In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 315-335 Reid: Conception, Representation and Innate Ideas ROGER D. GALLIE Section I of this paper begins with a presentation of Thomas Reid's doctrine of the signification of words, of what words signify or represent. That presentation serves to introduce a problem of interpretation, namely, what Reid thinks the connection is between conceiving something and grasping what a term for it (...) signifies. It is pointed out that even if Reid maintains that what a word signifies is conceived by both speaker and hearer when that word is understood, this is a far cry from the position that he takes the stronger view, whether for all or only for some things, that their being conceived involves the understanding of a term or terms. The position that he does indeed take this stronger, although moderate, view is defended in sections II, III and IV. In sections II and III it is argued that, in Reid's view, for an adequate conception of an individual, real or imaginary, a conception of its attributes is needed. In section IV it is argued that the possession of general conceptions (in distinction from their formation), without which conception of attributes is impossible, requires appropriate understanding of general terms. So since for the conception of an individual a conception of its attributes is needed, and since for the conception of attributes appropriate understanding of general terms is required, we arrive at a textually well-founded position: for the conception of most things, in Reid's view, understanding of terms is indispensable. Roger D. Gallie is at the Department of Philosophy, Nottingham University, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD UK. email: [email protected] 316 Roger D. Gallie The remainder of the paper considers the following question: to what extent, if any, Reid is committed to acceptance of nativist views on concept possession? To answer, in section V we consider to what extent Reid's moderate position on the possession of conceptions commits him to accepting Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind (RTM) for propositional attitudes. It is clear that the view that a propositional attitude state such as belief involves some relation between a person and a representation such as a significant word, phrase or sentence of a natural language such as English can fairly be attributed to Reid. But it is also clear that Reid cannot be an adherent of the view that persons have a functional cum computational relation to Fodorean mental representations, so he cannot be an adherent of any nativism ex- plicitly contained in such a view. But it is to be noted that in his Inquiry, Chapter IV, Reid argues by a different route that in order to acquire a language such as English prior mastery of a system of significant signs is required. In section VI Keith Lehrer's argument in criticism of a reductionist interpretation of a position such as Fodor's is presented: that for a sign to signify something to someone presupposes that that person has a conception of what is signified. It is however pointed out that since there is a case for not viewing Fodor's position as reductionist overall Fodor can accept Lehrer's argument. Lehrer's innatist position, which he both claims to follow easily from this critical argument and to be a correct interpretation of Reid, is then presented: that we must presuppose an innate understanding of some signs to account for our learning the meaning of any signs. The objection that Reid too must accept the alleged innatist implications of Lehrer's critical argument in view of the implications of his moderate position on the possession of conceptions is considered and rebutted. In section VIII argue that while Lehrer makes a respectable case for innate principles of formation of conceptions such as that of hardness, something that Reid clearly endorses in his Inquiry, Chapter V, he does not succeed in making a case for there being any innate possession of conceptions. Finally, in section VIII, Reid's mature views in the Intellectual Powers, Essay VI, on how conceptions come to be possessed are expounded, and are fleshed out with some... (shrink)

Les données des fouilles récentes de l'Éphorie de Larissa (Plateia Magoula Zarkoit, Makrychori 2) ainsi qu'un réexamen statistique des fouilles de V. Milojcic (Arapi, Otzaki, entre autres) ont permis de préciser la transition entre la culture néolithique thessalienne de Sesklo et celle de Dimini. Il s'agit, à l'échelle de l'ensemble de la péninsule balkanique, d'un moment de transformation historique majeure. Les analyses montrent en fait que seule l'apparition d'une céramique noire polie est un élément réellement nouveau. Pour les autres catégories (...) de céramique, on peut montrer, tant dans les formes que dans les décors ou le· techniques, qu'elles résultent d'expérimentations et d'évolutions technologiques progressive·, issues de la culture de Sesklo. On pourrait ainsi distinguer successivement une phase Sesklo tardive, une phase de transition dite «de Zarko», une première phase Dimini dite «Larissa» (au sens redéfini ici) et une seconde phase dite « Tsangli ». Ce moment de transition se caractéri»· néanmoins par une baisse quantitative de la céramique fine, monochrome ou décorée. (shrink)

Cet article constitue le second volet d'un programme d'ensemble sur le Néolithique de la Thessalie. Il est consacré aux résultats des analyses chimiques et pétrographiques effectuées sur la céramique de la fin de la culture de Sesklo («Néolithique Moyen») et du début de la culture de Dimini («Néolithique Récent»). Environ 400 analyses, principalement en fluorescence X, sont présentées ici, sur un total d'un millier déjà réalisées. Elles portent à la fois sur la céramique fine, la céramique grossière et sur des (...) prélèvements d'argile naturelle. Les résultats concernent d'une part la définition chimique, pétrographique et technologique des groupes céramiques précédemment reconnus d'un point de vue stylistique (BCH 112 [1988]) et d'autre part le mode de production et de circulation de ces différentes catégories. Trois modèles peuvent être distingués. La céramique grossière est essentiellement produite localement sur chaque site et circule peu. Les différents styles peints sont produits localement, mais circulent dans des proportions importantes entre les sites. Enfin la céramique «gris-sur- gris», techniquement remarquable, est produite dans une zone très limitée du Nord-Ouest thessalien, mais diffusée dans l'ensemble de la Thessalie. L'artisanat céramique se révèle ainsi beaucoup plus complexe qu'on ne le supposait habituellement; l'on peut également mieux cerner la constitution des entités culturelles du Néolithique. (shrink)

Il mondo dell'immaginazione.--La libertà religiosa.--Religione e coesistenza.--L'itinerario filosofico di Benedetto Croce.--Ancora sull'itinerario filosofico di Benedetto Croce.--Rosmini e il sensismo.--Il senso della storia.--Socrate.--La metafisica, ieri e oggi.--Di al cune aporie della teologia naturale.--Filosofi tedeschi d'oggi.

