The foundation of the mathematical theory of probabilities is still a controversial subject. There are schools of insufficient reasoning and of cogent reasoning, of a priori determination and of frequency determination, of subjective and of objective probability. Two main difficulties exist. The first is the definition of equally like events. The second difficulty is the relation between the laws of causal natural science and the laws of statistical regularity. Is it really necessary to add to the laws of mechanics one (...) or more independent “laws of large numbers” to explain the regularities in dice throwing? In all these cases different answers exist, and the existence of a mathematical theory of probabilities remains a kind of miracle, as esoteric to the further domain of natural science as the resurrection of the dead. (shrink)

On creating a grammar for living together The article is about the question whether it is possible for South Africans to learn a new common moral language. Six well-known positions are considered: a common political language, a common economic language, a common Biblical language, a common Christian language, a common language of survival, and a common rational language.

Does South Africa need a common moral language? Many people are of the opinion that South Africa finds itself 'after Babel’ and needs a common moral language (1). The author considers some of the arguments of people who disagree with this analysis, because they do not define the problem in this way (2); because they find the language- or Babel-methaphor confusing (3); because they agree with the description of the problem, but not with the suggested solution, namely a common moral (...) language (4); or because they accept the solution, but do not regard it as the proper task of the Christian church to be involved in this search for a common moral language (5). (shrink)

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding, and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. (...) The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated the relationship between subjective experience and attentional lapses during sustained attention. These experiments employed two measures of subjective experience to examine how differences in awareness correspond to variations in both task performance and psycho-physiological measures . This series of experiments examine these phenomena during the Sustained Attention to Response Task . The results suggest we can dissociate between two components of subjective experience during sustained attention: task unrelated thought which corresponds to an absent minded disengagement from the (...) task and a pre-occupation with one's task performance that seems to be best conceptualised as a strategic attempt to deploy attentional resources in response to a perception of environmental demands which exceed ones ability to perform the task. The implications of these findings for our understanding of how awareness is maintained on task relevant material during periods of sustained attention are discussed. (shrink)