A world of legal conflicts -- The limits of sovereigntist territoriality -- From universalism to cosmopolitanism -- Towards a cosmopolitan pluralist jurisprudence -- Procedural mechanisms, institutional designs, and discursive practices for managing pluralism -- The changing terrain of jurisdiction -- A cosmopolitan pluralist approach to choice of law -- Recognition of judgments and the legal negotiation of difference.

Legal pluralism refers to the idea that in any one geographical space defined by the conventional boundaries of a nation state, there is more than one law or legal system. This article examines several aspects of legal pluralism focusing on the relationship between the empirical facts of pluralism and its conceptual foundations. Variety of factors produce the perception of legal pluralism, which is reflected in intensified interest in the concept in contemporary scholarship. (...) Legal philosophy and sociological approaches to law often still occupy quite separate scholarly terrains. Legal pluralism has been identified as a fruitful area for constructive engagement between legal philosophy and the sociology of law. This article emphasizes the fact that with the decline of nation states as the locus of political and legal power, it seems inevitable that traditional state-centered legal philosophy must give way to a different paradigm, which recognizes the plurality of law. (shrink)

In addition to the traditional attacks from competing legal theories (from natural law to postmodern approach), modern legal positivism seems to be placed at a point of no return when looking at the effects of globalization upon the legal phenomenon. The reality offers to legal positivists countless examples of soft-law, i. e. law which is not law but is perceived and applied by the vast majority of the legal actors as law. Faced with this radically (...) changed reality, most contemporary legal positivists appear to be caught in a dilemma. The modern legal positivism, on one hand, is in front of a reality of legal globalization and increasing legal pluralism in many areas of law, that is a reality (e. g. soft-law) challenging some of the fundamental paradigms endorsed by this legal movement (e. g. the pedigree thesis). On the other hand, modern legal positivists have taken a quite passive attitude toward this challenge, either by abandoning the legal positivism as a whole to its destiny or by simply continuing to focus upon traditional (i. e. pre-globalization) issues as the fundamental ones to be tackled. The goal of this work is to suggest a shift of attention among legal positivists towards questions which have always been present in their program (though often in secondary terms), as also their solutions (often already present in the legal positivist works). This shift would possibly help the legal positivism movement to circumvent the black hole represented by legal globalization (and its legal pluralism), a black hole where the distinction between law and non-law (i. e. the major tenant of legal positivism) seems to vanish, putting the very existence and legitimacy of the legal phenomenon under question. (shrink)

This article provides the first-ever comprehensive analysis of how the relationship between the Chinese and Hong Kong legal orders has morphed in nature since China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. It argues that the relationship has evolved from a form of legal pluralism found in the European Union to a monist but bifurcated system—to a “dual state,” to borrow from Ernst Fraenkel’s theory. Recent events, including Beijing’s imposition of a national security law on Hong (...) Kong and its overhaul of Hong Kong’s election methods, have consolidated that evolution. The analysis herein not only enables us to make sense of the developments in the China-Hong Kong relationship, but has five wider theoretical implications. First, it suggests a way of distinguishing a dual state from a fully liberal legal system. Second, it discerns the similarities and differences between legal pluralism and dual state. Third, it connects the literature on theories of legal order and that on the dual state. Fourth, it clarifies the relationship between theories of legal order and regime types. Finally, Hong Kong’s experience reveals the challenges of and potential mechanisms for maintaining liberal values in an authoritarian regime. (shrink)

In this article I contend that the re-emergence of religion in Western liberal states is a feature of a much broader phenomenon, namely, the re-establishment of legal pluralism whereby various social actors claim to be the legitimate producers of their own law. To prove this, I first offer an account of secularization as the successful attempt of modern states to dismantle a legal-pluralist system. Based on this, I argue that the reviviscence of religions is the reviviscence of (...) their practical side: religious practices tend to be perceived by religious group members as providing guidance for conduct, one that challenges the rules of the state legal order and its monistic structure. Finally, by exploring the issue of same-sex union recognition, I defend the claim that, in a truly post-secular society, the state should allow a multiplicity of relationship-recognition models that reflect and meet different interests and needs. (shrink)

