The move from open outcry to electronic trading added another responsibility to futures exchanges—that of matching orders between buyers and sellers. Matching systems can affect the level and speed of price discovery, the distribution of revenue, as well as the level of price efficiency of a given market. Whether the matching system is procedurally fair is another important consideration. I argue that while FIFO (First In First Out) is a fair procedure in principle and is perceived as the default matching (...) system, it is not a fair procedure in practice. Likewise, while pro rata is a fair procedure in principle, it is not so in practice. Nevertheless, both FIFO and pro rata are relics of an open outcry system. Instead, I propose an alternative approach to matching systems that builds on the strengths of electronic trading—the ability to randomize in real time. I introduce random selection for service (RSS) as a matching system that is procedurally fair both in principle and in practice. (shrink)

Tolerance is not, as is often thought, an attribute of urbanity that can be equated with other similar values, such as politeness. Nor is it - or at least it should not be - considered the oil that facilitates the smooth functioning of the engine of human desires, in spite of their differences of opinion. Rather, true tolerance takes root in the same soil as human rights. And this root is at the same time shared by liberty and truth. It (...) is an untamed, barely diplomatic, root, burrowing deep in the soil of an absolute demand. (shrink)

The theoretical and philosophical assumptions underlying our psychological practices greatly affect the ways that clinicians in the mental health field go about their work and to some extent how successful at it they are. This paper attempts to illustrate this by describing how a careful and systematic look at the underlying philosophical presuppositions surrounding the concept of transference yielded clear clinical benefits to my own practice of psychotherapy. More specifically, by contrasting the philosophical paradigm implied in the classical definitions of (...) transference with that of an alternative, phenomenologically-based model my understandings of the clinical phenomena in question were allowed to develop in new ways--ones which feel truer to the actual experiences in question and ultimately more helpful. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

We continue the investigation of the Laver ideal ℓ 0 and Miller ideal m 0 started in [GJSp] and [GRShSp]; these are the ideals on the Baire space associated with Laver forcing and Miller forcing. We solve several open problems from these papers. The main result is the construction of models for $t , where add denotes the additivity coefficient of an ideal. For this we construct amoeba forcings for these forcings which do not add Cohen reals. We show that (...) c = ω 2 implies $\operatorname{add}(m^0) \leq \mathfrak{h}$ . We show that b = c, d = c implies $\operatorname{cov}(\ell^0) \leq \mathfrak{h}^+, \operatorname{cov}(m^0) \leq \mathfrak{h}^+$ respectively. Here $\operatorname{cov}$ denotes the covering coefficient. We also show that in the Cohen model $\operatorname{cov}(m^0) holds. Finally we prove that Cohen forcing does not add a superperfect tree of Cohen reals. (shrink)

We show that every analytic set in the Baire space which is dominating contains the branches of a uniform tree, i.e. a superperfect tree with the property that for every splitnode all the successor splitnodes have the same length. We call this property of analytic sets u-regularity. However, we show that the concept of uniform tree does not suffice to characterize dominating analytic sets in general. We construct a dominating closed set with the property that for no uniform tree whose (...) branches are contained in the closed set, the set of these branches is dominating. We also show that from a Σ1n+1-rapid filter a non-u-regular Π1n-set can be constructed. Finally, we prove that ∑12-Kσ-regularity implies ∑12-u-regularity. (shrink)

We continue [21] and study partition numbers of partial orderings which are related to /fin. In particular, we investigate Pf, be the suborder of /fin)ω containing only filtered elements, the Mathias partial order M, and , ω the lattice of partitions of ω, respectively. We show that Solomon's inequality holds for M and that it consistently fails for Pf. We show that the partition number of is C. We also show that consistently the distributivity number of ω is smaller than (...) the distributivity number of /fin. We also investigate partitions of a Polish space into closed sets. We show that such a partition either is countable or has size at least D, where D is the dominating number. We also show that the existence of a dominating family of size 1 does not imply that a Polish space can be partitioned into 1 many closed sets. (shrink)

A family A ⊆ ℘(ω) is called countably splitting if for every countable $F \subseteq [\omega]^{\omega}$ , some element of A splits every member of F. We define a notion of a splitting tree, by means of which we prove that every analytic countably splitting family contains a closed countably splitting family. An application of this notion solves a problem of Blass. On the other hand we show that there exists an $F_{\sigma}$ splitting family that does not contain a closed (...) splitting family. (shrink)

We prove that consistently the Lebesgue null ideal is not Tukey reducible to the Silver null ideal. This contrasts with the situation for the meager ideal which, by a recent result of the author, Spinas [Silver trees and Cohen reals, Israel J. Math. 211 473–480] is Tukey reducible to the Silver ideal.

