Suhrawardī has presented arguments to support the existence of wājib al-wujūd in many of his works. One of the most fundamental of these arguments, which also has a forward-looking feature, is the one he presents in his books al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq. To prove the existence of God, Suhrawardī devised three arguments in al-Talwīḥāt and one argument in Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq, all of which are interpretations of the ṣiddīqīn argument. In this article four of Suhrawardī’s arguments, three of them (...) in al-Talwīḥāt and one of them in Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq are reviewed. the main aim of this study is to analyze and explain Suhrawardī’s arguments, due to their importance in philosophy and theology, with the descriptive-analytical method and using library-based collecting data. The arguments presented in the al-Talwīḥāt are succinct, and what made these claims essential was the evaluation of their robustness and content. The significance of his first and third arguments in this book is that they do not require the denial of the vicious circle as a precondition, and by assuming the likelihood of both the vicious circle and infinite regress, the necessity of existence is demonstrated. On the other hand, his argument in Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq, which, like his second argument, is based on the refutation of the vicious circle and infinite regress, includes innovative features and should be investigated thoroughly. (shrink)

This article aims to investigate and analyze Yusuf b. Muhammad Jān al-Karabāghī's (d. 1035/1626) treatise in which he discusses some issues related to existence (wujūd) and the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd). This study aims to bring this treatise of al-Karabāghī, which has not been studied yet, into the literature of the history of Islamic thought by investigating and analyzing its content. There is no information about Yusuf al-Karabāghī's birthplace and education in bio-bibliographical sources. It is known that (...) he wrote works in the fields of tafsīr and theology (kalām). Some of his works are Erbau' Ta'līkātin fi't-Tafsīr, Risāla fi'l-Mubāḥasa allatī waka'at fī surat al-Fath bayna al-ulamā, Hāshiya 'alā Sharhi'l-Aqā'id al-Adudiyya, Sharḥ Risāla Ithbāt al-wājib li al-Dawwānī. Three copies of this treatise, which is the subject of this study, have been identified in manuscript libraries. The first of these copies is listed as MS 791 in Selimiye Manuscript Library, the second is listed as MS 1210 in Suleymaniye Library, Carullah Efendi Collection, and the third is listed as 1960 in Suleymaniye Library, Manuscript Donations Collection. Among the mentioned copies, the copy registered in Selimiye Library ms. no 791 was preferred as the main one in the analysis both because it is very clear and readable, and because of the scribes’s collation note in the ferağ record. This is because the scribe wrote this copy in correspondence with other copies that existed in his period but have not survived to the present day. The author does not explicitly mention the name of this treatise in the introduction. In the introductory part of the treatise, he states that he has collected topics that will serve as a remedy for finding the right thought. When its content is analyzed, it is understood that the treatise includes some issues related to existence (wujūd) and especially the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd). It is seen that the author followed a different method in the treatise. Yusuf al-Qarabāghī divided the treatise into seven chapters, which he called "halwa". He also added subheadings to each section, sometimes one and sometimes two, which he called "waqf". In these sub-headings he added to each section, he included the views of a thinker who is an authority on the subject he examined. In the treatise, the author examines the methods of demonstration such as burhān al- tatbīq, burhān al- tazāyuf, burhān al-sullamī and concepts such as revolution, succession, wujūd, wājib al-wujūd, possible, qadīm, hadīth, cause, ma'lūl, complete cause, nūr, zulm, al-ālam al-misālī, berzāh, and juz al lā yetajjazā (jawhar al-fard). In this framework, he discusses Karabāğī's proof of the existence of the Necessary Being through the cancellation of the vicious circle and infinite regression (tasalsul), the unity of the Necessary Being (tawḥīd), the relation between essence and attribute, and the attribute of knowledge of the Necessary Being. As a result, in this treatise, Yusuf al-Karabāghī analyzed some debates and views on existence (wujūd) and the concept of Necessary Being, which is an important issue in the tradition of Islamic thought, employing his unique methodological approach. (shrink)

: ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336) was a Kubrawī sheikh lived in Simnān one hundred years after Ibn al-Arabī (d. 638/1240). He authored around ninety works in Arabic and Persian on various fields within Sūfism, raised many disciples. His contribution to the sūfī tradition mainly come to forefront regarding problems like unity, latāif (subtle organs), rijāl al-ghaib (men of the unseen), wāqia (dream-like mystical experiences) and tajallī (manifestation). Simnānī’s understanding of the unity influenced subsequent sūfī’s and specifically Ahmad Sirhindī (d. (...) 1034/1624) and his sheikh Bāqībillah’s (d. 1012/1603) views of the unity overlap with Simnānī’s one. In Maktūbāt, Sirhindī who developed the idea of unity of the seen against the unity of the existence expresses that his understanding of being is the same with Simnānī’s one. Simnānī is also known as the first critic of Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of the unity among sūfī’s. Such that, whenever his name is mentioned the first thing comes to one’s mind has been his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī. However, his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī was not studied as a whole looking at his ouvre. Studying Simnānī’s works, it is seen that his criticism is concentrated on two main problems. First is Ibn al-Arabī’s employing the concept wujūd al-mutlaq (absolute being) for God. He maintains that it is not convenient to use this concept for al-Haq. His second criticism is against a sentence mentioned in al-Futūhāt: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. In this article, causes for Simnānī’s critiques will be discussed and both sūfī’s conceptions of wujūd al-mutlaq and ‘ayn (quintessence) will be studied.Summary: One of the famous names in the Kubrawī tradition, ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī is a sheikh who lived in the city of Simnān in the contemporary Iran between 659-736/1261-1336. In his youth, he served in the service of Arghūn Khan (r. 1284-1291) in the Īlkhānid Palace; and later, after a spiritual experience, he left the palace and turned to a Ṣūfī life. For a certain period, he continued worshipping and riyādhat (spiritual fight against the evil commanding self) on his own, and looked for a guide convenient to his character. Eventually, he became the disciple of the Kubrawī sheikh in Baghdad, Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Isfarāyīnī (d. 717/1317), and obtained ijāzah (permission) for irshād (guidance). After that, with the instruction of his sheikh, he went back to Simnān; and spent rest of his life with guiding his disciples and writing scholarly works. He authored around ninety works in Arabic and Persian on various fields within Sūfism. His contribution to the sūfī tradition mainly comes to forefront regarding problems like unity, latāif, rijāl al-ghaib, wāqia and tajallī; and influenced subsequent sūfī’s. Simnani’s influences can best be seen on the founder of the Mujaddidiyya branch of Naqshbandiyya, Ahmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624), and Sirhindī’s sheikh Bāqībillah (d. 1012/1603). In a letter Bāqībillah wrote to Sirhindī, he mentions certain differences between Simnānī’s understanding of unity and unity of the existence by stating that Simnānī’s path is not that of unity of the existence, and that his shuhūd (seen) is the most perfect shuhūd. Also in the Maktūbāt, Sirhindī expresses that his understanding of being is the same with that of Simnānī’s. Simnānī is also known as the first critic of Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of being and unity among sūfī’s. It would not be incorrect to say that he is more famous for this critique so much so that whenever his name is mentioned the first thing comes to one’s mind has been his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī. The main reason for this is that a letter Simnānī wrote to one of the followers of Ibn al-Arabī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 736/1335) in which Simnānī criticizes Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of unity, was included in the famous work of Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492), Nafakhāt al-uns. This letter’s presence in the Nafakhāt played a vital role in its publicity. For this reason, it can be said that Nafakhāt made Simnānī famous. Yet, it should also be said that the fame stemming from Nafakhāt is incomplete and it is just about one aspect of Simnānī, a scholar who authored dozens of books on the Sūfism. Moreover, it is not correct to defend that Simnānī’s statements in that letter reflects a full picture of his opinion about Ibn al-Arabī. Hence, to have a better understanding of his criticism and thoughts about Ibn al-Arabī, one should explore other works of Simnānī as well. Studying Simnānī’s works, it is seen that his criticism is concentrated on two main problems. First is Ibn al-Arabī’s employing the concept wujūd al-mutlaq for God. His second criticism is against a sentence mentioned in al-Futūhāt: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. To understand the first criticism, one needs to know the meaning both sūfī’s attribute to the concept of wujūd al-mutlaq; and for the second the meaning they attribute to the concept of ‘ayn. First, it should be known that Ibn al-Arabī did not think of being as a form category the members of which are beings. To the contrary, he uses wujūd exclusively for the Eternal, and refrains from using the concept of wujūd for the creation; and calls them mawjūd. In other words, Ibn al-Arabī differentiates between being and existence; and limits the concept of being only for the al-Haqq. Ibn al-Arabī states this view repeatedly in statements such as “al-Haqq (the Truth) is being; things, however, are attributes of being.” What Ibn al-Arabī means by wujūd al-mutlaq is al-Haqq who is wajib al-wujūd (the Necessary Being) and free from all restrictions. Thus, in a certain sense wujūd al-mutlaq means wajib al-wujūd. By writing that “Wujūd al-Haqq is the essence of wajib al-wujūd who is qualified with the perfect attributes of eternity and infinity. Absolute Being is the actions emanating from these attributes. Wujūd al-Muqayyad (the Limited Being) is the outcome that comes into existence as a result of these actions”, Simnānī explicitly states that for him Absolute Being is the actions of al-Haqq. What one can understand from the statements of both sūfī’s is that while by wujūd al-mutlaq Ibn al-Arabī refers to wajib al-wujūd (i.e. the essence of al-Haqq), for the same term Simnānī refers to actions of al-Haqq. Since in criticizing Ibn al-Arabī, Simnānī takes into account his own definition of the term Wujūd al-Mutlaq as the actions of al-Haqq, his criticisms are not valid. In fact, both exonerate al-Haqq from all the conditions. However, while Ibn al-Arabī chooses to verbalize the existence of God with the concept of “Absolute Being”, Simnānī only approves to express the existence of God with the concepts of wājib al-wujūd and al-Wujūd al-Haqq and differing from Ibn al-Arabī attributes the meaning of the actions of God to the concept of Absolute Being.Simnānī’s second critique against Ibn al-Arabī is related to this sentence: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. An annotation that is written by Simnānī on a page which is out of his gloss on al-Futūhāt is highly harsh reads as follows: “O, followers of the most deviant leader! If you hear that one says that your sheikh is identical with his beard, put the claim that he is identical with his rejectomenta aside, should you accept this and tolerate him?” It is understood from these sentences that Simnānī considers the concept “al-ayn” as the essence of that thing. Though, the word “al-ayn” is one of the most multi-meaning word in the Arabic language and in Ibn al-Arabī’s works it is used with various meanings such as eye, the quintessence, spring, water source, tangible being of a thing, the essence of a thing and so on. The usage as “the essence of a thing” is very much common in Ibn al-Arabī’s works. It is interesting that while this word has so many meanings, Simnānī takes one meaning as base and blaspheme against Ibn al-Arabī. It is obvious that the main cause for Simnānī’s critique against Ibn al-Arabī in both problems is his attribution to the concepts different meanings than Ibn al-Arabī and then judging him in the context of his attributes. (shrink)

