40 found
Order:
  1. (1 other version)Anti-individualism and privileged access.Michael McKinsey - 1991 - Analysis 51 (1):9-16.
  2. Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent.Michael McKinsey - 2023 - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  3. The semantics of belief ascriptions.Michael McKinsey - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):519-557.
    nated discussion of the semantics of such verbs. I will call this view.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  4. Apriorism in the philosophy of language.Michael McKinsey - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):1-32.
  5. Skepticism and Content Externalism.Michael McKinsey - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Hilary Putnam (1981) proposed an interesting and much discussed attempt to refute a skeptical argument that is based on one form of the brain-in-a-vat scenario. In turn, Putnam’s attempted refutation is based on content externalism (also known as semantic externalism). On this view, the referents and meanings of various types of singular and general terms, as well as the propositions expressed by sentences containing such terms, are determined by aspects of the speaker’s external environment. In this entry, we will consider (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. Mental anaphora.Michael McKinsey - 1986 - Synthese 66 (1):159 - 175.
  7. Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority.Michael McKinsey - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. pp. 97--116.
    In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.<sup>1</sup> One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  8. (1 other version)Forms of externalism and privileged access.Michael McKinsey - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:199-224.
  9. Names and intentionality.Michael McKinsey - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (2):171-200.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  10. Individuating beliefs.Michael McKinsey - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:303-30.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  11. Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism.Michael McKinsey - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):124-8.
  12. The semantic basis of externalism.Michael McKinsey - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Pro Universitaria.
    1. The primary evidence and motivation for externalism in the philosophy of mind is provided by the semantic facts that support direct reference theories of names, indexi- cal pronouns, and natural kind terms. But many externalists have forgotten their sem- antic roots, or so I shall contend here. I have become convinced of this by a common reaction among externalists to the main argument of my 1991 paper AAnti-Individual- ism and Privileged Access.@ In that argument, I concluded that externalism is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  13. Causality and the Paradox of Names.Michael McKinsey - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):491-515.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  14. Understanding proper names.Michael McKinsey - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):325-354.
    There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are determined. This is the question that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  15. The internal basis of meaning.Michael McKinsey - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):143-69.
  16. Levels of obligation.Michael McKinsey - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (4):385 - 395.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  17. Kripke's Objections to Description Theories of Names.Michael McKinsey - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):485 - 497.
    In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamples both to cluster theories and, more generally, to description theories of proper names. My view of these cases is that while they do not provide counterexamples to cluster theories, they can be used to provide evidence against single-description theories. In this paper I shall defend both of the claims involved in my view.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  18. (1 other version)Truths Containing Empty Names.Michael McKinsey - 2016 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Luis Fernandez Moreno (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names. Peter Lang. pp. 175-202.
    Abstract. On the Direct Reference thesis, proper names are what I call ‘genuine terms’, terms whose sole semantic contributions to the propositions expressed by their use are the terms’ semantic referents. But unless qualified, this thesis implies the false consequence that sentences containing names that fail to refer can never express true or false propositions. (Consider ‘The ancient Greeks worshipped Zeus’, for instance.) I suggest that while names are typically and fundamentally used as genuine terms, there is a small class (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. Obligations to the starving.Michael McKinsey - 1981 - Noûs 15 (3):309-323.
  20. (1 other version)On Knowing Our Own Minds.Michael McKinsey - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-116.
    This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21. Direct Reference and Logical Truth: a Reply to Lasonen‐Aarnio.Michael McKinsey - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):447-451.
  22. Thought by description.Michael Mckinsey - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):83-102.
  23. Divided reference in causal theories of names.Michael McKinsey - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (4):235 - 242.
    Gareth evans has proposed a type of case which shows that kripke's sketch of a causal theory of proper names is in need of modification. Kripke has himself suggested a way in which the modification might proceed, But I argue that this suggestion leads in the wrong direction. I consider a development of kripke's view by michael devitt which may overcome evans' case, But which is shown false by a different sort of case. The latter kind of case also shows (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24. The grammar of belief.Michael McKinsey - 1998 - In William J. Rapaport & Francesco Orilia (eds.), Thought, Language, and Ontology, Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri Castaneda. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  25. Curing folk psychology of arthritis.Michael McKinsey - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.
    Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26. A Refutation of Qualia-Physicalism.Michael McKinsey - 2005 - In Michael O'Rourke & Corey Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press. pp. 469.
  27.  28
    Causes and intentions: A reply.Michael McKinsey - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):408-423.
  28. The ambiguity of definite descriptions.Michael Mckinsey - 1979 - Theoria 45 (2):78-89.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Searle on proper names.Michael McKinsey - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (2):220-229.
    Searle has proposed a "presupposition-Theory" of proper names in which he maintains that names are not short for descriptions and which, He claims, Solves frege's puzzle as to how an identity-Sentence containing co-Referential names can be informative. Two possible interpretations of searle's view are proposed, And it is argued that neither interpretation can be used to solve frege's puzzle and that, On the most plausible interpretation of his view, Searle is committed to the thesis that names are short for descriptions (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Psychologism in Semantics.Michael McKinsey - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1 - 25.
    According to grice, Semantic concepts like meaning and reference should be explicated in terms of the propositional attitudes. In this paper, I argue that grice's program is mistaken in principle. I first motivate a gricean strategy for defining denotation, Or semantic reference, In terms of rules that govern what speakers may refer to with the terms they use. I then express three paradigm gricean theories of denotation and introduce considerations which show that these theories are false.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31.  64
    Against a Defence of Cluster Theories.Michael McKinsey - 1980 - Analysis 40 (1):1 - 5.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  34
    Consequences of Reference Failure.Michael McKinsey - 2019 - New York and Oxford: Routledge.
    This book defends the Direct Reference (DR) thesis in philosophy of language regarding proper names and indexical pronouns. It uniquely draws out the significant consequences of DR when it is conjoined with the fact that these singular terms sometimes fail to refer. Even though DR is widely endorsed by philosophers of language, many philosophically important and radically controversial consequences of the thesis have gone largely unexplored. This book makes an important contribution to the DR literature by explicitly addressing the consequences (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  66
    Expressing mental states.Michael McKinsey - 1979 - Philosophia 8 (4):657-671.
  34. A refutation of qualia physicalism.Michael McKinsey - 2005 - In Michael O'Rourke & Corey Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press.
  35.  12
    Chapter oclw 1.Michael Mckinsey - 1985 - In Aloysius Martinich (ed.), The philosophy of language. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 51--297.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Critical Notice of Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity. [REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):169-178.
    In this admirable book, Scott Soames provides well defended answers to some of the most difficult and important questions in the philosophy of language, and he does so with characteristic thoroughness, clarity, and rigor. The book's title is appropriate, since it does indeed go ‘beyond rigidity’ in many ways. Among other things, Soames does the following in the course of the book. He persuasively argues that the main thesis of Kripke's Naming and Necessity—that ordinary names are rigid designators—can be extended (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. (1 other version)Michael Devitt, Designation Reviewed by Michael McKinsey. [REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 1983 - Philosophy in Review 3 (3):112-116.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Beyond Formalism. [REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):709-713.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. (1 other version)Beyond Rigidity. [REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):149-168.
    In this admirable book, Scott Soames provides well defended answers to some of the most difficult and important questions in the philosophy of language, and he does so with characteristic thoroughness, clarity, and rigor. The book's title is appropriate, since it does indeed go ‘beyond rigidity’ in many ways. Among other things, Soames does the following in the course of the book. He persuasively argues that the main thesis of Kripke's Naming and Necessity—that ordinary names are rigid designators—can be extended (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  82
    Book reviews. [REVIEW]N. C. A. Costa, David Harrah, Michael Tye, D. S. Clarke, Jeffrey Olen, Robert Young, Richard Campbell, Michael McKinsey, John Peterson, Alex C. Michalos, John Glucker, John T. Blackmore, Eileen Bagus & Barbara Goodwin - 1985 - Philosophia 15 (1-2):279-281.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark