A possible world semantics for standard modal languages is presented, where the valuation functions are allowed to be partial, the truth--functional connectives are interpreted according to weak Kleene matrices, and the necessity operator is given a "weak" interpretation. Completeness and incompleteness results for some (axiomatic) systems are then established. Extensions of these modal logics in which figure "statability" operators are also examined.

A possible world semantics for standard modal languages is presented, where the valuation functions are allowed to be partial, the truth–functional connectives are interpreted according to weak Kleene matrices, and the necessity operator is given a “weak” interpretation. Completeness and incompleteness results for some (axiomatic) systems are then established. Extensions of these modal logics in which figure “statability” operators are also examined.

Paraconsistent weak Kleene logic is the $3$-valued logic based on the weak Kleene matrices and with two designated values. In this paper, we investigate the poset of prevarieties of generalized involutive bisemilattices, focussing in particular on the order ideal generated by Α$\textrm{lg} $. Applying to this poset a general result by Alexej Pynko, we prove that, exactly like Priest’s logic of paradox, $\textrm{PWK}$ has only one proper nontrivial extension apart from classical logic: $\textrm{PWK}_{\textrm{E}}\textrm{,}$ PWK logic (...) plus explosion. This $6$-valued logic, unlike $\textrm{PWK} $, fails to be paraconsistent. We describe its consequence relation via a variable inclusion criterion and identify its Suszko-reduced models. (shrink)

While participating in a symposium on Dave Ripley’s forthcoming book Uncut, I had proposed that employing a strict-tolerant interpretation of the weak Kleene matrices provided a content-theoretical conception of the bounds of conversational norms that enjoyed advantages over Ripley’s use of the strong Kleene matrices. During discussion, I used the case of sentences that are taken to be out-of-bounds for being secrets as an example of a case in which the setting of conversational bounds in (...) practice diverged from the account championed by Ripley. In this paper, I consider an objection that my treatment of quantifiers was mistaken insofar as the confidentiality of a sentence ϕ may not lift to the sentence ∃xϕ and draw from this objection that neither the strong nor the weak Kleene interpretation of quantifiers suffices, but that a novel interpretation may do so. (shrink)

This paper makes first steps toward a systematic investigation of how pertinence to topic contributes to determine deductively valid reasoning along with preservation of designated values. I start from the interpretation of Weak Kleene Logic WKL as a reasoning tool that preserves truth and topic pertinence, which is offered by Jc Beall. I keep Beall’s motivations and I argue that WKL cannot meet them in a satisfying way. In light of this, I propose an informal definition of a (...) topic-sensitive logic and I proceed to turn it into a formal one by deploying the topic-algebraic framework from the Topic-Sensitive Intentional Modalities project by Francesco Berto. I apply the framework in order to define semantically a ‘classical topic-sensitive logic’ CTSL that meets Beall’s motivations and proves topic-sensitive. Then, I prove results that connect CTSL and any possible topic-sensitive logic to the tradition of containment logics and provide a unification tool for a wide range of recent proposals in philosophical logic. A topic-theoretical interpretation of WKL is then offered without prejudice to the fact that the logic is not topic-sensitive. Finally, the paper discusses some conceptual issues and research perspectives. (shrink)

This paper presents a weak Kleene approach to conditionals that preserves some salient formal features of conditionals, particularly their interdefinability with Boolean logical connectives. I argue that such an approach fares better than other proposed weak logics of conditionals in this regard. In particular, it fares better than the logics proposed by Cooper, Cantwell, Farrell, De Finetti, Égré, Rossi, and Sprenger.

Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic is the 3-valued logic with two designated values defined through the weak Kleene tables. This paper is a first attempt to investigate PWK within the perspective and methods of abstract algebraic logic. We give a Hilbert-style system for PWK and prove a normal form theorem. We examine some algebraic structures for PWK, called involutive bisemilattices, showing that they are distributive as bisemilattices and that they form a variety, \, generated by the 3-element (...) algebra WK; we also prove that every involutive bisemilattice is representable as the Płonka sum over a direct system of Boolean algebras. We then study PWK from the viewpoint of AAL. We show that \ is not the equivalent algebraic semantics of any algebraisable logic and that PWK is neither protoalgebraic nor selfextensional, not assertional, but it is truth-equational. We fully characterise the deductive filters of PWK on members of \ and the reduced matrix models of PWK. Finally, we investigate PWK with the methods of second-order AAL—we describe the class \ of PWK-algebras, algebra reducts of basic full generalised matrix models of PWK, showing that they coincide with the quasivariety generated by WK—which differs from \—and explicitly providing a quasiequational basis for it. (shrink)

Paraconsistent Weak Kleene Logic is the 3-valued propositional logic defined on the weak Kleene tables and with two designated values. Most of the existing proof systems for PWK are characterised by the presence of linguistic restrictions on some of their rules. This feature can be seen as a shortcoming. We provide a cut-free calculus for PWK that is devoid of such provisos. Moreover, we introduce a Priest-style tableaux calculus for PWK.

This paper presents a semantical analysis of the Weak Kleene Logics Kw3 and PWK from the tradition of Bochvar and Halldén. These are three-valued logics in which a formula takes the third value if at least one of its components does. The paper establishes two main results: a characterisation result for the relation of logical con- sequence in PWK – that is, we individuate necessary and sufficient conditions for a set.

Multiple-conclusion Hilbert-style systems allow us to finitely axiomatize every logic defined by a finite matrix. Having obtained such axiomatizations for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene and Bochvar–Kleene logics, we modify them by replacing the multiple-conclusion rules with carefully selected single-conclusion ones. In this way we manage to introduce the first finite Hilbert-style single-conclusion axiomatizations for these logics.

It is well known that the following features hold of AR + T under the strong Kleene scheme, regardless of the way the language is Gödel numbered: 1. There exist sentences that are neither paradoxical nor grounded. 2. There are 2ℵ0 fixed points. 3. In the minimal fixed point the weakly definable sets (i.e., sets definable as {n∣ A(n) is true in the minimal fixed point where A(x) is a formula of AR + T) are precisely the Π1 1 (...) sets. 4. In the minimal fixed point the totally defined sets (sets weakly defined by formulae all of whose instances are true or false) are precisely the ▵1 1 sets. 5. The closure ordinal for Kripke's construction of the minimal fixed point is ωCK 1. In contrast, we show that under the weak Kleene scheme, depending on the way the Gödel numbering is chosen: 1. There may or may not exist nonparadoxical, ungrounded sentences. 2. The number of fixed points may be any positive finite number, ℵ0, or 2ℵ0 . 3. In the minimal fixed point, the sets that are weakly definable may range from a subclass of the sets 1-1 reducible to the truth set of AR to the Π1 1 sets, including intermediate cases. 4. Similarly, the totally definable sets in the minimal fixed point range from precisely the arithmetical sets up to precisely the ▵1 1 sets. 5. The closure ordinal for the construction of the minimal fixed point may be ω, ωCK 1, or any successor limit ordinal in between. In addition we suggest how one may supplement AR + T with a function symbol interpreted by a certain primitive recursive function so that, irrespective of the choice of the Godel numbering, the resulting language based on the weak Kleene scheme has the five features noted above for the strong Kleene language. (shrink)

In the literature, Weak Kleene logics are usually taken as three-valued logics. However, Suszko has challenged the main idea of many-valued logic claiming that every logic can be presented in a two-valued fashion. In this paper, we provide two-valued semantics for the Weak Kleene logics and for a number of four-valued subsystems of them. We do the same for the so-called Logics of Nonsense, which are extensions of the Weak Kleene logics with unary operators (...) that allow looking at them as Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Logics of Formal Underterminedness. Our aim with this work, rather than arguing for Suszko’s thesis, is to show that two-valued presentations of these peculiar logics enlighten the non-standard behavior of their logical connectives. More specifically, the two-valued presentations of paraconsistent logics illustrate and clarify the disjunctive flavor of the conjunction, and dually, the two-valued presentations of paracomplete subsystems of Weak Kleene logics reveal the conjunctive flavor of the disjunction. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss pure variable inclusion logics, that is, logical systems where valid entailments require that the propositional variables occurring in the conclusion are included among those appearing in the premises, or vice versa. We study the subsystems of Classical Logic satisfying these requirements and assess the extent to which it is possible to characterise them by means of a single logical matrix. In addition, we semantically describe both of these companions to Classical Logic in (...) terms of appropriate matrix bundles and as semilattice-based logics, showing that the notion of consequence in these logics can be interpreted in terms of truth (or non-falsity) and meaningfulness (or meaninglessness) preservation. Finally, we use Płonka sums of matrices to investigate the pure variable inclusion companions of an arbitrary finitary logic. -/- . (shrink)

