The philosophy of Gauḍapāda, although found in a small treatise, has remained obscure, as both the classical and contemporary approaches to reading this philosopher have overlooked his highly original contributions. This essay explores the scope of imagination in Gauḍapāda?s philosophy, with a focus on terms such as kalpanā and ābhāsa. This reading of Gauḍapāda?s philosophy tallies with some of the findings in contemporary consciousness studies.

In this article, I suggest that moksha (liberation or enlightenment) in Advaita Vedanta is best understood psychologically. A psychological understanding is not only consistent with the Advaita Vedanta articulated by Shankara and Gaudapada, but avoids what will be called the problem of jivan mukti. This article will consist of three main parts. First, I will briefly discuss the metaphysics and ontology of Advaita Vedanta. Next, I will present the problem of jivan mukti, and the Advaitin response to the problem. (...) The problem of jivan mukti will lead to the third portion of the article, which is a presentation of what moksha is. At no point in the article will I be arguing the truth of the Advaitin position. Instead, I will be meeting Advaita on its own terms in order to come to some understanding of moksha. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Samkhya Karikas of Is'vara Krishna: With the Commentary of Gaudapada; Abstract of Thesis In a concise and comprehensive way, these sixty-nine me morial verses, each in turn, explain the several doctrines of the earlier and pure Samkhya school, as yet untouched by Vedantic colorings, and in their brevity and terseness they resemble, in every particular, except their metrical structure, the sutras of the remaining five orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds (...) of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Gaudapada is usually supposed to have lived about 500 A.D. His Karika or Agamasastra, a short work of 215 verses, combines the conciseness of a sutra with the clarity of a commentary, thus avoiding both the unintelligibility characteristic of the Hindu sutras and the interminability characteristic of the commentaries. In the first of the four chapters, which is a commentary on, and usually considered part of, the Mandukya Upanishad, the appearance of the Self in the "three states" of waking (...) and dreaming and sleeping is contrasted with its true being in the "fourth state" beyond duality, various theories of creation are rejected, and the meaning of the mystic syllable Aum is explained. In the second chapter subjectivism is defended, with its consequence that the objects of waking experience, which constitute the world, are no more real than fairyland or the objects of dreams; really there is no creation and no destruction of things, no bondage and no liberation of the Self. In the third chapter the apparent plurality of selves is compared with the apparent plurality of spaces defined by various containers; just as there is only one real Space, so there is only one real Self; the "highest truth" is that "nothing is born." In the final chapter consciousness is compared to a firebrand, which seems to produce various figures when whirled around, though it does not really produce anything; so consciousness seems to produce various objects when agitated, but when calm it is just the Self. (shrink)

Aim of the lectures -- Early Brahmanical literature -- Panini's grammar -- A passage from the Chandogya Upanisad -- The structures of languages -- The Buddhist contribution -- Vaisesika and language -- Verbal knowledge -- The contradictions of Nagarjuna -- The reactions of other thinkers -- Sarvastivada Samkhya -- The Agamasastra of Gaudapada -- Sankara -- Kashmiri Saivism -- Jainism -- Early Vaisesika -- Critiques of the existence of a thing before its arising -- Nyaya -- Mimamsa -- The (...) Abhidharmakosa bhasya of Vasubandhu -- The Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga and its bhasya -- Bhartrhari -- The problem of negation -- Dignaga and verbal knowledge -- The Bodhisattvabhumi -- Prajnakaragupta -- Indian thinkers and the correspondence principle -- Appendix. The Mahaprajnaparamitasastra and the Samkhya tanmatras. (shrink)

This volume summarizes what we know of early Advaita Vedanta upto the Samkara's pupils, Suresvara, Padmapada, Totaka and Hanstamalaka. An analytical introduction by the editor introduces the reader to the concepts utilized by Gaudapada, Samkaracarya and mandana Misra in expounding and defending the Advaita view. This is followed by summaries of all the authentic Advaita works of these authors, together with those of Suresvara and Padmapada as well as a number of other works which have been attributed to samkara, (...) Totaka and Hastamalaka. This volume is divided into two parts and is enriched with an elaborate introduction discussing briefly the history of the school, its theories of value, language and relations and its metaphysics and epistemology. Contents Preface, Part one: Introduction to the philosophy of advaita vedanta, PART Two: Summaries of Works, Notes, Index. (shrink)

