An analysis of the Jain metaphysics of non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) shows how the epistemological theory of points of view (nayavāda) and the sevenfold schema of predication (saptabhaṅgī) provide a foundation for the central Jain principle of nonviolence (ahiṃsā).

Kundakunda’s handling of several basic ideas cannot be omitted when one deals with the following concepts in Jaina philosophy: 1. Sy_āt/siya, syādvāda_ or _saptabhaṅgī_. 2. _Nayas_, _vyavahāra_ and _niścaya nayas_ and _naya_vāda. 3. _Sapta_ and _Nava tattvas/padārtha_ and 4. _Anekāntavāda_. No doubt his dates are a major conundrum; recent research regards him to have lived around the fourth or fifth centuries (Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism, BEJ: Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia), edited by Knut (...) Jacobsen, John A. Cort, Paul Dundas and Kristi L. Wiley. Leiden | Boston: Brill, 2020., p. 853). Moreover, it has been said that Kundakunda “_thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller_”, evident by the fact that hardly, if any, Digambara or even Śvetāmbara scholar elaborates on his ideas, let alone crediting him for significant basic insights into Jaina philosophy. Moreover, it seems to be evident, as will be attempted to show, that some ideas appear to be taken over from Kundakunda. Together with Kundakunda’s ‘legacy’, this article will highlight several conundrums regarding the philosophical impact of several concepts in his works that fortunately have not been relegated to oblivion. (shrink)

The system of sevenfold predication of the Jainas, while an invaluable tool in expounding the Jaina doctrine of "non-onesidedness" (Anekāntavāda), has also been criticized for being unsystematic and contradictory. In particular, the fourth predication has been suggested to embrace a kind of irrationality. An analysis is provided here that makes clear the logical basis underlying the seven predications. An interpretation is also offered of the problematic fourth predication that renders the system free from contradiction, and it is suggested that this (...) interpretation best captures the positive spirit of Anekāntavāda. (shrink)

A rational interpretation is proposed for two ancient Indian logics: the Jaina saptabhaṅgī, and the Mādhyamika catuṣkoṭi. It is argued that the irrationality currently imputed to these logics relies upon some philosophical preconceptions inherited from Aristotelian metaphysics. This misunderstanding can be corrected in two steps: by recalling their assumptions about truth; by reconstructing their ensuing theory of judgment within a common conceptual framework.

Does it make sense to employ modern logical tools for ancient philosophy? This well-known debate2 has been re-launched by the indologist Piotr Balcerowicz, questioning those who want to look at the Eastern school of Jainism with Western glasses. While plainly acknowledging the legitimacy of Balcerowicz's mistrust, the present paper wants to propose a formal reconstruction of one of the well-known parts of the Jaina philosophy, namely: the saptabhangi, i.e. the theory of sevenfold predication. Before arguing for this formalist approach (...) to philosophy, let us return to the reasons to be reluctant at it. (shrink)

An alternative semantic framework is proposed in the following to reconstruct and make sense of “Eastern logics”: a Question-Answer Semantics (thereafter: QAS), including a set of questions-answers and a finite number of ensuing non-Fregean logical values. Thus, meaning is provided by yes-no answers to corresponding questions about relevant properties. These logical values help to show that the saptabhaṅgī (and its dual, viz., the Buddhist Mādhyamaka catuṣkoṭi) is not a many-valued paraconsistent logic but, rather, a one-valued proto-logic: a constructive machinery that (...) serves as a formal theory of judgment, rather than a Tarskian-like theory of consequence. Such an explanatory model of contradiction assumes a deep redefinition of logical values. (shrink)

The Jaina _saptabhaṅgī_ (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and _avaktavya_ (‘unutterable’). In its most basic structure, the _saptabhaṅgī_ appears as: (i) in a certain sense, _P_; (ii) in a certain sense, not _P_; (iii) in a certain sense, _P_ and not _P_; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of _P_; (v) in a certain sense, _P_ and inexpressibility of _P_; (vi) in a (...) certain sense, not _P_ and inexpressibility of _P_; (vii) in a certain sense, _P_, not _P_, and inexpressibility of _P_. This appearance has led many (e.g., Ganeri and Priest) to claim that the _saptabhaṅgī_ supports non-classical systems of logic, but such a reading is contested by Balcerowicz. Focusing on Vādidevasūri’s (12th c. CE) and Yaśovijaya’s (17th c. CE) accounts of the _saptabhaṅgī_, this paper puts forward a formalization of the _saptabhaṅgī_ that brings together the non-classical views and Balcerowicz’s view through relating the _saptabhaṅgī_ to the Buddhist unanswerable questions. (shrink)

Jaina philosophy provides a very distinctive account of logic, based on the theory of ?sevenfold predication?. This paper provides a modern formalisation of the logic, using the techniques of many-valued and modal logic. The formalisation is applied, in turn, to some of the more problematic aspects of Jaina philosophy, especially its relativism.

