Abstract

In Social Practices—A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social, Theodore R. Schatzki undertakes two interrelated projects. First, he seeks to articulate a program for the proper understanding of human social phenomena whose fundamental notion is that of a social practice. Second, he seeks to show that the approach he recommends is latent in the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is clear that Schatzki regards Wittgenstein's work as both inspirational and fundamentally correct. Nonetheless, he seeks to go beyond what he finds in Wittgenstein: "I acknowledge that what I will write is not explicitly found in Wittgenstein's remarks. My account is an attempt at creative interpretation, which draws out from a thinker's writings a position that is not officially presented there. I make no apologies for this procedure." This is reasonable enough. There are, however, some facets of Schatzki's purportedly Wittgensteinian analysis which, I believe, are much too "creative," in this sense. Not only do they go beyond what Wittgenstein presents, but they are pretty clearly antithetical to the spirit and substance of Wittgenstein's thought.