We study the notion of weak canonical bases in an NSOP $_{1}$ theory T with existence. Given $p=\operatorname {tp}$ where $B=\operatorname {acl}$ in ${\mathcal M}^{\operatorname {eq}}\models T^{\operatorname {eq}}$, the weak canonical base of p is the smallest algebraically closed subset of B over which p does not Kim-fork. With this aim we firstly show that the transitive closure $\approx $ of collinearity of an indiscernible sequence is type-definable. Secondly, we prove that given a total $\mathop {\smile (...) \hskip -0.9em ^| \ }^K$ -Morley sequence I in p, the weak canonical base of $\operatorname {tp}$ is $\operatorname {acl}$, if the hyperimaginary $I/\approx $ is eliminable to e, a sequence of imaginaries. We also supply a couple of criteria for when the weak canonical base of p exists. In particular the weak canonical base of p is the intersection of the weak canonical bases of all total $\mathop {\smile \hskip -0.9em ^| \ }^K$ -Morley sequences in p over B. However, while we investigate some examples, we point out that given two weak canonical bases of total $\mathop {\smile \hskip -0.9em ^| \ }^K$ -Morley sequences in p need not be interalgebraic, contrary to the case of simple theories. Lastly we suggest an independence relation relying on weak canonical bases, when T has those. The relation, satisfying transitivity and base monotonicity, might be useful in further studies on NSOP $_1$ theories. (shrink)

This paper obtains the weak completeness and decidability results for standard systems of modal logic using models built from formulas themselves. This line of work began with Fine (Notre Dame J. Form. Log. 16:229-237, 1975). There are two ways in which our work advances on that paper: First, the definition of our models is mainly based on the relation Kozen and Parikh used in their proof of the completeness of PDL, see (Theor. Comp. Sci. 113-118, 1981). The point is (...) to develop a general model-construction method based on this definition. We do this and thereby obtain the completeness of most of the standard modal systems, and in addition apply the method to some other systems of interest. None of the results use filtration, but in our final section we explore the connection. (shrink)

Let be a weakly o‐minimal structure with the strong cell decomposition property. In this note, we show that the canonical o‐minimal extension of is the unique prime model of the full first order theory of over any set. We also show that if two weakly o‐minimal structures with the strong cell decomposition property are isomorphic then, their canonical o‐minimal extensions are isomorphic too. Finally, we show the uniqueness of the prime models in a complete weakly o‐minimal theory (...) with prime models. (shrink)

Our main results are:Theorem 1. Con implies Con. [In fact equiconsistency holds.]Theorem 3. Con implies Con.Theorem 5. Con ”) implies Con.We start with a discussion of the canonical functions and look at some combinatorial principles. Assuming the domination property of Theorem 1, we use the Ketonen diagram to show that ω2V is a limit of measurable cardinals in Jensen’s core model KMO for measures of order zero. Using related arguments we show that ω2V is a stationary limit of (...) measurable cardinals in KMO, if there exists a weakly normal ultrafilter on ω1. The proof yields some other results, e.g., on the consistency strength of weak*-saturated filters on ω1, which are of interest in view of the classical Ulam problem. (shrink)

We give a model of set theory in which the strongly non‐stationary ideal over is weakly presaturated below some canonical set. Here μ is a regular uncountable cardinal. The model is the forcing extension with the Lévy collapse of a Woodin cardinal to the successor of μ. This improves on results of Goldring and of the first author.

Weakness of will denotes a phenomenon that many would regard as forming part of everyday human experience. I hate to admit to it, but I do sometimes reprimand my children more harshly than I think I should, and similar situations occur daily. This could be an example of weakness of will or incontinence: I will to be constructive and provide a model of calm interaction, but fail to do so because my will is weak and I end up (...) acting against better knowledge. But what is it that happens in such situations? Philosophers, theologians, poets, and other writers have discussed this question as akrasia, as well as under other headings. Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present not only contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the history of akrasia, but is also the first book that attempts to cover the trajectory of this issue through all major periods of Western philosophy. The book invites a broad range of readers, focusing on canonical figures from Plato and Aristotle through Augustine and Aquinas to Descartes, Kant, and Nietzsche. (shrink)

We study the degree of elimination of imaginaries needed for the three main applications: to have canonical bases for types over models, to define strong types as types over algebraically closed sets and to have a Galois correspondence between definably closed sets B such that A ⊆ B ⊆ acl and closed subgroups of the Galois group Aut/A). We also characterize when the topology of the Galois group is the quotient topology.