In 1948 Jaśkowski introduced the first discussive logic. The main technical idea was to take what holds to be what is true at some possible world. Some 2,000 years earlier, Jain philosophers had advocated a similar idea, in their doctrine of _syādvāda_. Of course, these philosophers had no knowledge of contemporary logical notions; but the techniques pioneered by Jaśkowski can be deployed to make the Jain ideas mathematically precise. Moreover, Jain ideas suggest a new family of many-valued discussive logics. In (...) this paper, I will explain all these matters. (shrink)

I claim that a relatively new position in philosophy of mathematics, pluralism, overlaps in striking ways with the much older Jain doctrine of anekantavada and the associated doctrines of nyayavada and syadvada. I first outline the pluralist position, following this with a sketch of the Jain doctrine of anekantavada. I then note the srrong points of overlaps and the morals of this comparison of pluralism and anekantavada.

Mohanty, J. N. Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a metaphysician.--Deutsch, E. On meaning.--Potter, K. Towards a conceptual scheme for Indian epistemologies.--Ganguly, S. N. Rationality versus reasonableness (freedom: a reinterpretation).--Sen, P. K. A sketch of a theory of properties and relations.--Mohanty, J. N. Perceptual consciousness.--Chattopadhyaya, D. P. Theory and practice.--Bhadra, M. K. The idea of self as purpose, an existential analysis.--Matilal, B. K. Saptabhaṅgī.--Banerjee, H. The identification of mental states and the possibility of freedom.--Chatterjee, M. A phenomenological approach to the self.--Banerjee, S. P. (...) Alienation and freedom.--Sinha, D. Cognitive language in Shahrukh. (shrink)

These are the Mahavira Extension Lectures 12 (2nd Series), delivered by Dr. Mookerjee, under the patronage of Sri Santi Prasad Jain, Jainism reveals an ideology entirely different from the Vedic. The study of Jainism in its earlier aspects suggests some kind of animistic philosophy of the people,and especially its literature, having been written in Prakrit, shows a definitive trend towards a sort of folk-philosophy interested in overstraining the moral aspects without any theistic bias. This folk-philosophy reveals elements developed into logical (...) doctrines remarkable for their originality, acuteness and subtlety. Dr. Mookerjee lays bare the fundamentals of the Jaina doctrine, Syadvada of Anekantavada, with all the relevant problems to the benefit of the reader. With a rich background in other darsanas both East and West the author has endeavoured to give a thorough and powerful exposition of Jaina Thought, which could be done only by an adherent of Jaina faith. (shrink)

Jain ādhyātmik (spiritual, mystical) poets from the 17th to 19th centuries (e.g., Banārasīdās, Ānandghan, Cidānanda) elaborated a category of ineffability to discuss the pure experience of the soul or self (ātma-anubhava). These early-modern Jain poets mobilized a very specific understanding of the ineffable, one that resists language and logocentrism as sources of delusion and conflict. The focus on the ineffable in this poetry is always attended by a set of terms that qualify the ādhyātmik view. These are a privileging of (...) the neutral (samatā), experience (anubhava), and on the other hand, a demotion of opinion, partisanship, doctrinarism, and bigotry (matawālā, mata-arthi, mata-jaṅgī). This paper will show that a shared constellation of terms, intertextuality, and a rejection of partisanship and logocentrism bound a group of Jain poets from the 17th to 19th centuries to a particular endorsement and understanding of ineffability; one which was authorized and emboldened by an engagement with Jain philosophical plurality and non-absolutism. The poetry exhibits a frequent co-occurrence of ādhyātmik anubhava with the Jain the epistemological system known as saptabhaṅgī (Jain seven-valued predications), of which avaktavya (sometimes translated as ineffable or non-assertable) is a prominent aspect. The association philosophically grounds ādhyātmik positions and reinforces their assertion that some aspects of reality, namely ātma-anubhava, are ineffable and beyond the realm of phenomenal predication. (shrink)