An original form of poetical debate is elaborated in the 12th and 13th century in relation to court lyricism. Under the appellation of “jeux-partis” in “oil” tongue, they meet some success in the urban frame of the “puy d'Arras”. As they formulate a sophistry of love, they intersect a number of different formalisations such as the poetical, juridical and scholastic ones.What is at stake in the debate is expressed on the dilemmatic mode. The argumentation is worked out at large through (...) three basic enunciations: maxims, proverbs and images.The maxim, inscribed as it is in the lyrical discourse that it lays down as being axiomatical for love, has an ambivalent function: on one hand it is the enunciation one intends to dispute, on the other hand it is the form taken by the demonstration. As it combines with a syntax of demonstration it only brings out the illusion of dialectics incidentally revealing the reduddant tautology of “le jeu-parti”. Out of a number of 120 poems, there are no less than 80 proverbial expressions which articulate themselves on the context differently — although they do so in majority through assertive formulations — yet disrupting with its isotopy in so much as they illustrate and enunciate the rule at the same time. The process of examplarisation, in the form of imaged enunciations operate other alterations. If the proverb, descending from the empirical universe, universalizes the situation it refers to, the image alone proceeds inversely: from a general theme it gives an example of one or several anecdotical situations out of which the universalness of the rule emerges.Now, none of those enunciations proceeds from a demonstrative or even properly argumentative logic. They are enclosed in themselves. The interlocutors do not resume what has just been said, unless it be in a blunt form of refutation. The true formalisation is polemical. It consists in a discourse which handles irony, lightly touches insult and seeks after effect rather than reasoning. It builds up its own truth — contradictorily though — as a game played on an audience whose complicity is to be grasped and then requested — for truthfulness does lie right in the midst of the debate and asserts itself unendlessly, such as it is in “les disputes”, those contests between scholars. “Disputes” and “jeux-partis” promote a logic of controversy. They are “argumentations-spectacles”. The elaboration of truth lies elsewhere, in the “Summae” for example. Le “jeu-parti” is aporhetical. If ever there exists an answer to its questioning, it can be found in love poetry the form of which includes the “sic et non” of “la joy”, mirth and play on love. (shrink)

I think it will be generally admitted that if Oxford philosophers have any claim to have added in recent years to the store of our philosophical ideas, it lies in their published works on the theory of conduct. I don’t think it can be claimed that, even in this sphere, they have given us many new and illuminating positive truths. After reading Mr. Ross, Professor Prichard, and Mr. Joseph, we are left, I think, with the impression that the whole subject (...) is much more intricate and puzzling than we should have thought possible. I intend in this paper to try and discover what is true in the theories of these three moralists on one of the most difficult and puzzling of ethical problems, viz., “What Renders a Right Act Right?” Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, in the main, stand together; it is regrettable that Professor Prichard's published work is so very meagre. And if in quoting from his article in Mind , 1912, on “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake,” I am doing him an injustice in attributing to him any views which he no longer holds, I am sorry; but modesty in publishing has its penalties, and anyhow, the article is too guilty an offender to get off free, for its annoying subtleties started the whole trouble, and led indirectly to Some Problems in Ethics and the Right and the Good. (shrink)

A substantial guide providing an overview of both physicalism and metaphysical naturalism, reviewing both questions of formulation and justification for both doctrines. Includes a diagnostic strategy for understanding talk of naturalism as a metaphysical thesis.

En este trabajo presentamos los fundamentos teóricos de una propuesta para el abordaje didáctico de concepciones teleológicas de los y las estudiantes en la enseñanza de la Biología. La propuesta en cuestión supone acudir al modo en que Darwin lidió con las concepciones teleológicas dominantes entre sus contemporáneos, para proponer una estrategia general a través de la cual se podría incidir sobre las intuiciones teleológicas de los estudiantes, de modo que se pueda facilitar el aprendizaje de la teoría de la (...) selección natural. Sugeriremos también que esta propuesta implica un modo original de apelar a la analogía entre el cambio teórico en la Historia de la Ciencia y el aprendizaje de las ciencias. (shrink)

Summary For the study of the first year of life, Sander, Stern, and Gomez each chose the adult–infant relationship as the unit of analysis; they followed its development, respectively, in moments of meeting, in the proto-conversation and in the focus of attention. The authors explicitly refer to the Gestalt theory and support the need to interpret the behavior of the child as part of a wider context, as the experiences of a person in relation since birth.

Inside What Would Plato Do?, you'll find the basics of philosophy, written in an easy, digestible way we can all understand, along with questions to help you apply these important theories to your own life. So, after you've learned about a philosophical concept, you'll then be challenged to test yourself and see how the results can impact your daily life. For instance, after learning about Kant's theory of morality and the importance of intention you're challenged with questions like: Can good (...) people do bad things? Was there a time when you intended to do something helpful that ended up being hurtful? Does that make you a good person (because you intended to do good) or a bad person (because the results were bad)? What Would Plato Do? will not only help you better understand some of the greatest thinkers ever but will also help you think of the world around you in a whole new way! (shrink)