This paper extends David Lewis' result that all first degree modal logics are complete to weakly aggregative modal logic by providing a filtration-theoretic version of the canonical model construction of Apostoli and Brown. The completeness and decidability of all first-degree weakly aggregative modal logics is obtained, with Lewis's result for Kripkean logics recovered in the case k = 1.

Suppose T is a weakly minimal theory and p a strong 1-type having locally finite but nontrivial geometry. That is, for any M [boxvR] T and finite Fp, there is a finite Gp such that acl∩p = gεGacl∩pM; however, we cannot always choose G = F. Then there are formulas θ and E so that θεp and for any M[boxvR]T, E defines an equivalence relation with finite classes on θ/E definably inherits the structure of either a projective or affine space (...) over some finite field. We then specify what other structure θ/E may inherit: there is some collection of definable subspaces of finite codimension and some set of algebraic points, which in the affine case may be in the canonically associated vector space, Up to acl, no further structure is possible. If we assume T is weakly minimal and has a strong type p as above, and also that T is unidimensional, we obtain a global description of any model of T in terms of those structures mentioned in the previous paragraph. (shrink)

We prove that a form of the $Erd\H{o}s$ property (consistent with $V = L\lbrack H_{\omega_2}\rbrack$ and strictly weaker than the Weak Chang's Conjecture at ω1), together with Bounded Martin's Maximum implies that Woodin's principle $\psi_{AC}$ holds, and therefore 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. We also prove that $\psi_{AC}$ implies that every function $f: \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_1$ is bounded by some canonical function on a club and use this to produce a model of the Bounded Semiproper Forcing Axiom in which (...) Bounded Martin's Maximum fails. (shrink)

We give a model-theoretic account for several results regarding sequences of random variables appearing in Berkes and Rosenthal [12]. In order to do this,•We study and compare three notions of convergence of types in a stable theory: logic convergence, i.e., formula by formula, metric convergence (both already well studied) and convergence of canonical bases. In particular, we characterise א0-categorical stable theories in which the last two agree.•We characterise sequences that admit almost indiscernible sub-sequences.•We apply these tools to the (...) theory of atomless random variables (ARV). We characterise types and notions of convergence of types as conditional distributions and weak/strong convergence thereof, and obtain, among other things, the Main Theorem of Berkes and Rosenthal. (shrink)

This paper connects the following four topics: a class of generalized graphs whose relations do not have fixed arities called hypergraphs, a family of non-normal modal logics rejecting the aggregative axiom, an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, and the classical group knowledge modality of ‘someone knows’. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs (...) and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity and positive introspection, and upon adding a single combinatorial axiom, it is also the logic of ‘someone knows’ for a fixed finite number of positively introspective agents. At the core of all these completeness results is a new canonical neighborhood model construction for monotone modal logics that is capable of dealing with all these diverse cases. We also provide an axiomatization for the logic of all non-n-colorable hypergraphs based on a filtration argument that also shows the decidability of the logics of hypergraphs we study. (shrink)

We follow [8] in asking when a set of ordinals $X \subseteq \alpha$ is a countable union of sets in K, the core model. We show that, analogously to L, and X closed under the canonical Σ 1 Skolem function for K α can be so decomposed provided K is such that no ω-closed filters are put on its measure sequence, but not otherwise. This proviso holds if there is no inner model of a weak Erdős-type (...) property. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to prove a topological completeness theorem for a weak version of Stalnaker’s logic KB of knowledge and belief. The weak version of KB is characterized by the assumption that the axioms and rules of KB have to be satisfied with the exception of the axiom (NI) of negative introspection. The proof of a topological completeness theorem for weak KB is based on the fact that nuclei (as defined in the framework (...) of point-free topology) give rise to a profusion of topological belief operators that are compatible with the familiar topological knowledge operator. Thereby a canonical topological model for weak KB can be constructed. For this canonical model a truth lemma for the K and B holds such that a completeness theorem for KB can be proved in the familiar way. The second aim of this paper is to show that the topological interpretation of knowledge K comes along with a complete Heyting algebra of belief operators B that all fit the knowledge operator K in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all axioms of weak KB. This amounts to a pluralistic relation between knowledge and belief: Knowledge does not fully determine belief, rather it designs a conceptual space for belief operators where different (competing) belief operators coexist. (shrink)

