This dissertation compares the notions of homo rationalis in Philosophy and homo oeconomicus in Economics. Particularly, in Part I, we claim that both notions are close methodological substitutes. Accordingly, we show that the constraints involved in the notion of economic rationality apply to the philosophical notion of rationality. On these premises, we explore the links between the notions of Kantian and Humean rationality in Philosophy and the constructivist and ecological approaches to rationality in economics, respectively. Particularly, we show that the (...) constraints involved in both approaches to rationality in economics apply to the notions of Kantian and Humean rationality. That is why we introduce the notion of minimal global rationality. In a nutshell, the latter links one’s rationality to one’s ability to make good use of their cognitive apparatus to process contextual variables. On this basis, in Part II, we present two empirical tests showing that minimal global rationality is at work in philosophical experiments because systematic manipulations of contextual variables predictably affect philosophical judgment in the Trolley Problem and in some Knobe-like vignettes. In the first case, the manipulation of the information provided to subjects predictably causes inconsistent judgments. More precisely, subjects’ response to information shocks predictably causes them to issue inconsistent judgments. Instead, in the second case, our experimental results reveal that the Knobe Effect activates only if the perpetrator of an action is likely to be perceived as evil and unfriendly. Besides, when the Knobe-like vignettes include probabilistic outcomes, the Knobe Effect does not activate or is reduced in magnitude. For these reasons, we maintain that the availability heuristic bias arguably affects one’s judgment in Knobe-like experiment settings. Eventually, in Part III, we survey the general implications of the findings presented in Part II. First and foremost, we show that when manned social media algorithms produce wide-ranging availability cascades, agents predictably respond to those cascades by herding around biased claims. Interestingly, we find that the exposure to similarly redundant online content makes new social groups emerge unhindered. That is why populists and conspiracy theorists obtain such a large follow-up online. Secondly, we find that manned social media algorithms can exploit the flaws of minimal global rationality at a faster pace than humans. Yet, given that latter algorithms cannot do so on their own, we argue that the Turing Test is still an open game. Specifically, we argue so because state-of-the-art technology can request a service to be supplied (e.g., Google Duplex) but cannot operate direct sales. This constraint of state-of-the-art technology is linked to its inability to exploit the flaws of global minimal rationality as well as humans can. Importantly, we show that if algorithms were able to do so, the involved sociopolitical risk would be high. Therefore, we argue that only some form of regulation over state-of-the-art technology can prevent and reduce such sociopolitical risks. -/- In case you want a copy of this dissertation, please email me. (shrink)

In order to make Aristotle’s philosophy better understood, I would like to provide here a brief but accurate account of the concepts of logos and nous, and their respective functions in his method of dialectic. Dialectic was used in all the major works of the corpus Aristotelicum, in the philosopher’s great effort to noetically grasp and philosophically explain the place of man in the cosmic order of things, and his search for eudaimonia. Since Aristotle’s conception of human nature and its (...) potential for virtuous activity, at the ethical and political or at the intellectual levels of excellence, has deeper roots in his ontology and ousiology, such a synoptic account will be useful, for it will provide an appropriate context for the correct evaluation of the ethical and political views of this philosopher. It will become clear from our analysis that he is misunderstood by scholars in the West and in the East for different historical reasons, which will be elucidated as we proceed further into the discussion of our theme in this essay. (shrink)

The essay deals with Aquinas’theory of person, focusing especially on the relevance of this qualification in Saint Thomas’ theory of the «spiritual substances», on his rejection of Platonism and on his peculiar use of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of the intellecitve substances. We especially stress that Aquinas’functionalist theory of person places the concept of «dignity» as the ultimate foundation of rationality, understanding the latter as a specific assignement and a specific responsibility in the order of Creation.

The aim of this article is to show the relationship between the Liber nouus de anima rationali, a work by Ramon Llull, and the psychological discourse in the thirtheenth century, by means of an analysis of its sources and the doctrinal and thematic context.

