LetTbe a recursive theory in the language of first order Arithmetic. We prove that ifTextends: (a) the scheme of parameter free Δ1-minimization (plusexp). or (b) the scheme of parameter free Π1-induction, then there are no Σ1-maximal models with respect toT. As a consequence, we obtain a new proof of an unpublished theorem of Jeff Paris stating that Σ1-maximal models with respect toIΔ0+expdo not satisfy the scheme of Σ1-collectionBΣ1.

By a result of L.D. Beklemishev, the hierarchy of nested applications of the $$\Sigma _1$$ -collection rule over any $$\Pi _2$$ -axiomatizable base theory extending Elementary Arithmetic collapses to its first level. We prove that this result cannot in general be extended to base theories of arbitrary quantifier complexity. In fact, given any recursively enumerable set of true $$\Pi _2$$ -sentences, S, we construct a sound $$(\Sigma _2 \! \vee \! \Pi _2)$$ -axiomatized theory T extending S such that the (...) hierarchy of nested applications of the $$\Sigma _1$$ -collection rule over T is proper. Our construction uses some results on subrecursive degree theory obtained by L. Kristiansen. (shrink)

By a theorem of R. Kaye, J. Paris and C. Dimitracopoulos, the class of the Πn+1-sentences true in the standard model is the only consistent Πn+1-theory which extends the scheme of induction for parameter free Πn+1-formulas. Motivated by this result, we present a systematic study of extensions of bounded quantifier complexity of fragments of first-order Peano Arithmetic. Here, we improve that result and show that this property describes a general phenomenon valid for parameter free schemes. As a consequence, we obtain (...) results on the quantifier complexity, finite axiomatizability and relative strength of schemes for Δn+1-formulas. (shrink)

A well known theorem proved by J. Paris and H. Friedman states that BΣn +1 is a Πn +2-conservative extension of IΣn . In this paper, as a continuation of our previous work on collection schemes for Δn +1-formulas , we study a general version of this theorem and characterize theories T such that T + BΣn +1 is a Πn +2-conservative extension of T . We prove that this conservativeness property is equivalent to a model-theoretic property relating Πn-envelopes and (...) Πn-indicators for T . The analysis of Σn +1-collection we develop here is also applied to Σn +1-induction using Parsons' conservativeness theorem instead of Friedman-Paris' theorem.As a corollary, our work provides new model-theoretic proofs of two theorems of R. Kaye, J. Paris and C. Dimitracopoulos : BΣn +1 and IΣn +1 are Σn +3-conservative extensions of their parameter free versions, BΣ–n +1 and IΣ–n +1. (shrink)

We study the quantifier complexity and the relative strength of some fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by induction and minimization schemes for Δn+1 formulas.

We study the quantifier complexity and the relative strength of some fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by induction and minimization schemes for Δn+1 formulas.

Metagenomics bears upon all aspects of microbiology, including our understanding of mitochondrial and eukaryote origin. Recently, ribosomal protein phylogenies show the eukaryote host lineage – the archaeal lineage that acquired the mitochondrion – to branch within the archaea. Metagenomic studies are now uncovering new archaeal lineages that branch more closely to the host than any cultivated archaea do. But how do they grow? Carbon and energy metabolism as pieced together from metagenome assemblies of these new archaeal lineages, such as the (...) Deep Sea Archaeal Group (including Lokiarchaeota) and Bathyarchaeota, do not match the physiology of any cultivated microbes. Understanding how these new lineages live in their environment is important, and might hold clues about how mitochondria arose and how the eukaryotic lineage got started. Here we look at these exciting new metagenomic studies, what they say about archaeal physiology in modern environments, how they impact views on host‐mitochondrion physiological interactions at eukaryote origin. (shrink)

This work aims to rescue, transcribe and create new artistic and cultural expressions through the use of native peoples’ historical visual recordings, integrating intelligent technologies. For this purpose, a Chilean native peoples’ digital repository is collected, in order to apply a Digital Humanities-based methodology. From the chosen material, portraits are selected, recoloured through a AI-based model; the facial mesh is constructed using a facial landmark detector; the points of the mesh are reconstructed by a Delaunay triangulation; to finally apply an (...) additive manufacturing process. Thus, these physical pieces allow to compare the native people’s own physiognomies, creating new cultural expressions. (shrink)