Approaches to legal pluralism vary widely across the spectrum of different disciplines. They comprise normative and descriptive perspectives, focus both on legal pluralist realities as well as public debates, and address legal pluralism in a range of different societies with varying political, institutional and historical conditions. Emphasising an empirical research to contemporary legal pluralist settings in Muslim contexts, the present collected volume contributes to a deepened understanding of legal pluralist issues and realities through (...) comparative examination. This approach reveals some common features, such as the relevance of Islamic law in power struggles and in the construction of (state or national) identities, strategies of coping with coexisting sets of legal norms by the respective agents, or public debates about the risks induced by the recognition of religious institutions in migrant societies. At the same time, the studies contained in this volume reveal that legal pluralist settings often reflect very specific historical and social constellations, which demands caution towards any generalisation. The volume is based on papers presented at a conference in Münster (Germany) in 2016 and comprises contributions by Judith Koschorke, Karen Meeschaut, Yvonne Prief, Ulrike Qubaja, Werner de Saeger, Ido Shahar, Katrin Seidel, Konstantinos Tsitselikis, Vishal Vora and Ihsan Yilmaz. (shrink)

After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences the European Union can no longer be conceived as an intergovernmental arrangement: It is a polity founded on an “overlapping consensus.” Consequently, to reconstruct the relations between national and Community law, legal monism does not work, neither in its statist, nor in its international version: Legal pluralism is needed, not in a sociological‐descriptive sense, but as a normative criterion by which a judge (and a citizen) must refer to many and various (...) sources of law to settle a dispute. Legal pluralism, however, can operate only under a rule of recognition: a common normative framework within which a reasonable number of sources can be handled. What Europe needs, therefore, is an interactionist constitution, which should emerge through an “open‐ended”discursive process. (shrink)

This book offers a comparative study of the management of legal pluralism. The authors describe and analyse the way state and non-state legal systems acknowledge legal pluralism - defined as the coexistence of a state and non-state legal systems in the same space in respect of the same subject matter for the same population - and determine its consequences for their own purposes. The book sheds light on the management processes deployed by legal (...) systems in Africa, Canada, Central Europe and the South Pacific, the multitudinous factors circumscribing the action of systems and individuals with respect to legal pluralism, and the effects of management strategies and processes on systems as well as on individuals. The book offers fresh practical and analytical insight on applied legal pluralism, a fast-growing field of scholarship and professional practice. Drawing from a wealth of original empirical data collected in several countries by a multilingual and multidisciplinary team, it provides a thorough account of the intricate patterns of state and non-state practices with respect to legal pluralism. As the book's non-prescriptive approach helps to uncover and evaluate several biases or assumptions on the part of policy makers, scholars and development agencies regarding the nature and the consequences of legal pluralism, it will appeal to a wide range of scholars and practitioners in law, development studies, political science and social sciences. (shrink)

The relationship between legal pluralism and international human rights law is a complex and multi-faceted one. To fully appreciate the nature of this relationship, one has to desegregate the various forms of legal pluralism and analyse whether in their existence or operation they are compatible with international human rights law. This article undertakes such an exercise drawing on the jurisprudence of global and regional human rights bodies. In doing so, it goes beyond a mechanical audit of (...) legal pluralism in the light of specific human rights and explores more foundational issues such as the nature and extent of a State’s human rights obligations when legal pluralism exists within its borders, the possibility of waiving human rights and questions of cultural relativism which hover over any discussion of legal pluralism. What emerges from this analysis is that a tentative conceptual framework exists to regulate the relationship between legal pluralism and international human rights law. It is one that not only requires the State to render legal pluralism compatible with human rights but also stipulates the process by which this should be done. Effectively implemented, it can achieve this objective and harness the pull of religious and customary law to ensure the more effective protection of human rights. (shrink)

This book brings together contributions from academics and practitioners to explore the implications of legal pluralism for legal development.