영성이란 다층적인 의미를 지니고 있다. 어원적으로 영혼과 관련하여 생명의 원리로서, 특히 ‘지성혼(rational souls, anima rationalis)’과 관련하여 사물의 이치를 분별하는 로고스의 원리로서 이해된다. 그러나 내용적으로 보면 영성의 본질은 무엇보다도 정신의 초월성과 밀접한 관련이 있다. 본고는 전통 사상에 입각하여 영성의 기본 개념을 생명, 로고스, 초월의 원리로 규정하고, 이를 현대적 사유 안에서 이해 가능한 방법을 모색한다. 인간은 정신적 존재로서 ‘근본 물음(Grundfrage)’ 안에 놓여 있다. 물음 안에서 자기 존재의 궁극 의미를 향해 끊임없이 자기를 넘어서는 존재가 바로 인간이다. 이러한 철학적 인간학적 통찰에 근거하여 논의를 전개시키고 (...) 있는 본고는 영성을 인간 본성의 차원에서 감성이나 이성과는 구분되는 또 다른 인간의 고유한 영역으로 이해하며, 나아가 존재 긍정과 존재 의미를 향해 끊임없이 물음을 지속하는 내적 원리로 규정한다. 영성이 지닌 이와 같은 초월적 특성이 인간의 치유와 밀접하게 연관되어 있다는 점을 강조하는 본고는 영성과 치유 사이의 긴밀한 관계를 철학실천적 관점에서 그 논의를 확장, 심화시키고 있다. (shrink)

Greek antiquity saw the development of two distinct systems of logic: Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and the Stoic theory of the hypothetical syllogism. Some ancient logicians argued that hypothetical syllogistic is more fundamental than categorical syllogistic on the grounds that the latter relies on modes of propositional reasoning such asreductio ad absurdum. Peripatetic logicians, by contrast, sought to establish the priority of categorical over hypothetical syllogistic by reducing various modes of propositional reasoning to categorical form. In the 17th (...) century, this Peripatetic program of reducing hypothetical to categorical logic was championed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In an essay titledSpecimina calculi rationalis, Leibniz develops a theory of propositional terms that allows him to derive the rule ofreductio ad absurdumin a purely categorical calculus in which every proposition is of the formA is B. We reconstruct Leibniz’s categorical calculus and show that it is strong enough to establish not only the rule ofreductio ad absurdum, but all the laws of classical propositional logic. Moreover, we show that the propositional logic generated by the nonmonotonic variant of Leibniz’s categorical calculus is a natural system of relevance logic known as RMI$_{{}_ \to ^\neg }$. (shrink)

We all make decisions, sometimes dozens in the course of a day. This paper is about what is involved in this activity. It's my contention that the ability to deliberate, to weigh different courses of action, and then to decide on one of them, is a distinctively human activity, or at least an activity which sets man and the higher animals apart from other creatures. It is as much decisio as ratio that constitutes the distinguishing mark of human beings. Homo (...) may not always be rationalis, but he is always decidens.The paper is about practical decision, although there is also another important kind of decision that I won't discuss, namely cognitive decision. The difference is roughly that which distinguishes the function of a jury from that of a judge, at least in jury trials. The jury's job is to arrive at an answer to the question: guilty or not guilty? This is a cognitive decision, a decision that, on the basis of the evidence, such-and-such is the case. The judge, apprized of the jury's cognitive decision, makes the practical decision to sentence the guilty party to 20 years. On some other occasion, I hope to be able to say something about cognitive decision, as well as about a third kind of decision named value decision. (shrink)

There are few opinions as soundly rooted and commonly acknowledged as the notion of usefulness of education. There is a deep belief, proved right by the experience of mankind, that an educated person has the advantage over a simpleton. It is considered that educated individuals understand themselves and the world around them better. Therefore, they are more a homo rationalis than uneducated ones.In the world changing as in a kaleidoscope an educated person must have the skill to absorb incoming information (...) easily and quickly, to select it and then process into substantial knowledge about the world. At the same time, they need to be reliable and highly efficient in its particular applications. In a word, an educated person needs to know how to develop their individual capital of knowledge. The average age of starting a career increases. Keeping up with fast occurring civilisation changes requires some outside assistance, and so the tasks for higher education are expanding to include theneed to organise lifelong learning.I think that the more effectively will an educational system deliver the abovementioned objectives-acquiring knowledge as such, understood as acquiring the truthabout the world and as increasing the intellectual potential of the society-the ’better’ it will be. This leads to perceiving also the system’s effectiveness as a value in itself, and achieving this value becomes the system’s priority.However, are the values and goals of the higher education mentioned above exclusive? What tradition is backing the priorities of universities nowadays? What should be changed to make the education in universities more efficient in the changing world?I am asking those difficult questions while not quite convinced that my opinion is the best and the only one possible, but I would like to make a small contribution to the discussion on values of education. (shrink)

