Bilingual speakers have often been found to be superior in taking the perspective of another person. Also, females are commonly found to have enhanced perspective taking abilities compared with males, with male PT being generally more easily affected by external factors. The present study investigated whether bilingualism improves PT in males more strongly than in females. In total, 108 bilingual and 108 matched monolingual adults, with equal numbers of males and females, filled in the PT subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity (...) index. While monolinguals showed the typical result of females scoring higher on PT than males, scores of male and female bilinguals did not differ, with both bilingual groups scoring as high as female monolinguals. Thus, bilingualism enhanced self-reported PT only in males, suggesting that male PT can be enhanced through socialization. (shrink)

Problem Solving Technologies provides a user friendly understanding of technological objects including what they are and how the function in our lives.

Ethics settings allow for morally significant decisions made by humans to be programmed into autonomous machines, such as autonomous vehicles or autonomous weapons. Customizable ethics settings are a type of ethics setting in which the users of autonomous machines make such decisions. Here two arguments are provided in defence of customizable ethics settings. Firstly, by approaching ethics settings in the context of failure management, it is argued that customizable ethics settings are instrumentally and inherently valuable for building resilience into the (...) larger socio-technical systems in which autonomous machines operate. Secondly, after defining the preliminary condition of responsibility attribution and demonstrating how ethics settings enable humans to exert control over the outcomes of morally significant incidents, it is shown that ethics settings narrow the responsibility gap. (shrink)

Can autonomous systems replace humans in the performance of their activities? How does the answer to this question inform the design of autonomous systems? The study of technical systems and their features should be preceded by the study of the activities in which they play roles. Each activity can be described by its overall goals, governing norms and the intermediate steps which are taken to achieve the goals and to follow the norms. This paper uses the activity realist approach to (...) conceptualize autonomous systems in the context of human activities. By doing so, it first argues for epistemic and logical conditions that illustrate the limitations of autonomous systems in tasks which they can and cannot perform, and then, it discusses the ramifications of the limitations of system autonomy on the design of autonomous systems. (shrink)

In the past couple of decades, there has been a tendency to identify the study of artefacts as one of the central subject matters of philosophy of technology. This subject identification relies on a metaphysical distinction between artefacts and non-artefacts, and is supported by the premise that artefacts are philosophically significant in ways that non-artefacts are not. Here it is argued that if we want philosophy of technology to be practically useful, the artefact/non-artefact distinction is a misleading place to start, (...) as this distinction is developed through a metaphysical approach which is of little use for practical decisions and evaluations. Instead, we need to adopt a different metaphysical approach which is practically useful. This alternative approach is called activity realism, as opposed to entity realism in light of which artefacts are defined. Activity realism provides a metaphysical foundation for a practically useful philosophy of technology. (shrink)

There are at least two assumptions which, except for very few occasions, have not been discussed by philosophers who have written on the metaphysics of technological objects. The first assumption is that to be a technology is an absolute matter and that all technological objects are equally technological. The second assumption is that the property of being technological is abstracted from existing things which happen to have this property in common. I appeal to the definition of technological objects as problem-solving (...) physical instruments to show that things can be technological to different degrees, and that the property of being technological is more fundamental than being a technology. (shrink)

A form of metaphysical humanism in the field of philosophy of technology can be defined as the claim that besides technologies’ physical aspects, purely human attributes are sufficient to conceptualize technologies. Metaphysical nonhumanism, on the other hand, would be the claim that the meanings of the operative words in any acceptable conception of technologies refer to the states of affairs or events which are in a way or another shaped by technologies. In this paper, I focus on the conception of (...) technologies as problem-solving physical instruments in order to study the debate between the humanist and the nonhumanist ways of understanding technologies. I argue that this conception commits us to a hybrid understanding of technologies, one which is partly humanist and partly nonhumanist. (shrink)

The way in which agency is conceptualised has implications for understanding human–machine interactions and the governance of technology, especially artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Traditionally, agency is conceptualised as a capacity, defined by intrinsic properties, such as cognitive or volitional facilities. I argue that the capacity-based account of agency is inadequate to explain the dynamics of human–machine interactions and guide technology governance. Instead, I propose to conceptualise agency as impact. Agents as impactful entities can be identified at different levels: from the (...) low level of individual entities to the high level of complex socio-technical systems. Entities can impact their surroundings through different channels, and more influential channels of impact lead to higher degrees of agency. Technology governance must take into account different channels of impact in the contexts of use, design and regulation. (shrink)

Peter-Paul Verbeek's Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0143-5 Authors Sadjad Soltanzadeh, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Canberra, Australia Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757.

In this study, we explore the future of work by examining differences in productivity when teams are composed of only humans or both humans and machine agents. Our objective was to characterize the similarities and differences between human and human–machine teams as they work to coordinate across their specialized roles. This form of research is increasingly important given that machine agents are becoming commonplace in sociotechnical systems and playing a more active role in collaborative work. One particular class of machine (...) agents, bots, is being introduced to these systems to facilitate both taskwork and teamwork. We investigated the association between bots and productivity outcomes in open source software development through an analysis of hundreds of project teams. The presence of bots in teams was associated with higher levels of productivity and higher work centralization in addition to greater amounts of observed communication. The adoption of bots in software teams may have tradeoffs, in that doing so may increase productivity, but could also increase workload. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for advancing human–machine teaming research. (shrink)

In this study, we explore the future of work by examining differences in productivity when teams are composed of only humans or both humans and machine agents. Our objective was to characterize the similarities and differences between human and human–machine teams as they work to coordinate across their specialized roles. This form of research is increasingly important given that machine agents are becoming commonplace in sociotechnical systems and playing a more active role in collaborative work. One particular class of machine (...) agents, bots, is being introduced to these systems to facilitate both taskwork and teamwork. We investigated the association between bots and productivity outcomes in open source software development through an analysis of hundreds of project teams. The presence of bots in teams was associated with higher levels of productivity and higher work centralization in addition to greater amounts of observed communication. The adoption of bots in software teams may have tradeoffs, in that doing so may increase productivity, but could also increase workload. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for advancing human–machine teaming research. (shrink)

The implementation of Responsible Research and Innovation is not without its challenges, and one of these is raised when societal desirability is included amongst the RRI principles. We will argue that societal desirability is problematic even though it appears to fit well with the overall ideal. This discord occurs partly because the idea of societal desirability is inherently ambiguous, but more importantly because its scope is unclear. This paper asks: is societal desirability in the spirit of RRI? On von Schomberg’s (...) account, it seems clear that it is, but societal desirability can easily clash with what is ethically permissible; for example, when what is desirable in a particular society is bad for the global community. If that society chose not to do what was desirable for it, the world would be better off than if they did it. Yet our concern here is with a more complex situation, where there is a clash with ethical acceptability, but where the world would not be better off if the society chose not do what was societally desirable for itself. This is the situation where it is argued that someone else will do it if we do not. The first section of the paper gives an outline of what we take technology to be, and the second is a discussion of which criteria should be the basis for choosing research and innovation projects. This will draw on the account of technology outlined in the first section. This will be followed by an examination of a common argument, “If we don’t do it, others will”. This argument is important because it appears to justify acting in morally dubious ways. Finally, it will be argued that societal desirability gives support to the “If we don’t…” argument and that this raises some difficulties for RRI. (shrink)