This review article examines the conceptual possibility of ‘cosmopolitan pluralism’, a jurisprudential theory developed by Paul Schiff Berman in his recent book, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders. Cosmopolitan pluralism is presented as a conceptual framework for understanding and managing situations of multiple legal orders which overlap and conflict. It seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both sovereigntist territorialism, which attempts to solve all legal disputes by exclusive application of the norms (...) of some single territorially-based jurisdiction, as well as universalism, which always looks for norms which transcend the differences of particular communities. Cosmopolitan pluralism maintains that conflicts ought to be preserved, not eliminated, and local variations should be recognized and accommodated to the greatest extent possible. Here I argue that while Berman has constructed a worthy and desirable goal for communities which find themselves in an increasingly globalized world, much work of an analytical kind remains to be done to show how such a goal is conceptually possible. As I shall attempt to demonstrate, Berman’s cosmopolitan pluralism asks for a radically revisionist understanding of the nature of law’s claim to authority, but it is not clear that such an account is available. (shrink)

This dissertation argues for a position called "legal pluralism". According to legal pluralism, most legal decision-making, especially decision-making by judges in "hard cases", is best analyzed as the application of a plurality of legal values which often conflict. Moreover, legal pluralism claims that these conflicts often cannot be resolved, and therefore decision-making in law is genuinely indeterministic in many cases. The position contrasts with two common accounts of judicial decision-making in hard cases: (...) the claim that judicial decision-making is significantly determinate and the claim that it is radically indeterminate . ;The first chapter argues for the first part of pluralism, namely that there is a plurality of legal values which typically conflict in hard cases of legal interpretation. It also argues against the doctrine of "intentionalism" which claims that determinacy can be achieved in legal interpretation by identifying the correct legal answer with the author's intended answer. The second chapter provides an extended analysis of Dworkin's doctrine of "law as integrity". It argues that Dworkin's theory of law is "monistic" in two senses. First, his theory attempts to provide a method for achieving deterministic decision-making; and secondly, his theory is committed to treating a single legal value--the value of "integrity"--as overriding. I claim that neither form of monism can plausibly be maintained. The third chapter argues that pluralism provides the best account of the special features of legal disagreement in hard cases and attempts to rebut counter-arguments suggesting that disagreement is epistemic disagreement only. The fourth and final chapter focuses on the nature of the values over which judges disagree. It proposes that the conflicts between values in some cases are genuine legal dilemmas because legal conflicts are often conflicts between "generically different" values or "incommensurable" values. In particular, "institutional" values--values which enhance the operation of law conceived as an institution having a certain function in society--are incommensurable with the values of substantive justice. (shrink)

Throughout the medieval period law was seen as the product of social groups and associations that formed legal orders, as Max Weber elaborates, "either constituted in its membership by such objective characteristics of birth, political, ethnic, or religious denomination, mode of life or occupation, or arose through the process of explicit fraternization." During the second half of the Middle Ages, roughly the tenth through fifteenth centuries, there were "several distinct types of law, sometimes competing, occasionally overlapping, invariably invoking different (...) traditions, jurisdictions and modes of operation." Types of law included imperial and royal edicts and statutes, canon law, unwritten customary law of tribes and localities, written Germanic law, residual Roman law, municipal statutes, the law of merchants and of guilds, and in England the common law, on the continent the Roman law of jurists after the twelfth century revival of the Justinian Code. The types of courts included various imperial and royal courts, ecclesiastical courts, manorial or seigniorial courts, village courts, municipal courts in cities, merchant courts, and guild courts. Serving as judges in these courts, respectively, were kings or their appointees, Bishops and abbots, barons or lords of the manor or their appointees, local lay leaders, leading burghers, merchants, and members of the guild. These various positions were not wholly separate-many high government officials were in religious orders, while Churches held landed estates that came with local judicial responsibilities. "Bishops, abbots and prioresses, as lords of temporal possessions, controlled manorial or honorial courts at which they sometimes, though not generally, presided in person, exercising responsibility for criminal and customary law." "The result was the existence of numerous law communities," Weber wrote, "the autonomous jurisdictions of which overlapped, the compulsory, political association being only one such autonomous jurisdiction in so far as it existed at all." Jurisdictional rules for judicial tribunals and the laws to be applied related to the persons involved and the subject matter at issue. The personality principle linked law to a person's community or association, and under feudalism property ownership came wrapped together with the right to judge those tied to the property. "Demarcation disputes between these laws and courts were numerous." Jurisdictional conflicts arose especially in relation to ecclesiastical courts, which claimed broad jurisdiction over personal status laws (marriage, divorce, inheritance) and moral crimes, as well as church property and personnel, matters which regularly overlapped with the jurisdiction of other courts. Furthermore, different bodies of law could be applicable in a given court in a given case. "It was common to find many different codes of customary law in force in the same kingdom, town or village, even in the same house, if the ninth century bishop Agobard of Lyons is to be believed when he says, 'It often happened that five mem were present or sitting together, and not one of them had the same law as another.'" In long settled areas, the personal law of communities became local customary law. People living within cities were subject to municipal statutes and customary law on certain matters (penal law, procedural), and the community law to which they were attached. (shrink)

