Esta pesquisa tem o interesse em destacar alguns aspectos específicos da filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer, em particular a recepção e o uso das ciências naturais em conjunto com sua Metafísica da Vontade. O trabalho enfoca inicialmente os aspectos da formação científica do filósofo, adquirida em Göttingen, onde ele tem contato com vários naturalistas de sua época, que se dedicam ao estudo e a pesquisa de diversos campos das ciências empíricas. A questão que se coloca no texto é: compreender como o (...) autor utiliza as pesquisas e descobertas no campo das ciências naturais, trazendo à sua argumentação filosófica campos de estudo como anatomia e fisiologia. Portanto, a tarefa deste trabalho é investigar: como essa estrutura oferece fundamento para uma metafísica que se propõe imanente? Considerando a argumentação do autor pertinente ao debate entre filosofia e ciência (como é perceptível na obra Sobre a vontade na natureza, 1836), encontramos conjuntamente estímulo em um dos aspectos mais originais de sua filosofia; a inversão conceitual que o autor faz, reconhecendo a racionalidade como “instrumento” de uma vontade irracional; ganhando assim uma nova perspectiva de interpretação da natureza humana para a discussão de seu tempo, que busca harmonizar o discurso filosófico com os achados empíricos da ciência. (shrink)

This article is a methodological discussion of formal approaches to the question of identity of proofs from a philosophical standpoint. First, an introduction to the question of identity of proofs itself is given, followed by a brief reconstruction of the so-called normalisation thesis, proposed by Dag Prawitz in 1971, in which some of its core mathematical and conceptual traits are presented. After that, a comparison between the normalisation thesis and the more well-known Church-Turing thesis on computability is carried out in (...) three main parts: the first dedicated to highlighting some of the analogies between them; the second, their most remarkable differences; and the third, to the possible relations of dependence between the two. Based on these considerations, some concluding remarks concerning the potential of the normalisation thesis and similar approaches to the question of identity of proofs are made in the last section. (shrink)

Muitas vezes os juristas consideram científico o seu saber e o seu fazer sobre normas jurídicas – a chamada dogmática jurídica. Isso é feito sem maiores problematizações, como se o caráter científico fosse um dado, uma obviedade, um truísmo. O conceito de ciência, por sua vez, é o objeto principal de uma disciplina do saber filosófico: a Filosofia da Ciência. No presente artigo, pretendo compreender o que é a Filosofia da Ciência, qual o seu campo de atuação, para então refletir (...) sobre se e como ela se aplica à dogmática jurídica. Para isso, realizei pesquisa teórica e bibliográfica cujo ponto de partida residiu no recorte bibliográfico feito pelo curso “Philosophy of Science”, da plataforma Saylor Academy. Foram examinadas, sistematizadas e confrontadas diferentes fontes com o intuito de identificar a posição mais consistente. Dentre os principais resultados, encontram-se: a identificação da Filosofia da Ciência como disciplina distinta das disciplinas empíricas ou observacionais sobre Ciência; a confrontação dessa disciplina com a crítica que denuncia sua suposta inutilidade; a defesa da relevância da Filosofia da Ciência e de sua aplicação ao Direito. (shrink)