We provide results allowing to state, by the simple inspection of suitable classes of posets , that the corresponding intermediate propositional logics are maximal among the ones which satisfy the disjunction property. Starting from these results, we directly exhibit, without using the axiom of choice, the Kripke frames semantics of 2No maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property. This improves previous evaluations, giving rise to the same conclusion but made with an essential use of the axiom of choice, of (...) the cardinality of the set of the maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property. (shrink)

We prove the canonical models introduced in [D] do not exist for some graded normal logics with symmetric models, namelyKB°, KBD°, KBT°, so that we define a new kind of canonical models, the general ones, and show they exist and work well in every case.

I build a canonical model for constant domain basic first-order logic (BQLCD), the constant domain first-order extension of Visser’s basic propositional logic, and use the canonical model to verify that BQLCD satisfies the disjunction and existence properties.

We define the property of Π2-compactness of a statement Φ of set theory, meaning roughly that the hard core of the impact of Φ on combinatorics of 1 can be isolated in a canonical model for the statement Φ. We show that the following statements are Π2-compact: “dominating NUMBER = 1,” “cofinality of the meager IDEAL = 1”, “cofinality of the null IDEAL = 1”, “bounding NUMBER = 1”, existence of various types of Souslin trees and variations on (...) uniformity of measure and CATEGORY = 1. Several important new metamathematical patterns among classical statements of set theory are pointed out. (shrink)

We introduce Kripke models for propositional substructural logics with strong negation, and show the completeness theorems for these logics using an extended Ishihara's canonical model construction method. The framework presented can deal with a broad range of substructural logics with strong negation, including a modified version of Nelson's logic N$^-$, Wansing's logic COSPL, and extended versions of Visser's basic propositional logic, positive relevant logics, Corsi's logics and M\'endez's logics.

Although the computational properties of the Region Connection Calculus RCC-8 are well studied, reasoning with RCC-8 entails several representational problems. This includes the problem of representing arbitrary spatial regions in a computational framework, leading to the problem of generating a realization of a consistent set of RCC-8 constraints. A further problem is that RCC-8 performs reasoning about topological space, which does not have a particular dimension. Most applications of spatial reasoning, however, deal with two- or three-dimensional space. Therefore, a consistent (...) set of RCC-8 constraints might not be realizable within the desired dimension. In this paper we address these problems and develop a canonical model of RCC-8 which allows a simple representation of regions with respect to a set of RCC-8 constraints, and, further, enables us to generate realizations in any dimension d = 1. For three-and higher-dimensional space this can also be done for internally connected regions. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to develop the notion of partial probability distributions as being more realistic models of belief systems than the standard accounts. We formulate the theory of partial probability functions independently of any classical semantic notions. We use the partial probability distributions to develop a formal semantics for partial propositional calculi, with extensions to predicate logic and higher order languages. We give a proof theory for the partial logics and obtain soundness and completeness results.

This work intends to be a generalization and a simplification of the techniques employed in [2], by the proposal of a general strategy to prove satisfiability theorems for NLGM-s (= normal logics with graded modalities), analogously to the well known technique of the canonical models by Lemmon and Scott for classical modal logics.

In this paper we investigate Kripke models, used to model knowledge or belief in a static situation, and action models, used to model communicative actions that change this knowledge or belief. The appropriate notion for structural equivalence between modal structures such as Kripke models is bisimulation: Kripke models that are bisimilar are modally equivalent. We would like to find a structural relation that can play the same role for the action models that play a prominent role in information (...) updating. Two action models are equivalent if they yield the same results when updating Kripke models. More precisely, two action models are equivalent if it holds for all Kripke models that the result of updating with one action model is bisimilar to the result of updating with the other action model. We propose a new notion of action emulation that characterizes the structural equivalence of the important class of canonical action models. Since every action model has an equivalent canonical action model, this gives a method to decide the equivalence of any pair of action models. We also give a partial result that holds for the class of all action models. Our results extend the work in van Eijck et al. (Synthese 185(1):131–151, 2012). (shrink)

In their presentation of canonical models for normal systems of modal logic, Hughes and Cresswell observe that some of these models are based on a frame which can be also thought of as a collection of two or more isolated frames; they call such frames ‘non-cohesive’. The problem of checking whether the canonical model of a given system is cohesive is still rather unexplored and no general decision procedure is available. The main contribution of this article consists (...) in introducing a method which is sufficient to show that canonical models of some relevant classes of normal monomodal and bimodal systems are always non-cohesive. (shrink)

