Thinking through Kierkegaard is a critical evaluation of Søren Kierkegaard's vision of the normatively human, of who we are and might aspire to become, and of what Mehl calls our existential identity.

Kierkegaard is considered in light of the contemporary debate over rationality and relativism, especially as it pertains to his understanding of human moral existence. He is interpreted as providing a philosophical anthropology as a basis for affirming responsible personhood. The Kantian and, more briefly, the Hegelian and Aristotelian influence on his views are discussed, and it is argued that Kierkegaard draws on these to formulate a view of the universally human as the potential possessed by each individual which is to (...) be actualized. This view is distinguished from, yet encompasses, the human being as "subjective actuality" which is relative to each individual, and as "empirical actuality," which is peripheral and variable. Finally, his view of essential humanness is interpreted as formulated by employing a "radical empiricism" of the lived-experience of actually searching for a meaningful perspective on human "praxis," a "method" that draws on a comprehensive conception of rationality. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that liberal arts education must reject scientism and embrace tmths about human flourishing, tmths that can be supported by both traditional wisdom and recent scientific studies. Liberal arts education can speak to the human spirit's yeaming for moral and spiritual meaning in life, and can help students come to terms with this interest. Current research into human flourishing enables us to make a more persuasive public case for the importanceof liberal arts education, and specifically for (...) it as education for our moral and spiritual lives. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that liberal arts education must reject scientism and embrace tmths about human flourishing, tmths that can be supported by both traditional wisdom and recent scientific studies. Liberal arts education can speak to the human spirit's yeaming for moral and spiritual meaning in life, and can help students come to terms with this interest. Current research into human flourishing enables us to make a more persuasive public case for the importanceof liberal arts education, and specifically for (...) it as education for our moral and spiritual lives. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that liberal arts education must reject scientism and embrace tmths about human flourishing, tmths that can be supported by both traditional wisdom and recent scientific studies. Liberal arts education can speak to the human spirit's yeaming for moral and spiritual meaning in life, and can help students come to terms with this interest. Current research into human flourishing enables us to make a more persuasive public case for the importanceof liberal arts education, and specifically for (...) it as education for our moral and spiritual lives. (shrink)

This essay compares Alasdair Maclntyre's and Basil Mitchell's recent work in religious ethics and ethical theory. The focus is on the interconnections among theories of human nature, sociocultural context, moral thought, and theories of rationality, all of which have a bearing on our prospects for assessing moral traditions. While I note many of the striking parallels between their positions, I also point out that they differ regarding their appreciation of the impact of social and cultural context on morality. In distinction (...) from Maclntyre, Mitchell combines an appreciation for moral tradition with an awareness that in order to assess traditions we must have some critical resources that are relatively tradition-independent. He finds these in theories of human nature and in general standards of rationality. Furthermore, from Mitchell's perspective, Maclntyre seems to employ similar resources in developing his position. (shrink)

I argue that at least some of Kierkegaard’s authorship is designed to make a rational case for a religious and specifically Christian existence; he is not a total fideist. He argues that anything short of the existential stance of the “strong spiritual/moral evaluator” is despair. To overcome this we are compelled to reach for religious or transcendent sources of meaning; the authentic life is the life of constant ethical and spiritual evaluation grounded in the authority of God. But I ask (...) how does Kierkegaard justify the stance of the strong evaluator in the first place? I argue that he crafts an existential and pragmatic case for it, but that this approach does not have the strength he suggests. Indeed. I argue that because this defense reflects his own Protestant Christian context, his case for Christian existence (as an existence of strong spiritual/moral evaluation) is seriously weakened. (shrink)

This essay attempts to understand the search for authenticity in terms of the breakdown of authority in the modern world. The sense of autonomy, I argue, emerges from the need to choose the authorities one will accept. The ever-increasing difficulty of choosing from among authorities is internalized and is experienced as a difficulty of choosing, or “finding” oneself. The shattered authorities on the outside become a fragmented self on the inside. The search for the authentic self, then, is the search (...) for an authority on the inside that has been broken and lost on the outside. The prospects for achieving such selfhood are criticially evaluated. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Goodman’s philosophy in relation to psychotherapeutic interpretation. Goodman argues that we shouldunderstand our knowledge as a creative symbolic construction, and not as a set of ideas that match reality. The notion of “the world” does no epistemological work. Using an example of psychotherapeutic interpretation found in Erik Erikson’s writings, I argue that whileErikson suggests that he discovers in the patient’s showings and tellings the patient’s message and its meaning, I argue (with Goodman) that Erikson creates (...) a narrative identity for his patient. The self is not found but fashioned, and it is deemed the true self because it coheres with Erikson’s general theoretic standpoint and is found to be cognitively and practically helpful for the patient. The conclusion is that selves, like worlds, are largely creative constructs. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Goodman’s philosophy in relation to psychotherapeutic interpretation. Goodman argues that we shouldunderstand our knowledge as a creative symbolic construction, and not as a set of ideas that match reality. The notion of “the world” does no epistemological work. Using an example of psychotherapeutic interpretation found in Erik Erikson’s writings, I argue that whileErikson suggests that he discovers in the patient’s showings and tellings the patient’s message and its meaning, I argue (with Goodman) that Erikson creates (...) a narrative identity for his patient. The self is not found but fashioned, and it is deemed the true self because it coheres with Erikson’s general theoretic standpoint and is found to be cognitively and practically helpful for the patient. The conclusion is that selves, like worlds, are largely creative constructs. (shrink)