Fábio Alves dos Santos (1954-2013) cursou Pedagogia, Ciências Sociais e Teologia, era Especialista em Filosofia da Religião (PUC Minas), Advogado (PUC Minas) e Mestre em Direito Constitucional (UFMG). Lecionou na PUC Minas como professor de Cultura Religiosa e depois como professor no Curso de Direito, atuando principalmente no Serviço de Assistência Judiciária – SAJ, especialmente cuidado de causas populares como as da ASMARE (Associação dos Catadores de Papel, Papelão e Material Reaproveitável de Belo Horizonte), da Pastoral de Rua, da (...) Pastoral Carcerária, de movimentos de “Sem Casa”, de ocupações e tantos outros grupos. Fábio sofria de grave problema de visão há mais de 15 anos. Quase ficou cego depois de diversas cirurgias de miopia. Isso, porém, não o impedia de seguir seu constante compromisso com as lutas populares. Na última entrevista que concedeu, menos de um mês antes de sua morte (19 de outubro de 2013), depois de duro sofrimento de quase dois anos, no tratamento de um câncer no pâncreas, conta um pouco de sua vida, sua luta e sua percepção de várias realidades, especialmente da Igreja e da pastoral. Militante formado na Teologia da Libertação, de profunda espiritualidade, marcada por traços da religiosidade popular nordestina e comprometida com a libertação, Fábio Alves também buscou em sua vida abrir-se à teologia do pluralismo religioso, especialmente com o Santo Daime, em cuja tradição religiosa chegou a ser “fardado”, mantendo uma profunda atitude espiritual aberta ao diálogo inter-religioso. Sua primeira publicação foi “Começo de mundo novo: sofrimento, luta e vitória dos posseiros de Santana dos Frades”, Sergipe, numa versão popular em 1981 e outra pela Editora Vozes (1990). Fruto de sua dissertação de mestrado, publicou o livro “Direito Agrário: política fundiária no Brasil (1995). Em 2001 saiu seu último livro, uma coletânea de artigos publicados em diversos jornais: “Em defesa da vida”. Num artigo em Horizonte (2004), juntamente com o advogado, amigo e colega Prof. Cristiano de Melo Bastos, discutiu “A prática jurídica na missão da PUC Minas”. Palavras-chave : Teologia da Libertação. Militância. Igreja Católica. Pastoral. Lutas populares. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

O presente ensaio resulta de uma indagação introdutória e parcimoniosa acerca da transformação da mundividência científica e epistemológica no século XX. Em primeira instância, são analisados os conceitos fundacionais da Relatividade Restrita e da Relatividade Geral, visando elencar as principais dissonâncias entre a proposta científica de Albert Einstein e a cosmovisão estabelecida pela física clássica. De seguida, é invocada a célebre experiência de Edwin Hubble, responsável pela origem da Teoria do Big-Bang. Como não poderia deixar de ser, esta é também (...) alvo de uma examinação cuidadosa. Por fim, a reflexão estende-se ao domínio indeterminista da mecânica quântica, com o propósito de perscrutar os seus princípios fundamentais. Por forma a assegurar o cumprimento deste desígnio, o trabalho não se furta à exigência de aflorar certos traços elementares das doutrinas de Niels Bohr e Werner Heisenberg. Em suma, o breve estudo que aqui se presentifica procura, sobretudo, trazer à coação os elementos teóricos que ancoram o entendimento da física e da cosmologia nos nossos dias, problematizando, quando necessário, algumas das suas inferências. (shrink)

This work aims to present the meaning of the distributions of the sensible in Jacques Rancière's theory. In order to understand the genesis of the distributions of the sensible – especially at this particular moment –, we will start from Rancier's definition of political subjectivization, which is inherent to the contribution of the distribution of places promoted by instances of domination. After all, for the author, politics is not the distribution of power. The distribution of the sensible would be a (...) political and policy process that is sometimes mediated by instances of conflict, and sometimes interceded by instances of power, and this tends to affect the way in which subjects occupy the sensible community by verifying the ways in which reality is taken and ordered following the order of domination. (shrink)

Statements’ rated truth increases when people encounter them repeatedly. Processing fluency is a central variable to explain this truth effect. However, people experience processing fluency positively, and these positive experiences might cause the truth effect. Three studies investigated positivity and fluency influences on the truth effect. Study 1 found correlations between elicited positive feelings and rated truth. Study 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect, but positivity did not influence the effect. Study 3 conveyed positive and negative correlations between positivity and (...) truth in a learning phase. We again replicated the truth effect, but positivity only influenced judgments for easy statements in the learning phase. Thus, across three studies, we found positivity effects on rated truth, but not on the repetition-based truth effect: We conclude that positivity does not explain the standard truth effect, but the role of positive experiences for truth judgments deserves further investigation. (shrink)

