The proofs of some results of abstract algebraic logic, in particular of the transfer principle of Czelakowski, assume the existence of so-called natural extensions of a logic by a set of new variables. Various constructions of natural extensions, claimed to be equivalent, may be found in the literature. In particular, these include a syntactic construction due to Shoesmith and Smiley and a related construction due to Łoś and Suszko. However, it was recently observed by Cintula and Noguera that both of (...) these constructions fail in the sense that they do not necessarily yield a logic. Here we show that whenever the Łoś–Suszko construction yields a logic, so does the Shoesmith–Smiley construction, but not vice versa. We also describe the smallest and the largest conservative extension of a logic by a set of new variables and show that contrary to some previous claims in the literature, a logic of cardinality \ may have more than one conservative extension of cardinality \ by a set of new variables. In this connection we then correct a mistake in the formulation of a theorem of Dellunde and Jansana. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss pure variable inclusion logics, that is, logical systems where valid entailments require that the propositional variables occurring in the conclusion are included among those appearing in the premises, or vice versa. We study the subsystems of Classical Logic satisfying these requirements and assess the extent to which it is possible to characterise them by means of a single logical matrix. In addition, we semantically describe both of these companions to Classical Logic in (...) terms of appropriate matrix bundles and as semilattice-based logics, showing that the notion of consequence in these logics can be interpreted in terms of truth (or non-falsity) and meaningfulness (or meaninglessness) preservation. Finally, we use Płonka sums of matrices to investigate the pure variable inclusion companions of an arbitrary finitary logic. -/- . (shrink)

What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable through: (...) (1) genuinely finite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (2) no finite-valued but only an infinite-valued truthtabular semantics; (3) no truth-tabular semantics at all. Any of those logics, however, can in principle be characterized through non-truth-functional valuation semantics, at least as soon as their associated consequence relations respect the usual tarskian postulates. So, paradoxical as that might seem at first, it turns out that truth-functional logics may be adequately characterized by non-truth-functional semantics . Now, what feature of a given logic would guarantee it to dwell in class (1) or in class (2), irrespective of its circumstantial semantic characterization? (shrink)

We show that for an arbitrary logic being locally tabular is a strictly weaker property than being locally finite. We describe our hunt for a logic that allows us to separate the two properties, revealing weaker and weaker conditions under which they must coincide, and showing how they are intertwined. We single out several classes of logics where the two notions coincide, including logics that are determined by a finite set of finite matrices, selfextensional logics, algebraizable and equivalential logics. Furthermore, (...) we identify a closure property on models of a logic that, in the presence of local tabularity, is equivalent to local finiteness. (shrink)

This paper continues the investigation, started in Lávička and Noguera : 521–551, 2017), of infinitary propositional logics from the perspective of their algebraic completeness and filter extension properties in abstract algebraic logic. If follows from the Lindenbaum Lemma used in standard proofs of algebraic completeness that, in every finitary logic, intersection-prime theories form a basis of the closure system of all theories. In this article we consider the open problem of whether these properties can be transferred to lattices of filters (...) over arbitrary algebras of the logic. We show that in general the answer is negative, obtaining a richer hierarchy of pairwise different classes of infinitary logics that we separate with natural examples. As by-products we obtain a characterization of subdirect representation for arbitrary logics, develop a fruitful new notion of natural expansion, and contribute to the understanding of semilinear logics. (shrink)

We explore a relation we call 'anticipation' between formulas, where A anticipates B (according to some logic) just in case B is a consequence (according to that logic, presumed to support some distinguished implicational connective →) of the formula A → B. We are especially interested in the case in which the logic is intuitionistic (propositional) logic and are much concerned with an extension of that logic with a new connective, written as "a", governed by rules which guarantee that for (...) any formula B, aB is the (logically) strongest formula anticipating B. The investigation of this new logic, which we call ILa, will confront us on several occasions with some of the finer points in the theory of rules and with issues in the philosophy of logic arising from the proposed explication of the existence of a connective (with prescribed logical behaviour) in terms of the conservative extension of a favoured logic by the addition of such a connective. Other points of interest include the provision of a Kripke semantics with respect to which ILa is demonstrably sound, deployed to establish certain unprovability results as well as to forge connections with C. Rauszer's logic of dual intuitionistic negation and dual intuitionistic implication, and the isolation of two relations (between formulas), head-implication and head-linkage, which, though trivial in the setting of classical logic, are of considerable significance in the intuitionistic context. (shrink)

A notable early result of David Makinson establishes that every monotone modal logic can be extended to LI, LV, or LF, and every antitone logic can be extended to LN, LV, or LF, where LI, LN, LV, and LF are logics axiomatized, respectively, by the schemas □α↔α, □α↔¬α, □α↔⊤, and □α↔⊥. We investigate logics that are both monotone and antitone (hereafter amphitone). There are exactly three: LV, LF, and the minimum amphitone logic AM axiomatized by the schema □α→□β. These logics, (...) along with LI, LN, and a wider class of “extensional” logics, bear close affinities to classical propositional logic. Characterizing those affinities reveals differences among several accounts of equivalence between logics. Some results about amphitone logics do not carry over when logics are construed as consequence or generalized (“multiple-conclusion”) consequence relations on languages that may lack some or all of the nonmodal connectives. We close by discussing these divergences and conditions under which our results do carry over. (shrink)