Given a weakly o-minimal structure${\cal M}$and its o-minimal completion$\bar{{\cal M}}$, we first associate to$\bar{{\cal M}}$a canonical language and then prove thatTh$\left$determines$Th\left$. We then investigate the theory of the pair$\left$in the spirit of the theory of dense pairs of o-minimal structures, and prove, among other results, that it is near model complete, and every definable open subset of${\bar{M}^n}$is already definable in$\bar{{\cal M}}$.We give an example of a weakly o-minimal structure interpreting$\bar{{\cal M}}$and show that it is not elementarily equivalent to (...) any reduct of an o-minimal trace. (shrink)

In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A., Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. and Rodrigues & Carnielli, present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ. Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical logics in which the Laws of Explosion and Excluded Middle are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic (...) of Formal Inconsistency. This means that there is an operator that, roughly speaking, identifies a formula as having classical behavior. Both systems are motivated by the idea that there are different conditions for accepting or rejecting a sentence of our natural language. So, there are some special introduction and elimination rules in the theory that are capturing different conditions of use. Rodrigues & Carnielli’s paper has an interesting and challenging idea. According to them, BLE and LETJ are incompatible with dialetheia. It seems to show that these paraconsistent logics cannot be interpreted using truth-conditions that allow true contradictions. In short, BLE and LETJ talk about conflicting evidence avoiding to talk about gluts. I am going to argue against this point of view. Basically, I will firstly offer a new interpretation of BLE and LETJ that is compatible with dialetheia. The background of my position is to reject the one canonical interpretation thesis: the idea according to which a logical system has one standard interpretation. Then, I will secondly show that there is no logical basis to fix that Rodrigues & Carnielli’s interpretation is the canonical way to establish the content of logical notions of BLE and LETJ. Furthermore, the system LETJ captures inside classical logic. Then, I am also going to use this technical result to offer some further doubts about the one canonical interpretation thesis. (shrink)

• We define a notion of order of indiscernibility type of a structure by analogy with Mitchell order on measures; we use this to define a hierarchy of strong axioms of infinity defined through normal filters, the α-weakly Erdős hierarchy. The filters in this hierarchy can be seen to be generated by sets of ordinals where these indiscernibility orders on structures dominate the canonical functions.• The limit axiom of this is that of greatly Erdős and we use it to (...) calibrate some strengthenings of the Chang property, one of which, CC+, is equiconsistent with a Ramsey cardinal, and implies that where K is the core model built with non-overlapping extenders — if it is rigid, and others which are a little weaker. As one corollary we have:TheoremIf then there is an inner model with a strong cardinal. • We define an α-Jónsson hierarchy to parallel the α-Ramsey hierarchy, and show that κ being α-Jónsson implies that it is α-Ramsey in the core model. (shrink)

This article introduces confirmatory composite analysis (CCA) as a structural equation modeling technique that aims at testing composite models. In doing so, it overcomes a current weakness of structural equation modeling, i.e., the operationalization and assessment of design concepts, so-called artifacts. CCA entails the same steps as confirmatory factor analysis: model specification, model identification, model estimation, and model assessment. Composite models are specified such that they consist of a set of interrelated composites, all of which emerge (...) as linear combinations of observable variables. Researchers must ensure theoretical identification of their specified model. For the estimation of the model, several estimators are available; in particular Kettenring's extensions of canonical correlation analysis provide consistent estimates. Model assessment mainly relies on the Bollen-Stine bootstrap to assess the discrepancy between the empirical and the estimated model-implied indicator covariance matrix. A Monte Carlo simulation examines the efficacy of CCA, and demonstrates that CCA is able to detect various forms of model misspecification. (shrink)

How does our language relate to reality? This is a question that is especially pertinent in set theory, where we seem to talk of large infinite entities. Based on an analogy with the use of models in the natural sciences, we argue for a threefold correspondence between our language, models, and reality. We argue that so conceived, the existence of models can be underwritten by a weak notion of existence, where weak existence is to be understood as existing (...) in virtue of language. (shrink)

