0. Introductory remarks. I assume that every serious theory of language must give some explicit account of the relationship between expressions in the language described and expressions in some interpreted language which spells out the semantics of the language.1 Let's call this relationship the translation relation. Theories differ as to how this relation is specified. In the Aspects theory of syntax, taken together with a Katz-Postal view of "semantic rules", it was assumed that the relation was defined on deep structures. (...) Serious problems led to modifications of this view in several directions. Chomsky's latest papers assume that a modified 'intermediate structure' is transformed by rules of interpretation to a level of representation called 'logical form'. Common to all of these approaches is the assumption that the translation rules are defined initially on syntactic structures of one sort or another. Let us call this assumption the configurational hypothesis: the translation rules all have the form: [183]. (shrink)

Various restrictions on transformational grammars have been investigated in order to reduce their generative power from recursively enumerable languages to recursive languages.It will be shown that any restriction on transformational grammars defining a recursively enumerable subset of the set of all transformational grammars, is either too weak (in the sense that there does not exist a general decision procedure for all languages generated under such a restriction) or too strong (in the sense that there exists a recursive (...) language that cannot be generated by any transformational grammar thus restricted). In addition, some related problems will be discussed. (shrink)

The article traces interpretative mechanisms hidden in Chomsky's Transformational Model. The framework is that of epistemological criticism, investigating the intertwining of interpretation, context and intuition. My hypothesis is that the Transformational Model is an example of a quasi-axiomatic, intuition-based grammar. It is not a scientific model of Competence but a scientistic description of Performance (teleological corpora). The scientistic décor is thus an eristic stratagem to hide arbitrary interpretation. The discussion is empirically substantiated by analyzing the notion of (...) grammaticality, the tectonics of the Transformational Model and the phenomenology of countable/uncountable nouns. Key Words: interpretative mechanisms • intuition • epistemology • transformational model • context • Dasein • performance • competence. (shrink)

Written by two of the leading figures in the field, this is a lucid and systematic introduction to semantics as applied to transformational grammars of the ...

Despite decades of emancipatory mobilization, there is no realistic prospect for any profound socio-ecological transformation of contemporary consumer societies. Instead, social inequality and ecological destruction are on the rise and an autocratic-authoritarian turn is reshaping even the most established liberal democracies. In explaining these phenomena, the struggle for autonomy and emancipation is an important parameter that has not received sufficient attention so far. This article investigates these phenomena through the lens of the dialectic of emancipation – a concept that I (...) have suggested elsewhere and that I here further elaborate, placing particular emphasis on the relationship between the rule-transgressing and the rule-setting capacities of the emancipatory project. The article specifies constitutive dimensions of the emancipatory project, explores their ongoing reinterpretation and reconfiguration and thus explains how the emancipatory logic itself has come to obstruct the socio-ecological transformation and to nurture new forms of authoritarian governance. (shrink)

The theory of language must predict the possible thought—signal (or meaning—sound or sign) pairings of a language. We argue for a Meaning First architecture of language where a thought structure is generated first. The thought structure is then realized using language to communicate the thought, to memorize it, or perhaps with another purpose. Our view contrasts with the T-model architecture of mainstream generative grammar, according to which distinct phrase-structural representations—Phonetic Form (PF) for articulation, Logical Form (LF) for interpretation—are generated (...) within the grammar. At the same time, our view differs from early transformational grammar and generative semantics: We view the relationship between the thought structure and the corresponding signal as one of compression. We specify a formal sketch of compression as a choice between multiple possible pronounciations balancing the desire to transmit information against the effort of pronounciation. The Meaning First architecture allows a greater degree of independence between thought structures and the linguistic signal. We present three arguments favoring this type of independence. First we argue that scopal properties can be better explained if we only compare thought structures independent of the their realization as a sentence. Secondly, we argue that Meaning First architecture allows contentful late insertion, an idea that has been argued for in Distributed Morphology already, but as we argue is also motivated by the division of the logical and socio-emotive meaning content of language. Finally, we show that only the Meaning First architecture provides a satisfying account of the mixing of multiple languages by multilingual speakers, especially for cases of simultaneous articulation across two modalities in bimodal speakers. Our view of the structure of grammar leads to a reassessment of priorities in linguistic analyses: while current mainstream work is often focused on establishing one-to-one relationships between concepts and morphemes, our view makes it plausible that primitive concepts are frequently marked indirectly or unpronounced entirely. Our view therefore assigns great value to the understanding of logical primitives and of compression. (shrink)