Emotion evaluations are assumed to play a crucial role in the emotion regulation process. We tested a postulate from our framework of emotion dysregulation (Nowak, U., Wittkamp, M. F., Clamor, A., & Lincoln, T. M. [2021]. Using the Ball-in-Bowl metaphor to outline an integrative framework for understanding dysregulated emotion. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 12, 118), namely that the extent to which individuals evaluate an emotion as harmful and their personal resources to modify and accept/tolerate the emotion as sufficient predict the subsequent (...) use of regulation strategies. Participants (n = 118) from a community sample took part in an experience-sampling assessment over 7 days including 10 daily paired measurements. The first measured momentary affective valence and arousal along with harmfulness evaluations and evaluations of personal resources to modify and accept/tolerate an emotion. The second followed three minutes later and measured emotion regulation strategies. The more harmful individuals evaluated an emotion, the more likely they were to use an emotion regulation strategy. The more harmful individuals evaluated an emotion, and the less sufficient they evaluated their personal resources to accept/tolerate an emotion, the more likely they were to use a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy. We conclude that emotions that people evaluate as harmful or difficult to accept are most likely to be regulated in a maladaptive manner. This implies that modifying beliefs about emotions could represent a promising treatment approach. (shrink)

Determinism which denies freedom of action is a common philosophical view. Is the action of such determinists incompatible with Kant’s claim that a rationally willed being “cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom” [G 4, 448]? In my paper, I examine Kant’s argument for this claim at the beginning of the Third Section of the Groundwork and argue that it amounts to the assertion that one cannot act while being aware of being guided by invalid principles. Belief in (...) determinism does not necessarily amount to such awareness. A structurally similar argument based on the contrast between deliberation and prediction is examined and similarly found wanting. (shrink)

La psicología contemporánea parece caracterizarse desde sus propios orígenes por la multiplicidad de sus contenidos, además de por su casi infinita fragmentación en corrientes encontradas. Esto crea importantes dificultades, no sólo a quienes quieran tener una primera aproximación, sino también a los especialistas, que muchas veces no llegan a una opinión suficientemente clara sobre la naturaleza epistemológica de la psicología, ni sobre su unidad disciplinar. Esta obra, sin descuidar el problema global, se centra en un aspecto particular: el que presenta (...) la praxis de la psicología, en particular la psicoterapia y sus fundamentos teóricos. Se pone especial interés en una visión crítica del psicoanálisis, punto de referencia inevitable (positivo o negativo) para la mayoría de las corrientes de psicoterapia. Pero este intento de esclarecimiento epistemológico y práctico se lleva a cabo desde un punto de vista original: a la luz del pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274), conocido como uno de los más grandes teólogos y filósofos de la Iglesia Católica. Las calidades del Aquinate como epistemológico son sobradamente conocidas. Menos conocida es su faceta de psicólogo, que esta obra quiere poner de manifiesto con gran detalle para evidenciar la actualidad de las líneas maestras de la psicología de Santo Tomás, como también la posibilidad de practicar hoy la psicología bajo la guía fundamental del Doctor Humanitatis.\n. (shrink)

In the target article, Juslin & Vll (J&V) contend that neural mechanisms not unique to music are critical to its capability to convey emotion. The work reviewed here provides a broader context for this proposal. Human abilities to signal emotion through sound could have been essential to human evolution, and may have contributed vital foundations for music. Future learning experiments are needed to further clarify engagement underlying musical and broader emotional signaling.

En su artículo “On Knowing One’s Own Mind” (1988), Shoemaker argumenta en favor de tres afirmaciones: (1) se requiere un autoconocimiento directo (self-acquaintance) para la cooperación racional con otras personas (porque ésta depende de que podamos decirles qué es lo que creemos e intentamos hacer); (2) el autoconocimiento directo es necesario para la deliberación sobre qué creer y qué hacer (porque no podemos ajustar racionalmente creencias y deseos sin saber qué creencias y deseos tenemos); y (3) el autoconocimiento directo es (...) una consecuencia inmediata de nuestra capacidad para reconocer el carácter paradójico de oraciones que ejemplifican la paradoja de Moore. En este capítulo trato de mostrar que las afirmaciones (1) y (2) no son correctas; la cooperación se puede llevar acabo comunicándonos exclusivamente sobre (supuestos) hechos y acciones y el ajuste racional de creencias normalmente sucede de una manera automática a un nivel de primer orden. Sin embargo, la afirmación (3) indica una relación interesante entre nuestras capacidades conceptuales y lingüísticas, por un lado, y, por el otro, nuestra capacidad de “contestar la pregunta de si creo que p poniendo en marcha el proceso (cualquiera que éste sea) mediante el cual respondo a la pregunta de si p” (Evans, 1982: 225). (shrink)

Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...) theories of self-knowledge, neatly encapsulated in Byrne’s epistemic rule (BEL): If p, believe that you believe that p (Byrne 2005). In this paper, I examine an objection to Carruthers’s theory in order to see whether it opens up space for a transparency theory of self-knowledge: Is it not the case that in order to interpret someone I have to have some direct access to what I believe (cf. Friedman and Petrashek 2009)? (shrink)

Four different notions of freedom can be distinguished in Kant's philosophy: logical freedom, practical freedom, transcendental freedom and freedom of choice ("Willkür"). The most important of these is transcendental freedom. Kant's argument for its existence depend on the claim that, necessarily, the categorical imperative is the highest principle of reason. My paper examines how this claim can be made plausible.