The Advaita literature prior to the time of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is scarce. Relying on the citations of proponents and their opponents, the picture we glean of this early monism differs in many aspects from that of Śaṅkara. While Bhavya’s criticism of this monistic thought has received scholarly attention, the chapter Puruṣavāda in Dvādaśāranayacakra has rarely been studied. Broadly, this conversation will help ground classical Advaita in light of the contemporary discourse on naturalism. In particular, this examination will help contextualize (...) the early Advaita that lacks clear imprint of Mahayana Buddhism. The doctrine of Puruṣa, central to this paper, sidelines the role of avidyā or ignorance, and provides a realistic picture of the world. I have relied on the commentary Vṛtti upon the Vākyapadīya as has been substantially cited in DNC in order to advance the arguments. As a consequence, the examination on Puruṣa also paves the path for advancing arguments on linguistic monism. (shrink)

This article discusses the early advaitin view of dreaming, Specifically sankara's and gaudapada's, And analyzes the advaitin view in relation to that of contemporary western dream psychology. Advaitins emphasize that dreams spring from waking experiences, But are also imaginative reconstructions of them. Both waking and dream seduce us into thinking appearances are real, But both ultimately only point to the non-Dual reality, Brahman.

Not being satisfied with the interpretation offered by Sankara and his followers, or some other teachers the author has attempted in the following pages to present to the readers his own interpretation of the work as he has understood it. But in no way does he claim that his interpretation is the interpretation, i.e., the interpretation intended by Gaudapada himself. In the present volume the author has given a new edition of the text of the Agamasastra based on a (...) number of MSS and different editions, followed by an English translation. After this comes his annotation. At the end there are Appendixes including the text and English translation of the Mandukya Upanisad, VAriants of the MSS used for the edition of the text of the Agamasastra, and different indexes. (shrink)