This volume presents significant developments in the field of Montague Grammar and outlines its past and future contributions to philosophy and linguistics. The contents are as follows: Introduction by Steven Davis and Marianne Mithun Emmon Bach, "Montague Grammar and Classical Transformational Grammar" Barbara H. Partee, "Constraining Transformational Montague Grammar: A Framework and a Fragment" James D. McCawley, "Helpful Hints to the Ordinary Working Montague Grammarian" Terence Parsons, "Type Theory and Ordinary Language" David R. Dowty, (...) "Dative 'Movement' and Thomason's Extensions of Montague Grammar" Muffy E. A. Siegel, "Measure Adjectives in Montague Grammar" Michael Bennett, "Mass Nouns and Mass Terms in Montague Grammar" Jeroen Groenendijk and Martin Stokhof, "Infinitives and Context in Montague Grammar" James Waldo, "A PTQ Semantics for Sortal Incorrectness". (shrink)

Recent defenders of the cognitive significance of religious language have had to face opponents from two directions; from those who demand that religious language be capable of some form of empirical verification and from those who demand that for religious language to be meaningful it must be capable of being understood in ordinary language. Apologists who have taken the first challenge seriously have strained to show that religious statements can be verified by ‘religious experience’, or by an ‘odd discernment’ or (...) by an ‘eschatological verification’. Each of these responses raises further problems for the defender of religion, but in general they all are subject to their failure to provide an adequate criterion or standard by which they could be inter-subjectively tested. Facing in the other direction, theological apologists have attempted to justify religious expressions by showing that they could be subsumed under special categories of ordinary language; namely those of ‘convictional language’ and ‘performative language’. Although these defenders have shown that religious language has an ‘ordinary usage’, they have not shown that the cognitive elements of this usage can be reduced to the ‘use of ordinary language’. (shrink)

Whatever one may think of Schmidt’s intuition, it is still nothing but intuition, and the variety of syntactic structures which εἶναι admits of is neither articulated nor unified. Kahn, on the other hand, by the use of Transformational Grammar, is able to a large extent to generate in a regular way from a posited notion of "kernel sentence" all the Greek sentences in which εἶναι occurs. Kahn’s original plan was "to correlate every intuitive difference of meaning in the (...) use of εἰμί with a formal description of the corresponding sentence-type", but he admits that he cannot always do so. Whether this is a failure inherent in Transformational Grammar itself, or in the version Kahn uses, can for the moment be left aside. First, an example of the success and another of the failure of the technique, as Kahn practices it, are in order. Kahn formulates the rule for the recognition of periphrasis somewhat as follows: εἶναι is used periphrastically with the participle if and only if it is impossible to obtain two kernel sentences, one of which has a finite form of εἶναι and the other a finite form of the participle, but if two kernel sentences can be so obtained, the usage is not periphrastic. This rule is both simple and elegant; it will no doubt become in time a standard part of Greek grammar. The enchantment, however, which mathematical clarity can cast is best illustrated in the case of another construction. ἔστιν ὅστις... is not uncommon. It looks like the existential operator of modern logic, and the fact that it occurs far more often with οὐκ than without seems to be, linguistically, irrelevant. Now, Kahn asserts that, though he looked hard for examples, he could only find one in which the second clause has the copula, and he offers a proof as to why this should be the case. He is mistaken. Euripides has οὐκ ἔστι θνητῶν ὅστις ἕστ’ ἐλεύθερος, and Sophocles καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων ὅ τι μὴ Ζεύς, and there are several examples in just one passage of Plato’s Charmides. The Sophoclean example is important since it illustrates a double "zeroing" of εἶναι, and whereas for traditional grammar such nominal sentences are treated as primary, with the insertion of ἐστί as a secondary development, in Kahn’s use of Transformational Grammar no distinction between the presence or the absence of the verb can be allowed. For deep structure, the verb is always present, and it might be no more than an apparent paradox that a verb, whose primitive meaning is said to designate presence, can in its absence make its presence equally felt. Can a verb which is almost always eliminable be the word for reality and truth? Or is it because "being" is the only word that cannot be just a word that it can so easily be suppressed in speech? (shrink)