Several aspects of the personality, thought and work of Don Vasco de Quiroga are known today, but a deeper awareness of his legal thinking would enable us to understand better the motives for his actions in New Spain and the Michoacán region. In order to do this we need to place him in the conceptual, institutional and legal context in which he was educated and where he developed throughout his life. Well versed in the different legal systems (...) in use at the time, he absorbed Roman laws, which he respected as the work of esteemed scholars, while at the same time basing his evangelical mission in Mexico on the canons of the Church. And the legal system that was to govern the villages he created according to a new model would be based on custom coming from the grassroots. (shrink)

Since 9/11, the possibilities for pluralism and tolerance have been severely tested by a discourse of terrorism and security. The development of an intelligent and cosmopolitan understanding between religious communities in Europe and America has been compromised by a range of legal and political responses to terrorism. While the debate about the berqa has clearly indicated the problems relating to Muslim cultural differences, we argue that legal pluralism and in particular the question of Shari’a tribunals may (...) prove to be a more decisive test of Western multiculturalism. This article examines the many criticisms raised against religious arbitration in domestic affairs and considers the presence of the Shari’a at various levels of society, claiming that the evolution of Sharia-mindedness is compatible both with a faith-based life and with liberal ideals. However, the problem with religious courts lies elsewhere, namely with the fragmentation of social life and the erosion of citizenship. The article concludes by examining the prospects and problems of Turkish entry into the European Union with special reference to the domestic policies of the Justice and Development Party. (shrink)

Global legal pluralism has become one of the leading analytical frameworks for understanding and conceptualizing law in the twenty-first century.

As we move towards a more global legal community, often with accompanying injustice and violence, Mireille Delmas-Marty demonstrates an urgent need to reconstruct the national and international legal landscapes. She argues that legal reasoning can be applied to concepts such as human rights for European citizens in the new world order. The book will be of interest to all comparative European lawyers, and to social scientists and legal theorists grappling with contemporary issues in legal (...) class='Hi'>pluralism and globalization. (shrink)

Both decentralization of state law and cultural relativism have been fundamentally embedded in legal pluralism. As a scholarly trend in law and society, it has insightfully challenged the underpinnings of analytical positivist jurisprudence. Nevertheless, a theoretical concept of political power has significantly been missing in research on the plurality of legal practices in various jurisdictions. This Article aims to critically offer a theoretical concept of political power that takes legal decentralization and cultural relativism seriously and yet (...) points to how and where we should look into political power, assuming that legal pluralism itself may be a strategy of elites and nation-states amid globalization. First, the Article explores the contributions of legal pluralism, and its limits, in intellectually revolting against analytical positivist jurisprudence. Second, it explicates why a concept of political power has been missing, and why such a concept is required for better comprehension of legal pluralism. Third, it calls for a look into three sites of political power in the praxis of legal pluralism: politics of identities, non-ruling communities, and neo-liberal globalization. Last, the Article constructs a concept of political-legal transformations that enables us to unveil political power in the context of de-centralized legal pluralities. Power is produced in, resides in and is generated in the dynamic interactions between nation-states, localities and global agents. Transformative relations along these dimensions allow the nation-state to forfeit some elements of power, both in economics and in law, but they also enable it to maintain some essential ingredients of political power that are often veiled in the rhetoric of globalized pluralism. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a method to solve controversies in scenarios of legal pluralism. Shortly, in scenarios of legal pluralism some of the controversies involve members of culturally differentiated groups who justify their allegations with arguments that only make sense in the culture to which they belong. If the adjudicator does not share the same cultural worldview as the parts under litigation, how can he/she come to make a decision determining the parties’ rights and obligations? (...) My answer for this question includes (1) an account of knowledge to culturally differentiated groups, and (2) a method for the evaluation of the culturally-dependent arguments. (shrink)