Pretendemos neste artigo analisar a relação entre tragédia antiga e moderna tal qual se apresenta na obra _Ou-Ou_, de Kierkegaard. Assim, analisando o conceito de tragédia na antiguidade e sua mudança na modernidade, afigura-se como problema mostrar de que maneira a reflexão acerca do trágico aponta uma condição para que a arte moderna tenha significado. Levando em conta, então, que a tragédia antiga é caracterizada pela ação no seio do Estado, da família e da religião e que, por outro lado, (...) a tragédia moderna é determinada pela reflexão, procura-se mostrar que o pesar ligado à ação e suas consequências, torna-se angústia ligada à reflexão e à possibilidade de uma vida trágica. Para tal, primeiro analisa-se o conceito de tragédia antiga e moderna de acordo com o exposto por Hegel em seus _Cursos de Estética_, desse modo, pode-se melhor ver de que modo Kierkegaard se apropria do exposto por Hegel, mas também de que maneira diverge deste. Isto feito, será possível ver que enquanto Hegel vê na tragédia uma reconciliação das forças opostas, Kierkegaard acentua o caráter esteticamente ambíguo da mesma, afastando-se de qualquer reconciliação. E que, ao assim fazê-lo, indica que a arte moderna só ganha significado com o renascimento do trágico na modernidade. (shrink)

Face à la nouvelle sensibilité de l'homme contemporain envers les questions écologiques, à l’importance qu’il accorde au soin de la planète, et dans le sillage de la publication de Laudato Si’, la vision de Teilhard de Chardin apparaît à nouveau actuelle. Bien que les questions et l’état des sciences aient changé considérablement depuis sa mort en 1955, la portée cosmologique de la christologie teilhardienne fait de la perspective du jésuite paléontologue une source inespérée pour une pratique chrétienne adaptée aux exigences (...) du monde moderne. À partir de sa notion d’Église en tant que Corps cosmique du Christ, où toutes les créatures de notre vaste univers sont englobées au sein de la sphère ecclésiale elle-même, la communion entre les êtres s’étend au-delà des êtres humains, fondant un profond respect pour toutes les créatures. Le présent ouvrage cherche à préciser et à justifier, d’un côté, l’insertion de Teilhard au sein de la tradition chrétienne et à envisager, d’un autre, les conséquences pratiques de cette ecclésiologie écologique, notamment dans la spiritualité, l’éthique et la liturgie. Andreas Gonçalves Lind est un prêtre jésuite luso-allemand qui, pour le moment, fait une thèse doctorale sur la phénoménologie henryenne de la Vie à l’Université de Namur comme boursier de la FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (Portugal). (shrink)

Há de fato, uma diferença entre as duas carreiras docentes, e não é em essência, mas em condições de trabalho, uma para as a realização pessoal e profissional e outra que não oferece a mesma possibilidade. Nesse sentido, desenvolver um ensino de filosofia eficaz, pressupõe não só a utilização dos textos clássicos dos filósofos que fizeram e promoveram a perpetuação da filosofia como apenas mais uma disciplina do currículo, mas como um distintivo que possibilite o desenvolvimento da criticidade dos alunos (...) do Ensino Médio por meio de um tratamento contextualizado do programa da disciplina. Finalmente, ao contrário do que defendem muitos críticos do ensino da Filosofia no Ensino Médio, a presença da filosofia associada aos textos filosóficos em conexão com os demais componentes curriculares numa prática interdisciplinar, está longe de levar os adolescentes a uma eventual adesão a propostas ideológicas, de doutrinação e possível adesão ao dogmatismo, ela é condição primordial para que se revistam de uma postura crítica frente aos dogmas que impregnam não só o senso comum da contemporaneidade, mas também os dogmatismos que perpassam até mesmo o discurso científico. (shrink)