For a given inner model N of ZFC, one can consider the relativized version of Berkeley cardinals in the context of ZFC, and ask if there can exist an “N-Berkeley cardinal.” In this article we provide a positive answer to this question. Indeed, under the assumption of a supercompact cardinal $\delta $, we show that there exists a ZFC inner model N such that there is a cardinal which is N-Berkeley, even in a strong sense. Further, the involved (...) model N is a weak extender model of $\delta $ is supercompact. Finally, we prove that the strong version of N-Berkeley cardinals turns out to be inconsistent whenever N satisfies closure under $\omega $ -sequences. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Kaplan (Synthese 183:339–373, 2011) takes up the task of extending Craver’s (Explaining the brain, 2007) mechanistic account of explanation in neuroscience to the new territory of computational neuroscience. He presents the model to mechanism mapping (3M) criterion as a condition for a model’s explanatory adequacy. This mechanistic approach is intended to replace earlier accounts which posited a level of computational analysis conceived as distinct and autonomous from underlying mechanistic details. In this paper I discuss (...) work in computational neuroscience that creates difficulties for the mechanist project. Carandini and Heeger (Nat Rev Neurosci 13:51–62, 2012) propose that many neural response properties can be understood in terms of canonical neural computations. These are “standard computational modules that apply the same fundamental operations in a variety of contexts.” Importantly, these computations can have numerous biophysical realisations, and so straightforward examination of the mechanisms underlying these computations carries little explanatory weight. Through a comparison between this modelling approach and minimal models in other branches of science, I argue that computational neuroscience frequently employs a distinct explanatory style, namely, efficient coding explanation. Such explanations cannot be assimilated into the mechanistic framework but do bear interesting similarities with evolutionary and optimality explanations elsewhere in biology. (shrink)

Following [3], we build higher-order models of analysis resembling the frameworks of nonstandard analysis. The models are entirely canonical, constructed without Choice. Weak transfer principles are developed and the models are applied to topology, graph theory, and measure theory. A Loeb-like measure is constructed.

The significance of horizontal gene transfer (HGT) in eukaryotic evolution remains controversial. Although many eukaryotic genes are of bacterial origin, they are often interpreted as being derived from mitochondria or plastids. Because of their fixed gene pool and gene loss, however, mitochondria and plastids alone cannot adequately explain the presence of all, or even the majority, of bacterial genes in eukaryotes. Available data indicate that no insurmountable barrier to HGT exists, even in complex multicellular eukaryotes. In addition, the discovery of (...) both recent and ancient HGT events in all major eukaryotic groups suggests that HGT has been a regular occurrence throughout the history of eukaryotic evolution. A model of HGT is proposed that suggests both unicellular and early developmental stages as likely entry points for foreign genes into multicellular eukaryotes. (shrink)

The relation between least and diagonal fixed points is a well known and completely studied question for a large class of partially ordered models of the lambda calculus and combinatory logic. Here we consider this question in the context of algebraic recursion theory, whose close connection with combinatory logic recently become apparent. We find a comparatively simple and rather weak general condition which suffices to prove the equality of least fixed points with canonical (corresponding to those produced by (...) the Curry combinator in lambda calculus) diagonal fixed points in a class of partially ordered algebras which covers both combinatory spaces of Skordev and operative spaces of Ivanov. Especially, this yields an essential improvement of the axiomatization of recursion theory via combinatory spaces. (shrink)

We show that the variety of weakly representable relation algebras is neither canonical nor closed under Monk completions.

Interpreting the diamond of modal logic as the derivative, we present a topological canonical model for extensions of K4 and show completeness for various logics. We also show that if a logic is topologically canonical, then it is relationally canonical.