Christian Wolff foi o primeiro filosofo que separou a doutrina da alma em duas partes: a "psychologia empirica" e a "psychologia rationalis". Ele deu certa ênfase sobretudo à primeira parte, mais nova e original, que tratava daqueles conhecimentos das faculdades da alma, derivados da observação dos dados da experiência, ao passo que a segunda parte tratava das reflexões sobre a essência e a imortalidade da alma. Em certa medida, a psicologia empírica propunha de proceder segundo um método análogo àquele da (...) física newtoniana e da astronomia kepleriana, baseado num círculo virtuoso entre fatos observados e reflexões teóricas. A importância desta concepção de "experiência" estaria na origem do rápido abandono, nas traduções alemães e franceses, do adjetivo "empírico" – embora ele existisse em francês e alemão – para Erfahrungspsychologie, Experimental-Seelenlehre e Psychologie expérimentale. Astronomia e física newtoniana fascinavam pela capacidade heurística de produzir novos conhecimentos. Então se tratava de deslocar este método da natureza física para o conhecimento do homem. Assim, na segunda metade do século dezoito, assiste-se na Alemanha aos desenvolvimentos de uma "física da alma", como foi definida por Sulzer e Herder. Autores como Johann Krüger, Karl Moritz, Ernst Platner, Marcus Hertz trabalham em projetos de aprofundamento desta pesquisa sobre os "fatos" da alma, dando a estas reflexões psicológicas a consistência de uma antropologia. (shrink)

Topic of the essay is the central philosophical question of Buddhism of the onto- and epistemological status of the true self. Based on the Kantian critique of the psychologia rationalis concerning the doctrine of the soul I argue in favor that the doctrine of the non-self of the Anattavāda should be interpreted in an apophatic way. This interpretation sustains the so-called “old-buddhistic doctrine” of Georg Grimm after which the essence of buddhistic thoughts on the true self lies in its unknowability (...) and its inexpressibility, but not in its non-existence.Das Thema des Aufsatzes ist die zentrale philosophische Frage des Buddhismus nach dem onto- und epistemologischen Status des wahren Selbst. Ausgehend von der kantischen Kritik der Seelenlehre der psychologia rationalis wird dafür plädiert, die Lehre des Nicht-Selbst des Anattavādas als Apophatik im Sinne der sog. „altbuddhistischen Lehre“ Georg Grimms zu deuten, welche die Unerkennbarkeit und Unaussprechlichkeit des wahren Selbst zum Inhalt hat, nicht jedoch dessen Inexistenz. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a especificidade da imaginação enquanto faculdade da alma na obra do metafísico Christain Wolff. Limitaremos nosso recorte às obras Metafísica alemã, Discurso preliminar sobre a filosofia em geral, Psychologia empirica e Psychologia rationalis. Orimeiramente investigamos o lugar de ambas as Psicologiæ no interior do sistema de Wolff, ressaltando a centralidade do estudo da alma [Seele]. Num segundo momento, analisamos as principais características da alma e sua vis repræsentativa como operador da relação entre a sensibilidade e as faculdades (...) da mente. Por fim, analisamos os modos de produção de phantasmata e de associação por meio dos quais a imaginação opera na alma. Concluimos mostrando que é em Wolff, contrariamente à tradição que o antecedera, que a imaginação aparece como uma faculdade rigorosamente regulada pelas leis do intelecto, e não pelo costume. (shrink)

La fenomenología de la razón escudriña todos los procesos racionales que intervienen en la aprehensión del objeto real y de su constitución, y las consiguientes relaciones noético-noemáticas. Sólo la razón pura colegida, primero como fuerza que depura los procesos de la evidencia y las posiciones del sujeto, y sólo la razón entendida también como proceso que ratifica la verificabilidad del darse el objeto y de todos los demás procesos y relaciones, se revela como la única instancia posible capaz de asegurar (...) la validez del conocimiento y del objeto del conocimiento. Por otro lado, la razón juega un papel decisivo en lo que respecta al sujeto de razón. Ésta es la nota constitutiva y respectiva del ser humano, el poder que lo separa del entramado de facticidades y contingencias de las que se compone la realidad, de suerte que éste no es un factum más entre todas las objetividades, tal como postulan la psicología y las ciencias naturales. El hombre es un ser mundano, está efectivamente en el mundo. Ahora bien, “su ser en” y “su estar en” son modificados por el poder de la razón. Su modo de ser mundano es serlo racionalmente. Únicamente de este modo el Umwelt deviene Lebenswelt.The phenomenology of reason inspects all rational processes involved in the apprehension of real object and its constitution, and the respective noetic-noematic relationships. Only the pure reason comprehended, first of all, as a strength which purifies the mentioned processes, the evidence and the subject positions. Secondly the reason, also comprehended as a process which confirms the object verificability which gives itself and the other processes and relationships, appears as the only possible power, which is able to guarantee the validity of the knowledge, and so the object of knowledge. On the other hand, the reason plays a very important role in the subject of the reason. This is the constitutive and respective note of the human being, the power that separates it from the labyrinth of facts and contingencies which makes up reality, so that this isn’t a fact among all objectivities, as postulated by psychology and natural sciences. The human being is a worldly being; he is really in the world. Now then, “his being-in” and “his staying-in” are modified by the strength of the reason. His way of being worldly is being rationaly. Only in this way the “Umwelt” becomes “Lebenswelt”. (shrink)