Two recently proposed experiments by Kolen and Torr (K-T), designed to detect possible failures of Einstein's special relativity (SR) are analyzed. Imprecisions in these papers are pointed out. Computation in Lorentz aether theory (LAT), with the K-T violation of SR, of the theoretical prediction for the proposed K-T clock experiment prove their results to be incorrect. Analytical computation of the proposed K-T rotor Doppler experiment using LAT confirms the order of magnitude of their prediction by numerical computation. For LAT in (...) the K-T form, this experiment, using a turntable, is shown to give results which could be detected with the technology of 20 years ago. Another LAT model is considered which leads to deviations of SR smaller than in the K-T model. The central point of the approach adopted in this paper is the use of Einstein's coordinates in the comoving frame, even when SR is violated, leading always to isotropic propagation of light in vacuum; the anisotropy usually obtained in LAT is only a coordinate effect. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Berkeley’s theories about vision, perception of distance, and the foundations of Geometry. I start with Locke’s answer to Molineaux’s problem and the criticisms Berkeley addressed to it. I explain the fundamentais of Berkeley’s theory about our cognitive shaping of the visual field and the type of connections that visual data establishes with data from the haptic field. I show how interesting are Berkeley’s conceptions for a phenomenology of perception, and, eventually, I carried some phenomenological evidence (...) against Berkeley’s too much strict location of the idea of distance in the haptic field alone. (shrink)

I intend to understand from a phenomenological point of view the relationship between figurative consciousnesses (Bildbewusstsein) and other non-original presentations (Vergegenwiirtigungen) such as expectations, recollections or fantasies. I centre my analyses in the difference between figurative consciousness, on the one hand, and a modality of fantasy I cal! “daydream consciousness”, on the other. I stress that figurative consciousness implies apure observational ego, whereas day-dream consciousness is a free construction of the ego’s own personal story. The freedom of”day dream consciousness” has, (...) nevertheless, some important constraints. I emphasize the constraints that come from the passive and affective life of the ego. Finally, I propose new criteria for the phenomenological differentiation between the several kinds of acts of non-original presentation. (shrink)

In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in (...) the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis. (shrink)

Gustavo de Fraga was one of the most influential Portuguese phenomenologists. He had a deep understanding of the Husserlian as well as of the Heideggerian phenomenology. One of his major concerns was the connection between these thinkers, and the resettlement of metaphysical questions some step beyond the works of both. In so doing, Gustavo de Fraga took an original stance in the field of Phenomenology, combining conceptual and poetic experiences of thought.

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that (...) the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world. (shrink)

While not a phenomenologist, Fernando Gil was highly interested in some aspects of Husserl’s work. One of these aspects was Husserl’s theory of evidence. ln a notable book entitled Traité de l’évidence, he developed a throughout theory of evidence, paying close attention to the most important insights Husserl exposed his works. Gil’s theory of evidence is at the same time rooted in Phenomenology and extended beyond it in as much as he locates the first dimension of evidence ma primitive stratum (...) hallucinating aesthesia from desire. Accounting for evidence as threefold process, going from aesthesia to presence, and then to the intellectual grasping of an individual object, the most interesting feature of his theory is the of evidence as a hallucinating process, encompassing all strata of sensitive, perceptive, and conceptual life. (shrink)