This paper is a literature review of the thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Hamzah Fansuri regarding the philosophical discourse of embodiment which is considered to have a relationship in the discourse of Islamic philosophy and the archipelago. This paper aims to read and explain the philosophical relation of the embodiment of Hamzah Fansuri and Mulla Sadra as models of Nusantara and Islamic thought which are seen as having a relationship or similarity. By using a descriptive analysis approach, it is concluded (...) that being in the view of Hamzah Fansuri and Mulla Sadra is seen as a source of existence that is one in diversity. One source of existence is understood as existence that presents various entities outside of itself. Mulla Sadra and Hamzah Fansuri understand that the universe consists of a series of causes and effects that imply the diversity of existence in reality. The diversity of existence comes from the main cause called wājib al-wūjūd which describes existence as the source of one being in diversity. The result of this paper is to read the urgency of Hamzah Fansuri's and Mulla Sadra's philosophy of being who is seen as having a relationship or similarity in philosophical civilization, as well as tracing the interaction of the discourses of Nusantara and Islamic thought. (shrink)

Although Ibn Sina’s metaphysics is heavily indebted to Aristotle’s, with regard to the substantiality of the rational soul and God, Aristotle and Ibn Sina take opposite positions: Aristotle holds that theos is a substance, while Ibn Sina denies that God is a substance; Aristotle holds that the soul is not a substance, while Ibn Sina claims that it is. In both of these regards we observe the movement toward greater abstraction in Ibn Sina. The concept of God is more abstract (...) when considered outside the categories, and the soul is understood more abstractly, not merely as the form of an organism, but as independent of any materiality. God is freed from the constraints of substantiality while the soul is freed from the constraints of corporeality. Ibn Sina argues that since God transcends the categories, God is not a substance. Another argument is that everything that falls under the categories is contingent in its existence, God, however, is necessary in His existence. Hence, God is not a substance. Ibn Sina’s main argument, however, is that a condition for being a substance is, according to Arsitotle, not to be in a subject. This condition should be understood in such a manner that it does not imply the existence of what satisfies it. The existence of a necessary being, however, is implied by such a condition. Hence, God does not have the condition, and, thus, is not a substance. (shrink)

The theory of Wahdat al-Wujūd, or as it is called in English the Oneness of Being, is the core idea of Sufism. The founder of this theory is Ibn ‘Arabī. There are contradictions in Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of the Oneness of Being. The most important one, which is my main concern in this essay, occurs in his explanation of the relation between Being, which is, according to him, the only real being, and other beings. According to Ibn ‘Arabī, Being (...) is identical and also non-identical with beings. Different philosophers, through hundreds of years, tried to dissolve such contradictions, by proposing consistent readings of Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of the Oneness of Being. I will not follow this path. Instead, I take the theory of the Oneness of Being to be a dialetheic one, that is, according to this theory there are true contradictions. Thus, I claim that one can have a paraconsistent semantics of the theory of the Oneness of Being. To do so, I appeal to Graham Priest’s Gluon theory. Gluon theory concerns the problem of unity, that is, what makes the plurality of an object’s parts into a whole? I give a translation of the theory of the Oneness of Being into Gluon theory, and show how Gluon theory explains the theory of the Oneness of Being. (shrink)

This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of existence, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of existence in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets—the primacy of existence, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in existence (Tashkīk-i wujūd)—is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of existence holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that existence is fundamental. The writers distinguished between two conceptions (...) of ethics in this regard: one based on existence and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of existence. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic. (shrink)

