RESUMEN Durante el siglo XVII, el reloj parece el modelo más adecuado para pensar los seres vivos. El filósofo alemán G. W. Leibniz es parte de la tradición mecanicista que concibe los seres vivos a partir del modelo del reloj o de los autómatas, pero establece una distinción esencial entre máquinas naturales y artificiales, que muestra los límites de este modelo. Las primeras son máquinas infinitamente complejas, máquinas dentro de máquinas ad infinitum, las segundas no, alcanzan un límite de complejidad. (...) Esta distinción obliga a ir más allá del reloj como modelo de los seres vivos, pues este modelo resulta insuficiente para comprender la dinámica propia de los seres vivos, en al menos dos aspectos: a) deja sin explicar el origen de la estructura o forma del ser vivo; b) no establece un principio interno de actividad que fundamente la unidad dinámica y estructural del ser vivo. Con su noción de organismo o máquina natural, Leibniz intenta resolver estas insuficiencias del modelo puramente mecánico: a) en su propuesta el ser vivo no se constituye de manera mecánica o serial, sino de una vez, por un acto de creación; b) la conservación del ser vivo en el tiempo sólo es comprensible a partir de un principio de actividad intrínseca que dota de unidad, actividad y estructura al viviente. ABSTRACT During the seventeenth century, the clock seems the most appropriate model for thinking about living beings. The German philosopher G. W. Leibniz, is part of the mechanical tradition that conceives living beings from the clock or the automata’s model, but he establishes an essential distinction between natural and artificial machines. This distinction shows the limits of the mechanical model. The machines of nature are infinitely complex machines, machines within machines ad infinitum; the artificial machines, instead, reach a limit of complexity. This distinction forces us to go beyond the clock as a model of living beings, because this model is insufficient to understand the dynamics of living beings, in at least two aspects: a) it is not able to explain the origin of the living being’s structure or form; b) it does not establish an internal principle of activity grounding the living being’s dynamic and structural unit. With his notion of organism or natural machine, Leibniz tries to solve these insufficiencies of the purely mechanical model: a) in his proposal, the living being is not constituted mechanically or serially, but at once, by an act of creation; b) the conservation of the living being in time is only understandable from a principle of intrinsic activity that provides unity, activity and structure to living beings. (shrink)

Este artículo busca comprender las relaciones e intercambios entre filosofía y ciencia, analizando un caso concreto: el uso que hace Bergson del argumento de Boltzmann contra la reversibilidad o recurrencia del universo (“paradoja de Zermelo”), apoyando indi- rectamente su concepción de la irreversibilidad del universo asentada en un élan vital. Criticamos que Bergson, en su interpretación, convierta en “imposibilidad absoluta” lo que Boltzmann asienta sólo como “imposibilidad práctica”. Mostraremos que el filósofo francés distorsiona el argumento, dejando de lado dos puntos (...) fundamentales: a) la particular posición epistemológica de Boltzmann respecto a las teorías científicas y su relación con la experiencia, b) el atomismo que sirve de base al argumento de Boltzmann, atomismo que Bergson rechaza. Concluiremos que el argumento de Boltzmann no es válido en el marco metafísico (epistemológico y ontológico) de Bergson. Esto contribuirá a una mejor comprensión de los problemas que surgen en los intercambios conceptuales entre ciencia y filosofía. (shrink)

This book explores questions surrounding material memory, culture and technology, and examines the active and constitutive role that technical artefacts play in our practices of memory. Interdisciplinary in nature, the book’s argument includes themes unusual in memory studies, such as the production of technology and the concept of nature.

Resumen:En este artículo analizamos las relaciones entre ciencia, técnica y vida en el pensamiento del filósofo francés Michel Henry (1922-2002). Presentamos, primero, el rol que asigna Henry a la ciencia moderna que con su geometrización del mundo ha dejado de lado la vida y la subjetividad y con ello ha dado lugar a la técnica moderna o tecnología. En segundo lugar, siguiendo a Henry, caracterizamos esta técnica moderna como ciencia aplicada, basada en máquinas automáticas que se autonomizan del ser humano; (...) y que constituye la concreción práctica del conocimiento objetivo de la ciencia moderna. Por último, analizamos lo que Henry llama la Técnica original, definida como Cuerpo-apropiación y Praxis de la Subjetividad original y su expresión en los instrumentos y el trabajo humano. Estos análisis permiten vislumbrar una “filosofía de la técnica” en Henry, que consideramos podría inscribirse en la tradición de la “filosofía clásica de la técnica” (en la línea de autores como Heidegger y Ellul).Palabras clave: Michel Henry; ciencia; técnica; tecnología; vida; subjetividad. (shrink)

En este artículo se analizan las relaciones entre arte, tecnología y cuerpo, teniendo como marco de análisis el pensamiento del filósofo español Félix Duque. En primer lugar, consideramos la concepción del cuerpo como máquina y su derivación actual en la noción de cyborg. En segundo lugar, mostramos cómo la concepción del cuerpo-máquina se hace parte del body art de Stelarc y del arte carnal de Orlan, quienes plantean el diseño del cuerpo dada su obsolescencia. En tercer lugar, presentamos las críticas (...) de Duque a estos ciberartistas y en general a los planteamientos transhumanistas y posthumanistas. Finalmente, comparamos la metáfora del «cyborg» en Broncano con la «filosofía de la técnica de la naturaleza» de Duque, poniendo de relieve la necesidad de plantear y explicitar la cuestión política implícita en el diseño del cuerpo y la «libre creación». (shrink)

La termodinámica clásica establece una oposición irreducible entre vida y materia. El universo dibujado por ella tiende de manera irreversible, debido a una continua disipación de energía, a un estado de equilibrio o reposo, la llamada «muerte térmica». En este universo, la vida, su actividad y su evolución aparecen como externas y fortuitas, permitidas, pero no explicadas por las leyes de la termodinámica. La vida aparece casi anti-natural o milagrosa en un universo muerto o en vías de morir. El filósofo (...) francés Henri Bergson intenta superar esta contraposición de vida y materia con su concepción de un universo en continua creación conducido por un élan vital. Este impulso vital es fundamento tanto de la vida como de la materia, y la organización de los seres vivos y su evolución, la evolución creadora, necesitan de ambos principios para su concreción. Sin embargo, la propuesta de Bergson no logra establecer una verdadera unidad de vida y materia. Mantiene la dualidad de estos principios, a pesar de su complemento, y deja sin responder por ejemplo cómo es posible el surgimiento de la vida a partir de la propia materia. Classical thermodynamics establishes an irreducible opposition between life and matter. The universe draws by classical thermodynamics tends to, due to a continuous dissipation of energy, an equilibrium or state of rest, the so-called «heat death». In this universe, life, her activity and her evolution, appear as external and fortuitous, permitted but not explicated by laws of thermodynamics. Life seems unnatural or miraculous in a dead or almost dead universe. The French philosopher Henri Bergson tries to overcome this opposition between life and matter with his conception of a universe in an unending creation, driven by an élan vital, which is the foundation of both life and matter. Organization of living beings and their evolution, the creative evolution, need both principles for its concretion. However, the Bergson’s proposal fails to make a real unity of life and matter, keeping the duality of these principles, even when he conceives them as a complementary pair, leaving unanswered for example how it is possible the emergence of life from matter itself. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se muestra cómo la "inteligencia sentiente", en sus elementos "noológicos", adquiere cierto carácter "técnico" primario y constitutivo que se despliega en el logos y en la razón de manera individual, social e histórica. En la aprehensión primordial de la realidad se juega la viabilidad misma del hombre en su estar siendo en el mundo como animal humano, donde lo "técnico" juega un papel relevante. En los elementos noológicos primarios de la aprehensión primordial se hallan los cimientos de los que (...) surge la "técnica", que no es entonces elemento accesorio, sino parte constitutiva del hacerse cargo de la realidad. ABSTRACT The paper shows how "sentient intelligence", in its noological elements, acquires a certain primary and constitutive "technological" character that is deployed individually, socially, and historically in logos and reason. The very viability of man's being in the world as a human animal is at stake in the primordial apprehension of reality, and the "technological" plays a relevant role here. It is in the primary noological elements of primordial apprehension that we find the bases for the emergence of "technology", which would then be not an accessory element, but a constitutive part of taking charge of reality. (shrink)

