Many types of `other-regarding' acts and beliefs cannotbe accounted for satisfactorilyas instances of sophisticated selfishness, altruism,team-reasoning, Kantian duty, kinselection etc. This paper argues in favour ofre-inventing the notion of solidarity as ananalytical category capable of shedding importantnew light on hitherto under-explainedaspects of human motivation. Unlike altruism andnatural sympathy (which turn theinterests of specific others into one's own), orteam-reasoning (which applies exclusivelyto members of some team), or Kantian duty (whichdemands universalisable principlesof action), the essence of solidarity lies in thehypothesis that people (...) are capable ofresponding sympathetically to (or empathising with)a condition afflicting ‘others’,irrespectively of who those others are or whetherone cares for them personally. Andwhen that condition is a social artefact, we argue,solidarity turns radical. (shrink)

In December 1999 two papers were published on the theme of inequality in journals of the American Economic Association. The first article (Welch, American Economic Review) celebrates inequality's recent advances in conventional neoliberal fashion, as an essentially progressive force that spawns innovation and stimulates growth. The second article (Aghion et al, Journal of Economic Literature) presents contrary evidence that inequality has retarded growth and impeded socioeconomic progress. This paper argues that Welch's defense of the status quo might be of greater (...) value to those who object to it than Aghion et aUs well-intentioned article. (shrink)

Evolutionary game theory has recently furnished some exciting theoretical and experimental insights regarding the birth of social power and discrimination. But can this type of theory illuminate the history and nature of capitalism? The answer turns out to be negative: evolutionary models are bound to remain either insufficiently evolutionary or hopelessly indeterminate. However, social theorists have much to gain from understanding what would breathe social life into evolutionary game theory's models: a proper historical account of the sources of behavioral variety, (...) and an adaptive mechanism that leaves room for the cunning of human reason. (shrink)

The a priori definitions of rationality and freedom that permeate orthodox economics in particular and the liberal discourse in general have important theoretical implications. A Hegelian critique of ahistorical approaches to the meaning of Liberty and Reason reveals insurmountable problems that the axiomatic approach inflicts upon game theory, contractarian theories of justice and Rational Choice Marxism. While the postmodern critique and the method of deconstruction are useful, the meaning we seek is best gleaned through Marx's conception of praxis.

Equilibrium game theory borrows from neoclassical economics its rationality concept which it immediately puts to work in order to produce the basic results it needs for building an elaborate narrative of social interaction. This paper focuses on some recent objections to game theory's use of rationality assumptions in general, and of backward induction and subgame perfection in particular, and interprets them in the light of the postmodern critique of the grand meta-narratives which social theorists often rely on for social explanation. (...) The paper presents a defence of game theory which seeks to accommodate the postmodern critique. However, it goes on to show that such a defence is illegitimate and claims that the problem lies with the faulty conceptualisation of the main concept on which game theory rests: that of Reason. Having established the nature of the problem, it considers three alternative interpretations (Humean, postmodern and Hegelian) of why the problem resists logical solutions and of its significance for social theory. (shrink)

L’Europe connaît une triple crise : bancaire, des dettes souveraines, et de l’investissement. Laisser les États-nations gérer ces crises ne peut que creuser les inégalités territoriales et aller vers la désagrégation de l’Europe. Celle-ci dispose pourtant d’institutions bancaires et financières qui lui permettent d’intervenir dans le respect des souverainetés nationales, tout en dessinant une voie de progrès européenne. L’article détaille la feuille de route proposée à ces institutions.

Moralising is a venerable last resort strategy. The ancient Melians presented the Athenian generals with a splendid example when in a particularly tight corner. In our Western philosophical tradition moral rhetoric is often couched in the form of reasons for action either external to preference and desire (eg. Kant) or internal to the agent''s calculus of desire (e.g., Hume, Gauthier). A third tradition dismisses such rhetoric as the last recourse of the weak (e.g., Aristotle, Nietzsche) whereas a fourth calls for (...) an examination of the social context (e.g., Socrates, Marx, Wittgenstein, Habermas). This paper reports on an experiment which throws some empirical light on these debates and offers a surprising twist to the interpretation of the Melians'' plea. (shrink)