Following [3], we build higher-order models of analysis resembling the frameworks of nonstandard analysis. The models are entirely canonical, constructed without Choice. Weak transfer principles are developed and the models are applied to topology, graph theory, and measure theory. A Loeb-like measure is constructed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 119-134 [Access article in PDF] The Constitution of Rhetoric's Tradition Maurice Charland Rhetoric is not a discipline. That is to say, as a domain of theoretical and practical knowledge, rhetoric is weakly institutionalized, lacking a centralized arbiter and standardized set of procedures for establishing truth claims. It also lacks the basic characteristics that Michel Foucault defines as disciplinary, for while we can identify "groups (...) of objects, methods, their corpus of properties considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools," these are neither universally admitted, nor do they "constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without their being any question of their meaning" (1972, 222). On the contrary, despite the fact that rhetoric is usually figured as offering practical and, indeed, positive knowledge, the meaning of its terms is always being questioned and at stake. While we might, by considering terms loosely, seek to identify rhetoric in terms of objects such as "persuasion," or "discourse," these are not exclusively its province. Furthermore, the ends of rhetoric are themselves unclear. Is rhetoric really the art of discovering the available means of persuasion? Or is it an art of citizenship? Or a method of enquiry? It has at times been defined as each. Consequently, none of these methods can fix its identity. At most, we can say that "rhetoric," as a domain of knowledge, signals a commitment to the idea of agency in discourse.Rhetoric, while not disciplinary, nevertheless "hangs together" as a domain of knowledge even though it does not cohere conceptually. It is, or comes close to being, a "discursive formation." That is to say, we can identify a field that produces statements concerning discourse and its operations, which is characterized by certain regularities that articulate with the term rhetoric itself. The first such regularity is the gesture of negation. Rhetoric refuses philosophy (or acts out having been refused by philosophy). [End Page 119] Rhetoric further is defined against other intellectual genres: rhetoric is not poetics, is not political science, is not ethics, though it may "speak" to them. Ultimately, though, this tells us very little about the nature of rhetoric's difference, for while refusal is effective in positing the existence of a boundary between rhetoric and other domains, the location of that boundary and what it contains remains unspecified. Rhetoric must also be attributed an at least provisional sense. This is accomplished by rhetoric's second gesture, which initially appears more substantial. Rhetoric is framed in terms of the positivity of a foundational "tradition." Indeed, the gesture toward tradition is ubiquitous. Consider, for example, both the title and principles of organization of Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg's (1990) anthology, George Kennedy's (1998) recursion to the idea of "tradition" even as he attempts to present rhetoric as a natural and cross-cultural phenomenon, recent feminist works that explicitly address "the tradition," 1 the routine citation of Classical authorities and examples, the recurrence of "new" rhetorics, including Burke's dramatism, Perelman's theory of argumentation, as well as Barthes' semiotics, which are offered as supplements to tradition's lacks, and, finally, the energy devoted to the study of the history of rhetoric. The rhetorical tradition, as something bequeathed or put in play by ancient teachers, appears to offer rhetoric a substance, a literature, and a set of problems, particularly through variants of two other principles of discursive formation identified by Foucault, commentary and the author-function. Even so, the gesture toward tradition does not imply the existence of a historically rooted and fixed corpus or model: "Tradition" is a vague term, there is no unproblematic canon of texts to be commented upon, and tradition itself, rather than Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero, stands as "author." What we debate is the meaning of the "tradition," the uneasy relationship between Socrates and Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, but as positions rather than personae. Furthermore, in the name of rhetoric, ancient and modern texts are often read against the grain, and what is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.2 (2003) 363-381 [Access article in PDF] Imre Lakatos and Literary Tradition Suzanne Black ALTHOUGH THE CANON DEBATES have largely subsided, the categories of tradition and canon remain problematic and unhelpfully contentious. Some authors view tradition as weighty and oppressive, while cultural studies scholars criticize the concept itself as elitist and exclusionary. Yet literature, like other creative pursuits, cannot avoid its past; nor should it seek (...) to do so. Progressive ideas have a history and a logical development; to argue otherwise leaves them vulnerable to accusations of faddish trendiness. Artists learn from the work of other artists, and critics rely on older examples to describe and understand what they study. Thus activist critics, writers, and moderate scholars all need some way to react to and to conceive of literary history.E. Dean Kolbas has argued that shared assumptions such as a preoccupation with educational institutions limit the arguments of conservative humanists and canon openers alike. 1 If the perspective of literary critics is indeed narrow, they may benefit from broader and more interdisciplinary studies of tradition. For example, historicist philosophy of science devoted considerable energy to understanding how major accomplishments influence the work of scientists. This scholarship offers several complex accounts of the ways science is shaped by its past, and so can offer literary critics another, more structured, more rational, and even more flexible, view of tradition. In addition, some of its preoccupations, like the emergence of consensus or criteria for the selection of representative examples, are relevant to the canon debates. Finally, because writers and scientists understand the past differently and because their ideas develop in distinct social contexts, literary theory and philosophy of science have potentially complementary strengths and weaknesses. [End Page 363]In this article I first summarize Imre Lakatos's conception of the research program and explain some of its potential benefits for an understanding of literary tradition. Then, to show that the concept of a "literary research program" makes sense, I use the category to examine the ideas of Ricardo Reis, a neo-classical persona created by the Portuguese modernist Fernando Pessoa. Finally, I turn to a discussion of W. H. Auden's "Letter to Lord Byron" to identify some difficulties in applying Lakatos's model to literature. To view Auden as working within a Byronic program directs attention to his interpretation of the older poet, but the poem's formal innovation and its irony suggest some important differences between artistic and scientific approaches to the past, as well as some limitations of Lakatos's analytical framework.During the 1960s and 1970s, partly in response to Thomas Kuhn, but also in reaction against other approaches to their field, several important philosophers of science sought to incorporate the history of science into their work. David J. Hess terms this tendency a historicist "period and style" 2 within philosophy of science. As the Hungarian philosopher Imre Lakatos (echoing Kant) contended, "Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind." 3 Generalizing about how scientists think (or ought to think) while still bearing in mind actual science led some philosophers of science to devise subtle and provocative ways of viewing the past. Kuhn's notion of paradigms as "models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research" 4 is the best known and influenced Stanley Fish and Frank Kermode. Generally, however, literary critics are unaware of philosophers' responses to Kuhn and of their attempts to refine his category of paradigm. Larry Laudan, for example, sought to delineate the role of "research traditions" in the natural sciences. As his terminology suggests, these formulations overlap to some extent with literary understandings of past practice.But how much overlap is there, and is it significant? While Kuhn and Laudan both mention the arts, they disagree about the relevance of their work to the humanities. In 1969, noting that "topics" such as "competing schools," "changing standards of value" and "altered modes of perception" "have long been basic for the art historian," Kuhn argued that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions "makes them central to... (shrink)

