a critical nature as regards the principles of justice (IC). The distinction between the general and the special conception of justice hinges on the lixical priority of freedom. Now, a contradiction seems to emerge between the fact that the choice in favor of the special conception is an absolute one, valid for all societies regardless of time and place, and the fact that the general conception is sometimes presented as a first phase in the evolution of a well-ordered society (sect.82). This is an indication that in Rawl's theory the priority of freedom is not as absolute as he thinks it to be. The decisive point in this respect seems to be the fact that the „fair value of liberty” (Sect. 36) would demand that a subsistence minimum is lexically prior to freedom. These seem to be serious inconsistencies for which nnno remedy can be found and which are apt to lead us back to „instuitionism” The author considers next (and this is his main point) the logical structure of Rawls's contract theory, which in his opinion stands in urgent need of clarification. It is argued that the concept of contract as such implies a certain indifference or indeterminateness as regards its result. At the other hand, the result (that which is agreed upon, i.e. the principles of justice) is ex hypothesi considered to explain „our considered judgements” in reflective equilibrium. In this way it appears that Rawl's central idea (rather implicitly) is : there exists a consensus as regards our considered judgements concerning justice and this consensus may be explained as resulting from a (hypothetical) contract. So the argument really is of a hypothetico-deductive nature and it would have been much better if Rawls had been clear about it himself. Some critical considerations follow. First attention is paid to the fact that strict observance is an essential element of the concept of contract and that from this point of view the three psychological laws (chapt. VIII) are of crucial importance to the theory. Their nature, however, is not altogether clear. They are neither empirical laws (because they presuppose a just institutional structure and a just society is said not to exist), nor are they a priori ones. So it is only left for us to say that they are construed as empirical laws. Now, the difficulty for Rawls with this must be that reliance on such laws is inconsistent with the rationality of the parties in the original position, because as a matter of fact these laws have not been tested empirically (the fact that they can not be tested in this way makes no difference at all). Secondly it is asked whether we are dealing with a contract doctrine at all. Starting from the question, whether in this theory the notion of contract (intended to explain our considered judgements as givens) really is an ultimate explanatory concept, it is argued that there are some anthropological presuppositions, which rather point in the direction of a theory of self-realization. This seems to be confirmed by some other features of the theory, e. g. the Aristotelian principle, the Kantian interpretation, the concept of natural rights, and society as a social union of social unions. In conclusion, neither Rawls's principles of justice nor his contract theory are sufficiently consistent to escape the need of reconsideration. (shrink)

The author argues that there is a sharp contrast between Plato's earlier teleological explanation of nature and his later conception. In the Phaedo Anaxagoras' νοṽς as a teleological principle is rejected, the forms taking its place, in the Philebus the existence of a νοṽς explaining order and finality in nature, is strictly demonstrated. After that nature and consequences of this new doctrine are briefly discussed : the ineffable character of the transcendent cause of the world ; the reduction of the (...) number of the Forms to those of substances in nature ; the causality of νοṽς as an immanent and intermediate one ; the foundation of a mathematical science of nature. Thirdly the author makes an effort to reconstruct the philosophical grounds of this development, starting from the three theses, on which the argumentation of the Philebus is based. 1) νοṽς can only exist in a soul. It is argued that the dynamic conception of soul in the Phaedrus logically leads to the conclusion, that νοṽς also is movement . 2) To explain cosmic order and finality a νοṽς has to be accepted. This new idea occurs for the first time in the Sophistes and in the myth of the Politicus. 3) Cosmic order has a mathematical and astronomical character. This aspect is absent before the Philebus and seems to have been a consequence of Plato's discovery of the regularity in the planitary motions . Finally the author thinks he can indicate in the Sophistes the turning-point in the theory of Forms, as a result of the extension of the notion of being. (shrink)

The contributions to this special collection concern issues and problems discussed in or related to the work of Wesley C. Salmon. Salmon has long been noted for his important work in the philosophy of science, which has included research on the interpretation of probability, the nature of explanation, the character of reasoning, the justification of induction, the structure of space/time and the paradoxes of Zeno, to mention only some of the most prominent. During a time of increasing preoccupation with historical (...) and sociological approaches to under standing science (which characterize scientific developments as though they could be adequately analysed from the perspective of political movements, even mistaking the phenomena of conversion for the rational appraisal of scientific theories), Salmon has remained stead fastly devoted to isolating and justifying those normative standards distinguishing science from non-science - especially through the vindi cation of general principles of scientific procedure and the validation of specific examples of scientific theories - without which science itself cannot be (even remotely) adequately understood. In this respect, Salmon exemplifies and strengthens a splendid tradi tion whose most remarkable representatives include Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap and Carl G. Hempel, all of whom exerted a profound influence upon his own development. (shrink)

This collection of essays is the definitive version of a widely discussed debate over the origins of the New Theory of Reference. In new articles, written especially for this volume, Quentin Smith and Scott Soames, the original participants in the debate, elaborate their positions on who was responsible for the ideas that Saul Kripke presented in his Naming and Necessity. They are joined by John Burgess, who weighs in on the side of Soames, while Smith adds a further dimension in (...) discussing the contributions of philosophers such as Follesdal, Geach, Hintikka, and Plantinga. Also included are lengthy excerpts from Follesdal's 1961 Harvard dissertation and a careful examination by Sten Lindstrom of the respective contributions of Kripke and Stig Kanger to the development of modal semantics. The collection will be essential reading for anyone acquainted with these influential ideas. (shrink)

This additional volume offers a revised edition of Lingua , Erasmus’ work on language, its possibilities and the dangers in its use, ending in a praise of the Word of God. Since it deals with the moral implications of language, Erasmus placed it in Ordo IV that comprises works on moral issues.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In many theories in contemporary philosophy of mind, attention is constitutively linked to phenomenal consciousness. Ned Block has recently argued that ‘identity crowding’ provides an example of subjects consciously seeing something to which they are unable to attend. Here I examine the reasons that Block gives for thinking that this is a case of a consciously perceived item that we are unable to attend to, and I offer a different interpretation.

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By the death, last summer, of Jack Robson, the world of utilitarian studies and a wider world of scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic lost one of their most distinguished figures. It would not be appropriate here, even if it were possible now, to attempt a full and measured assessment of his work. Writing only a few months after the news of his death, while the sense of loss is still so sharp for all his many friends, two things (...) are possible. Something can and should be said to acknowledge and celebrate Robson's achievement as a scholar; and to this can be added some personal recollections of one whose human qualities were as outstanding as his scholarship. (shrink)