This essay will pose and seek to answer the following question: If, as Swami Vivekananda claims, the four yogas are independent and equally effective paths to God-realization and liberation from the cycle of rebirth, then what must reality be like? What ontology is implied by the claim that the four yogas are all equally effective paths to the supreme goal of religious life? What metaphysical conditions would enable this pluralistic assertion to be true? Swami Vivekananda’s worldview is frequently identified with (...) Advaita Vedānta. We shall see that Vivekananda’s teaching is certainly Advaitic in what could be called a broad sense. As Anantanand Rambachan and others, however, have pointed out, it would be incorrect to identify Swami Vivekananda’s teachings in any rigid or dogmatic sense with the classical Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara; this is because Vivekananda’s teaching departs from that of Śaṅkara in some significant ways, not least in his assertion of the independent salvific efficacy of the four yogas. This essay will argue that Swami Vivekananda’s pluralism, based on the concept of the four yogas, is far more akin to the deep religious pluralism that is advocated by contemporary philosophers of religion in the Whiteheadian tradition of process thought like David Ray Griffin and John Cobb, the classical Jain doctrines of relativity (anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda), and, most especially, the Vijñāna Vedānta of Vivekananda’s guru, Sri Ramakrishna, than any of these approaches is to the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Advaita Vedānta, in Vivekananda’s pluralistic worldview, becomes one valid conceptual matrix among many that bear the ability to support an efficacious path to liberation. This essay is intended not as an historical reconstruction of Vivekananda’s thought, so much as a constructive philosophical contribution to the ongoing scholarly conversations about both religious (and, more broadly, worldview) pluralism and the religious and philosophical legacies of both Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. The former conversation has arrived at something of an impasse (as recounted by Kenneth Rose), while the latter conversation has recently been revived, thanks to the work of Swami Medhananda (formerly Ayon Maharaj) and Arpita Mitra. (shrink)

John Hick’s revolutionary, “Copernican” approach to religious diversity received a great deal of criticism in his lifetime from more conservative theologians and philosophers of religion, many of whom were seeking to preserve a unique place of pre-eminence for Christianity amongst the world’s faiths. Critical responses to Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis have also emerged, however, from amongst his fellow religious pluralists, who have sought either to build upon or to go beyond his pivotal and groundbreaking work. In the same spirit as the (...) responses given by this latter group, this chapter will seek to look beyond Hick’s important work, certainly not in an unfriendly fashion, but with the understanding that Hick is the proverbial “giant” upon whose shoulders subsequent generations of pluralists are standing as we seek to advance pluralism even further than he did in his work. Specifically, this chapter will draw on the Jain concepts of anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda, as well as the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and his successors in the movement of process philosophy, to reconceptualize the Real, not on a Kantian foundation, as is done in the Pluralistic Hypothesis, but on the basis of a robust metaphysical realism. The aim of this approach to pluralism is to capture more fully the sense of mystics from diverse religious traditions that they have actually perceived the Real as such, and not merely one of its phenomenal appearances. (shrink)

Jainism is a religio-philosophical school of India which reacted against the Brahmanic/Vedic tradition and established as a school of thought. As a way of life it started as a Sramanic movement (the non-Brahmanic ascetic tradition) to attain the truth. Jains metaphysics and epistemology are purely logical and conducive for all. Jainism always is against the physical and psychological violence, and believes that it is the Ekanta (one sided view of reality) philosophy, which leads to violence. According to the Jains, Ekantavada (...) is a very rigid view, thus partial in nature. Any school asserting this claim for the absolute truth logically thus rejecting all the other views that basically leads towards dogmatism and in toleration; which further aggravated and leads toward violence. Mahavira as a champion of Ahimsa (nonviolence) carried out this concept from the domain of practical behaviour to the domain of intellectual and philosophical discussion. The Jaina principle of respect for the other life gave rise to the principle of respect for the views of others; thus they advocates Anekāntavāda. According to them, non-violence is the goal and Anekāntavāda becomes the tool. Its Syadvada is basically a logical inclusivity which accepts diversified aspects of truth. Consequently, it tells that a complete understanding of any truth requires the consideration and acceptance of a variety of viewpoints. This pluralistic view of the Jains is to be effective well to combat social violence and evils too. The world is in the pyramid of violence that can only entail massive destruction of this phenomenal world in any moment. I think, this pluralistic approach of Anekāntavāda is to be considered as the panacea to overcome all types of rigidities and bigotries of the present society as well. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#67-68; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2020 P 15-31. (shrink)

The central goal of the _cross-cultural critical thinking movement_ is to change the dominant model of critical thinking pedagogy that is used in the US, UK, and those countries that follow this model. At present the model is centered on an Anglo-American and Euro-Centric model of critical thinking that actively and blatantly ignores contributions to logic and critical thinking education from non-Western sources; more importantly, the model implicitly sends the message to students of critical thinking that _critical thinking_ is a (...) valuable set of skills that derives from what is taken to be Western culture. Cross-cultural critical thinking, by contrast, is centered on a globally inclusive model of critical thinking that presents contributions to critical thinking from a variety of different cultures and traditions. This alternative model aims in part to convey the message that critical thinking is part of the human condition and that understanding it within the human condition is essential to the proper deployment of it in a pluralistic society where there is disagreement over matters of ultimate value. In this paper I offer a presentation and defense of a set of contributions deriving from the Jaina tradition of philosophy that could be presented in a globally sensitive critical thinking course. The central concepts I present and interpret are: non-one-sidedness, the theory of epistemic standpoints, intellectual non-violence, and the theory of seven-fold predication. In each case I focus on the relevance that the concept has for critical thinking education at the introductory level. (shrink)