How Norms (Might) Guide Belief

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409 (2015)
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Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief normativism were true, the relevant norms would have to offer such guidance. I argue that G&W’s case against belief normativism is not successful. In section 1, I defend the idea that truth-norms can guide belief formation indirectly via epistemic norms. In section 2, I outline an account of how the epistemic norms might guide belief. Interestingly, this account may involve a commitment to a certain kind of expressivist view concerning judgments about epistemic norms



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Teemu Toppinen
Tampere University

Citations of this work

Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance.Alireza Kazemi - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):213-228.
Reasoning, rationality, and representation.Wade Munroe - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8323-8345.
Rationality, Reasoning Well, and Extramental Props.Wade Munroe - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):175-198.

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References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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