In The Time That Remains, Agamben seeks to separate the Pauline texts from the history of the Church that canonized them, thus revealing them to be "the fundamental messianic texts of the West.

What is an apparatus? -- The friend -- What is the contemporary?

He proposes, in his characteristically allusive and intriguing way, a politics of gestureOCoa politics of means without end.Among the topics Agamben takes up are the properly political paradigms of experience, as well as those generally not ...

What is a paradigm? -- Theory of signatures -- Philosophical archeology.

Explores the symbiosis of philosophy and literature in understanding negativity.

In this follow-up to The Kingdom and the Glory and The Highest Poverty, Agamben investigates the roots of our moral concept of duty in the theory and practice of Christian liturgy. Beginning with the New Testament and working through to late scholasticism and modern papal encyclicals, Agamben traces the Church's attempts to repeat Christ's unrepeatable sacrifice. Crucial here is the paradoxical figure of the priest, who becomes more and more a pure instrument of God's power, so that his own motives (...) and character are entirely indifferent as long as he carries out his priestly duties. In modernity, Agamben argues, the Christian priest has become the model ethical subject. We see this above all in Kantian ethics. Contrasting the Christian and modern ontology of duty with the classical ontology of being, Agamben contends that Western philosophy has unfolded in the tension between the two. This latest installment in the study of Western political structures begun in Homo Sacer is a contribution to the study of liturgy, an extension of Nietzsche's genealogy of morals, and a reworking of Heidegger's history of Being. (shrink)

In this book, one of Italy's most important and original contemporary philosophers considers the status of art in the modern era. He takes seriously Hegel's claim that art has exhausted its spiritual vocation. He argues, however, that Hegel by no means proclaimed the 'death of art' (as many still imagine) but proclaimed rather the indefinite continuation of art in a 'self-annulling' mode. With astonishing breadth and originality, he probes the meaning, aesthetics, and historical consequences of that self-annulment. He argues that (...) the birth of modern aesthetics is the result of a series of schisms - such as between artist and spectator, genius and taste, and form and matter - that are manifestations of the deeper, self-negating yet self-perpetuating movement of irony. He offers an imaginative reinterpretation of the history of aesthetic theory from Kant to Heidegger. The final chapter offers a dazzling interpretation of Dürer's Melancholia. (shrink)

"The texts published here reproduce, with some variation, those of five lectures held at the Mendrisio Academy of Architecture between October 2012 and April 2013.".

_ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 258 - 271 This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s _Extended Rationality_ is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism.

In The Sacrament of Language Agamben investigates the phenomenon of the oath, arguing that it points toward a fundamental experience of language that lies at the root of religion and law alike.

Creation and salvation -- What is the contemporary? -- K. -- On the uses and disadvantages of living among specters -- On what we can not do -- Identity without the person -- Nudity -- The glorious body -- Hunger of an ox : considerations on the Sabbath, the feast, and inoperativity -- The last chapter in the history of the world.

Apparently, aiming to comply with the norm ‘Believe that P if and only if the proposition that P is true’ can hardly differ from aiming to comply with the norm ‘Believe that P if and only if the proposition that P is epistemically justified’. So one may be tempted to agree with Richard Rorty that the distinction between truth and justification is pragmatically useless because it cannot make any difference ‘when the question is about what I should believe now’. I (...) resist this conclusion by arguing that the distinction between truth and justification is pragmatically useful even if the two properties are indeed normatively coincident. The argument I offer turns on the claim that truth plays an explanatory role that justification is inherently incapable of playing. However, my contention is not just that the distinction between truth and justification is pragmatically useful because truth is a bona fide explanatory notion. It is that the distinction between truth and justification is pragmatically useful because the realization that the former plays an explanatory role that the latter is inherently incapable of playing gives access to reasons which would otherwise escape our attention. If truth is a bona fide explanatory notion, the distinction between truth and justification is pragmatically useful because it is precisely when the question is about what I should believe now that attending to such a distinction will often make a difference – and it will make a difference even if the two properties are in fact normatively coincident. (shrink)

This book consists of prose pieces that find a new form of expression for philosophy, an expression showing the inseparability of idea and prose--the very form of truth.

Homo sacer : sovereign power and bare life -- State of exception -- Stasis : civil war as a political paradigm -- The sacrament of language : an archaeology of the oath -- The kingdom and the glory : for a theological genealogy of economy and government -- Opus Dei : an archaeology of duty -- Remnants of Auschwitz : the witness and the archive -- The highest poverty : monastic rules and form-of-life -- The use of bodies.

La ricerca può essere effettuata anche con parole non complete. Per esempio - per la ricerca dell'autore 'Gerardus van der Leeuw' può bastare l'inserimento della parola 'lee' o di altre parti del nome o del cognome. Questa possibilità facilita la ricerca di parole difficili o di cui non è semplice memorizzare la trascrizione. Se invece si inserisce nella ricerca, oltre al cognome dell'autore, anche il nome ed il titolo del libro, o almeno alcune parole significative del titolo, il risultato della (...) ricerca sarà più selettivo. (shrink)

L'eclissi della politica è cominciata da quando essa ha omesso di confrontarsi con le trasformazioni che ne hanno svuotato categorie e concetti. Accade così che paradigmi genuinamente politici vadano ora cercati in esperienze e fenomeni che di solito non sono considerati politici: la vita naturale degli uomini restituita al centro della polis; il campo di concentramento; il rifugiato; il linguaggio come luogo politico per eccellenza, oggetto di una contesa e di una manipolazione senza precedenti; la sfera dei mezzi puri o (...) dei gesti, ossia dei mezzi che, pur restando tali, si emancipano dalla loro relazione a un fine. Il libro cerca di ripensare le categorie della politica in una nuova realtà. (shrink)

La causa e la colpa -- Crimen e karman -- Le aporie della volontà -- Al di là dell'azione.

This chapter is an intervention into the interpretation of Franz Kafka's great novels The Trial and The Castle; implicitly, it constitutes a divided assault on the divisiveness of the law. In Roman law, slander represented so serious a threat for the administration of justice that the false accuser was punished by the branding of the letter K on his forehead. The gravity of slander is a function of its calling into question the principle itself of the trial: the moment of (...) accusation. K.'s strategy can be defined with more precision as the failed attempt to render impossible, not the trial, but the confession. The profession of the protagonist of The Castle is addressed. The interpretation according to which K. wants to be accepted by the castle and settle in the village would then appear all the more mistaken. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Image and SilenceGiorgio AgambenTranslated by Leland de la Durantaye (bio)[End Page 94]In the Roman pantheon there is a goddess named Angerona, represented with her mouth bound and sealed (ore obligato signatoque).1 Her finger is raised to her lips as if to command silence. Scholars claim that she represents, in the context of pagan mystery cults, the power of silence, although there is no consensus among them as to how (...) to understand this power. Etymologically speaking, myein, the root of the Greek word mysterion, means “to close the mouth, to silence.” At the beginning of the sacred rites in Eleusis a herald “commanded silence” (epittatei tēn siōpen). It is said that that the initiates into these Eleusinian mysteries were required to maintain absolute silence concerning what they had seen and heard during their initiation. Our question is how to understand this silence. Was it a prohibition aimed at keeping a secret doctrine from the uninitiated? Or did it concern, instead, something truly impossible to say?To begin we might ask what sense there might have been in the obligation to remain silent given that it was possible for anyone—including slaves, and thus, potentially, the entire population of Athens—to be initiated into the mysteries. In his early work, “On Philosophy,” Aristotle affirmed that, “the initiates do not need to learn something (mathein ti), but, instead, to be disposed to something, to experience and to undergo something (pathein kai diatethēnai).”2 It would therefore be possible that in the ancient mystery cults the initiate did not learn a doctrine that could be expressed in words (yet had to remain secret), but, instead, experienced something essentially silent, something impossible to say. “A great awe in face of the gods,” we read in the Homeric ode to Demeter, “silences the voice.”3The impossibility of speaking—and the power of silence—has two forms, one joyful and the other disturbing. In myth muteness is often associated with rape. The Romans tell the story of Lara who was punished for her inclination to gossip by being rendered mute and who was then raped in a sacred wood by Mercury (who took advantage of her impossibility of speaking). Before being transformed into a swallow Philomela was raped by Tereus, who cut off her tongue to prevent her from recounting his misdeed. Persephone, raped, kidnapped, and conducted to Hades, remained there silent as the dead. In every one of these cases silence is the painful experience of a privation of speech, of being unable to say what one wishes to say.In Gnostic mythology, the preexisting, eternal, uncreated God contains within himself a female figure which is his silence, Sigē. From his union with Silence Thought is born. “Sigē,” we read in a Valentinian text, “is the mother of all the beings that have emerged from the Abyss. He who has failed to say the unsayable has silenced it; he who was understood the unsayable, has declared it unsayable.”4 Here too silence appears as the experience of an impossibility of saying, as a privation. It is in opposition to this abyssal figure of silence that the church fathers affirmed the primacy of the logos in which God is revealed. Nevertheless, of the power of silence Heidegger would write: “This primordial silence is more powerful than any human potentiality. No one, on his or her own, has ever invented language—that is, has been strong enough to break the power of this silence.”5 [End Page 95]In Kafka’s parable on Ulysses, we are told that the silence of the Sirens is more perilous than their song, and that Ulysses—who realized, as his ship neared them, that the Sirens were silent—put on an act to protect himself from this silence, plugging his ears with wax and having his men tie him to the mast.6 In Kafka’s retelling of the tale, the silence of the Sirens represents a zero degree of song and, following a stubborn tradition that sees in absence the most extreme form of presence, also represents an at once zero and ultimate degree of reality. In this sense Heidegger could write... (shrink)

L'uomo moderno è ancora capace di esperienza o la distruzione dell'esperienza è da considerare un fatto ormai compiuto? Da questo interrogativo prende avvio la ricerca che dà il titolo al volume per proporre un ripensamento radicale del problema dell'esperienza, in cui il tema si allarga sino ad abbracciare motivi apparentemente lontani; la sotterranea solidarietà di razionalismo e irrazionalismo nella nostra cultura e lo scivolare della fantasia dalla sfera della conoscenza a quella dell'irrealtà; la scissione fra desiderio e bisogno e l'apparizione (...) del concetto di inconscio; il rifiuto delle ragioni dell'esperienza da parte dei movimenti giovanili e lo spostarsi dell'avventura dal quotidiano allo straordinario; la nascita dell'io e la rivendicazione dell'inesperibile nella poesia moderna. (shrink)

Motivated by the analysis of a general optimal portfolio selection problem, which encompasses as special cases an optimal consumption and an optimal debt-arrangement problem, we are concerned with the questions of how a personality trait like risk-perception can be formalized and whether the two objectives of utility-maximization and risk-minimization can be both achieved simultaneously. We address these questions by developing an axiomatic foundation of preferences for which utility-maximization is equivalent to minimizing a utility-based shortfall risk measure. Our axiomatization hinges on (...) a novel axiom in decision theory, namely the risk-perception axiom. (shrink)

This title is a book of three richly detailed treatments of the myth of Kore. Kore, also called Persephone and referred to poetically by the Greeks as 'the unspeakable girl', was the daughter of Dermeter and Zeus who was abducted by Hades and made queen of the netherworld.

Angelaki, Volume 16, Issue 3, Page 117-123, September 2011.

Originally published as a preface to a collection of Italian translations of writings by and interviews with Carl Schmitt, this chapter asks what Schmitt’s professional identity as a jurist meant for his thought. It shows how each of his works offers an image of him that can best be understood in the context of what Walter Benjamin called the “now of knowability,” i.e., in a constellation produced by the thorniest political problems of Schmitt’s time. The challenge that Schmitt’s writings raise (...) is akin to that of finding figures hidden in a landscape painting. Agamben argues that the hidden figures in Schmitt’s works designate points at which their contemporary relevance is greatest. Only with this constellation in mind, he insists, can the crux of Schmittian exegesis—that of a fascist thinker who continues to concern contemporary society—be fully appreciated. (shrink)