Children’s literature was first published in the eighteenth century at a time when the philosophical ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on education and childhood were being discussed. Ironically, however, the first generation of children’s literature (by Maria Edgeworth et al) was incongruous with Rousseau’s ideas since the works were didactic, constraining and demanded passive acceptance from their readers. This instigated a deficit or reductionist model to represent childhood and children’s literature as simple and uncomplicated and led to children’s literature being (...) overlooked and its contribution to philosophical discussions being undermined. Although Rousseau advocates freeing the child to develop, he does not feel that reading fiction promotes child development, which is a weakness in an otherwise strong argument for educational reform. Yet, rather ironically, the second generation of children’s writers, from Lewis Carroll onwards, more truly embraced Rousseau’s broader philosophical ideas on education and childhood than their predecessors, encouraging and freeing readers to imagine, reflect and actively engage in ontological enquiry. The emphasis had changed with the child being embraced in education and society as active participant rather than passive or disengaged recipient. Works deemed to be seminal to the canon of children’s literature such as Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Peter Pan and The Chronicles of Narnia challenge readers to work through conflicts many of which can be identified retrospectively as exhibiting postmodern characteristics. By exploring moral and spiritual dilemmas in their writing, Carroll, Barrie and Lewis’s works can be regarded as contributing to discussions on theodical postmodernism. The successes of The Lord of the Rings and Narnia films suggest that there is an interest in exploring moral dilemmas, fulfilling a need (perhaps for tolerance and understanding) in society at large. Children’s literature has an almost divine power to restore, to repair and to heal, all characteristics of theodical postmodernism but differing from the more widely held conception of postmodernism which pulls apart, exacerbates and exposes. Children’s literature therefore offers a healthy and constructive approach to working through moral dilemmas. In their deconstruction of childhood, these authors have brought children’s literature closer to aspects of enquiry traditionally found in the domain of adult mainstream literature. As the boundaries between childhood and adulthood become more fluid, less certain, debate is centring around whether the canon of children’s literature itself has become redundant or meaningless since there are no longer any restrictions on which subjects can be treated in children’s literature. Despite the fact that children’s literature clearly engages with difficult issues, it continues to be left out of the critical equation, not given serious attention, disregarded as simplistic and ignored in contemporary philosophical discussions concerning morality, postmodernism and the future of childhood. With children’s literature coming closer to mainstream literature, and exhibiting prominent features of postmodernism, however, it is only a matter of time before philosophical discussions actively engage with children’s literature and recognise its contribution to the resolution and reconciliation of ontological dilemmas. When this occurs, philosophy and children’s literature will re-engage, enriching contemporary investigations of existence, ethics and knowledge and fruitfully developing thought in these areas. This paper aims to contribute to this process. (shrink)