This paper aims at giving a brief historical survey of the growth and development of the meaning attributed by the ancient Indians to the term maya. In studying this term we must not lose sight of the fact that it is very often used in various texts without any bearing upon the great problem of the,reality' of the phenomenal world as compared with brahman. In a large number of texts originating in pre-or non-Vedantic circles the word occurs in a great (...) variety of connotations : « power, wisdom, subtle device », and, especially, « incomprehensible power enabling its possessor to create something » ascribed to mighty beings. In the Vedic period there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the phenomenal world in the use of the term. It does not mean « chimera, illusion, fascination, delusion, fata morgana, etc. ». It refers to a reality of an artificial or misleading character, to phenomena produced by a special ability or imagination ; it can often be translated by a locution beginning with pseudo —, or by the Engl. craft in one of its connotations. It can also mean « fraud, deception ». Philosophers often referred to these common meanings of the word in discussing the,relation' of brahman and the phenomena which essentially are brahman. Svet. Up. 4, 9 and 10 nature is called maya : in this upanûad the germs from which the various views or doctrines of the generations to come were to develop had already reached the first stage of growth without differentiating in any considerable degree. Here maya does not express the unreality of the world, but the impossibility of man's understanding its character and the power of its creator. Nor does the Bhagavadgita question the reality of the world either. Deussen and other scholars were wrong in following Sahara's school of thought which interpreted these texts from its own particular point of view. In the history of Indian thought Buddhism is of outstanding importance. According to the ancient Buddhists the world and the individuals are real, but unstable, of a comparatively insignificant,metaphysical dignity'. The Madhyamika's and Nagarjima's relativistic school prepare the way for the idealistic Vijnanavadins who, founding their ontology on the psychology of yoga, hold the view that only vijnana « mere consciousness » exists. Any pretended,reality' outside this reality is to be regarded as dependent on a wrong interpretation of our inner experiences. The,causally dependent aspect', a determined,form of reality' reflects the,absolute aspect'; the lower constructed aspect' or,wrong ideation', the sphere of the concrete phenomena, however, is to be compared to a snake the presence of which we incorrectly assume when, at dusk, we find a cable.In this connection the term maya is also used : a rope may appear in the shape of a snake, or a maya in the shape of a man and other objects which do not really exist in themselves. This maya is void, non-substantial; in the same way the, wrong or constructive ideation' which appears in the, aspect of subject and object' is called non-substantial. In the process by which the reality of consciousness is transformed into the aspect of wrong ideation maya plays an important rôle : it is the power or factor producing the differentiation of the homogeneous consciousness which results in the pseudo-existence of the phenomenal world. Gaudapada, the earliest exponent of the view of pure non-duality writing at a time when the influence of these idealistic Buddhists was predominant, availed himself of the results of their speculative endeavour. On the other hand he made sure of the sanction of the traditional brahminical circles by expounding his views in the form of an expatiation on the Mandukya. Upanmd. The universum, he holds, is like a dream, like a maya ; « it is not actually so ». All phenomenal beings are dreamlike projections of the Divine Self, which is by its very maya able to make itself assume this projected form. But in his book maya also serves to indicate that any relation at all between the world and the Ultimate cannot be rationally sustained, for this,relation' is inexplicable. Maya, inherent to brahman is the condition underlying the,Origin', the pseudo-existence of this world ; but our lack of understanding is also maya. Our empirical knowledge, which makes us believe that things come into being is would-be knowledge. Maya is the hypothesis needed to express in a formula that the diversity of the phenomenal world is neither identical with atman-brahman nor existing by itself. Sawkara likewise regards the world as,pseudo' ; but in contradistinction to Gaudapada who focusses attention on the maya formula and the character of the phenomena, he emphasizes the sole reality of brahman, avoiding any suggestion as to the world's being void, non-being or unsubstantial. This formulation holds good from the higher point of view, viz. that of the supreme reality, into which empirical knowledge cannot penetrate. For practical purposes the world may be considered as really existing. The ignorance which conceals our true character from us and makes us perceive a world which from the standpoint of the Supreme does not exist is maya. Maya hides the reality and projects a pseudo-reality. It is undefinable and inexplicable ; it is neither being nor non-being. Maya is the postulate needed to account for the phenomenon called universe, for the existence of the diversity, though it is only the One which exists. Finally the maya theories of Saktas and Visnuite schools are briefly discussed. According to the former mayasakti is the power of the Supreme to veil itself without ceasing to be what it is ; they emphasize the point of view that « this all is brahman », accusing Sankara of admitting a principle beside brahman. Ramanuja who basing himself on the conviction that Brahman in the first place is God, defends the thesis that the world and the souls are real, and attacks Sankara's maya theory ; according to this great exponent of Visnuite thought maya symbolizes the wonderful and miraculous in God's creation and creative power. (shrink)