Sadr al-Sharīʿah (d. 747/1346) is one of the theologians representing the later period of the Māturīdī kalām. He based his system of thought on his criticisms of Avicenna, al-Rāzī, and Ṭūsī. His criticism of these names stems from his own understanding of being. He thinks differently from the theologians of the later period on issues such as the essence-existence division, the superaddition of existence to essence, and the acceptance of mental being, which are accepted by the majority of theologians of (...) the later period. His understanding of being in question also influenced his analysis of the idea of the wahdat al-wujūd. In the study, some aspects of the framework proposed by Muhammed Bedirhan will be given first. Then, in order to make sense of Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticism of wahdat al-wujūd, the major understandings of wahdat al-wujūd will be summarized briefly, and finally, Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s analysis of wahdat al-wujūd will be examined and clarified using Bedirhan’s framework. Although the framework has subheadings, it classifies criticisms into two categories: rationally-based and sharʻī-based objections. Rational objections are directed from the traditions of kalām and philosophy, while sharʻī-based objections come from Salafi thinkers, faqihs, and sufis. The framework is comprehensive in classifying criticisms against the theory of wahdat al-wujūd. This framework will clarify Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s approach, and the source of his criticisms should be identified. According to Bedirhan, the sufis’ theory is in conflict with the members of other schools in two aspects, practical and theoretical. While the first one considers sufism a religious state (ḥal), the second one is the point that shapes the view of other intellectual groups on sufism in terms of the fact that sufism is also a science. Bedirhan has based the theoretical conflict part of his framework on the triple classification of al-Jābiri: burhān, beyān and irfān. According to al-Jābiri’s classification, sufism, which is included under the title of irfān, deals with the previous two traditions mentioned. However, burhan and beyan traditions also offer their criticisms of the epistemological and ontological acceptances of the irfān tradition. Behind the criticism of the traditions of thought towards each other is the claim that the metaphysical theory of the opposite group is insufficient. According to the presented framework Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticisms can be considered within not only the kalām tradition but also the sufi tradition, because he is a sufi who accepts ittihād as one of the “sayr sulūk” degrees. Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s explains two proofs by which sufis defend their metaphysical theory, and also presents a counter-proof based on the verbal commonality of sense knowledge and being. He also aims to point out the weakness of the metaphysical theory of sufis with the view that the idea of ittihād is unique to a certain degree. By mentioning Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticisms and explanations of wahdat al- wujūd, the study identifies Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s stance on the rational and sharʻī-based objections. (shrink)

Interpretation of the Unicity doctrine and teachings regarding sufism of Abdurrauf Singkel, an Indonesian ulama from Aceh; study of an Islamic manuscript.

Mulla Sadra (ca. 1572-1640) is one of the most prominent figures of post-Avicennan Islamic philosophy and among the most important philosophers of Safavid Persia. He was a prolific writer whose work advanced the fields of intellectual and religious science in Islamic philosophy, but arguably his most important contribution to Islamic philosophy is in the study of existence (wujud) and its application to such areas as cosmology, epistemology, psychology, and eschatology. Sadra represents a paradigm shift from the Aristotelian metaphysics of fixed (...) substances, which had dominated Islamic philosophy, to an analysis of existence as the ultimate ground and dynamic source of things. He posits that all beings derive their reality and truth from their wujud and that a proper philosophical analysis must therefore start and eventually end with it. The present work's focus on Sadra's gradational ontology provides a strong foundation for the reader to understand Sadra's other works and later texts by other philosophers working in the same field. This edition contains parallel English-Arabic texts and a new translation by preeminent scholar of Islamic philosophy Seyyed Hossein Nasr. (shrink)

Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) was one of the towering figures of Islamic intellectual history, and among Sufis still bears the title of al-shaykh al-akbar, or "the greatest master." Ibn al-'Arabī and Islamic Intellectual Culturetraces the history of the concept of "oneness of being" (wahdat al-wujūd) in the school of Ibn al- 'Arabī, in order to explore the relationship between mysticism and philosophy in Islamic intellectual life. It examines how the conceptual language used by early mystical writers became increasingly engaged (...) over time with the broader Islamic intellectual culture, eventually becoming integrated with the latter's common philosophical and theological vocabulary. It focuses on four successive generations of thinkers (Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, Mu'ayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, and Dāwūd al-Qaysarī), and examines how these "philosopher-mystics" refined and developed the ideas of Ibn al-'Arabī. Through a close analysis of texts, the book clearly traces the crystallization of an influential school of thought in Islamic history and its place in the broader intellectual culture. Offering an exploration of the development of Sufi expression and thought, this book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Islamic thought, philosophy, and mysticism. (shrink)

Al-Fārābī, in the Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, is apparently the first person to maintain that existence, in one of its senses, is a second-order concept [ma‘qūl thānī]. As he interprets Metaphysics Δ7, ‘‘being'' [mawjūd] has two meanings, second-order ‘‘being as truth'', and first-order ‘‘being as divided into the categories.'' The paronymous form of the Arabic word ‘‘mawjūd'' suggests that things exist through some existence [wujūd] distinct from their essences: for al-Kindī, God is such a wujūd of all things. Against this, (...) al-Fārābī argues that existence as divided into the categories is real but identical with the essence of the existing thing, and that existence as truth is extrinsic to the essence but non-real. The Ḥurūf tries to reconstruct the logical syntax of syncategorematic or transcendental concepts such as being, which are often expressed in misleading grammatical forms. Al-Fārābī thinks that Greek more appropriately expressed many such concepts, including being, by particles rather than nouns or verbs; he takes Metaphysics Δ to be discussing the meanings of such particles, and he takes these concepts to demarcate the domain of metaphysics. This explains how al-Fārābī's title can mean both ‘‘Book of Particles'' and ‘‘Aristotle's Metaphysics.''. (shrink)

In this study, Qāḍī Abd al-Jābbār’s views on knowing Allah (ma‘rifatullah) and following issues have been analysed. In this context, either the divine message has reached to a person or not, it is examined whether ma‘rifatullah is obligatory (wajib) upon him. Subsequently, it is discussed whether this obligation is ensured by reasoning (‘aql) or revelation (naql). Furthermore, while keeping in mind the role of intellect (nazar) and argumentation (istidlāl), we have established and evaluated religious state and source of nazar and (...) istidlāl. Also, we discussed to what extend God can be the subject of knowledge and from which aspects He can be known. Besides, we discussed whether ma‘rifatullah is an obligation and if not what its justification is. In addition, we examined whether imitative knowledge (taqlīd) is possible in the case of ma‘rifatullah or not and whether it’s sufficient to know God just by taqlīd without the reasoning at all. Finally, Qāḍī Abd al-Jābbār’s opinions on the religious situation of people to whom the divine revelation did not reach at all and so they lack of knowledge on God. (shrink)

In the Hanafī madhab (school law), al-hukm al-taklifī have been determined in different categories, taking into account that the relevant evidence is conjecture-conclusive in terms of certitude-dalāla and whether the request is binding or not. In general terms, it is stated in the usūlworks that the orders and prohibitions that are fixed with definite evidence are fard and haram, and the binding provisions in which there is suspicion and doubt in their evidence are wājib and tahrīman makrūh. However, some (...) “fards” have been identified, which have stronger effects than “wājib” in the Hanafi fiqh doctrine, and which are subject to suspicion and doubt in their evidence, and therefore there is disagreement about their ruling among fiqh scholars. The Hanafī jurists of the later period adopted the concept of “al-fard al-amalī (al-zannī)” for such judgments. In addition, while examining the propositional provisions in the Hanafī Usūl literature, the wājib is generally compared with the fard. However, in some of the later usūl works and in many other issues in fiqh, wājib is compared with sunnah, and its connection with sunnah or its distinction from sunnah is considered as an important issue. In this article, it is aimed to clarify the nature of the “al-fard al-amalī”, which expresses an intermediate category in the classification of propositional provisions in the Hanafī school, and similarly, attention is drawn to the existence of some “haram” in the Hanafī school of which there is doubt. Some of the evaluations made by Hanafi jurists regarding the distinction between wajib and sunnah, taking into account the quality of the evidence, have been discussed and it has been tried to determine what is the ruling of abandoning the muakkad sunnah, which is often not explicitly included in the proposed judgment classifications made depending on the nature of the relevant evidence. In this study, it has been tried to make a comparative and chronological reading between the usūl and furū works in Hanafī school. (shrink)