What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view (...) attributed to Moran. I rebut the charge of circularity, but also reject the theory as an adequate interpretation of Moran. (shrink)

The question concerning the meaning of life is important, but it immediately confronts the present authors with insurmountable obstacles from a philosophical standpoint, as it would require us to define not only what we hold to be life, but what we hold to be meaning in addition, requiring us to do both in a properly researched context. We unconditionally surrender to that challenge. Instead, we offer a vernacular, armchair approach to life’s origin and meaning, with some layman’s thoughts on the (...) meaning of origins as viewed from the biologist’s standpoint. One can observe that biologists generally approach the concept of biological meaning in the context of evolution. This is the basis for the broad resonance behind Dobzhansky’s appraisal that “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”. Biologists try to understand living things in the historical context of how they arose, without giving much thought to the definition of what life or living things are, which for a biologist is usually not an interesting question in the practical context of daily dealings with organisms. Do humans generally understand life’s meaning in the context of history? If we consider the problem of life’s origin, the question of what constitutes a living thing becomes somewhat more acute for the biologist, though not more answerable, because it is inescapable that there was a time when there were no organisms on Earth, followed by a time when there were, the latter time having persisted in continuity to the present. This raises the question of where, in that transition, chemicals on Earth became alive, requiring, in turn, a set of premises for how life arose in order to conceptualize the problem in relation to organisms we know today, including ourselves, which brings us to the point of this paper: In the same way that cultural narratives for origins always start with a setting, scientific narratives for origins also always start with a setting, a place on Earth or elsewhere where we can imagine what happened for the sake of structuring both the problem and the narrative for its solution. This raises the question of whether scientific origins settings convey meaning to humans in that they suggest to us from what kind of place and what kinds of chemicals we are descended, that is, to which inanimate things we are most closely related. (shrink)

En el primer libro de su Ética Nicomaquea, Aristóteles hace dos intentos por establecer la tesis de que ser un ser humano tiene un punto, usando dos conjuntos paralelos de ejemplos. Su primer paso es sostener que siempre que algo tiene una actividad característica esa actividad es su fin, usando el ejemplo del “flautista, el escultor y, en general, cualquier artesano”. Esta identificación de la actividad característica de un artesano con la ubicación de su “bien y lo bueno” qua artesano (...) y, por ello, presumiblemente con el télos del artesano, podría ser cuestionada, por supuesto, pero esto no afecta el curso de los argumentos y el uso de los ejemplos que quiero perseguir. Es suficiente que, para ciertos roles dados, pueda haber una relación teleológica con algún punto para aquel rol. (shrink)

In "Individuals", Peter Strawson talks about identifying, discriminating and picking out particular objects, regarding discriminating and picking out as ways of identifying. I object that, strictly speaking, identification means to say of two things that they are the same. In contrast, discriminating an object from all others can be done by just ascribing some predicate to it that does not apply to the others. Picking out an object does not even seem to require to distinguish it from all others. The (...) object picked is distinct in that it is the picked one, but it is not clear - even in the context of sensorily picking out - that I have to be aware of this in order to do the picking. (shrink)

The ninth and last poem in Book 4 of the Silvae is an amusing hendecasyllabic piece in which Statius, addressing Plotius Grypus, reproves him for having sent him for the Saturnalia a tatty, second-hand copy of a boring book in return for the fine, expensive, new volume which was Statius' present to him. The poem includes a long list of humble and/or poor-quality items, any of which, it is suggested, would have been more acceptable than Grypus' gift. Included in the (...) list are eggs. (shrink)

The ninth and last poem in Book 4 of the Silvae is an amusing hendecasyllabic piece in which Statius, addressing Plotius Grypus, reproves him for having sent him for the Saturnalia a tatty, second-hand copy of a boring book in return for the fine, expensive, new volume which was Statius' present to him. The poem includes a long list of humble and/or poor-quality items, any of which, it is suggested, would have been more acceptable than Grypus' gift. Included in the (...) list are eggs. (shrink)

¿Qué relación existe entre la autoridad de la primera persona y el conocimiento de las propias acciones? Una posibilidad es que gracias al conocimiento de las razones que tenemos para actuar sabemos qué es lo que hacemos y, análogamente, gracias al conocimiento de las razones que tenemos para admitir [avow] una creencia sabemos qué es lo que creemos. Carlos Moya atribuye una teoría de este tipo a Richard Moran y la critica por ser circular. En este trabajo examino la teoría (...) atribuida a Moran, refuto la idea de circularidad, pero también rechazo la teoría como una interpretación adecuada de Moran. (shrink)