We describe a list of canonical functions from 2 to ℝ such that every Borel measurable function from 2 to ℝ, on some superperfect rectangle, induces the same equivalence relation as some canonical function.

We investigate several versions of a cardinal characteristic $ \frak f$ defined by Frankiewicz. Vojtáš showed ${\frak b} \leq{\frak f}$ , and Blass showed ${\frak f} \leq \min({\frak d},{\mbox{\rm unif}}({\bf K}))$ . We show that all the versions coincide and that ${\frak f}$ is greater than or equal to the splitting number. We prove the consistency of $\max({\frak b},{\frak s}) <{\frak f}$ and of ${\frak f} < \min({\frak d},{\mbox{\rm unif}}({\bf K}))$.

This paper discusses identification and estimation of causal intensive margin effects. The causal intensive margin effect is defined as the treatment effect on the outcome of individuals with a positive outcome irrespective of whether they are treated or not, and is of interest for outcomes with corner solutions. The main issue is to deal with a potential selection problem that arises when conditioning on positive outcomes. We propose using difference-in-difference methods - conditional on positive outcomes - to estimate causal intensive (...) margin effects. We derive sufficient conditions under which the difference-in-difference estimator identifies the causal intensive margin effect. We apply the methodology to estimate the causal intensive margin effect of reaching the full retirement age on working hours. (shrink)

Let ${{\mathcal J}\,(\mathbb M^2)}$ denote the σ-ideal associated with two-dimensional Miller forcing. We show that it is relatively consistent with ZFC that the additivity of ${{\mathcal J}\,(\mathbb M^2)}$ is bigger than the covering number of the ideal of the meager subsets of ω ω. We also show that Martin’s Axiom implies that the additivity of ${{\mathcal J}\,(\mathbb M^2)}$ is 2 ω .Finally we prove that there are no analytic infinite maximal antichains in any finite product of ${\mathfrak{P}{(\omega)}/{\rm fin}}$.

Two countable filters on ω are incompatible if they have no common infinite pseudointersection. Letting α(P f ) denote the minimal size of a maximal uncountable family of pairwise incompatible countable filters on ω, we prove the consistency of t $.

Two countable filters on $\omega$ are incompatible if they have no common infinite pseudointersection. Letting $\alpha(P_f)$ denote the minimal size of a maximal uncountable family of pairwise incompatible countable filters on $\omega$, we prove the consistency of t $< \alpha(P_f)$.

We investigate uncountable maximal antichains of perfect trees and of splitting trees. We show that in the case of perfect trees they must have size of at least the dominating number, whereas for splitting trees they are of size at least \\), i.e. the covering coefficient of the meager ideal. Finally, we show that uncountable maximal antichains of superperfect trees are at least of size the bounding number; moreover we show that this is best possible.

Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually before measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize well-being and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.

Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...) well-being is constituted by endorsed veridical experiences. This account refers back to theories of well-being but does so as agnostically as possible. An intermediate account of well-being is meant as a policy guiding compromise between the different theories of well-being that make claims regarding what constitutes well-being. An intermediate account does as well as can be hoped for in providing a basis for well-being policy. (shrink)

It is an open question whether well-being ought to primarily be understood as a temporal concept or whether it only makes sense to talk about a person’s well-being over their whole lifetime. In this article, I argue that how this principled philosophical disagreement is settled does not have substantive practical implications for well-being science and well-being policy. Trying to measure lifetime well-being directly is extremely challenging as well as unhelpful for guiding well-being public policy, while temporal well-being is both an (...) adequate indirect measure of lifetime well-being, and an adequate focus for the purposes of improving well-being through public policy. Consequently, even if what we ought to care about is lifetime well-being, we should use temporal measures of well-being and focus on temporal well-being policies. (shrink)

Wearable robots are an emerging form of technology that allow organizations to combine the strength, precision, and performance of machines with the flexibility, intelligence, and problem-solving abilities of human wearers. Active exoskeletons are a type of wearable robot that gives wearers the ability to effortlessly lift up to 200 lbs., as well as perform other types of physically demanding tasks that would be too strenuous for most humans. Synchronization between exoskeleton suits and wearers is one of the most challenging requirements (...) to operate these technologies effectively. In this conceptual paper, we extend interpersonal adaption theory (IAT) to the exoskeleton context and explicate (a) the antecedents that are most likely to shape synchrony in human-exoskeleton interactions, (b) automatic and strategic synchrony as adaptive behaviors in human-exoskeleton interactions, and (c) outcome variables that are especially important in these processes. Lastly, we offer a discussion of key methodological challenges for measuring synchrony in human-exoskeleton interactions and offer a future research agenda for this important area. (shrink)