This paper takes distances from two influential images of Wittgenstein's philosophy: the image of a primarily ethical philosopher defended by the so-called «resolute» interpreters and that of an ascetically "analytical" philosopher transmitted by the standard interpretation. Instead of contrasting images (that of Wittgenstein as an "aesthetic" philosopher and that of the "ethical" Wittgenstein), this paper focuses on the analysis of the fractures and tensions characterizing not only the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and aesthetics, but also the very style of Wittgenstein's (...) thought. Addressing a specific issue from a conceptual and textual standpoint (the unity of Ethics and Aesthetics in the Tractatus) seems to the author to be a fruitful strategy that allows us not only to understand whether and how determinant and central the aesthetic problem is for Wittgenstein, but also to see how aesthetics itself can be radically reshaped through the filter offered by his thought. In the first place, then, it is clarified what the Tractatus claim that ethics and aesthetics «sind eins» might entail. Secondly, it is checked if and how the conceptual consistency of the «being one» of ethics and aesthetics is transformed during the 1930s, to the point that it requires a different configuration: the metamor¬phosis of the logical unity between the two conceptual fields into an analogical affinity. Analyzing this conceptual metamorphosis the paper considers also the idea of an asymmetry of the aesthetic over the ethical as already evident, despite appearances, in the 1929 Lecture on Ethics. This asymmetry is then developed focusing the image of grammatical mechanism with its degrees of freedom of which Wittgensteins writes from 1930. In connection with this image the author outlines finally the idea of an aesthetic mechanism arising from primitive reactions and strictly related with the genesis of language games. (shrink)

The theoretical debate in linguistics during the past half-century bears an uncanny parallel to the politics of the (now defunct) Communist Bloc. The parallels are not so much in the revolutionary nature of Chomsky's ideas as in the Bolshevik manner of his takeover of linguistics (Koerner 1994) and in the Trotskyist (“permanent revolution”) flavor of the subsequent development of the doctrine of Transformational Generative Grammar (TGG) (Townsend & Bever 2001, pp. 37–40). By those standards, Jackendoff is quite a (...) party faithful (a Khrushchev or a Dubcek, rather than a Solzhenitsyn or a Sakharov) who questions some of the components of the dogma, yet stops far short of repudiating it. (shrink)

Relational Grammar (RG) was introduced in the 1970s as a theory of grammatical relations and relation change, for example, passivization, dative shift, and raising. Furthermore, the idea behind RG was that transformations as originally designed in generative grammar were unable to capture the common kernel of, e.g., passivization across languages. The researchconducted within RG has uncovered a wealth of phenomena for which it could produce a satisfactory analysis. Although the theory of Government and Binding has answered some of (...) the complaints, still it left many phenomena unaccounted for. Referent Systems (RSs) have been introduced by Vermeulen (1995) to overcome certain weaknesses of Dynamic Semantics. Their usefulness has not yet been realized in semantical theory. We shall show here that their significance cannot be overestimated. Namely, we will show in this paper that there exists a fundamental affinity to RG. Both handle the relation between an argument and a functor by means of a shared relational sign, which is unique for each argument. This assignment can be changed. What is interesting is that the notion of a chômeur, which is central to RG, finds a natural treatment in RSs. This coincidence is in our view not accidental but reveals some fundamental properties of the human language faculty. (shrink)