In Islamic theological writings, under the heading of sustenance, the focus is generally on issues such as who is the provider of sustenance, whether haram is considered sustenance, and whether Allah’s consent exists for haram sustenance. Another issue that can be found between the lines of the subject of sustenance is whether it is haram for a person to work for sustenance or not. In fact, the pursuit of means of livelihood in order to sustain one’s life is, according to (...) the general and predominant acceptance of Muslim scholars, permissible and, in cases of necessity, wajib. According to a record in Uṣūl al-niḥal, during the formative period of itizālī thought, there were Mu‘tazilite sufis (ṣūfiyyat al-Muʿtazila) such as Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir’s disciple Abū Imrān Mūsā b. al-Raqqāshī, al-Naẓẓām’s apostate disciple Fadl al-Hadathī, and Husayn al-Kūfī, about whom no information is available. These names, who seem to have earned their livelihood through almsgiving, defended the forbiddenness (taḥrīm al-makāsib) of all kinds of endeavour for sustenance, contrary to the acceptance of Muslim thinkers. However, it should be noted that for them, the forbiddenness in making an effort for sustenance does not cover the definition of sustenance, which is ‘all the benefits’, but only the effort in obtaining sustenance through means such as trade and agriculture. It is interesting to find such an extreme tendency among the Mu‘tazilites, who came to the fore with their rationalist discourses. “How could a Mu‘tazilite defend tahrīm al-makāsib?”, the issue of abandonment of striving for sustenance (tark al-makāsib), from which the idea of tahrīm al-makāsib is thought to have evolved, is mentioned, and then the Mu‘tazilite sufis views on tahrīm al-makāsib are tried to be based mainly on Mu‘tazilite sources and the criticisms of Mu‘tazilite authors against them are included. It has been determined that Mu‘tazilite sufis justifications for defending tahrīm al-makāsib concentrate on three points: (i) the absence of a just order due to the absence of a just imam and the possibility of supporting the oppressors (rulers) intentionally or unintentionally, and as a result of this, some of them describe the land of Islam as dār al-kufr, (ii) again in relation to the issue of imamate, in an environment where there is no justice, i.e. legal/moral order, the halāl and harām are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from each other, and in order to protect oneself from harām, the things that are subject to sustenance can only be purified through charity and become halāl, and (iii) the fact that trust in Allah is obligatory and any effort to pursue sustenance is contrary to tawakkul. The Mu‘tazilite authors criticised the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib on the grounds that it is permissible to trade while maintaining a rational and ethical attitude, that one’s intention and interest in trade are important, and that tawakkul cannot be built on the right ground. As a result, the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib disappeared because they could not gain a foothold in the Mu‘tazilite intellectual climate due to their erroneous reasoning. (shrink)

One of the issues covered by Muʿtazila’s idea of justice is the subject of the imposition of moral obligation (taklīf). The concept of the obligation (taklīf), which expresses that God imposes some difficult acts on His servants and asks them to fulfill them, is important because it explains God’s justice for His servants and His wisdom in creating them. For this reason, the main emphasis in the matter of imposition has been on the veneration of the servants and rendering benefits (...) to them in return for imposition. As a matter of fact, God offers His servants such a reward that it is not possible to achieve with anything other than obligation. This article presents examples of hypothetical obligations emphasizing the same issue. Al-taklīf al-zāid is an additional imposition period meaning that God does not end the life that he determines for the morally obliged (mukallaf), but prolongs the life of the servant in such a way that changes the result of his imposition. In Muʿtazilite thought, the issue of the additional imposition basically takes place in the form of two separate discussions about unbeliever and believer. While the additional imposition of the unbeliever deals with the situation of the unbeliever who is known to believe when his imposition (or life) is prolonged; the additional imposition of believer deals with the situation of the believer who is known to disbelieve when his imposition (or life) is prolonged. Abū ʿAli thinks that it is obligatory (wajib) for God to keep this unbeliever alive when it is known that he would come to believe if He did not kill him and his imposition had been prolonged. His argument in this regard is his thought that the additional imposition is a favour (lutf) for the unbeliever to believe. Abū Hāshim, on the other hand, says that it is not obligatory for God to prolong the imposition of unbeliever in such a situation, and that it would be good (hasan) to kill the unbeliever, even though it is known that he would have believed if his imposition had been prolonged. Because, according to Abū Hāshim, God already gave the unbeliever the opportunity to attain rewards in his first imposition. The unbeliever reached this end because he made a wrong choice in his imposition and it cannot be obligatory for God to re-present the circumstances that will change this outcome. According to him, the additional imposition of an unbeliever is not a favour (lutf), but it is like the enabling to act (tamkīn) and is not obligatory. As for the additional imposition of a believer, Abū ʿAli, Abū Hāshim and the Bahshamites agree that it is good to prolong the imposition of the believer who is known to be an unbeliever if his imposition was prolonged. The reason for their view is that God has endowed the servant with a reward, which would otherwise be unattainable, in return for the prolonged imposition. However, the Husaynites believe that prolonging the imposition of believer in this situation would not be good. Because the believer deserves a reward for his first imposition and in this case, his additional imposition will be a corruption (mafsada) for him. As a result of these different views, when we look generally, it is seen that the main concern in Muʿtazilite thought is to make the most appropriate decision for the benefit of the servant in all the impositions that God has imposed and is likely to impose. The Bahshamites have always prioritized offering more rewards to the servant. However, Abū ʿAli regarding the additional imposition of the unbeliever, and the Husaynites regarding the additional imposition of believer, prioritized the imposition’s resulting in belief, and they thought that it was more suitable for the benefit of the servant. Since the purpose of the imposition in Muʿtazilite thought is to provide the opportunity to attain the degrees that it could never been reached in any other way, regardless of the outcome, it should be said that the views of the Bahshamites on both additional obligations are more consistent within the general system of Muʿtazila. (shrink)