This paper extends Fitting's epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics, to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting's "cut-down" operator is discussed, rendering a "track-down" operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in this (...) track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations. (shrink)

This paper offers a new and very simple alternative to Bochvar's well known nonsense -- or meaninglessness -- interpretation of Weak Kleene logic. To help orient discussion I begin by reviewing the familiar Strong Kleene logic and its standard interpretation; I then review Weak Kleene logic and the standard interpretation. While I note a common worry about the Bochvar interpretation my aim is only to give an alternative -- and I think very elegant -- interpretation, (...) not necessarily a replacement. (shrink)

This paper continues my work of [9], which showed there was a broad family of many valued logics that have a strict/tolerant counterpart. Here we consider a generalization of weak Kleene three valued logic, instead of the strong version that was background for that earlier work. We explain the intuition behind that generalization, then determine a subclass of strict/tolerant structures in which a generalization of weak Kleene logic produces the same results that the strong Kleene (...) generalization did. This paper provides much background, but is not self-contained. Some results from [9] are called on, and are not reproved here. [9] Melvin C. Fitting. “A Family of Strict/Tolerant Logics”. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. Online. Print publication forthcoming. (shrink)

Our aim is to provide a sequent calculus whose external consequence relation coincides with the three-valued paracomplete logic `of nonsense' introduced by Dmitry Bochvar and, independently, presented as the weak Kleene logic K3W by Stephen C. Kleene. The main features of this calculus are (i) that it is non-reflexive, i.e., Identity is not included as an explicit rule (although a restricted form of it with premises is derivable); (ii) that it includes rules where no variable-inclusion conditions are (...) attached; and (iii) that it is hybrid, insofar as it includes both left and right operational introduction as well as elimination rules. (shrink)

This paper presents a sound and complete five-sided sequent calculus for first-order weak Kleene valuations which permits not only elegant representations of four logics definable on first-order weak Kleene valuations, but also admissibility of five cut rules by proof analysis.

Building on early work by Girard ( 1987 ) and using closely related techniques from the proof theory of many-valued logics, we propose a sequent calculus capturing a hierarchy of notions of satisfaction based on the Strong Kleene matrices introduced by Barrio et al. (Journal of Philosophical Logic 49:93–120, 2020 ) and others. The calculus allows one to establish and generalize in a very natural manner several recent results, such as the coincidence of some of these notions with (...) their classical counterparts, and the possibility of expressing some notions of satisfaction for higher-level inferences using notions of satisfaction for inferences of lower level. We also show that at each level all notions of satisfaction considered are pairwise distinct and we address some remarks on the possible significance of this (huge) number of notions of consequence. (shrink)

Kleene’s strong three-valued logic extends naturally to a four-valued logic proposed by Belnap. We introduce a guard connective into Belnap’s logic and consider a few of its properties. Then we show that by using it four-valued analogs of Kleene’s weak three-valued logic, and the asymmetric logic of Lisp are also available. We propose an extension of these ideas to the family of distributive bilattices. Finally we show that for bilinear bilattices the extensions do not produce any new (...) equivalences. (shrink)