This paper presents a theory of the syntactic aspects of human sentence production. An important characteristic of unprepared speech is that overt pronunciation of a sentence can be initiated before the speaker has completely worked out the meaning content he or she is going to express in that sentence. Apparently, the speaker is able to build up a syntactically coherent utterance out of a series of syntactic fragments each rendering a new part of the meaning content. This incremental, left‐to‐right mode (...) of sentence production is the central capability of the proposed Incremental Procedural Grammar (IPG). Certain other properties of spontaneous speech, as derivable from speech errors, hesitations, self‐repairs, and language pathology, are accounted for as well.The psychological plausibility thus gained by the grammar appears compatible with a satisfactory level of linguistic plausibility in that sentences receive structural descriptions which are in line with current theories of grammar. More importantly, an explanation for the existence of configurational conditions on transformations and other linguistics rules is proposed.The basic design feature of IPG which gives rise to these psychologically and linguistically desirable properties, is the “Procedures + Stack” concept. Sentences are built not by a central constructing agency which overlooks the whole process but by a team of syntactic procedures (modules) which work—in parallel—on small parts of the sentence, have only a limited overview, and whose sole communication channel is a stack.IPG covers object complement constructions, interrogatives, and word order in main and subordinate clauses. It handles unbounded dependencies, crossserial dependencies and coordination phenomena such as gapping and conjunction reduction. It is also capable of generating self‐repairs and elliptical answers to questions. IPG has been implemented as an incremental Dutch sentence generator written in LISP. (shrink)

In this paper, a formal theory is presented that describes syntactic and semantic mechanisms of philosophical discourses. They are treated as peculiar language systems possessing deep derivational structures called architectonic forms of philosophical systems, encoded in philosophical mind. Architectonic forms are constituents of more complex structures called architectonic spaces of philosophy. They are understood as formal and algorithmic representations of various philosophical traditions. The formal derivational machinery of a given space determines its class of all possible architectonic forms. Some of (...) them stand under factual historical philosophical systems and they organize processes of doing philosophy within these systems. Many architectonic forms have never been realized in the history of philosophy. The presented theory may be interpreted as falling under Hegel’s paradigm of comprehending cultural texts. This paradigm is enriched and inspired with Propp’s formal, morphological view on texts. The peculiarity of this modification of the Hegel-Propp paradigm consists of the use of algebraic and algorithmic tools of modeling processes of cultural development. To speak metaphorically, the theory is an attempt at the mathematical and logical history of philosophy inspired by the Internet metaphor. And that is why it belongs to the tradition of doing metaphilosophy in The Lvov-Warsaw School, which is continued today mainly by Woleński, Pelc, Perzanowski, and Jadacki. (shrink)

The paper presents a way to transform pregroup grammars into contextfree grammars using functional composition. The same technique can also be used for the proof-nets of multiplicative cyclic linear logic and for Lambek calculus allowing empty premises.

Second-order abstract categorial grammars (de Groote in Association for computational linguistics, 39th annual meeting and 10th conference of the European chapter, proceedings of the conference, pp. 148–155, 2001) and hyperedge replacement grammars (Bauderon and Courcelle in Math Syst Theory 20:83–127, 1987; Habel and Kreowski in STACS 87: 4th Annual symposium on theoretical aspects of computer science. Lecture notes in computer science, vol 247, Springer, Berlin, pp 207–219, 1987) are two natural ways of generalizing “context-free” grammar formalisms for string and (...) tree languages. It is known that the string generating power of both formalisms is equivalent to (non-erasing) multiple context-free grammars (Seki et al. in Theor Comput Sci 88:191–229, 1991) or linear context-free rewriting systems (Weir in Characterizing mildly context-sensitive grammar formalisms, University of Pennsylvania, 1988). In this paper, we give a simple, direct proof of the fact that second-order ACGs are simulated by hyperedge replacement grammars, which implies that the string and tree generating power of the former is included in that of the latter. The normal form for tree-generating hyperedge replacement grammars given by Engelfriet and Maneth (Graph transformation. Lecture notes in computer science, vol 1764. Springer, Berlin, pp 15–29, 2000) can then be used to show that the tree generating power of second-order ACGs is exactly the same as that of hyperedge replacement grammars. (shrink)