One of the most important issues that distinguishes the Baghdādī branch of the Muʿtazila from the Baṣran branch is their view on ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661). Basra branch accepts the order of virtue of the first four caliphs as their order of coming to office, while the Baghdad branch considers the first three caliphs legitimate, but considers Ali more virtuous than them. The Baghdādī Muʿtazilīs who outspokenly defended this idea were Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (...) (d. 319/931) and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258). Among them, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd was renowned as “the greatest scholar of the Muʿtazila” and was considered one of the last representatives of this school. He ardently defended ʿAlī's superiority in his commentary on Nahj al-Balāgha, the famous collection of Ali’s sermons, letters and wisdom sayings. In his defense, he rebutted some criticisms about ʿAlī’s political decisions from his school’s point of view. Many items of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s rebuttal are worthy of analysis in terms of their content, style and approach. This article aims to present a detailed account of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s aforementioned refutations. In addition to the descriptive method, the interpretative method was also employed in the article. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd did not consider Ali's infallibility necessary (wājib), unlike Imamiyya, he accepted it. Therefore, he responded to the criticisms directed at Ali, starting from the point of Ali's innocence. According to Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd: (a) After the death of the Prophet, ʿAlī insisted on becoming the new leader of the Muslim community. He did not act hastily to assume the caliphate because he was not expecting any opposition to that. However, when the events took a different turn, he did not escalate the situation, rather accepted the status quo. (b) ʿAlī also did the right thing by participating in ʿUmar b. Al-Khaṭṭāb’s (d. 23/644) electoral shūrā. This was an opportunity for him to become the next caliph, and reinstitute a system in accordance with the Qurʿānic principles and sunna of the Prophet. (c) It was also not an error when ʿAlī decided to stay in Medina during the events of ʿUthmān’s murder (d. 35/656). He played an active role in dissuading the rebels from their attempt to kill ʿUthmān, but he was in no position to know that his activity would be used against him later by the Umayyads who accused ʿAlī of being complicit in ʿUthmāns’s murder. (d) ʿAlī took the caliphate after ʿUthmān because of his popularity among the people. In this way, he managed to prevent an unqualified person to occupy the seat of the caliphate. (e) When the Battle of Camel broke out, those who demanded justice and opposed ʿAlī were in error. (f) When ʿAlī became the new caliph, his decision to remove Muʿāwīya (d. 60/680) from the governorship of Syria was correct. This is because Muʿāwīya would have refused to accept ʿAlī’s leadership even had he stayed in office as a governor. ʿAlī understood that the conflict would end only through fighting, so he did not lose time in marching against Muʿāwīya. (g) During the battle he abided by the sharīʿa and allowed the Syrian army to access water. (h) It was not ʿAlī, but those defectors in his army who obliged him to end the fighting through arbitration. (i) When ʿAlī agreed to sign the Ṣiffīn ceasefire agreement and did not use his title amīr al-muʾminīn, he followed the Prophet's example since the latter also refrained from using his title during the Ḥudaybiyya agreement. (j) ʿAlī also cannot be blamed for those among his supporters, such as the poet al-Najāshī, who defected and joined the ranks of Muʿāwīya. The motivations for the defectors were either to attain worldly gains or to escape from punishment for the crimes which they had committed. (k) When Muʿāwīya managed to conquer Egypt, ʿAlī’s governors of the province, Qays b. Saʿd (d. 60/680) or Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr (d. 38/658), did nothing for which they could be blamed. (l) And finally, ʿAlī never had guards to protect him because he was never afraid of being assassinated. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd took Ali's innocence as a basis while presenting these views, he did not make inconsistent comments in general and did not say things contrary to historical facts. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge historical value of his views in question. (shrink)

Such questions that may it be essential, necessary, recommended, or free to believe in some matters will be addressed in the article. It is concluded that such an approach is possible for Māturīdis and Ash'arīs. In the study, it was thought that the following two problems should be solved first. The first problem is how can a definitive confirmation be made with speculative information (zannī). Second, if it is a contradiction that the ulema of the relevant school construct the subject (...) of belief with an āḥād report (khabar) even though they explain the true report as mutawātir in the works of Kalām? In the article, three different solutions are proposed for the first problem, and the second problem is tried to be solved with the proposition that tawātur is compulsory for the universal or essential subjects of theology. Then, by giving two examples for each decree (hukm), it was tried to determine what this idea means in practice. It has been determined that the main controversial issues between the Ahl al-sunnah and the Mu'tazila arise in the category of wājib to be believed. It has been determined that the scholars of the aforementioned sects fall into dispute among themselves in matters presented as sunnah to be believed. As a result, in terms of the principles set forth by the Ahl al-Sunnah, it has been deemed possible to implement ʾafʿālu al-mukallafīn (deeds of those obligated) to theological issues. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The connection between the unity of God and the multiplicity seen in the universe represents the central concern for the Sufi thinker, Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240). It deeply affected the thought of the Southeast Asian mystic, Ḥamza Fanṣūrī (d. 1590?), and his alleged disciple, Shams al-Dīn al-Sumatra’ī (d. 1630). Traces of this idea, through its popularisation in the poems of Fanṣūrī, exert a powerful influence on the Indonesian intellectual topography to this day. This article investigates the concept (...) of unity and multiplicity, of the One expressed as the many in the phenomenal world, in Ibn ‘Arabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Ringstones of Wisdom). Through a close textual reading of the chapters of Ādam (Adam) and Ibrāhīm (Abraham) and their various commentaries by the most influential followers of Ibn ‘Arabī, it concludes that the representation of ‘oneness of being’ (waḥdat al-wujūd), which was extensively taught by Fanṣūrī in Aceh, as an erasure of the God-Man divide, is untenable. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an unconventional mereological framework involving the doctrine of divine simplicity, to surmount a significant yet neglected dilemma resulting from that long-standing view of God as absolutely, and uniquely, simple. This framework establishes God as literally a part of everything—an “omni-part.” Although consequential for the many prominent religious traditions featuring divine simplicity, my analysis focuses on potential implications for an important formative issue in medieval Islamic philosophy. This problem of principality, with regards to metaphysical primacy and (...) importance, derives from Ibn Sīnā’s celebrated distinction between essence and existence, and involves determining which is genuinely, objectively, real. Instead of supporting the historically dominant opposing viewpoints advancing either the principality of existence or of essence (aṣālat al-wujūd/al-māhiyya), I claim that God as omni-part aids renewed defence of the majority rejected view which upholds the combined principality of existence and essence together. Additionally, my proposal reinforces various theological desiderata including divine omnipresence and God’s necessity across possible worlds, while also supporting new perspectives on Ibn ‘Arabi’s influential notion of waḥdat al-wūjūd, understood as the absolute unity of being. (shrink)

The integration of modern Western philosophy with the study of Sufism tradition wasn’t quite familiar. So far, philosophical Sufism is often studied from the perspective of neo-platonic philosophy which is famous for its emanation doctrine. Through this research, the author proposes a new integration by using the philosophical concept of Heidegger’s hermeneutics and Roland Barthes’s semiotics as perspectives in studying the phenomena of the philosophical Sufism tradition. The hermeneutic theory of Martin Heidegger used in this research is existential primordial verstehen (...) and the theory of facticity. Whereas Semiotic theory used in this research is Roland Barthes’s theory of order of signification which is used to analyze Sufi’s connotative interpretation of the Qur’an verse. The method used in this research is analysis descriptive by a combined table of hermeneutic and semiotic theories through library research on several primary sources concerning Sufi’s interpretation such as Miftahus Sufi, al-Luma‘, Shaṭaḥāt al-Sūfiyyah, etc. As a result, in the perspective of Sufism Primordial Verstehen, the doctrines of Sufism such as ittiḥād, ḥulūl, and waḥdah al-wujūd could be understood as existential primordial understanding in contemplating Sufi’s existence in the world and his arrival at the understanding of Allah as the only existing Being. (shrink)

This work examines the influence of the school of Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi on the well-known Kubrawi masters. This path-breaking book is a study of major Kubrawi works and the manner in which the Kubrawis approached Ibn 'Arabi's ideas. By delving into the most important cornerstones of Ibn 'Arabi's worldview, such as wahdat al-wujud (unity of existence), al-insan al-kamil (Perfect Human Being) and asma wa sifat (God's Names and Attributes), this work provides a comparative study of their reception in the thought (...) of major Kubrawi mystics, especially that of Najm al-Din Kubra, Sa'd al-Din amuyah, Aziz al-Din Nasafi, Ala al-Dawlah Simnani, and Sayyid 'Ali Hamadani. (shrink)