What, if any, are the limits of the Husserlian concept of Gegebenheit? Is there a limit beyond which nothing can be seen by the phenomenologist? In asking these questions, we allude to a distinction typical of Kantian criticism: “Grenze” or “Schranke”, limit or boundary? These same questions are reformulated in a famous review of Ideen I by Paul Natorp, a Marburg neo-Kantian who directly attacks the unlimited scope Husserl gives to the phenomenological principle of intuition. From a phenomenological point of (...) view, however, the Achilles’ heel of the critical method lies in the impossibility of accessing by intuition, beyond phenomena, the thing-in-itself. A major consequence is that the phenomenological dissolution of the “Grenze” prescribes a limitless opening to the horizon of phenomena. But if we can speak of a limitless openness, it is because in a certain way everything gives itself to be seen. What kind of vision is this? And what kind of Gegebenheit is at work here? The Husserlian answer lies in the recovery of a concept, the “idea in the Kantian sense”, without its counterpart, the “limit”, whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the concept of “limit” that characterizes the gnoseological status of the “idea”. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the main traits of the phenomenological thinking of Abranches de Soveral. I start with the work of his master Miranda Barbosa explaining the criticisms he address to the Husserlian phenomenology. I show Soveral’s approach to phenomenology is framed by the conceptions of Barbosa and the problems that, for him, phenomenology cannot answer in an accurate way. In this context, I present the fundamental tenets of Soveral’s rejoinder to his master, showing how phenomenology can be rearranged (...) in order to formulate and to answer “the fundamental problem of knowledge”. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we try to show how the discussion of Meinong’s distinction between distributed and undistributed objects was crucial for Husserl’s thinking about the phenomenology of time consciousness. The criticism of Meinong’s thesis that the representation of a distributed object (temporal object) is an undistributed act is presented as the central point for the development of Husserl’s own thesis about the perception as a continuum of continua and about consciousness as an unitary flux of temporal (...) phases. In a second part, we move to Brentano’s theory about original associations in the constitution of the “presence-time”. Brentano’s position about the function of phantasy as the origin of our representation of time is refused by Husserl and, as a result, the structural composition of time consciousness in phases of primal-impression, fresh memory (later “retention”) and immediate expectation (later “protention”) appears as the core form to the intuition of the present and the constitution of time. In a last section, we follow Husserl’s revision of his own analysis of fresh memory in order to understand his final position about retention as a primitive form of Vergegenwärtigung. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the consistency and accuracy of Husserl’s sketch of a theory about non-declarative sentences in the last chapter of Logical Investigations. Whereas the consistency is acknowledged, the accuracy is denied, because Husserl’s treatment of non-declarative phrases such as questions or orders implies that those phrases contain, in some way, a declarative sentence and an objectifying act. To construct a question like “is A B?” as being equivalent to a pseudo-declarative sentence such as “I ask whether A (...) is B” is, however, a false phenomenological analysis, because to ask o r to order or to beg is not to assert. I turn, then, to John Austin ‘s theory of performative (as opposed to constatative) utterances and illocutionary acts in order to find a more accurate approach to the logical-semantic content of non-declarative sentences. Eventually, I show how this Husserlian theory of non-declarative sentences has a negative impact on the phenomenological theory of social ·acts and communication. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the reappraisal of Husserl’s ontology and epistemology, sketched in book one of Ideen. The main issue is Husserl’s theory of essence and essential insight. I present the fundamental distinction between facts and essences, and, over and above it, Husserl’s defense of an a priori knowledge based on essential insight as well as his partition of the whole realm of a priori knowledge into a formal set of material, regional ontologies. I will show how the theory (...) of essential insight presented in Ideen gives rise to several criticisms, namely those made by Neo-Kantians, like Rickert and Natorp. In the last part, I will show how the mathematical concept of an invariant under a group of variations was the leading case for Husserl’s mature notion of eidetic insight. (shrink)

I sketch an analysis of observing as a particular attitude one can take regarding the surrounding world. I stress some particular features of observation, like the cancelling of the vital engagement. in the world, and the delight that pure observation involves. Then I move to a description of figurative consciousness and its image-world. In the final part, 1 try to show how watching movies displays a new type of observation, based on the empathic connection with the characters, the emergence of (...) a virtual body, and a self-decentered life, where the ego is not an onlooker, but something like an “ in-looker”. (shrink)

I offer an outline of an integrated phenomenological analysis of free fantasy and of fictional worlds. My main concern amounts to stress the scissions entailed in free fantasy and in the consciousness of fictional objects: a scission of the I, and a scission of the experience. Firstly, I offer a somewhat new characterization of the presence of the objects of free fantasy, which disconnects any possible relationship of those objects with a real perception as the leading form of an originally (...) giving consciousness. My leading example is daydream. Secondly, I take the Husserlian analysis of neutralization as a conceptual tool to explain the consciousness of fictional worlds, against a new tendency for interpreting these worlds in light of the concept of “possible world”. The two approaches converge to a twofold characterization of the mode of being of fictions and of the modality of presence of the objects of fantasy. (shrink)