Are the words in our natural language which we use to speak about natural and social phenomena actually laden with preexisting (and hence corrigible) theoretical commitments, full-blown "ontologies," or even metaphysics? Or can we appeal to rules for their use in adjudicating the sense (or otherwise) of any scientific or philosophical innovation? These questions arise most commonly in the context of claims about scientific "transformations," especially "scientific revolutions." Cognitive science, for example, announces such a "revolution" in its conceptualizations of the (...) true nature of the "mind," "thought," "intelligence," "understanding," and so on. In this paper I shall argue that Wittgenstein's reflections on "grammar" enable us to dissolve many of the perplexities that confront us when we invoke Kuhnian "incommensurability" in distinguishing between genuine scientific revolutions and pseudo-revolutions. Indeed, the Kuhnian thesis itself is seen to depend on a range of contestable claims about "words" and "meanings.". (shrink)

A number of criticisms of a recent paper byare made. (1) In attempting to assess the observational adequacy of story grammars, they state that a context‐free grammar cannot handle discontinuous elements; however, they do not show that such elements occur in the domain to which the grammars apply. Further, they do not present adequate evidence for their claim that there are acceptable stories not accounted for by existing grammars and that the grammars will accept nonstories such as procedures. (2) (...) They state that it has been proven that under natural conditions children cannot learn transformational grammars, which is a misrepresentation of the learnability proofs which have been offered. (3) Most important, they take an unduly narrow approach to story understanding by claiming that people only understand story content and do not have knowledge of story structure which is useful in comprehension or memory. Counterevidence from the literature is cited which indicates that such knowledge is both useful and used, and a number of methods for assessing the psychological adequacy of structural models are discussed. (shrink)

The paper aims to explore the phenomenon of the spread in democracy of new powers – produced by inexhaustible technological developments – from the perspective of the philosophy of Institutions. It traces the original idea of democracy, in which the «government of the people» arises from the conversion of natural liberty into social and political liberty, dwells on the political and juridical meaning of authority, analyses the traditional instruments used to condition human opinions and behaviours, and reconstructs – in light (...) of this itinerary – the functioning and new grammar of the digital order. What opens before us is a fluid and disorganized scenario, dominated by digital systems, algorithms and artificial intelligence, that draws the attention of philosophers and sociologists, jurists and scholars of language and of anthropology. The old single order, outlined by the political and juridical machine of the modern State – which, through an aloof and solemn language, aimed to impart regularity to human behaviour and to give society direction – is replaced by multifarious models of order, each of which is generated by its own logic, practices, and autonomous control techniques. Under the omnipotence of technology, concepts such as authority, liberty, truth and power undergo a vortex of semantic transformations that penetrate a new symbolic space into human reasoning and actions. (shrink)

This paper presents empirical studies and closely corresponding theoretical models of the performance of a chart parser exhaustively parsing the Penn Treebank with the Treebank’s own CFG grammar. We show how performance is dramatically affected by rule representation and tree transformations, but little by top-down vs. bottom-up strategies. We discuss grammatical saturation, including analysis of the strongly connected components of the phrasal nonterminals in the Treebank, and model how, as sentence length increases, the effective grammar rule size increases (...) as regions of the grammar are unlocked, yielding super-cubic observed time behavior in some configurations. (shrink)

Because of the ease of their implementation, attribute-value based theories of grammar are becoming increasingly popular in theoretical linguistics as an alternative to transformational accounts and in computational linguistics. This book provides a formal analysis of attribute-value structures, their use in a theory of grammar and the representation of grammatical relations in such theories of grammar. It provides a classical treatment of disjunction and negation, and explores the linguistic implications of different representations of grammatical relations. Mark (...) Johnson is assistant professor in cognitive and linguistic sciences at Brown University. He was a Fairchild postdoctoral fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during the 1987-88 academic year. (shrink)