Abdullah Bosnawī is one of the representatives of the Ibn al-‘Arabī school, which has an important place in the tradition of Islamic thought as well as in the field of Sufism. He is also an Ottoman intellectual who successfully annotated the Ibn al-‘Arabī's "Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥıkam" in Turkish and Arabic for the first time. Most of the treatises that Bosnawī wrote in the field of tafsir and mysticism are in manuscript and are waiting to be introduced to the world of science. (...) His treatise, which contains original interpretations, in which he interprets the story of Dhu’l-Qarnayn according to the theory of waḥdat al-wujūd, which is influential in Islamic thought, is one of them. In the study, the method of examining, comparing and evaluating the tafsir and mysticism literature was applied to the extent of its relevance to the subject. After giving information about the author, the literal and isharī interpretations on the story of Dhu’l-Qarnayn were examined and compared with the comments of Bosnevi. The interpretation method of the author in the treatise is researched, evaluated and introduced. The position of the interpretations of the author in the tradition of isharī tafsir has been tried to be revealed within the framework of the historical stages of Sufism. The content of the treatise has been introduced under the appropriate headings for the handling of the subject. It has been seen that the author, who is observed to use tafsir methods such as explaining the verse by verse, considering the siyâk-sibâk relationship, does not go into too much detail, although he uses classical tafsirs in his literal interpretations. It has been understood that in his isharī tafsirs, he adapted to the tradition of ṣūfī-naẓarī interpretation and made ontological explanations about the creation of man by Almighty Allah. The author has tried to explain throughout his treatise that the curtains of the subtleties of creation will be opened according to the sulūk levels. With these aspects, bringing the work to the literature is important in terms of introducing the isharī interpretations made by a professional scholar about the place, person and objects in the verses related to the story of Dhu’l-Qarnayn in a manuscript. (shrink)

Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī was an indispensable link in the transmission ofMullā Sadrā’s teachings and an important commentator of his works.In my article, I’ll focus on one of them – a short treatise, entitled“Basīt al-haqīqa wa wahdat al-wujūd,” which deals with the modes ofthingness and existence in general, and the socalled“illuminative relation” in particular.The most significant statements Nūrī makes in this brief work consistin the identification of thingness with existence and the “breath of theMerciful” with the “illuminative relation”. I intendto (...) examine these two important points and the employedargumentation in detail, showing how Nūrī exploited some ideas,current in the Kalām and theoretical Sufism, to the benefit of thedoctrine of Mullā Sadrā. (shrink)

Ṣūfī people, as well as the ulema (ʿulemā), discussed the issue of how God (Ḥaḳḳ) surrounds the universe (ʿālem) and where the ʿarş (arsh / the ninth heaven) in which God ensconces himself exists. The Ṣūfī people supporting the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) concept claim that God surrounds the universe by his own being and so that the ʿarş (arsh) is all the creation / created beings by God moreover they argued that people who rejected this idea could attribute (...) weakness or impotence to the power of God. On the other hand, commentators and scholastic theologians acknowledge the idea that God surrounds the universe not by his own being as Ṣūfīs claimed but God surrounds the universe by his knowledge (ʿilm) and power (ḳudret). They claimed that there was no physical connection of God with the universe. There-fore, this article discusses a couplet (beyit) written by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from Bayramī-Melāmī group in light of four different tracts (risāle). One of the four tracts was written by the author of the couplet Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī himself. The title of his tract is Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). The other tract was written by Munīrī-yi Belgradī and the title of it is Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān. The other two tracts analyzed in this article were written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. These two tracts try to explain how God surrounds the universe from the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) perspective. Therefore, they may help in understanding the men-tioned couplet written by Lāmekānī. The outline of the article is as follows: the introduction has the text of the ghazal including the mentioned couplet and discusses how the characteris-tics of Bayramī-Melāmī people were reflected in their poems. This part also tries to determine who wrote the mentioned ghazal as there were two different pen manes / pseudonyms (mah-las) for the same ghazal in various resources. To determine the original writer of the ghazal is crucial for proper interpretation of the texts. The next part of the article discusses the accusa-tion that Lāmekānī was an heretic in the Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān tract by Munīrī-yi Belgradī. This part also tries to outline Munīrī-yi Belgradī’s mode of thought to discuss the background of his criticism about the couplets. According to his way of thinking, though Munīrī had some tolerance to Ṣūfī people believing fenā fillāh, he ironically harshly criticized the Ṣūfī group supporting Wahdat al-wujud entitled as Fuṣūṣī. In the second section, based on his work named Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme), it is aimed to create a general portrait of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. In this context, it discusses how Wahdat al-wujud and Hurufism, which are generally big issues for Bayramī-Melāmī, influenced Lāmekānī. Therefore, the comparison between Oglan Sheikh İsmāʿil-i Maʿşūḳī who was clearly influenced by Wahdat al-mavjud (vaḥdet-i mevcūd) and Hurufism, and Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī is realized in this part. It was figured out that adoration of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem (Fuṣūṣīlik) was more influential in Bayramī-Melāmī Sheikh’s mode of thinking through the analysis of the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem in Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). It was suggested that the reason behind the allocation of Munīrī-yi Belgradī for Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī was the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem which was salient for Melāmī Sheikh Lāmekānī. The final part of the article is about two tracts Miftāḥ al-vucūd and Zayl al-kitāb written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. The criticized couplet was read under the light of these tracts. These two tracts are significant as they explain how God surrounds the universe and where the ʿarş (arsh) is located by referring to the verses of Quran al-Fussilet 41/54, al-Nisā 4/126 and el-Tāhā 20/5 mentio-ned in the couplet by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī proposed a new argument about how God surrounds the universe in Zayl al-kitāb. According to this argument, in Miftāḥ al-vucūd Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī tries to explain God’s surrounding potent through the or-ders/grades of the existence. In Zayl al-kitāb, he claims that there must be a center for God’s surroundings of the universe and this center must be Ḥaḳīḳat al-Muḥammediyye. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī stated that he did not acknowledge this information by himself but he acquired it from Ibn Arabī when he had a dream. Lastly, this part of the article discusses what Rahman settles in ʿarş (arsh) means in terms of circle (devir) theory. It was suggested that according to Ṣūfī people believing Wahdat (vaḥdetçi) God’s ʿarş (arsh) is the human being himself by drawing on the Kasf al-Gıtā (Keşfu’l-Gıtā) qasida written by Sunʿullāh-ı Gaybī who was a successor of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from the second generation. (shrink)

The subject of this study will be to analyze the contribution of an important figure of the period known as the period of new ilm al kalām in the history of kalām, which started in the mid-nineteenth century and included the first periods of the Republic. This person is Mehmet Şerafettin Yaltkaya (1880-1947). Yaltkaya stands out with his original aspects such as being both a school and a madrasa student, representing his scholar and government bureaucrat personality together and strongly, and (...) his open support for the changes and transformation periods of Republican Turkey. It is known that difficult and troubled times in history have been the source of the emergence of rich intellectual movements. Yaltkaya was also nourished by such a political and intellectual hinterland. As is known, the changes in Western thought in the nineteenth century led to the emergence of atheist and materialist worldviews, which was one of the important reasons that caused us to open a new era in kalām. It has even been interpreted that the Ottoman scholars' work on the criticism of materialism was the main reason for the opening of this new era in kalām. In this regard, before discussing Yaltkaya's point of view and his contributions, we have tried to briefly discuss the historical conditions, changes and transformations of the new period of kalām, accompanied by the views of some of its representatives, which will help us to recognize the period. Secondly, we have endeavored to deal with the main dynamics of Şerafettin Yaltkaya's theological views, especially his scholarly and actional aspects that came to the fore in the course of his life, and in particular his up to date understanding of isbāt al-wājib regarding the existence of God and the social theory of kalām (ictimaī ilm al-kalām) about which the debates intensified. As far as we have been able to determine, Yaltkaya's theological views are actually a multiple-polarized structure that draws from all schools of kalām, philosophy, and Sufism. His interest in different disciplines of Islamic sciences and his curiosity in modern sciences also contributed to his vigorous personality. On the other hand, it must be said that he was also influenced by Western intellectuals and evaluated the possibilities of reason and instinct. Yaltkaya's support for Ottoman modernization and Republic reforms are among the significant aspects of Yaltkaya, both an Islamist and a kind of cultural nationalist. He made great contributions to the world of scholarship and thought of his time with his knowledge and works in different disciplines such as kalām, philosophy, literature, sufism history of sects and history of medicine. In addition, we believe that his lectures on kalām, philosophy and history of sects in important high schools and universities that were newly opened at the time and his position as the second head of the Presidency of Religious Affairs supported the background of his ideas that we highlight in this article. We have determined that Yaltkaya, who criticized the theological views of the traditional scholars, was also closely familiar with and influenced by Western scholars and philosophers who were his contemporaries. (shrink)