In the paper I explore the relations between a relatively new and quickly expanding branch of artificial intelligence –- the automated discovery systems –- and some new views advanced in the old debate over scientific realism. I focus my attention on one such system, GELL-MANN, designed in 1990 at Wichita State University. The program's task was to analyze elementary particle data available in 1964 and formulate an hypothesis (or hypotheses) about a `hidden', more simple structure of matter, or to put (...) it in contemporary terms –- the discovery of quarks. The central thesis of my paper is that systems like GELL-MANN not only discover (or rediscover) the hidden structure of matter, but also provide independent strong evidence in favor of scientific realism about entities involved in that structure. I make an attempt to show how an argument for scientific realism about sub-microscopic entities can be constructed that would parallel Ian Hacking's `argument from coincidence' presented with respect to microscopic objects in his famous book Representing and Intervening. (shrink)

Esprit, l’un des mots clés des Pensées, reçoit chez Pascal deux significations : la raison et le souffle intérieur. Si l’esprit en tant que mens rationalis appartient au deuxième ordre, l’esprit en tant que mens spiritualis relève du troisième ordre. Deux dualismes se croisent dans la distinction pascalienne des trois ordres : le premier de nature philosophique, cartésienne, oppose le premier ordre, voué au corps, et les deuxième et troisième ordres, voués à la mens ; le second, de nature éthico-religieuse, (...) oppose le premier et le deuxième ordres, ordres de la cupidité, au troisième ordre, celui de la charité. Au-dessus de l’esprit/raison se tient l’esprit/amour. Pascal tisse, au sein du troisième ordre, un lien entre l’esprit et le cœur. Dans la notion de spiritus cordialis, d’esprit cordial, se situe l’apport essentiel de l’auteur des Pensées.« Esprit », one of the key-words of Pascal’s Pensées, has two meanings according to Pascal : i.e. reason and interior creative inspiration. If esprit as mens rationalis belongs to the second order, esprit as mens spiritualis refers to the third order. Two dualisms cross themselves within the Pascalian distinction of three orders. The former – of a philosophical nature, i.e. Cartesian – opposes the first order, devoted to the body and the second and third order devoted to the mens ; the latter – of an ethico-religious nature – opposes both the first and second order, i.e. the orders of cupidity to the third order, i.e. that of charity. The esprit as love rests above the esprit as reason. Pascal weaves, amid the third order a link between the esprit and the heart. The major contribution of the author of the Pensées rests in the concept of spiritus cordialis. (shrink)

In August 1712 A. L. Königsmann sent to Leibniz a copy of his dissertation De rationali metaphysices cultu together with a letter. In his answer to Königsmann Leibniz underlines, firstly, his rationalistic opinion on the relationship between natural and revealed theology and, in second place, his moderate position regarding the anti-Scholastic polemics. Leibniz's letter, till now unpublished, has been edited and annexed at the bottom of the article.

T. 1. Logicam ontologiam et cosmologiam generalem complectens. pars 1. Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere logica. pars 2. Ontologia cosmologia generalis -- T. 2. Psychologias, empiricam atqve rationalem, nec non theologiam natvralem complectens. pars 1. Psychologia empirica, psychologia rationalis. pars 2. Theologia naturalis.

The question about the object, method, and nature of Psychology in the first half of the 19th century received three proposals: the first, presented by Christian Wolff, appealed to the conciliation between the Psychologia Rationalis and the Psychologia Empirica based on the process of Experimentalphysik and in the Principle of Sufficient Reason; the second, proposed a shift towards Physiology this proposal was responsible for establishing the Psychology as an independent Science; the third offers an existential approach to mental phenomena. We (...) argue that the project of Søren Kierkegaard presents a Psychology Experimenterende as a response to Psychologia Empirica and the Experimentelle Psychologie. (shrink)

1. Introductio generalis, logica, cosmologia.--2.Psychologia, gnoseologia, ontologia.--3. Theologia rationalis, ethica, pedagogia, aesthetica, historiologia.-4. Supplementum.