Bhattacharyya, K. The Advaita concept of subjectivity.--Deutsch, E. Reflections on some aspects of the theory of rasa.--Nakamura, H. The dawn of modern thought in the East.--Organ, T. Causality, Indian and Greek.--Chatterjee, M. On types of classification.--Lacombe, O. Transcendental imagination.--Bahm, A. J. Standards for comparative philosophy.--Herring, H. Appearance, its significance and meaning in the history of philosophy.--Chang Chung-yuan. Pre-rational harmony in Heidegger's essential thinking and Chʼan thought.--Staal, J. F. Making sense of the Buddhist tetralemma.--Enomiya-Lassalle, H. M. The mysticism of Carl Albrecht (...) and Zen.--Parrinder, G. The nature of mysticism.--Cairns, G. E. Axiological contributions of East and West to the spiritual development of mankind.--Mayeda, S. Śaṇkara's view of ethics.--Mercier, A. On peace.--Barlingay, S. S. A discussion of some aspects of Gaudapāda's philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Part TwoAndrew O. FortA History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Part Two. By Hajime Nakamura. Translated by Hajime Nakamura, Trevor Leggett, et al.. Edited by Sengaku Mayeda. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004. Pp. xxi + 842. Hardcover $58.95.First, to address the exact nature of this volume: the bulk of A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Part Twoby Hajime Nakamura was part of Nakamura's doctoral (...) thesis submitted to Tokyo University in 1942, with, as the front flap states, "many additions and revisions done by the author himself." Part 1 was published by Motilal Banarsidass in 1976. For those interested, that first volume includes four parts: the chronology and significance of early Vedānta philosophy, early Vedānta philosophy as seen by other Indian (particularly Buddhist) thinkers and schools, scholars before the Brahmasūtra, and the nature and content of the Brahmasūtraitself. Part 2 is thus rather overdue, although various portions of this volume were published in the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, we should be grateful that the English-speaking world finally has more of the vast erudition of this titan of scholarship on Hindu thought, yet acknowledge that this is as much a pioneering historical document in Advaita research as a contribution to current knowledge.Despite this reservation, let us begin with fulsome praise: how many scholars in any discipline from any period can rival Hajime Nakamura? Even in his dissertation, he shows wide familiarity with Hindu and Buddhist thought, having consulted sources in Sanskrit, Pāli, Prakrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese, English, German, and probably others. Who, ever again, would have the courage, or the linguistic skills, to attempt a book called Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples?Truly this was a jñānasāgara!Still, one must say that the present volume has shortcomings beyond age: it is not particularly well-organized or "user-friendly," not always well-focused, and sometimes repetitious. The translations, while clear, are generally not graceful. And in the decades since the bulk of this was written, much additional scholarship on key figures and texts discussed therein has been published, and new theoretical conceptualizations have arisen to aid our understandings. Depending on one's view, this text reveals the notable absence of (or freedom from) contemporary scholarly currents of postcolonial, postmodern, or feminist critique, nor does it reflect the move to greater social history often apparent today. It is also surprisingly noncomparative, given the author's later work. This, then, is mostly a traditional history of the development of ideas by one of the pitāmahasof classical Indian scholarship.The book is divided into four basic sections. First are remarks on the life, works, and ideas of post- Brahmasūtrabut pre-Śaṅkara thinkers such as Upavarṣa, Bodhāyana (who influenced Rāmānuja), and Bhartṛprapañca (whom Śaṅkara and Sureśvara opposed, particularly on jñānakarma-samuccaya), with frequent comparisons of their thinking with that of Śaṅkara. This section well traces the basic time and lineage of key thinkers, and nicely unpacks their views and later influence. [End Page 480]Next is an extended consideration of Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍükyakārikās, which is probably the most important pre-Śaṅkara Advaita work. Nakamura describes and offers extensive analysis of each chapter (prakaraṇa)and its characteristics separately, particularly the thought (on consciousness states, māyā, ajātivāda, and Buddhist ideas, respectively) and practices ( ommeditation, Self-realization, asparśayoga, etc.) distinctive to each. He clearly shows the differences in doctrine and application among the chapters, and between them and the Māndūkya Upaniṣad. Nakamura raises the questions of the text's authorship, sacrality, unity, and extent of Buddhist influence, which had already been debated by many scholars at that time, and yet this section shows its age; while even-handedly summarizing the discussion to that point, and offering his own judiciously reasoned conclusions (most importantly, that they are four independently composed treatises), his conclusions are neither groundbreaking nor today near to the last word. In fact, I was reminded of reading through those debates as I was... (shrink)

Rational epistemics is the line of reasoning inclined to reason separated from reliance on experience that ultimately leads to monism or non-dualism.

Epistemic approaches towards understanding ultimate reality proceed chiefly via the rational, the empirical, and the fideistic way, each yielding a theological view consistent to the approach chosen. Rational theologies tend to be ultimately monist in nature, while empirical theologies are pluralistic, e.g. polytheism. Fideism has its dangers as well where blind faith only hampers scientific research. However, Indian philosophy has suggested few criteria for verifying a source of authoritative testimony. This dissertation investigates why an authentic revelation would solve the ultimate (...) clash between reason and experience. (shrink)