This article descriptively discusses the divine purpose in the creation of the world and especially the human being, and the value analysis of the concepts, expressing this purpose in the light of the views of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024), who was from the Basra School, and systemized the five doctrinal principles of the Mu'tazila. Accordingly, it answers the question why God created the human on the basis of the purpose/aim in divine actions and examines the qualitative value of the (...) non-compulsory cause (dā’ī) that motivates God to create. In addition, the article shows that 'beneficence', the central concept in the purpose of the creation, is formulized as ‘tafaḍḍul’ (disinterested or gratuitous beneficence) with the title of wisdom before the creation and as ‘thawāb’ (reward) and ‘iwaḍ (compensation) with the title of wājib (necessary or obligatory) in the resurrection. It also emphasizes that ‘iqāb (punishment) is not a value for the beginning of creation, and therefore it is 'legal good' required by the resurrection. It also touches on that the concepts, expressing all this purposefulness are based on the values of 'benefit and good' (maṣlaḥa and ḥusn). This article concludes that while the main purpose of the beginning of creation is beneficence and its actual value is tafaḍḍul; the main purpose of re-creation is benefit and good, and the actual value is wājib. (shrink)

Sunnah is the second main source for Islamic law following the Qur’ān. Sunnah in the books on the Methodology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) is examined in two main parts, one of which is as the source for religious commands and the other is being as religious/taklīfī commands. Sunnah is divided into three categories in terms of being the source for Islamic commands: qawlī (verbal), fi‘ilī (behavioral) and taqrīrī (approval). In the Islamic literature, when the word “sunnah” is mentioned, first (...) of all, it is understood as a verbal appeal, which is qawlī sunnah (hadith). Verbal sunnah has a rhetoric/wording that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). And ultimately to the wording of this verbal address, some religious commands, such as farḍ/wājib, sunnah/mandūb, and permissible/mubāḥ are attributed. The behavioral sunnah (the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other hand, does not have a rhetoric that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). The command/judgment is based on rhetoric. In other words, if there is an address, there is a command; if there is no address, there is no command/judgment. Therefore, it is problematic that the acts of the Prophet are decreed in the form of farḍ/ wājib, sun-nah/mandūb and mubāḥ. For this reason, the acts of the Prophet in the books on the Method-ology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) have been particularly examined under the title of Afʿāl al-Rasūl. While some of the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad have a religious character, some of them are the acts that he performed completely in accordance with the customs and traditions in the society he lived in. Therefore, not all of the Prophet’s deeds/acts (behavioral sunnah) are at the same level in terms of obligation. Therefore, while some of the acts/deeds of the Prophet express wucūb, some other mandūb (sunnah-mustaḥab) and still some other ibāhā/mubāḥ. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad, in terms of being the source of religious commands, are divided into two categories: the tashrīī (religiously) qualified and non tashrīī (religiously) qualified. What is meant by a religious act is the actions of the Prophet, which he performed as being a prophet, for the purpose of worshiping and that he wanted his followers act accordingly. What is meant by a non-religious act is the behavior of the Prophet as a human being or as a requirement of the society he lived in. Sunnah, in terms of being a religious com-mand, refers to commands other than fard and wājib. Ḥanafī scholars are of the opinion that sunnah as a religious decree is divided into two parts as sunnah-i hudā and sunnah-i zawāid. The acts of the Prophet, in accordance with his being a human or the custom of the society he lived in, are included in the scope of sunnah zawāid. In other words, sunnah zawāid generally means the actions of the Prophet that he did not do with the intention of worship. In this con-text, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad are important. Because, the acts of the Prophet are not the same in terms of qualification (command), nor are they the same in terms of their nature (being religious or humanly natural). The acts of the Prophet Muḥammad with a religious nature are divided into two as known qualities and unknown qualifications. In principle, the religious acts of the Prophet, whose qualities are known, are also obligation for the ummah (Muslims). Therefore, when it is known for what purpose the Prophet Muḥammad made a deed/behavior, that act is accordingly is binding for the ummah (Muslims). Accordingly, if the attribute of a deed/behavior made by the Prophet is wājib/farḍ, it is also wājib for the ummah and permissible (ibāḥā) for the ummah if it is permissible. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet in the Qur’ān as a mujmal (ambiguous nass /verse) are also subject to the command of mujmal. There is a dispute regarding the verdict of the Prophet’s acts of religious nature whose qualifications are unknown. According to the majority of Hanafī scholars, what is essential in the actions of the Prophet whose qualifications are unknown and that contain the characteris-tics of worship, is that it is mustahab/mandūb. According to Kerkhī (d. 340/952), what is es-sential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. Jassās (d.370 / 980) expresses the same opinion with Kerkhī. Opinions on this issue are conveyed from Imām Mālik and Imām Shafiī that he declared permissibility. The preferred opinion in Hanbalis is to declare permissibility. Non-religious acts of the Prophet Muḥammad as a human being or as per the custom of the society he lives in are not obligation for the ummah. Therefore, what is essential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. (shrink)

A religious experience in the neuroscience view is interpreted as a symptom of neurological disorders of the brain. The neuroscience view is one of the various views that deny the reality of religious experience. Through empirical research instruments, neuroscientists have found that the soul is identical to the brain, which means that every activity can be measured through the brain. This has implications for the experiences of the Prophets in receiving revelations as the result of brain disorders. This paper seeks (...) to explain religious experience through its ontological basis, namely the existence of immaterial existence and the existence of the soul, as well as its epistemological basis, namely the performance of the faculty of knowledge, both of which cannot be separated. The research method used is descriptive-analytic with the philosophical approach of the soul of Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah. The results of this study indicate that the Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah which was founded by Mulla Ṣadrā proves the existence of the wujūd levels, including the soul, explaining the various levels of perception carried out by the soul corresponding to the various levels of existence. Ṣadrā thought can explain the concept of the soul as an immaterial substance that can perceive metaphysical objects as the emanation of God. (shrink)