Spoofing is the act of placing orders to buy or sell a financial contract without the intention to have those orders fulfilled in order to create the impression that there is a large demand for that contract at that price. In this article, I deny the view that spoofing in financial markets should be viewed as morally permissible analogously to the way bluffing is permissible in poker. I argue for the pro tanto moral impermissibility of spoofing and make the case (...) that spoofing is disanalogous from bluffing in at least one important regard—speculative trading serves an important economic role, whereas poker does not. (shrink)

Policy-makers sometimes aim to improve well-being as a policy goal, but to do this they need some way to measure well-being. Instead of relying on potentially problematic theories of well-being to justify their choice of well-being measure, Daniel Hausman proposes that policy-makers can sometimes rely on preference-based measures as evidence for well-being. I claim that Hausman’s evidential account does not justify the use of any one measure more than it justifies the use of any other measure. This leaves us at (...) a loss as to which policy should be chosen in the non-trivial cases for which there is substantial disagreement between the different measures in their assessment of policy. (shrink)

Many philosophers reject the view that well-being over a lifetime is simply an aggregation of well-being at every moment of one's life, and thus they reject theories of well-being like hedonism and concurrentist desire satisfactionism. They raise concerns that such a view misses the importance of the relationships between moments in a person's life or the role narratives play in a person's well-being. In this article, we develop an atomist meta-theory of well-being, according to which the prudential value of a (...) life depends solely on the prudential value of each moment of that life. This is a general account of momentary well-being that can capture different features of well-being that standard atomistic accounts fail to capture, thus allowing for the possibility of an atomism that is compatible with a variety of well-being theories. Contrary to many criticisms leveled against momentary well-being, this well-being atomism captures all of the important features of well-being. (shrink)

in recent years, policy makers have shown increasing interest in implementing policies aimed at promoting individual well-being. But how should policy makers choose their well-being policies? a seemingly reasonable first step is to settle on an agreed-upon definition of well-being. yet there currently is significant disagreement on how well-being ought to be characterized, and agreement on the correct view of well-being does not appear to be forthcoming. Nevertheless, i argue in this paper that there are several reasons to think that (...) the domain of well-being in the public policy context is narrower than that of well-being in general, which makes agreement on how to understand well-being in the public policy context more likely. (shrink)

We investigate measure and category in the projective hierarchie in the presence of large cardinals. Assuming a measurable larger than $n$ Woodin cardinals we construct a model where every $\Delta ^1_{n+4}$ -set is measurable, but some $\Delta ^1_{n+4}$ -set does not have Baire property. Moreover, from the same assumption plus a precipitous ideal on $\omega _1$ we show how a model can be forced where every $\Sigma ^1_{n+4}-$ set is measurable and has Baire property.

Assuming that an inaccessible cardinal exists, we construct a ZFC-model where every Δ 1 4 -set is measurable but there exists a Δ 1 4 -set without the property of Baire. By a result of Shelah, an inaccessible cardinal is necessary for this result.

According to what I call the ‘argument from public bads’, if a researcher deceived subjects in the past, there is a chance that subjects will discount the information that a subsequent researcher provides, thus compromising the validity of the subsequent researcher’s experiment. While this argument is taken to justify an existing informal ban on explicit deception in experimental economics, it can also apply to implicit deception, yet implicit deception is not banned and is sometimes used in experimental economics. Thus, experimental (...) economists are being inconsistent when they appeal to the argument from public bads to justify banning explicit deception but not implicit deception. (shrink)

Fessard, G. Jeanne Hersch, genèse d'une œuvre.--Muralt, A. de. Phénoménologie et métaphysique.--Philonenko, A. Leibniz et le platonisme.--Christoff, D. Représentation et décision dans la temporalité selon Kant.--Tilliette, X. De l'illusion au savoir, la philosophie.--Widmer, G. Variations kierkegaardiennes sur l'édifiant.--Dufour-Kowalska, G. L'imagination maîtresse de vérité.--Leyvraz, J.-P. Des noms.--Piguet, J.-C. Liberté esthétique et liberté éthique.--Schaerer, R. Le philosophe entre oui et non.--Scheurer, P.-B. Vues nouvelles sur la science du temps et l'histoire.--Starobinski, J. La littérature et l'irrationnel.--Aron, R. De la libéralisation.--Werner, E. La digue (...) et la vie.--Cottier, G. La fascination du vide, éléments pour un diagnostic. (shrink)

We prove that every analytic set in ω ω × ω ω with σ-bounded sections has a not σ-bounded closed free set. We show that this result is sharp. There exists a closed set with bounded sections which has no dominating analytic free set, and there exists a closed set with non-dominating sections which does not have a not σ-bounded analytic free set. Under projective determinacy analytic can be replaced in the above results by projective.