Esprit, l'un des mots clés des Pensées, reçoit chez Pascal deux significations : la raison et le souffle intérieur. Si l' esprit en tant que mens rationalis appartient au deuxième ordre, l' esprit en tant que mens spiritualis relève du troisième ordre. Deux dualismes se croisent dans la distinction pascalienne des trois ordres : le premier de nature philosophique, cartésienne, oppose le premier ordre, voué au corps, et les deuxième et troisième ordres, voués à la mens ; le second, de (...) nature éthico-religieuse, oppose le premier et le deuxième ordres, ordres de la cupidité, au troisième ordre, celui de la charité. Au-dessus de l' esprit /raison se tient l' esprit /amour. Pascal tisse, au sein du troisième ordre, un lien entre l' esprit et le cœur. Dans la notion de spiritus cordialis, d' esprit cordial, se situe l'apport essentiel de l'auteur des Pensées. « Esprit », one of the key-words of Pascal's Pensées, has two meanings according to Pascal : i.e. reason and interior creative inspiration. If esprit as mens rationalis belongs to the second order, esprit as mens spiritualis refers to the third order. Two dualisms cross themselves within the Pascalian distinction of three orders. The former — of a philosophical nature, i.e. Cartesian — opposes the first order, devoted to the body and the second and third order devoted to the mens ; the latter — of an ethico-religious nature – opposes both the first and second order, i.e. the orders of cupidity to the third order, i.e. that of charity. The esprit as love rests above the esprit as reason. Pascal weaves, amid the third order a link between the esprit and the heart. The major contribution of the author of the Pensées rests in the concept of spiritus cordialis. (shrink)

Die Bände 1 und 2 dieser Ausgabe vereinen die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz aus seinen Universitätsjahren in Leipzig und Altdorf (1663 bis 1667) sowie in vier Abteilungen die Schriften aus seiner Zeit in Frankfurt und Mainz (Herbst 1667 bis März 1672): A. Jurisprudentia rationalis B. Demonstrationes catholicae. Zur Theologie und Ethik C. Philosophia naturalis D. Zur Methodologie Etwa die Hälfte dieser Texte ist aus den Handschriften und in dieser Ausgabe größtenteils zum ersten Mal ediert. Im zweiten Band werden der kritische (...) Apparat mit Varianten und Erläuterungen, die Überlieferungen, die Datierungsbegründungen und Berichtigungen zu den Stücken des ersten Bandes nachgetragen und mit Sach-, Schriften- und Stellenverzeichnissen aus dem Corpus juris civilis und dem Corpus juris canonici für beide Bände ergänzt. (shrink)

Die Bände 1 und 2 dieser Ausgabe vereinen die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz aus seinen Universitätsjahren in Leipzig und Altdorf (1663 bis 1667) sowie in vier Abteilungen die Schriften aus seiner Zeit in Frankfurt und Mainz (Herbst 1667 bis März 1672): A. Jurisprudentia rationalis; B. Demonstrationes catholicae. Zur Theologie und Ethik; C. Philosophia naturalis und D. Zur Methodologie. Etwa die Hälfte dieser Texte ist aus den Handschriften und in dieser Ausgabe größtenteils zum ersten Mal ediert. Im zweiten Band werden der (...) kritische Apparat mit Varianten und Erläuterungen, die Überlieferungen, die Datierungsbegründungen und Berichtigungen zu den Stücken des ersten Bandes nachgetragen und mit Sach-, Schriften- und Stellenverzeichnissen aus dem Corpus juris civilis und dem Corpus juris canonici für beide Bände ergänzt. (shrink)

In the essay “Principia Calculi rationalis” Leibniz attempts to prove the theory of the syllogism within his own logic of concepts. This task would be quite easy if one made unrestricted use of the fundamental laws discovered by Leibniz, e.g., in the “General Inquiries” of 1686. In the essays of August 1690, Leibniz had developed some similar proofs which, however, he considered as unsatisfactory because they presupposed the unproven law of contraposition: “If concept A contains concept B, then conversely Non-B (...) contains Non-A”. The proof in “Principia Calculi rationalis” appears to reach its goal without resorting to this law. However, it contains a subtle flaw which results from failing to postulate that the ingredient concepts have to be “possible”, i.e. self-consistent. Once this flaw is corrected, it turns out that the proof – though formally valid – would not have been approved by Leibniz because, again, it rests on an unproven principle even stronger than the law of contraposition. (shrink)