The thesis deals with the concept of truth and the paradoxes of truth. Philosophical theories usually consider the concept of truth from a wider perspective. They are concerned with questions such as - Is there any connection between the truth and the world? And, if there is - What is the nature of the connection? Contrary to these theories, this analysis is of a logical nature. It deals with the internal semantic structure of language, the mutual semantic connection of sentences, (...) above all the connection of sentences that speak about the truth of other sentences and sentences whose truth they speak about. Truth paradoxes show that there is a problem in our basic understanding of the language meaning and they are a test for any proposed solution. It is important to make a distinction between the normative and analytical aspect of the solution. The former tries to ensure that paradoxes will not emerge. The latter tries to explain paradoxes. Of course, the practical aspect of the solution is also important. It tries to ensure a good framework for logical foundations of knowledge, for related problems in Artificial Intelligence and for the analysis of the natural language. Tarski’s analysis emphasized the T-scheme as the basic intuitive principle for the concept of truth, but it also showed its inconsistency with the classical logic. Tarski’s solution is to preserve the classical logic and to restrict the scheme: we can talk about the truth of sentences of a language only inside another essentially richer metalanguage. This solution is in harmony with the idea of reflexivity of thinking and it has become very fertile for mathematics and science in general. But it has normative nature | truth paradoxes are avoided in a way that in such frame we cannot even express paradoxical sentences. It is also too restrictive because, for the same reason we cannot express a situation in which there is a circular reference of some sentences to other sentences, no matter how common and harmless such a situation may be. Kripke showed that there is no natural restriction to the T-scheme and we have to accept it. But then we must also accept the riskiness of sentences | the possibility that under some circumstances a sentence does not have the classical truth value but it is undetermined. This leads to languages with three-valued semantics. Kripke did not give any definite model, but he gave a theoretical frame for investigations of various models | each fixed point in each three-valued semantics can be a model for the concept of truth. The solutions also have normative nature | we can express the paradoxical sentences, but we escape a contradiction by declaring them undetermined. Such a solution could become an analytical solution only if we provide the analysis that would show in a substantial way that it is the solution that models the concept of truth. Kripke took some steps in the direction of finding an analytical solution. He preferred the strong Kleene three-valued semantics for which he wrote it was "appropriate" but did not explain why it was appropriate. One reason for such a choice is probably that Kripke finds paradoxical sentences meaningful. This eliminates the weak Kleene three valued semantics which corresponds to the idea that paradoxical sentences are meaningless, and thus indeterminate. Another reason could be that the strong Kleene three valued semantics has the so-called investigative interpretation. According to this interpretation, this semantics corresponds to the classical determination of truth, whereby all sentences that do not have an already determined value are temporarily considered indeterminate. When we determine the truth value of these sentences, then we can also determine the truth value of the sentences that are composed of them. Kripke supplemented this investigative interpretation with an intuition about learning the concept of truth. That intuition deals with how we can teach someone who is a competent user of an initial language (without the predicate of truth T) to use sentences that contain the predicate T. That person knows which sentences of the initial language are true and which are not. We give her the rule to assign the T attribute to the former and deny that attribute to the latter. In that way, some new sentences that contain the predicate of truth, and which were indeterminate until then, become determinate. So the person gets a new set of true and false sentences with which he continues the procedure. This intuition leads directly to the smallest fixed point of strong Kleene semantics as an analytically acceptable model for the logical notion of truth. However, since this process is usually saturated only on some transfinite ordinal, this intuition, by climbing on ordinals, increasingly becomes a metaphor. This thesis is an attempt to give an analytical solution to truth paradoxes. It gives an analysis of why and how some sentences lack the classical truth value. The starting point is basic intuition according to which paradoxical sentences are meaningful (because we understand what they are talking about well, moreover we use it for determining their truth values), but they witness the failure of the classical procedure of determining their truth value in some "extreme" circumstances. Paradoxes emerge because the classical procedure of the truth value determination does not always give a classically supposed (and expected) answer. The analysis shows that such an assumption is an unjustified generalization from common situations to all situations. We can accept the classical procedure of the truth value determination and consequently the internal semantic structure of the language, but we must reject the universality of the exterior assumption of a successful ending of the procedure. The consciousness of this transforms paradoxes to normal situations inherent to the classical procedure. Some sentences, although meaningful, when we evaluate them according to the classical truth conditions, the classical conditions do not assign them a unique value. We can assign to them the third value, \undetermined", as a sign of definitive failure of the classical procedure. An analysis of the propagation of the failure in the structure of sentences gives exactly the strong Kleene three-valued semantics, not as an investigative procedure, as it occurs in Kripke, but as the classical truth determination procedure accompanied by the propagation of its own failure. An analysis of the circularities in the determination of the classical truth value gives the criterion of when the classical procedure succeeds and when it fails, when the sentences will have the classical truth value and when they will not. It turns out that the truth values of sentences thus obtained give exactly the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics. In that way, the argumentation is given for that choice among all fixed points of all monotone three-valued semantics for the model of the logical concept of truth. An immediate mathematical description of the fixed point is given, too. It has also been shown how this language can be semantically completed to the classical language which in many respects appears a natural completion of the process of thinking about the truth values of the sentences of a given language. Thus the final model is a language that has one interpretation and two systems of sentence truth evaluation, primary and final evaluation. The language through the symbol T speaks of its primary truth valuation, which is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three valued semantics. Its final truth valuation is the semantic completion of the first in such a way that all sentences that are not true in the primary valuation are false in the final valuation. (shrink)