Se muestra cómo la “inteligencia sentiente”, en sus elementos “noológicos”, adquiere cierto carácter “técnico” primario y constitutivo que se despliega en el logos y en la razón de manera individual, social e histórica. En la aprehensión primordial de la realidad se juega la viabilidad misma del hombre en su estar siendo en el mundo como animal humano, donde lo “técnico” juega un papel relevante. En los elementos noológicos primarios de la aprehensión primordial se hallan los cimientos de los que surge (...) la “técnica”, que no es entonces elemento accesorio, sino parte constitutiva del hacerse cargo de la realidad. (shrink)

This book presents the current feminist critique of science and the philosophy of science in such a way that students of philosophy of science, philosophers, feminist theorists, and scientists will find the material accessible and intellectually rigorous.Contemporary feminist debate, as well as the debate brought on by the radical critics of science, assumes—incorrectly—that certain movements in philosophy of science and science-driven theory are understood in their dynamics as well as in their details. All too often, labels such as “Kuhnian” or (...) “positivistic” are taken for granted, and much of the contemporary postmodern or post-structuralist feminist theory that sets out to criticize science does little to alleviate the reader’s lack of knowledge with regard to such movements.Unlike other texts, Philosophies of Science: Feminist Theories provides a student-oriented framework so that, for example, positivism is given a thorough grounding before the feminist critique of such epistemological theory is given. Other movements discussed include the Kuhnian turn, sociology of science, and the radical critique of science. Feminist theory and critique are interwoven throughout, with one chapter devoted to feminist thought, which includes the work of such thinkers as Longino, Hararway, Hubbard, Nelson, Harding, and Keller. (shrink)

Within Ajzen's Planned Behavior Theory framework, this article tests a model to estimate the predictors of entrepreneurial intention in academic scientists working in Chile. We adapted into Spanish the entrepreneurship intention questionnaire. We tested the entrepreneurship intention model on a sample of 1,027 scientists leading research projects funded by the Chilean Scientific and Technological Development Fund, the country's primary scientific research grant. The results show strong empirical support for the entrepreneurship intention model proposed while highlighting some critical issues specific to (...) entrepreneurial intention in scientists. In particular, we found an indirect effect of perceived subjective social support on entrepreneurial intention, which is mediated by entrepreneurial attitude and perceived behavioral control toward entrepreneurship. These results suggest that policies orientated toward promoting academic entrepreneurship should include developing a healthy social environment toward it, meaning that entrepreneurial intention is not only an individual but an organizational challenge. These policies should analyze the social norms guiding the scientists' reference groups to increase their effectiveness. (shrink)

This study constructs a measurement scale for Socially Responsible Consumption in the particular context of Colombia. It uses a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodological approach, beginning with four focus groups and ending with a quantitative validation exercise employing Exploratory Factor Analysis. The result is a Socially Responsible Consumption measurement scale consisting of four dimensions that reflect paradigms found in the existing literature. These are, however, expressed differently in Colombia. In particular, Socially Responsible Consumption involves consumer behavior that favors corporate social (...) responsibility practices and the rational consumption of resources and products while recognizing the importance of maintaining a healthy lifestyle through healthcare. (shrink)

