Capitalism According to Evolutionary Game Theory: The Impossibility of a Sufficiently Evolutionary Model of Historical Change

Science and Society 72 (1):63 - 94 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory has recently furnished some exciting theoretical and experimental insights regarding the birth of social power and discrimination. But can this type of theory illuminate the history and nature of capitalism? The answer turns out to be negative: evolutionary models are bound to remain either insufficiently evolutionary or hopelessly indeterminate. However, social theorists have much to gain from understanding what would breathe social life into evolutionary game theory's models: a proper historical account of the sources of behavioral variety, and an adaptive mechanism that leaves room for the cunning of human reason

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evolutionary games without rationality?Martin Bunzl - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):365-378.
Modeling social and evolutionary games.Angela Potochnik - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):202-208.
Explaining the social contract.Zachary Ernst - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-24.
When evolutionary game theory explains morality, what does it explain?Justin D'arms - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):296-299.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-09-30

Downloads
52 (#293,581)

6 months
7 (#350,235)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references