Logics based on weak Kleene algebra (WKA) and related structures have been recently proposed as a tool for reasoning about flaws in computer programs. The key element of this proposal is the presence, in WKA and related structures, of a non-classical truth-value that is “contaminating” in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula ϕ, any complex formula in which ϕ appears is assigned that value as well. Under such interpretations, the contaminating states represent occurrences (...) of a flaw. However, since different programs and machines can interact with (or be nested into) one another, we need to account for different kind of errors, and this calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating values. In this paper, we make steps toward these evaluation systems by considering two logics, HYB1 and HYB2, whose semantic interpretations account for two contaminating values beside classical values 0 and 1. In particular, we provide two main formal contributions. First, we give a characterization of their relations of (multiple-conclusion) logical consequence—that is, necessary and sufficient conditions for a set Δ of formulas to logically follow from a set Γ of formulas in HYB1 or HYB2 . Second, we provide sound and complete sequent calculi for the two logics. (shrink)

As is well known, the variable-sharing property (vsp) is, according to Anderson and Belnap, a necessary property of any relevant logic. In this paper, we shall consider two versions of the vsp, what we label the "weak vsp" (wvsp) and the "strong vsp" (svsp). In addition, the "no loose pieces property," a property related to the wvsp and the svsp, will be defined. Each one of these properties shall generally be characterized by means of a class of logical (...) class='Hi'>matrices. In this way, any logic verified by an actual matrix in one of these classes has the property the class generally represents. Particular matrices (and so, logics) in each class are provided. (shrink)

In this paper we study the subdirectly irreducible algebras in the variety of pseudocomplemented De Morgan algebras by means of their De Morgan p‐spaces. We introduce the notion of the body of an algebra and determine when is subdirectly irreducible. As a consequence of this, in the case of pseudocomplemented Kleene algebras, two special subvarieties arise naturally, for which we give explicit identities that characterise them. We also introduce a subvariety of, namely the variety of bundle pseudocomplemented Kleene (...) algebras, fully describe its subvariety lattice and find explicit equational bases for each subvariety. In addition, we study the subvariety of generated by the simple members of, determine the structure of the free algebra over a finite set in this variety and their finite weakly projective algebras. (shrink)

We show that we can interpret concatenation theories in arithmetical theories without coding sequences by identifying binary strings with \(2\times 2\) matrices with determinant 1.

This article presents a weak system of intuitionistic second-order arithmetic, WKV, a subsystem of the one in S.C. Kleene, R.E. Vesley [The Foundations of Intuitionistic Mathematics: Especially in Relation to Recursive Functions, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1965]. It is then shown that some statements of real analysis, like a version of the Heine–Borel Theorem, and some statements of logic, e.g. compactness of classical proposition calculus, are equivalent to the Fan Theorem in this system.

This article introduces the three-valuedweakly-intuitionistic logicI 1 as a counterpart of theparaconsistent calculusP 1 studied in [11].I 1 is shown to be complete with respect to certainthree-valued matrices. We also show that in the sense that any proper extension ofI 1 collapses to classical logic.The second part shows thatI 1 is algebraizable in the sense of Block and Pigozzi (cf. [2]) in a way very similar to the algebraization ofP 1 given in [8].

