Autor przedstawia krytyczną analizę pewnych idei nominalistycznej teorii N. Goodmana w interpretacji R. Eberlego. Teoria ta, czyli „rachunek indywiduów", oparta jest na trzech podstawowych pojęciach, zasadzie sumowania, relacji „część-całość" i zasadzie indywidualizacji. Owe pojęcia wzięte razem charakteryzują przedmioty, które chcemy zaliczyć do indywiduów, przy czym charakterystyka ta określa raczej czym jest pewien zespół indywiduów, niż to czym jest pojedyncze indywiduum. Według Eberlego na specjalną uwagę zasługują tzw. atomistyczne uniwersa indywiduów. Definicja takich uniwersów ma stanowić właśnie określenie tego, czym są indywidua. (...) W ogólności „atomistyczne uniwersum indywiduów" to podzbiór pola relacji „część-całość", w którym są spełnione odpowiednie warunki dotyczące sumowania i indywidualizacji przedmiotów. Pojęcie to autor wiąże z atomizmem logicznym B. Russella oraz rozważa jego możliwe zastosowania. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE On the Rhetorical Point of View. Why rhetoric declined, and what remained of it. Once upon a time rhetoric was a vast and influential branch of ...

Most discussions of the reproducibility crisis focus on its epistemic aspect: the fact that the scientific community fails to follow some norms of scientific investigation, which leads to high rates of irreproducibility via a high rate of false positive findings. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there is a heretofore underappreciated and understudied dimension to the reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience that may prove to be at least as important as the epistemic dimension. This is (...) the communication dimension. The link between communication and reproducibility is immediate: independent investigators would not be able to recreate an experiment whose design or implementation were inadequately described. I exploit evidence of a replicability and reproducibility crisis in computational science, as well as research into quality of reporting to support the claim that a widespread failure to adhere to reporting standards, especially the norm of descriptive completeness, is an important contributing factor in the current reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów and Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. The author defends the thesis that it is justified to refer to Blaustein’s philosophy not as phenomenology sensu stricto, but as a phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology related but not equivalent to the project expounded by Husserl in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen as well as in his project of phenomenological (...) psychology. The article traces Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, putting it in the historical context of the discussion with Ingarden. Next, the author juxtaposes Blaustein’s understanding of psychology with Husserl’s project of 1925, which makes it possible to identify not only the differences between the two projects, but also their similarities. The article also raises questions about the scope of descriptive-psychological analyses. (shrink)

The basic part of the article is devoted to the nature and the modalities of use of eponyms, whereby terminological problems are also touched upon – preferably against the background of a contrastive analysis, which is also only implicit. In this context, a consistent differentiation is made between eponyms and deonyms in order to accommodate the disambiguation needs of the former in German. The use of deonyms will be exemplified primarily on the basis of scientific and culinary terminology, where deonyms (...) (in part) perform different functions in each case. (shrink)

We argue that Yarkoni's proposed solutions to the generalizability crisis are half-measures because he does not recognize that the crisis arises from investigators' underappreciation of the roles of theory in experimental research. Rather than embracing qualitative analysis, the research community should make an effort to develop better theories and work toward consistently incorporating theoretical results into experimental practice.

Since Leibniz, the logic of norms is founded on the analogy between the deontic and the alethic. Nevertheless, von Wright, creator of the deontic logic -firstly logic of norms, afterwards logic of normative statements-, holds this analogy responsible for the misadventures of the deontic logic. Now it is not responsible, but only limited so that the miscarriages in question are imputable solely to the overstepping of its limits.

Cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science: The article presents cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science, under which studies on embodied cognition and various forms of situated cognition are conducted. At the same time, the basic heuristic of cognitive ecology and its relationship to methodological individualism are identified. The paper includes the history of the concept of “cognitive ecology”, historical approaches preceding this research tradition, as well as an outline of contemporary research related to it. (...) At the end of the article, the role of the ecological heuristic is summarized. (shrink)

The aim of the article is a review of the wide spectrum of lobbying formulations and definitions to answer questions regarding the areas of lobbying activity. The author argues that lobbying is a wide scope of activities that lobbyists undertake according to their expectations and preferences. Ethical reflections on lobbying activity should then take into consideration the conditions in which the main players on the democratic political scene interact with each other.

The article addresses the popular reading of Ingarden that his aesthetic theory is determined by ontology. This reading seems to suggest that, firstly, aesthetics lacks its autonomy, and, secondly, the subject of aesthetic experience is reproductive, and passive. The author focuses on Ingarden’s aesthetics formulated by him in the period of 1925–1944. Moreover, the study presents selected elements of Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience, and by doing so, the author aims at showing how Ingarden’s aesthetics was reconsidered by Blaustein, a (...) student of Ingarden, whose theory seems to lead one beyond the scope of ontology. Blaustein, namely, reconsiders Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects by interpreting it in a descriptive-psychological, or phenomenological fashion. The article is divided into four parts. In section 1, the author highlights historical interconnections between Ingarden, and Blaustein. Section 2.1. is devoted to Ingarden’s phenomenological approach towards aesthetic experience as a phasic structure. At this basis, in section 2.2., Ingarden’s early theory of intentional objects is to be discussed. Section 3 concerns Blaustein’s contribution to phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Given that Blaustein formulates his theory in discussion with Ingarden, section 3.1. is devoted to Blaustein’s critical assessment of Ingarden’s method, and aesthetics. Next, in section 3.2., the author presents Blaustein’s original theory of presentations, and its use in aesthetics. Finally, in section 4, the author lists similarities, and differences between Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s aesthetic theories. (shrink)