Fixed-Point Posets in Theories of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic (1) (2019)
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Abstract

We show that any coherent complete partial order is obtainable as the fixed-point poset of the strong Kleene jump of a suitably chosen first-order ground model. This is a strengthening of Visser’s result that any finite ccpo is obtainable in this way. The same is true for the van Fraassen supervaluation jump, but not for the weak Kleene jump.

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Stephen Mackereth
University of Pittsburgh

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
On representing ‘true-in-L’ in L.Robert L. Martin - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.
Semantics and the liar paradox.Albert Visser - 1989 - Handbook of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):617--706.

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