Using a parallel mixed-methods design, the current study examined university students’ perceptions of academic cheating through collecting and analyzing both the quantitative and qualitative data. Our quantitative findings corroborate previous research that male students have engaged more in academic cheating than females based on students’ self-reports, and that undergraduate students are less willing to discuss issues on academic cheating as compared with their graduate counterparts. Five themes emerged from the thematic analysis of the qualitative data: flexible definitions for cheating, environmental (...) promotion of cheating, the moral transgression of cheating, cheating as an ambiguous justification, and cheating as a conscious decision making process. The mixed-methods findings indicate that there is no relationship between students’ gender or classification and their endorsements of the qualitative themes. However, non-White students are more likely to endorse the theme “cheating as an ambiguous justification.” Implications for reducing and preventing academic cheating at the university level are discussed. (shrink)

This is a brief review of the Civics and Moral Education programme currently in use in Singapore schools. The paper offers an appraisal of the rationale provided in policy statements and of selected official and students' workbook descriptions of curricular content, activities and pedagogic theories. It shows that the Civics and Moral Education programme is more a matter of training students to absorb pragmatic values deemed to be important for Singapore to achieve social cohesion and economic success, rather than moral (...) education as the development of intrinsic commitment to and habituation in the practice of values, defended on autonomous moral considerations and not mere national expediency. Whilst educationists would be inclined to take issue with the programme's ultimate stand on values, they might warm to the pedagogy it prescribes in terms of the need for character-building by practice and experience, and also the importance of reasoning in the resolving of disputes and dilemmas. (shrink)

THE ARTICLE ARGUES THAT RECENT ATTEMPTS, TO REFUTE THE NEO-HUMEAN CONTENTION 1. THAT MIRACLES CONSIDERED AS VIOLATIONS OF NATURAL LAWS ARE IN PRINCIPLE UNIDENTIFIABLE, AND 2. THAT IN ANY CASE CRITICAL HISTORY WOULD ALWAYS RULE AGAINST ACCEPTING PURPORTED EVIDENCES FOR MIRACLES, ARE UNSUCCESSFUL EVEN THOUGH SUGGESTIVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THEY EITHER EVADE THE ISSUE, OR FAIL TO FULLY COGNISE THE PURPORT OF THE CONTENTION. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT ONCE MIRACLES ARE CONSIDERED WITHIN THEIR RELIGIOUS CONTEXT, SITUATIONS COULD BE (...) ENVISAGED WHERE THE NEO-HUMEAN POSITION WOULD BE UNDULY SCEPTICAL. (shrink)

YOUNG DESCRIBES A MIRACLE AS DESCRIPTION OF AN EVENT EFFECTED BY A SET OF CAUSALLY OPERATIVE FACTORS, A NECESSARY ONE OF WHICH BEING GOD’S PRESENCE. BUT THE ACCOUNT IS ONLY A REDRESSING OF THE VIOLATION-OF-LAW MODEL OF MIRACLES AND DOESN’T ESCAPE THE CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE MODEL NOR THE METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING IDENTIFYING AND ASCERTAINING PURPORTED MIRACLES.

In two recent papers, Mr Robert Young maintains that all attempts by philosophers to bolster the-violation-of-law concept of miracles are bound to fail and propounds what he claims to be a novel non-reductivist concept of miracles which avoids the conceptual difficulties of the violation-model. His view of miracles is of god being ‘an active agent-factor in the set of factors which actually was causally operative’ [p. 123] in an event dubbed a miracle. God is put in among ‘the plurality of (...) causes’ [p. 122, S p. 33] that could determine the event, but if he acts in a miracle, then ‘his presence…alters the outcome from what it would have been if, contrary to fact , he had not been present’ [p. 122]. Young claims that his concept ‘is neither a violation of … laws nor is it a coincidental occurrence religiously interpreted’ [p. 122, S p. 33], and so it avoids the difficulties, which he thinks are faced by the violation-model, of having an intelligible notion of an occurrence of the physically impossible, and also the reductivism inherent in taking mere coincidences as miracles. He also suggests a procedure of settling the epistemological issue regarding particular alleged miracles, an inquiry he thinks he has made possible by having first given a sense to miracles. [p. 126]. (shrink)

In his paper ‘The Problem of the Meaning of “Miracle” , Professor Michael J. Langford proffers a concept of miracles that derives its intelligibility from the familiar phenomenon of the interaction of minds. Miraculous occurrences are portrayed as a variant, though abnormal, form of what we may term ‘inter-psychosomatic influence’, God's mind being the ultimate determinant. Langford thinks that to speak significantly of miracles, the phenomenon should be understood as ‘not totally dissimilar to our previous experience’ ; hence the familiar (...) notion of inter-psychosomatic influence. He thinks, too, that to talk of miracles as God interfering directly with the natural order would be to admit that such interference would not upset our concept of human nature and responsibility, a consequence which, to Langford, would make it inconsistent for Christians to maintain the free-will defence in the face of the problem of evil. According to Langford, human interference with the natural order does not vitiate the preconditions of human responsibility, and so he thinks that his concept of miracle, which is only ‘an extension of the same phenomenon, of a kind that also does not disrupt either human freedom or the stable order that is the necessary context for human life’ , will provide a way out of the dilemma. Having agreed with Hume and Flew that it would be unreasonable ‘to explain an unusual event by introducing divine causation if we hadn't already got independent evidence for the divine’ , Langford nevertheless maintains that ‘unthought possibilities’ should not be ruled out in the manner of a ‘prejudiced theorist’ . He thinks that such possibilities are left open in his concept of miracle, which makes the prior assumption that ‘independent grounds for belief in God’ exist before affirming that, given that God exists, miracles may be consistently and substantively understood in terms of a special distinguishable sort of inter-psychosomatic influence. He concedes, of course that his concept would rule out ‘those miracles that appear to be quite apart from the working of grace through human minds’ . I think, however, that Langford's thesis is faulty at key places. (shrink)