All these specialist aspects of one life are different facets of the intellectual diamond which scintillates in the huge quarry of The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. This is the quintessential man, the bundle of contradictions passionately dedicated to intellect, at times carrying the rational argument to irrational extremes; the natural-born emotional adventurer forever hampered by orphaned youth and too-early marriage. This Russell in the round is greater than the sum of his constituent parts, a man of (...) epic proportions, struggling through a lifetime beset with frustration and near-disaster; in youth the constitutional sceptic, in old age the sometimes splendid figure with "courage never to submit or yield.". (shrink)

Kategoriler’de, iki tür ontolojik yüklemleme ilişkisi ve karşılık gelen iki temel varlık ayrımı karşımıza çıkar. Aristoteles, bir taşıyıcı içinde olma ifadesiyle tözleri ilineklerden, bir taşıyıcı için söylenir olma ifadesiyle de tümelleri, özleri bakımından aynı olan tikellerinden ayırır. Anılan ayrımlar bize Aristoteles’in varlık görüşündeki iki temel prensibi verirler: Var olan çok anlamlıdır ve her zaman belirli bir şeydir. Bu bakımdan Kategoriler, şeylerin hem özlerini hem de ilineklerini açıklama ve böylece ilgili yüklemleme problemlerini çözme iddiasına sahiptir. Bu doğrultuda, metnin kendisinde doğrudan bir (...) atıf bulunmasa da literatürde Kategoriler’in Platoncu formlara yönelik iki temel eleştiri getirdiği sonucuna varılır: (1) Formlar teorisi var olanları tek anlamlı varsayarak şeylerin ilineksel özelliklerini açıklamakta başarısız olur; (2) formlar teorisi ilişkisel bir yüklemleme modeli kabul ettiğinden şeylerin özlerini açıklamakta başarısız olur. Bu yazı, Kategoriler ve Platoncu formlar arasındaki bu eleştirel ilişkinin Metafizik’in A kitabında yer alan bir pasajda (990b22-991a3) açıkça görülebileceği iddiasını taşır. Bilhassa Afrodisyaslı Aleksandros’un şerhi ışığında ele alındığında, pasajda formlar teorisine yöneltilen karşıt argümanların kategoriler kuramını varsaydığı ve argümanlar ile tam da literatürde konu edilen iki eleştirinin yapıldığı görülür. Bunun devamı olarak pasajdan, Kategoriler’in kaçındığı fakat formlar teorisinin yüzleşmek zorunda olduğu bazı ontolojik zorlukları çıkarsamak da mümkündür. Bu yazı ile, anılan pasaj bir kanıt olarak sunulmakta ve böylece Kategoriler’de formlar teorisinin örtük bir eleştirisi bulunduğu yönündeki literatür okumalarına katkıda bulunulması amaçlanmaktadır. Bunun için önce Aristoteles’in bu metinde ortaya koyduğu yüklemleme kuramı açıklanmakta ve ardından anılan pasaj analiz edilmektedir. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 32-39 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetics, Epistemics, and Feminist Theory Jane Duran Recent feminist analysts of aesthetics and analytic aesthetics in particular seem to have come to the conclusion that the redemption of formulated aesthetic theory from the feminist point of view is a difficult and recondite task. 1 If analytic aesthetics now looks problematic, qua fruitful philosophical enterprise, its future appears (...) bleaker still when the intersection of the androcentric nature of analytic philosophy and the larger feminist project, frequently articulated in other than analytic terms, is examined.In this essay I will assume that there is some future for analytic aesthetics, and I will not dispute the basic assumption that any portion of analytic theory is somewhat immiscible with feminist points of view. My concern, rather, will be to try to show what it is specifically in the nature of analytic theory, both aesthetic and otherwise, which renders it of dubious value to the feminist critique (at least on first blush). Although in the past feminist theorists have tried to characterize the androcentric nature of analytic philosophy on the whole in rather striking terms,it is not clear that these terms have been precise enough. 2 Further, it is not clear that analytic modes are obviously unusable for feminist theory or for the development of a still nascent feminist aesthetics, although what one wants to say here is that this task is a terribly danger-fraught one. 3My goal here is twofold: first, to articulate what precisely it is aboutanalytic aesthetics (or any portion of analytic theory, for that matter) thatmakes it a hindrance — at least preliminarily — to the development of feminist views. In order to do this I will need to examine a relatively uncharted area in the literature, that is the parallel between much of analytic aesthetic theory and analytic epistemology. The second portion of my task will runsomewhat contrary to conventional wisdom: having delineated the mostmasculinist parts of analytic endeavors, I inquire if there is, indeed, anypart of rigorously articulated analytic theory that could lend itself to the development of a feminist aesthetic. [End Page 32] Analytic Philosophy and Aesthetics Analytic aesthetics, like analytic philosophy taken as a whole, has often proceeded as if the development of conceptual clarification and theoretical