The need for renewal felt in various fields with the Tanẓīmat, and the changes and modernization activities realized in accordance with it, and the nature and boundaries of these activities are important issues that determine the period's intellectual agenda. Some of the proposals for a solution to save the state are related to the renewal of religious thought. The bad situation in the Ottoman Empire stems from the way religion is understood, not from religion itself, and one of the names (...) that produce ideas about the necessity of changing this way of thinking is Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri. He believes that Fiqh and Exegeticsshould be based on the work of updating the content of Islamic Sciences within the framework of contemporary needs. Claiming that the basic need of society is not Science of Kalām but Catechism, Kadri claims that the attempt of the science of Kalām, regulated to respond to the needs of the age will not result in even will cause religious conflict among people. In this article, Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri'sintellectual background, his suggestions for the renewal of religious thought and his objection to the new Science of Kalām are discussed.Summary: What defines the history of late Ottoman period is the concept called change. There have been reform attempts in order to canalise the military, economic, socio-cultural change and transformation due to political turmoil starting from the end of the 16th century and beginning of the 17th century. Basic argument regarding these reforms finds its base on Qanūn al-Qadīm and the idea of returning to Sharia. Along with the Declaration of the Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Edict of Gulhane) the previous reforms which were made earlier changed dimension and westernization became a government policy. During the ongoing process, the change in terms of Westernization became a current issue within every segment of Ottoman society. Need for innovation in various areas, and therefore the change and modernization movements and accordingly these movements’ nature and boundries set the intellectual agenda of the era. Some of the suggestions are associated with renewal of the religious thought which are to keep the State from difficult situation it is in. Solutions proposed in this context creates a rich intellectual discussion environment within Western, Islamist, and Turkist intellectuals. Islamists in general terms are of the opinion that the difficult situation Ottoman is in does not stem from the religion itself but the way of understanding religion; and they are of the opinion that this way of thinking should be altered; when they bring about their suggestions, it is seen that the way of thinking is their starting point. What causes the Islamists fall apart within themselves is the nature of renawal. Islamist intellectuals, supporting the idea which is the content of islamic knowledge should be updated according the needs of era, suggest various ideas in terms of which dicipline should be in charge for the needs in question. While some intellectuals are of the opinion Kalām should be prioritised, some are of the opinion Fiqh and Exegetics should be prioritised. Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri, who wrote under the pseudonym of Shaykh Muḥsin-i Fānῑ ez-Ẓāhirῑ, is one of these intellectuals coming up with an idea. Kadri suggests a renawal in thinking based upon Fiqh and ExegeticsḤüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis one of the most prominent intellectuals of Constitutional Period. Working as a governor of an Ottoman province, deputy, and minister and engaging in journalism, Kadri compiles a series of work in religion, language and agriculture. All of his efforts are to find ways of saving Ottoman from its difficult situations. Thus, Kadri questions the quality of the knowledge which was brought about in religious thinking and proposes solutions. What lies under his solution is the need for a dicipline for society’ s practical problems. He bases his opinion on opposition to new theology movement. According to Kadri, ever since Kalām was codified, it has never been useful to Muslims, on the contrary it has impaired the Muslims. Renowation of Kalām creates nothing but problem. In his opinion, due to using Greek philosophy content and method, Kalām is not a dicipline authentic to Muslims, besides it is a harmful dicipline which aims to damage the essence of Islam.One of the reasons why Kalām is out of Islamic thinking tradition is because of the Mu'tazila wises are the founders of this dicipline. Kadri is of the opinion that the wises/intellectuals belonging to this school and their theories regarding to understand the existence do not contribute to the field of faith. Admitting the function of Ahl-al Sunnah school generated after the Mihna Period, Kadri states the insufficient side of that function. To him, hence the subjects such as substance (cevher) –accident (araz), hudûth-eternality, wujud (vücûd)-nothingness (adem) etc have been discussed but at that time the subject in question could not be renovated in regard to needs. Another criticism of Kadri raised against Kalām is he considers this field the reason why Muslims are divided. Especially during the times when Muslims need to be in unity and solidarity, Kadri is worried about new discursion which will occur due to the renovation of Kalām attempts. This concern of Kadri causes him to object Kalām with a pragmatic motive.Kalām which is called Usulu'd-Din is another reason why Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis against Kalām. In his opinion, theologians complicates the subjects such as amalgation and adjectives of Allah instead of making it clear with ijtihad. Kadri who considers offering proof in terms of faith as faithlessness is of the opinion that faith is not a matter of reason but a matter of sense which has no doubt among people. Criticising the struggle for the enquiry of faith, Kadri puts an emphasis on the significance of the reinterpretation of the principles, for example in the field of Fiqh which deals with the practical area and says it is the most prominent religious duty. He also criticises the imitation of the past and remarks the importance of reason in Fiqh. As an alternative to Ilm-i Kalām, he claims a new Catechism and adds, it is going to provide the religious knowledge people need. It is an ideological contrast of Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadrito think Kalām is the reason for all the misfortune Muslims encountered. This opposition causes him to ignore all the accumulation in Kalām field. Moreover, it is the reason why he makes emotional deductions conflicting with historical facts. Kalām plays a role just like the other fields who could not contribute to Islamic Thinking and its renovation process in accordance with the needs of time. However, it is not realistic and reasonable to think Kalām is the only one responsible. (shrink)

The most fundamental subject and aim of the Islamic belief system is the subject of maʿrifatullah (knowing Allah). Studies on this subject are mostly called ithbāt al-wājib (the demonstration of God) in the literature. They are considered the most valuable work for kalām, philosophy and mysticism schools. Kalām schools started to use this conceptualization intensively after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, mainly under the influence of Ibn Sīnā. Sūfis, on the other hand, most participated in these studies based on the theory (...) of the unity of existence. In kalām, all the principles of belief are ultimately grounded to explain and strengthen faith in Allah. For this reason, belief in Allah is referred to as aṣl al-uṣūl (the origin of all principles). Throughout history, scholars of kalām discussed the creedal issues of Islam in the Muslim society while it tried to answer the creedal issues abroad by the expanding Islamic geography with studies on ithbāt al-wājib. In this framework, the problems of prophecy and the hereafter are included in kalām. Since the beginning of the history of kalām, it has used the theory of atomism to a large extent, especially in defending the existence of Allah against materialists. The systematisation of Islamic philosophy and mysticism in time, the kalām cosmological argument, the argument from contingency of philosophers and the argument from kashf and ilhām of Sūfis strengthened this area from three different branches. On the other hand, the interaction of these schools within themselves and the diversification of the interlocutors of studies on ithbāt al-wājib brought these arguments closer together. The convergence in terms of terminology, subject and methodology, especially after Shahrestānī and Rāzī, revealed the tradition of philosophical theology. In this process, theologians began to use both the concepts of temporality (hudūth) and contingency (imkān) to use ontological, cosmological and teleological proofs. Dawānī, one of the eminent figures of these studies in the last periods of Ottomans, is the subject of our research, due to his skills in utilising these proofs of ithbāt al-wājib and his influence in the studies after him. His review of the matter can be observed in his effort in his works where he deals with the so-called deficiencies and errors of his predecessors regarding ithbāt al-wājib. For this reason, many annotations and commentaries were made for his treatises and ideas until the 19th century. Especially, the advance of materialism in the West in this century showed great influence on many scholars and intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire seems to be a parallel historical experience. Therefore, it has become necessary to utilise the arguments for the existence of Allah by supporting each individual argument together. In this regard, in our study, to see the process, we also discussed the views of Aḥmad Nūrī, one of the scholars in the last period Ottoman, who dealt with the common arguments about ithbāt al-wājib produced by the three primary schools of Islamic thought: kalām, Islamic philosophy and mysticism. (shrink)

Some scholars showed that Mīrdāmād believed in the ‘primacy of quiddity’ by adducing his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’ in which an entity’s quiddity is the ‘object‘ of the act of creation, and by adducing his belief that ‘existence‘ is constructed. Some other passages in Mīrdāmād’s work reinforce such attribution, made by his prominent student, Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers. This article offers a careful account of Mīrdāmād’s theory of ‘simple act of creation’ to assess the accuracy or (...) inaccuracy of this attribution, and to provide a precise picture of quiddity in his philosophical system. The authors concluded that Mīrdāmād’s idea about ‘quiddity’ as the ‘object’ of creation by no means implies the primacy of quiddity as understood by Mullā Ṣadrā.By explicating his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’, they showed that it does’ imply the primacy of quiddity. (shrink)

Islam and society; religious life; Islam.

Islamic philosophy and creation (Islam) from early works to 1800.