We study a multiple-succedent sequent calculus with both of the structural rules Left Weakening and Left Contraction but neither of their counterparts on the right, for possible application to the treatment of multiplicative disjunction against the background of intuitionistic logic. We find that, as Hirokawa dramatically showed in a 1996 paper with respect to the rules for implication, the rules for this connective render derivable some new structural rules, even though, unlike the rules for implication, these rules are what we (...) call ipsilateral: applying such a rule does not make any formula change sides—from the left to the right of the sequent separator or vice versa. Some possibilities for a semantic characterization of the resulting logic are also explored. The paper concludes with three open questions. (shrink)

Accounts of logical independence which coincide when applied in the case of classical logic diverge elsewhere, raising the question of what a satisfactory all-purpose account of logical independence might look like. ‘All-purpose’ here means: working satisfactorily as applied across different logics, taken as consequence relations. Principal candidate characterizations of independence relative to a consequence relation are that there the consequence relation concerned is determined by only by classes of valuations providing for all possible truth-value combinations for the formulas whose independence (...) is at issue, and that the consequence relation ‘says’ nothing special about how those formulas are related that it does not say about arbitrary formulas. Each of these proposals returns counterintuitive verdicts in certain cases—the truth-value inspired approach classifying certain cases one would like to describe as involving failures of independence as being cases of independence, and the de Jongh approach counting some intuitively independent pairs of formulas as not being independent after all. In final section, a modification of the latter approach is tentatively sketched to correct for these misclassifications. The attention is on conceptual clarification throughout, rather than the provision of technical results. Proofs, as well as further elaborations, are lodged in the ‘longer notes’ in a final Appendix. (shrink)

The first part of the paper is a reminder of fundamental results connected with the adequacy problem for sentential logics with respect to matrix semantics. One of the main notions associated with the problem, namely that of the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, is elucidated by a couple of examples in the second part of the paper. E.g., it is shown that the minimal logic of Johansson and some of its extensions have degree of complexity 2. This is (...) the first example of an exact estimation of the degree of natural complex logics, i.e. logics whose deducibility relation cannot be represented by a single matrix. The remaining examples of complex logics are more artificial, having been constructed for the purpose of checking some theoretical possibilities. (shrink)

With each sentential logic C, identified with a structural consequence operation in a sentential language, the class Matr * (C) of factorial matrices which validate C is associated. The paper, which is a continuation of [2], concerns the connection between the purely syntactic property imposed on C, referred to as Maehara Interpolation Property (MIP), and three diagrammatic properties of the class Matr* (C): the Amalgamation Property (AP), the (deductive) Filter Extension Property (FEP) and Injections Transferable (IT). The main theorem of (...) the paper (Theorem 2.2) is analogous to the Wroski's result for equational classes of algebras [13]. It reads that for a large class of logics the conjunction of (AP) and (FEP) is equivalent to (IT) and that the latter property is equivalent to (MIP). (shrink)

The paper is conceived as a first study on the Suszko operator. The purpose of this paper is to indicate the existence of close relations holding between the properties of the Suszko operator and the structural properties of the model class for various sentential logics. The emphasis is put on generality both of the results and methods of tackling the problems that arise in the theory of this operator. The attempt is made here to develop the theory for non-protoalgebraic logics.

The main result of the present paper — Theorem 3 — establishes the equivalence of the interpolation and amalgamation properties for a large family of logics and their associated classes of matrices.

The present paper is thought as a formal study of distributive closure systems which arise in the domain of sentential logics. Special stress is laid on the notion of a C-filter, playing the role analogous to that of a congruence in universal algebra. A sentential logic C is called filter distributive if the lattice of C-filters in every algebra similar to the language of C is distributive. Theorem IV.2 in Section IV gives a method of axiomatization of those filter distributive (...) logics for which the class Matr (C) prime of C-prime matrices (models) is axiomatizable. In Section V, the attention is focused on axiomatic strengthenings of filter distributive logics. The theorems placed there may be regarded, to some extent, as the matrix counterparts of Baker's well-known theorem from universal algebra [9, § 62, Theorem 2]. (shrink)