rigor could do much to "solve" or dissolve aesthetic problems. George Dickie's introductory work, for example, presents the student with a number of difficult areas in aesthetics, and then proceeds to address these areas in much the same manner that other contemporary texts employ for the discussion of issues in ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics.In discussing symbolism, Dickie first attempts to clarify the use of theterm, and then notes that there are problematic areas with regard to whether or not a work of art can both contain a symbol and serve itself as a symbol simultaneously. A symbol "stands for" in some establishable way that which it symbolizes. A symbol serves to transfer someone's thought to something other than itself, and the transfer is not a random association. The transfer depends upon certain features of the symbol which give it a place in a certain meaning system. 4I cite this material as exemplary because the flavor of analytic aesthetics is remarkably similar to the flavor of analytic philosophy as a whole. We sometimes need to remind ourselves that the techniques of analysis developed in the earlier part of this century relied on breakthroughs in logic and formal representation which allowed for a certain precision in matching symbol to thing signified. The original hope of philosophers working at the time of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore had been to develop something close to a logically perfect language with a one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified. However without merit this somewhat arcane task, its goals infused much of the philosophizing that followed it, and even the ordinary language school was, of course, indirectly an offshoot of this work. Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, notes that "analytic philosophy was to be 'scientific philosophy'....The goal of the analytic philosopher... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.2 (2004) 88-94 [Access article in PDF] A Postmodern Tonantzín Jane Duran Visitors to the Puebla area in Mexico are frequently taken to the church of Santa María Tonantzínla, where they are told that they will see three or more styles of architecture simultaneously. Guidebooks to the area prominently feature this church and others like it, both as examples — or so the reader (...) is told — of the "Baroque," and as exemplars of the handiwork and craftsmanship of the indigenous.1 Because of the importance of various notions of style insofar as teaching in the arts is concerned, it might seem important to try to articulate what is meant by simultaneity of styles. In addition, today's students are often baffled by uses of the term "postmodern." In this essay I will argue that Santa María Tonantzínla may have somesurprising lessons for us all.There is no question that the visual effect of the building's interior is, in fact, stunning and that the visitor is simultaneously awed and bemused. Arrivals at this church in the Puebla suburb of Cholula see a riotous profusion of cherubs, angels, and other figures covering the walls, ceiling, nave, and almost every square inch of available space. Although some of the figures do indeed appear to bear a resemblance to those found in European structures created during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, other figures are more or less unrecognizable to most visitors, and clearly seem to be, as the books indicate, of non-European origin. To add to the effect of the stylistic mixing, the façade of the building is somewhat Romanesque, which only makes the interior more surprising and, in its own way, unexpected.I shall argue that work such as that at Tonantzín presents us with a variety of conceptual difficulties from the standpoint of aesthetics, and opens the door for some novel lines of argument. It is first of all quite unclear where the notion of "style" begins at Tonantzín; the boundaries are blurred and here, perhaps more than in most architectural treasures, one does not know how to announce or delineate the various styles. But much more important, [End Page 88] perhaps, is that this very amalgamation lends itself to the notion that one trope, the "postmodern," continually used in a discussion of contemporary architecture, is perhaps more relevant to Tonantzín than one might at first expect. In this essay I shall weave these two lines of argument together to support the contention that Tonantzín is, after all, postmodern. But before we can move to that assertion, it is important to try to think about what a meshing of such styles as "Spanish baroque" and "indigenous" could possibly mean, and why it has seemed urgent for writing on Tonantzín to employ these labels. Architectural Diversity In an intriguing article on the use of terms such as "modern" and "postmodern" in contemporary architecture, David Goldblatt has argued that Venturi's claim that modernity lacks what he terms diversity is more or less vacuous. As Goldblatt claims, the concept of diversity within a given work does not make much sense. More important for our