We investigate the theories of linear algebra, which were originally defined to study the question of whether commutativity of matrix inverses has polysize Frege proofs. We give sentences separating quantified versions of these theories, and define a fragment in which we can interpret a weak theory V 1 of bounded arithmetic and carry out polynomial time reasoning about matrices - for example, we can formalize the Gaussian elimination algorithm. We show that, even if we restrict our language, proves (...) the commutativity of inverses. (shrink)

This paper discusses a dualization of Fitting's notion of a "cut-down" operation on a bilattice, rendering a "track-down" operation, later used to represent the idea that a consistent opinion cannot arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. The logic of track-down operations on bilattices is proved equivalent to the logic d_Sfde, dual to Deutsch's system S_fde. Furthermore, track-down operations are employed to provide an epistemic interpretation for paraconsistent weak Kleene logic. Finally, two logics of sequential combinations of (...) cut-and track-down operations allow settling positively the question of whether bilattice-based semantics are available for subsystems of S_fde. (shrink)

The logic FBCI given by linearly ordered BCI-matrices is known not to be an axiomatic extension of the well-known BCI logic. In this paper we axiomatize FBCI by adding a recursively enumerable set of schemes of inference rules to BCI and show that there is no finite axiomatization for FBCI.

We investigate the relationship between three-valued Kripke/Kleene semantics and stratified semantics for stratifiable logic programs. We first show these are compatible, in the sense that if the three-valued semantics assigns a classical truth value, the stratified approach will assign the same value. Next, the familiar fixed point semantics for pure Horn clause programs gives both smallest and biggest fixed points fundamental roles. We show how to extend this idea to the family of stratifiable logic programs, producing a semantics we (...) call weak stratified. Finally, we show weak stratified semantics coincides exactly with the three-valued approach on stratifiable programs, though the three-valued version is generally applicable, and does not require stratification assumptions. (shrink)

In this paper we study a reducibility that has been introduced by Klaus Weihrauch or, more precisely, a natural extension for multi-valued functions on represented spaces. We call the corresponding equivalence classes Weihrauch degrees and we show that the corresponding partial order induces a lower semi-lattice. It turns out that parallelization is a closure operator for this semi-lattice and that the parallelized Weihrauch degrees even form a lattice into which the Medvedev lattice and the Turing degrees can be embedded. The (...) importance of Weihrauch degrees is based on the fact that multi-valued functions on represented spaces can be considered as realizers of mathematical theorems in a very natural way and studying the Weihrauch reductions between theorems in this sense means to ask which theorems can be transformed continuously or computably into each other. As crucial corner points of this classification scheme the limited principle of omniscience LPO, the lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO and their parallelizations are studied. It is proved that parallelized LLPO is equivalent to Weak Kőnig's Lemma and hence to the Hahn—Banach Theorem in this new and very strong sense. We call a multi-valued function weakly computable if it is reducible to the Weihrauch degree of parallelized LLPO and we present a new proof, based on a computational version of Kleene's ternary logic, that the class of weakly computable operations is closed under composition. Moreover, weakly computable operations on computable metric spaces are characterized as operations that admit upper semi-computable compact-valued selectors and it is proved that any single-valued weakly computable operation is already computable in the ordinary sense. (shrink)

A formal language of two-valued logic is developed, whose terms are formulas of the language of Kleene's three-valued logic. The atomic formulas of the former language are pairs of formulas of the latter language joined by consequence operators. These operators correspond to the three sensible types of consequence (strong-strong, strong-weak and weak-weak) in Kleene's logic in analogous way as the implication connective in the classical logic corresponds to the classical consequence relation. The composed formulas of (...) the considered language are built from the atomic ones by means of the classical connectives and quantifiers.A deduction system for the developed language is given, consisting of a set of decomposition rules for sequences of formulas. It is shown that the deduction system is sound and complete. (shrink)

