(1997). Cartesian cut, Heisenberg cut, and the concept of complexity. World Futures: Vol. 49, The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information, pp. 333-355.

Despite quantum theory’s remarkable success at predicting the statistical results of experiments, many philosophers worry that it nonetheless lacks some crucial connection between theory and experiment. Such worries constitute the Quantum Measurement Problems. One can broadly identify two kinds of worries: (1) pragmatic: it is unclear how to model our measurement processes in order to extract experimental predictions, and (2) realist: we lack a satisfying metaphysical account of measurement processes. While both issues deserve attention, the pragmatic worries have worse consequences (...) if left unanswered: If our pragmatic theory-to-experiment linkage is unsatisfactory, then quantum theory is at risk of losing both its evidential support and its physical salience. Avoiding these risks is at the core of what I will call the Pragmatic Measurement Problem. Fortunately, the pragmatic measurement problem is not too difficult to solve. For non-relativistic quantum theory, the story goes roughly as follows: One can model each of quantum theory’s key experimental successes on a case-by-case basis by using a measurement chain. In modeling this measurement chain, it is pragmatically necessary to switch from using a quantum model to a classical model at some point. That is, it is pragmatically necessary to invoke a Heisenberg cut at some point along the measurement chain. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, one can then strive for a wide-scoping measurement theory capable of modeling all (or nearly all) possible measurement processes. For non-relativistic quantum theory, this leads us to our usual projective measurement theory. As a bonus, proceeding this way also gives us an empirically meaningful characterization of the theory’s observables as (positive) self-adjoint operators. But how does this story have to change when we move into the context of quantum field theory (QFT)? It is well known that in QFT almost all localized projective measurements violate causality, allowing for faster-than-light signaling; These are Sorkin’s impossible measurements. Thus, the story of measurement in QFT cannot end as it did before with a projective measurement theory. But does this then mean that we need to radically rethink the way we model measurement processes in QFT? Are our current experimental practices somehow misguided? Fortunately not. I will argue that (once properly understood) our old approach to modeling quantum measurements is still applicable in QFT contexts. We ought to first use measurement chains to build up a case-by-case measurement framework for QFT. Modeling these measurement chains will require us to invoke what I will call a QFT-cut. That is, at some point along the measurement chain we must switch from using a QFT model to a non-QFT model. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, we can then strive for both a new wide-scoping measurement theory for QFT and an empirically meaningful characterization of its observables. It is at this point that significantly more theoretical work is needed. This paper ends by briefly reviewing the state of the art in the physics literature regarding the modeling of measurement processes involving quantum fields. (shrink)

While it is widely agreed that decoherence will not solve the measurement problem, decoherence has been used to explain the “emergence of classicality” and to eliminate the need for a Copenhagen edict that some systems simply have to be treated as classical via a quantum-classical “cut”. I argue that decoherence still relies on such a cut. Decoherence accounts derive classicality only in virtue of their incompleteness, by omission of part of the entangled system of which the classical-appearing subsystem is a (...) part. I argue that this omission is only justified by implicit classical assumptions that objectify a subsystem and are employed via either a traditional Copenhagen cut or a functionally equivalent imposition of separability on a system in a non-separable state. I argue that decoherence cannot derive classicality without assuming it in some other form, and I provide an analysis of when it is appropriate to make these otherwise implicit classical assumptions by adopting a minimalistic Copenhagen-style approach to measurement. Finally, I argue that, ironically, the conditions for making these assumptions may be better satisfied in standard measurement situations than in cases of environmental monitoring. (shrink)

The seminal work by one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, Physics and Philosophy is Werner Heisenberg's concise and accessible narrative of the revolution in modern physics, in which he played a towering role. The outgrowth of a celebrated lecture series, this book remains as relevant, provocative, and fascinating as when it was first published in 1958. A brilliant scientist whose ideas altered our perception of the universe, Heisenberg is considered the father of quantum physics; (...) he is most famous for the Uncertainty Principle, which states that quantum particles do not occupy a fixed, measurable position. His contributions remain a cornerstone of contemporary physics theory and application. Book jacket. (shrink)

Presents German physicist Werner Heisenberg's 1958 text in which he discusses the philosophical implications and social consequences of quantum mechanics and other physical theories.

The contributions of few contemporary scientists have been as far reaching in their effects as those of Nobel Laureate Werner Heisenberg.

At least 177 scales are available to researchers who want to measure religiosity, but questions exist as to exactly what these scales are measuring and in whom they are measuring it. A review of these scales found a lack items designed to measure ethical action in society or the world as a prophetic response to the experience of the divine. Instead, the vast majority of scales focus on internal experiences and beliefs or institutional relationships. A review of scale norm groups (...) found that norm groups often are not fully described, particularly in the area of race/ethnicity, and when they are described, they reveal an over-reliance on convenience samples of college students and an under-representation of racial/ethnic minority groups. Examples of scales with more fully described and more representative norm groups are given, and recommendations are offered for researchers using and developing religiosity scales. (shrink)

It is widely known that Hegel is a proponent and defender of the market economy. But why exactly does Hegel think that the market economy is superior to other economic systems? In this paper, I argue that Hegel's answer to this question has not been sufficiently understood. Commentators, or so I want to claim, have only identified one part of Hegel's argument—but have left out the most original and surprising dimension of his view: namely, Hegel's conviction that we should embrace (...) the market economy for its educational impact. Indeed, Hegel thinks that the market, by creating a sphere of life apart from traditional norms and expectations, teaches us something about ourselves, about others, and about the world we inhabit together—something that we could not learn anywhere else, but that we inevitably need to live well as individuals. (shrink)

It is widely known that Hegel's Philosophy of Right recognizes poverty as one of the central problems of modern civil society. What is much less well known, however, is that Hegel sees yet another structural problem at the opposite side of the economic spectrum: a problem of affluence. Indeed, as I show in this essay, Hegel's text contains a detailed—yet sometimes overlooked—discussion of the detrimental psychological and sociological effects of great wealth and how to counter them. By bringing this discussion (...) to the fore, we get a more complete picture of Hegel's theory of civil society and shed light on an aspect of Hegel's social philosophy that speaks to problems we face today. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungNach einer historischen Übersicht über die Entwicklung der naturwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen in den vergangenen Jahrhunderten wird auseinandergesetzt, dass wir seit der Quantentheorie einige frühere Theorien, wie etwa die Newton'sche Mechanik, als abge‐schlossene Theorien bezeichnen. Der Sinn dieser Begriffsbildung wird besprochen, ebenso die Bedingungen, unter denen eine Theorie als abgeschlossen bezeichnet werden kann.

The seminal work by one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, Physics and Philosophy is Werner Heisenberg's concise and accessible narrative of the revolution in modern physics, in which he played a towering role. The outgrowth of a celebrated lecture series, this book remains as relevant, provocative, and fascinating as when it was first published in 1958. A brilliant scientist whose ideas altered our perception of the universe, Heisenberg is considered the father of quantum physics; (...) he is most famous for the Uncertainty Principle, which states that quantum particles do not occupy a fixed, measurable position. His contributions remain a cornerstone of contemporary physics theory and application. (shrink)

In nine essays and lectures composed in the last years of his life, Werner Heisenberg offers a bold appraisal of the scientific method in the twentieth century--and relates its philosophical impact on contemporary society and science to the particulars of molecular biology, astrophysics, and related disciplines. Are the problems we define and pursue freely chosen according to our conscious interests? Or does the historical process itself determine which phenomena merit examination at any one time? Heisenberg discusses these issues (...) in the most far-ranging philosophical terms, while illustrating them with specific examples. (shrink)

Available here for the first time in English, "Reality and Its Order" is a remarkable philosophical text by Werner Heisenberg, the father of quantum mechanics and one of the leading scientists of the 20th century. Written during the wartime years and initially distributed only to his family and trusted friends, the essay describes Heisenberg’s philosophical view of how we understand the natural world and our role within it. In this volume, the essay is introduced by the physicist Helmut (...) Rechenberg and annotated by the science historian Ernst Peter Fischer. The content, particularly within its historical context, will be of great interest to many physicists, philosophers and historians of science. (shrink)

Werner Heisenberg: Der Teil und das Ganze.

It is widely acknowledged that Hegel holds the view that a rational social order needs to reconcile us to our status as natural beings, with bodily needs and desires. But while this general view is...

In this paper, I argue that Kant’s philosophy of history underwent a significant change be- tween his 1784 Idea for a Universal History and his 1790 Third Critique. My proposal is that in between these two texts Kant decisively revised his conception of the sources of historical, i. e. cultural and political, progress: In 1784, he conceived of historical progress as primarily accomplished through social antagonism among human beings, whereas beginning in 1790, he elevates ethical cooperation into a second, significant (...) source of progress. Between 1784 and the 1790s, in other words, Kant re-conceived the collaboration between moral agents as a driving force of history and of the progressing cultivation of humankind. In this paper I offer evidence for this change and suggest reasons why it might have occurred. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Value: Justice as the Living Good by Dean MoyarThimo HeisenbergDean Moyar. Hegel's Value: Justice as the Living Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 384. Hardback, $110.00.Hegel's Philosophy of Right is one of those texts that make it easy to miss the forest for the trees. On the argumentative journey from private property and punishment, via the "emptiness" of Kant's moral law to Hegel's vision of a (...) rational social order, it is easy to lose sight of the overall arch of Hegel's argument. Indeed, this kind of problem is confounded by an ever-growing literature on individual ideas and sections of the text (from Hegel's conception of agency to his argument for the market economy), which, while interesting and rewarding on their own, direct our attention to parts of his argument, rather than to the Philosophy of Right as a whole.Dean Moyar's new book is devoted to making us see the forest again—albeit while never leaving the trees out of sight. Indeed, to stretch the metaphor of forest and trees a little bit further, Moyar builds his ambitious endeavor on two new interpretative theses, which enable him to show us completely new paths through and clearings in the forest, bringing to light previously underappreciated aspects of the argument and adding refreshing new takes on the parts of Hegel's view that are already well known.The first of Moyar's two central theses concerns Hegel's methodology in his Philosophy of Right. Moyar maintains that the structure of the Philosophy of Right can be understood as a "teleologically inferentialist" account: the content of the norms of right is developed through use, where at each stage of the argument the content of those norms is refined by sublating previous failures of application. But while this Hegelian process is dynamic, relying on conflicts and their resolution, the process is—in contrast to some pragmatist forms of inferentialism—not open-ended: instead, or so Moyar convincingly argues, it leads to a point of inferential equilibrium as telos of the text (Hegel's vision of Ethical Life), in which some dynamism persists but further development of right is no longer necessary.This kind of interpretation, Moyar argues, has several advantages: it renders the methodology of the Philosophy of Right consistent with the method of Hegel's Logic, but it also provides us with a general template (which Moyar calls the "basic argument" [30 and passim]) on which to understand all the different transitions in the Philosophy of Right as structurally analogous, thereby showing Hegel to be both intertextually and intratextually consistent. Even more, using this basic argument as a template, Moyar puts himself in a position to generate interesting understandings of all the major and minor transitions in Hegel's text, focusing not merely on the most well-known (the transition from Morality to Ethical Life), but also on those that have traditionally received much less attention (such as the minor transition that leads from the contradiction between right [Recht] and welfare [Wohl] to the Good).The second of Moyar's two central theses concerns the importance of the concept of value to Hegel's project. Indeed, Moyar argues that even though the word 'value' (Wert) may not appear frequently in the published version of Hegel's lectures, the concept of value is at work everywhere in the text. Moyar, consequently, traces the presence of this concept throughout the Philosophy of Right, using it to understand many of the forbiddingly [End Page 327] difficult passages, from the dense section on the "Alienation of Property" early on in the part on Abstract Right, to Hegel's later views on the relationship between right and duty, his precarious theory of the "circulation of value" on the market, and finally his view of history at the end of the Philosophy of Right.In this way, Moyar extracts a rich interpretative bounty: he defends a heterodox reading of Hegel as a legal positivist, reconstructs a Hegelian doctrine of public reason, and argues against an "amoral" reading of Hegel's account of history. Most important, perhaps, is his interpretation of the relationship... (shrink)

Psychopathology is the study of the signs and symptoms of psychiatric disorders - delusions, hallucinations, phobias, depression, for example. This book gives an account of the terms currently in use and attempts an in-depth analysis of the nature of each. The matter is examined both from a philosophical perspective and from the point of view of what is known about the function of the hemispheres of the brain.

To us today, it seems intuitive that an ideal society would secure for its citizens some time for leisure that is, some time to do “whatever they want” after having attended to their various responsibilities and natural needs. But, in this essay, I argue that—in 19th century social philosophy—the status of leisure (Muße) in an ideal society was actually surprisingly controversial: whereas J.G. Fichte makes a strong case for leisure as part of an ideal society (going even so far as (...) considering it its central good), G.W.F. Hegel implicitly argues against this idea. For him, leisure is a crook that we only need as long as the social conditions are not sufficiently ideal—whereas a truly rational society would create a new type of work that subsumes the benefits of leisure into work itself. In this essay, I reconstruct this largely forgotten disagreement and argue that although both positions contain an important overstatement, each includes an important lesson for the contemporary debate on leisure and society. (shrink)

Philosophers today do not think of Goethe’s Faust as an important contribution to the philosophy of money. But to discount the work in this way is a mistake, I argue. Underneath Faust’s lyrical form, Goethe develops a comprehensive view of money that came to be an important influence on left-wing (Karl Marx) and right-wing (Oswald Spengler) discussions of money. Centrally, Goethe argues that modern economic practices have transformed money obsession (long conceived of primarily as an individual vice) into a structural (...) problem: social structures are now set up to systematically require individuals to engage in quasi-obsessive behaviors towards money (e.g. persistently talking about/sacrificing for money) independently, to a significant degree, from their individual choices. This structural power, Goethe proposes, requires a rethinking of how behavior towards money should be morally evaluated – and, importantly, a critique of moral attitudes that individualize what is, in truth, a social problem. (shrink)

Este artigo destina-se a introduzir a conferência de Heisenberg "A doutrina goethiana e newtoniana das cores à luz da física moderna", proferida em 1941, cuja tradução é aqui publicada. Analisa-se primeiramente o projeto filosófico de uma ordenação da realidade, desenvolvido pelo físico no início da década de 1940, o qual subjaz à discussão sobre as doutrinas das cores em Goethe e Newton. No segundo momento, faz-se uma exposição de algumas das implicações filosóficas da teoria quântica, com ênfase na interpretação (...) da assim denominada escola de Copenhague. Por fim, procura-se mostrar como a querela entre Goethe e Newton é utilizada para defender as abstrações da física teórica dos ataques da assim denominada "física ariana" e, ao mesmo tempo, preservar o valor das considerações intuitivas de Goethe. This paper aims at exposing the Heisenberg's conference "The teachings of Goethe and Newton on colors in the light of modern physics", presented in 1941, whose translation is presented here. In the first place the paper analyzes the philosophical project of an ordination of the reality, developed by the physicist in the early 1940s and which is the basis for the discussion of the "Teachings of Goethe and Newton on colors". Secondly it exposes some philosophical implications of the quantum theory by emphasizing the point of view of the Copenhagen school. Finally, it shows how the dispute between Goethe and Newton is exploited to defend the abstractions of the theoretical physics against the attacks of the so called "German physicists" and, at the same time, to preserve the worth of the Goethe's intuitive analysis. (shrink)

Much attention has been paid to the role that Hegel, in his mature ethical theory, attributes to what he calls the social or political body i.e. to the institutions of the social order. Ironically, by comparison, much less attention has been paid to the role the physical body plays in the same theory. This paper attempts to level the scale, by reconstructing Hegel’s ethical theory of the physical body from the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopedia. Hegel’s leading thesis here, (...) I argue, is that developing and maintaining a good relationship with one’s physical body is not only rather demanding, but also requires the right kind of social institutions – and that absent these institutions, individuals will (for the most part) be unable to see and to treat their body in the right kind of way. Achieving a good relationship to their body, hence, is something that individuals cannot just do on their own, on Hegel’s view, but something that requires them to collaborate with others, creating and sustaining social institutions that help them be at home in their bodies. (shrink)

Dorsal closure (DC), the closure of a hole in the dorsal epidermis of Drosophila embryos by the joining of opposing epithelial cell sheets, has been used as a model process to study the molecular and cellular mechanisms underlying epithelial spreading and wound healing. Recent studies have provided novel insights into how different tissues function cooperatively in this process. Specifically, they demonstrate a critical function of the epidermis surrounding the hole in modulating the behavior of the amnioserosa cells inside. These findings (...) shed light not only on the mechanisms by which the behavior of different tissues is coordinated during DC, but also on the general mechanisms by which tissues interact to trigger global morphogenesis, an essential but yet poorly explored aspect of embryogenesis. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Kant’s philosophy of history underwent a significant change between his 1784 Idea for a Universal History and his 1790 Third Critique. My proposal is that in between these two texts Kant decisively revised his conception of the sources of historical, i. e. cultural and political, progress: In 1784, he conceived of historical progress as primarily accomplished through social antagonism among human beings, whereas beginning in 1790, he elevates ethical cooperation into a second, significant source (...) of progress. Between 1784 and the 1790s, in other words, Kant re-conceived the collaboration between moral agents as a driving force of history and of the progressing cultivation of humankind. In this paper I offer evidence for this change and suggest reasons why it might have occurred. (shrink)

In neuroethology, the nervous system and behavior are analyzed in the context of the animal's natural habitat and evolutionary history. For the last 30 years the influence of genetics on neuroethology has steadily grown, particularly in Drosophila. Genetic variants reveal new properties of neurons; they help to dissect neuronal circuits and complex behavioral systems; genetics provides new methods to visualize certain brain structures and to assign behavioral functions to them; and, finally, genetic variants can be used to test ecological models. (...) While single‐gene mutations can have highly specific behavioral effects, molecular analysis of the corresponding genes reveals that the latter normally have a much broader functional scope. The ‘graininess’ of a functional model of the brain, therefore, is defined by the independent regulatory units of the genes rather than by the genes themselves. (shrink)