Our goal is to develop a syntactical apparatus for propositional logics in which the accepted and rejected propositions have the same status and obeying treated in the same way. The suggested approach is based on the ideas of Łukasiewicz used for the classical logic and in addition, it includes the use of multiple conclusion rules. More precisely, a consequence relation is defined on a set of statements of forms “proposition _A_ is accepted” and “proposition _A_ is rejected”, where _A_ is (...) a proposition,—a unified consequence relation. Accordingly, the rules defining a unified consequence relation,—the unified rules, have statements as premises and as conclusions. A special attention is paid to the logics in which each proposition is either accepted or rejected. If we express this property via unified rules and add them to a unified deductive system, such a unified deductive system defines a reversible unified consequence: a statement “proposition _B_ is accepted” is derived from the statement “proposition _A_ is accepted” if and only if a statement “proposition _A_ is rejected” is derived from the statement “proposition _B_ is rejected”. (shrink)

Transfer theorems are central results in abstract algebraic logic that allow to generalize properties of the lattice of theories of a logic to any algebraic model and its lattice of filters. Their proofs sometimes require the existence of a natural extension of the logic to a bigger set of variables. Constructions of such extensions have been proposed in particular settings in the literature. In this paper we show that these constructions need not always work and propose a wider setting in (...) which they can still be used. (shrink)

The Fregean-inspired Principle of Compositionality of Meaning for formal languages asserts that the meaning of a compound expression is analysable in terms of the meaning of its constituents, taking into account the mode in which these constituents are combined so as to form the compound expression. From a logical point of view, this amounts to prescribing a constraint—that may or may not be respected—on the internal mechanisms that build and give meaning to a given formal system. Within the domain of (...) formal semantics and of the structure of logical derivations, the PoC is often directly reflected by metaproperties such as truth-functionality and analyticity, characteristic of computationally well-behaved logical systems. (shrink)

A logic \ is called self-extensional if it allows to replace occurrences of a formula by occurrences of an \-equivalent one in the context of claims about logical consequence and logical validity. It is known that no three-valued paraconsistent logic which has an implication can be self-extensional. In this paper we show that in contrast, the famous Dunn–Belnap four-valued logic has exactly one self-extensional four-valued extension which has an implication. We also investigate the main properties of this logic, determine the (...) expressive power of its language, and provide a cut-free Gentzen-type proof system for it. (shrink)

According to Suszko's Thesis,any multi-valued semantics for a logical system can be replaced by an equivalent bivalent one. Moreover: bivalent semantics for families of logics can frequently be developed in a modular way. On the other hand bivalent semantics usually lacks the crucial property of analycity, a property which is guaranteed for the semantics of multi-valued matrices. We show that one can get both modularity and analycity by using the semantic framework of multi-valued non-deterministic matrices. We further show that for (...) using this framework in a constructive way it is best to view "truth-values" as information carriers, or "information-values". (shrink)

We adjust the notion of finitary filter pair, which was coined for creating and analyzing finitary logics, in such a way that we can treat logics of cardinality $$\kappa $$, where $$\kappa $$ is a regular cardinal. The corresponding new notion is called $$\kappa $$ -filter pair. A filter pair can be seen as a presentation of a logic, and we ask what different $$\kappa $$ -filter pairs give rise to a fixed logic of cardinality $$\kappa $$. To make the (...) question well-defined we restrict to a subcollection of filter pairs and establish a bijection from that collection to the set of natural extensions of that logic by a set of variables of cardinality $$\kappa $$. Along the way we use $$\kappa $$ -filter pairs to construct natural extensions for a given logic, work out the relationships between this construction and several others proposed in the literature, and show that the collection of natural extensions forms a complete lattice. In an optional section we introduce and motivate the concept of a general filter pair. (shrink)

Maximality is a desirable property of paraconsistent logics, motivated by the aspiration to tolerate inconsistencies, but at the same time retain from classical logic as much as possible. In this paper we introduce the strongest possible notion of maximal paraconsistency, and investigate it in the context of logics that are based on deterministic or non-deterministic three-valued matrices. We show that all reasonable paraconsistent logics based on three-valued deterministic matrices are maximal in our strong sense. This applies to practically all three-valued (...) paraconsistent logics that have been considered in the literature, including a large family of logics which were developed by da Costa's school. Then we show that in contrast, paraconsistent logics based on three-valued properly nondeterministic matrices are not maximal, except for a few special cases (which are fully characterized). However, these non-deterministic matrices are useful for representing in a clear and concise way the vast variety of the (deterministic) three-valued maximally paraconsistent matrices. The corresponding weaker notion of maximality, called premaximal paraconsistency, captures the "core" of maximal paraconsistency of all possible paraconsistent determinizations of a non-deterministic matrix, thus representing what is really essential for their maximal paraconsistency. (shrink)

We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not (...) equivalent to any k -valued logic with k < n. (shrink)

Paradefinite logics are logics that can be used for handling contradictory or partial information. As such, paradefinite logics should be both paraconsistent and paracomplete. In this paper we consider the simplest semantic framework for introducing paradefinite logics. It consists of the four-valued matrices that expand the minimal matrix which is characteristic for first degree entailments: Dunn–Belnap matrix. We survey and study the expressive power and proof theory of the most important logics that can be developed in this framework.

Special issue: "Reflecting on the Legacy of C.I. Lewis: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Modal Logic".