Bochvar algebras consist of the quasivariety $\mathsf {BCA}$ playing the role of equivalent algebraic semantics for Bochvar (external) logic, a logical formalism introduced by Bochvar [4] in the realm of (weak) Kleene logics. In this paper, we provide an algebraic investigation of the structure of Bochvar algebras. In particular, we prove a representation theorem based on Płonka sums and investigate the lattice of subquasivarieties, showing that Bochvar (external) logic has only one proper extension (apart from classical logic), algebraized (...) by the subquasivariety $\mathsf {NBCA}$ of $\mathsf {BCA}$. Furthermore, we address the problem of (passive) structural completeness ((P)SC) for each of them, showing that $\mathsf {NBCA}$ is SC, while $\mathsf {BCA}$ is not even PSC. Finally, we prove that both $\mathsf {BCA}$ and $\mathsf {NBCA}$ enjoy the amalgamation property (AP). (shrink)

“Weak relevant model structures” (wr-ms) are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure ${\mathcal{M}_{\rm CL}}$ built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. It is shown how to falsify in any wr-ms the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom and similar schemes used to derive Curry’s Paradox. In the last section of the paper we discuss how to extend this method of falsification to more general schemes that could also be used in deriving Curry’s Paradox.

This papers aims to analyse sentences of a self-referential language containing a truth-predicate by means of a Smullyan-style tableau system. Our analysis covers three variants of Kripke's partial-model semantics (strong and weak Kleene's and supervaluational) and three variants of the revision theory of truth (Belnap's, Gupta's and Herzberger's).

The logic DAI of demodalised analytic implication has been introduced by J.M. Dunn as a variation on a time-honoured logical system by C.I. Lewis’ student W.T. Parry. The main tenet underlying this logic is that no implication can be valid unless its consequent is “analytically contained” in its antecedent. DAI has been investigated both proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, but no study so far has focussed on DAI from the viewpoint of abstract algebraic logic. We provide several different algebraic semantics for DAI, (...) showing their equivalence with the known semantics by Dunn and Epstein. We also show that DAI is algebraisable and we identify its equivalent quasivariety semantics. This class turns out to be a linguistic and axiomatic expansion of involutive bisemilattices, a subquasivariety of which forms the algebraic counterpart of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. This fact sheds further light on the relationship between containment logics and logics of nonsense. (shrink)

We provide a logical matrix semantics and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the first-degree entailments valid in W. T. Parry’s logic of Analytic Implication. We achieve the former by introducing a logical matrix closely related to that inducing paracomplete weak Kleene logic, and the latter by presenting a calculus where the initial sequents and the left and right rules for negation are subject to linguistic constraints.

Jc Beall’s off-topic interpretation of Weak Kleene logic offers a logic of ‘true-and-topic’ preservation. However, Nissim Francez has recently argued that being ‘off-topic’ is a relational and not an _absolute_ semantic property; as such, it fails to satisfy the conditions of truth-functionality. For Francez, this means that it ‘cannot serve as an interpretation of a truth-value’. In this paper, I propose a two-layered _re_interpretation of Beall’s off-topic semantics. This two-layered framework has two crucial features: a sentential topic-tagging device (...) and a two-layered evaluation tool. I show that this framework results in a logic that preserves Beall’s key insight and addresses Francez’s concerns. (shrink)

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive (...) epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one. (shrink)

We examine the set of formula-to-formula valid inferences of Classical Logic, where the premise and the conclusion share at least a propositional variable in common. We review the fact, already proved in the literature, that such a system is identical to the first-degree entailment fragment of R. Epstein's Relatedness Logic, and that it is a non-transitive logic of the sort investigated by S. Frankowski and others. Furthermore, we provide a semantics and a calculus for this logic. The semantics is defined (...) in terms of a \-matrix built on top of a 5-valued extension of the 3-element weak Kleene algebra, whereas the calculus is defined in terms of a Gentzen-style sequent system where the left and right negation rules are subject to linguistic constraints. (shrink)

This paper is a follow-up to [4], in which a mistake in [6] was corrected. We give a strenghtening of the main result on the semantical nonconservativity of the theory of PT−with internal induction for total formulae${$, denoted by PT−in [9]). We show that if to PT−the axiom of internal induction forallarithmetical formulae is added, then this theory is semantically stronger than${\rm{P}}{{\rm{T}}^ - } + {\rm{INT}}\left$. In particular the latter is not relatively truth definable in the former. Last but not (...) least, we provide an axiomatic theory of truth which meets the requirements put forward by Fischer and Horsten in [9]. The truth theory we define is based on Weak Kleene Logic instead of the Strong one. (shrink)

I argue that a recent philosophical interpretation by Jc Beall of the middle value of Weak Kleene logic as ‘being off-topic’ is untenable. My main claim is that “being off-topic” is a relation, not a property, and as such cannot serve as an interpretation of a truth-value.

Bounds consequence provides an interpretation of a multiple-conclusion consequence relation in which the derivability of a sequent is understood as the claim that it is conversationally out-of-bounds to take a position in which each member of Γ is asserted while each member of Δ is denied. Two of the foremost champions of bounds consequence—Greg Restall and David Ripley—have independently indicated that the shape of the bounds in question is determined by conversational practice. In this paper, I suggest that the standard (...) treatments of bounds consequence have focused heavily on the matter of veridicality at the expense of ignoring other features by which conversational bounds are set, prime among them being the matter of content or subject-matter. Furthermore, I argue that the semantic behavior of propositions containing “monstrous” content—content whose introduction is inappropriate to a context independently of veridical considerations—leads to a weak Kleene account of bounds consequence. (shrink)

We show that any coherent complete partial order is obtainable as the fixed-point poset of the strong Kleene jump of a suitably chosen first-order ground model. This is a strengthening of Visser’s result that any finite ccpo is obtainable in this way. The same is true for the van Fraassen supervaluation jump, but not for the weak Kleene jump.

In this article we consider argumentation as an epistemic process performed by an agent to extend and revise her beliefs and gain knowledge, according to the information provided by the environment. Such a process can also generate the suspension of the claim under evaluation. How can we account for such a suspension phenomenon in argumentation process? We propose: (1) to distinguish two kinds of suspensions – critical suspension and non-critical suspension – in epistemic change processes; (2) to introduce a Paraconsistent (...) Weak Kleene logic (PWK) based belief revision theory which makes use of the notion of topic to distinguish the two kinds of suspensions previously mentioned, and (3) to develop a PWK-style argumentation framework and its expansion. By doing that, we can distinguish two kinds of suspensions in an epistemic process by virtue of the notion of topic. (shrink)

A wide family of many-valued logics—for instance, those based on the weak Kleene algebra—includes a non-classical truth-value that is ‘contaminating’ in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula φ⁠, any complex formula in which φ appears is assigned that value as well. In such systems, the contaminating value enjoys a wide range of interpretations, suggesting scenarios in which more than one of these interpretations are called for. This calls for an evaluation of systems with (...) multiple contaminating values. In this paper, we consider the countably infinite family of multiple-conclusion consequence relations in which classical logic is enriched with one or more contaminating values whose behavior is determined by a linear ordering between them. We consider some motivations and applications for such systems and provide general characterizations for all consequence relations in this family. Finally, we provide sequent calculi for a pair of four-valued logics including two linearly ordered contaminating values before defining two-sided sequent calculi corresponding to each of the infinite family of many-valued logics studied in this paper. (shrink)

Here, I first prove that certain families of k-valued clones have the Gupta-Belnap fixed-point property. This essentially means that all propositional languages that are interpreted with operators belonging to those clones are such that any net of self-referential sentences in the language can be consistently evaluated. I then focus on two four-valued generalisations of the Kleene propositional operators that generalise the strong and weak Kleene operators: Belnap’s clone and Fitting’s clone, respectively. I apply the theorems from the (...) initial part of the paper to analyse the fixed-point property of Belnap’s and Fitting’s clones when some special operators that reflect the semantics are added. The conclusion of the paper is that Fitting’s clone is better suited than Belnap’s to provide self-referential languages with highly expressive resources. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel reply to Prior’s dilemma (for the Is/Ought principle), advocating a so-called Weak Kleene framework motivated by two not uncommon thoughts in the debate, namely, that ought statements are identified as those that use ‘ought’, and that ought statements are ‘funny’ in ways that is statements aren’t (e.g., perhaps sometimes being ‘gappy’ with respect to truth and falsity).