purposes, Goldblatt goes on to provide a gloss on the notion of electicism, and its relation to a variety of architectural styles. He writes: When Venturi claims that modern architecture lacks diversity, he primarily means that it fails to achieve what he calls a pluralism. What he calls for is "Scarlatti and the Beatles, if diversity is to be achieved"....What Venturi is advocating is eclecticism.2As Goldblatt claims, eclecticism is the hallmark of the postmodern in architecture, and the eclectic pastiche that is Las Vegas — especially in terms of borrowed styles, ornamentation, and visible fripperies within the context of one building — becomes exemplary of that term and what it evokes. But to say simply that there may well be instances of the postmodern in architecture before the twentieth century, and before the decline of modernity itself, is to say very little. As Goldblatt... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, and: Anne Conway: A Woman PhilosopherJane DuranWomen Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, by Jacqueline Broad; 204 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. $65.00. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher, by Sarah Hutton; 280 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. $75.00.Recent work on women philosophers has, in general, approached the topic from two vantage points: on the one hand, a number of anthologies have (...) been published, wherein commentators present a small portion of the woman thinker's work, often without the background necessary for a fuller understanding. On the other hand, some few women philosophers have been the subject of full-length works, but these have tended, by and large, to be women thinkers of the twentieth century, with whose work we are already familiar. Two recent books, one by Jacqueline Broad and the other by Sarah Hutton, go a long way toward improving the situation.Work by Eileen O'Neill, Sarah Hutton and Margaret Atherton, among others, has helped familiarize us with the notion that the seventeenth century—that era so commonly associated with Descartes and the rise of modern philosophy—was also a time of rich theorizing by women philosophers. Jacqueline Broad's book possesses many virtues: it has the finely-tuned style of the careful historian, while at the same time not failing to demonstrate acquaintance with a range of contemporary feminist commentary. Part of the problem in addressing women thinkers of the past is another version of what we are now tempted to call the essentialism problem: does it make sense to think that there is a style that might be demarcated as "feminine," or that might, in some way, pertain uniquely to women theorists? These are difficult issues, but a partial response to the question is to try to remember that it is not for no reason that women thinkers have, indeed, been left out of the canon. As Broad herself says, women philosophers "are now mere footnotes to the standard historical-intellectual accounts of the early modern period" (p. 1).Broad does a superb job of navigating between the need to set out the plain tenets of the thinker's philosophy, and the desire to try to tie it into these larger questions. In six chapters, she addresses the work of Elizabeth of Bohemia, [End Page 200] Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Masham and Catharine Trotter Cockburn The chapters on Elizabeth, Margaret Cavendish and Mary Astell are particularly strong—here part of the difficulty is that we do have familiar commentaries addressing the work of these women, and it is hard to try to see them in a new light. We are accustomed, for example, to think of Elizabeth merely as Descartes's correspondent. As is the case with information that is currently coming to bear on the question of Harriet Taylor Mill's input into the work of John Stuart Mill, it is difficult for us to see Elizabeth as a thinker in her own right, or, indeed, to give her the credit that Descartes himself gave her; as Broad notes, he had described her as "the only person I have so far found who has completely understood all my previous works" (p. 13). Margaret Cavendish's reputation has suffered from the somewhat scattered approach of her writings, and Broad cites her "reputation for eccentricity" (p. 38). Nevertheless, the sheer volume of her work and its allusion to the problems addressed by the Cambridge Platonists (areas also worked on by Anne Conway) demands that she be taken far more seriously than she has in the past. Astell has become known largely for her more overtly feminist works, such as A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, but she was also the author of several other pieces addressing issues in metaphysics, and again the amount of her work and its citation during her own time would militate against the notion that it should not receive thorough examination.Broad does a wonderful job of setting out the main philosophical questions found in these theorists' works, and she excels at pitting their views against those of the various male philosophers whose work—according to... (shrink)

In this reprint of Law's Empire,Ronald Dworkin reflects on the nature of the law, its given authority, its application in democracy, the prominent role of interpretation in judgement, and the relations of lawmakers and lawgivers to the community on whose behalf they pronounce. For that community, Law's Empire provides a judicious and coherent introduction to the place of law in our lives.Previously Published by Harper Collins. Reprinted (1998) by Hart Publishing.

Reasoning About Knowledge is the first book to provide a general discussion of approaches to reasoning about knowledge and its applications to distributed ...

ABSTRACTRecent research on moral dynamics shows that an individual's ethical mind-set moderates the impact of an initial ethical or unethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically on a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mind-set facilitates Moral Balancing, whereas a rule-based mind-set facilitates Moral Consistency. The objective was to look at the evolution of moral choice across a series of scenarios, that is, to explore if these moral patterns are maintained over time. The results of three studies showed that (...) Moral Balancing is not.. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 162-169, February 2022.

In 1993, Professor of Jurisprudence, Ronald Dworkin of Oxford University and Professor of Law at New York University, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s thirteenth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia." Dworkin is Professor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University. He received B.A. degrees from both Harvard College and Oxford University, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School and clerked for Judge Learned Hand. He was (...) associated with a law firm in New York (Sullivan and Cromwell) and was a professor of law at Yale University Law School from 1962-1969. He has been Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and Fellow of University College since 1969. He has a joint appointment at Oxford and at NYU where he is a professor both in the Law School and the Philosophy Department. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Professor Dworkin is the author of many articles in philosophical and legal journals as well as articles on legal and political topics in the New York Review of Books. He has written Taking Rights Seriously (1977), A Matter of Principle (1985), Law’s Empire (1986), Philosophical Issues in Senile Dementia (1987), A Bill of Rights for Britain (1990), Life’s Dominion (1993), and Freedom’s Law (1996). (shrink)

Antonius Andreae was one of the most distinguished disciples and disseminators of John Duns Scotus’s doctrines within the Crown of Aragon and his works, which had an outstanding editorial success,...

Antonius Andreae was one of the most distinguished disciples and disseminators of John Duns Scotus’s doctrines within the Crown of Aragon and his works, which had an outstanding editorial success, can be considered as complete philosophical treatises ad mentem Scoti. This article focusses on his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where Andreae completes and reformulates the metaphysical views of his teacher, which results in a systematic treatise of Scotist metaphysics. To assess the scope of his reformulation and its value, I examine (...) his interpretation of the concept of science and the scientific status of metaphysics as is exposed in the sixth book of this commentary. For it, I present a detailed overview and transcription of his Quaestiones super Metaphysicam Aristotelis VI, which is based on Oxford, Oriel College Library, ms. 65. (shrink)

Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, Volume 62, Issue, Page 91-168, January 2020.

Antoni Andreu fue un pensador clave en la formación y difusión del pensamiento escotista. El objetivo del presente número monográfico consiste en arrojar un poco de luz sobre estos dos aspectos fundamentales de la obra de Antoni Andreu: el pensamiento filosófico de Andreu y las diferencias que presenta respecto al de Escoto, y su influencia posterior, fundamentalmente en autores de la modernidad.