This article, and a related one in the next issue, investigates some myths surrounding the application of the right to life at the end of life. The present article focuses upon the myth that the right to life is an absolute right, always requiring the preservation of life. It identifies three distinct situations in which state authorities may be justified in declining to take intervening action in order to save a life. It argues that the right to life encompasses recognition (...) of the impossibility and undesirability of preserving human life in all circumstances and that recognition of this fact will render the right more useful in a health-care context. (shrink)

This article continues the rejection of certain myths about the right to life at the end of life commenced in an article in the previous issue of the journal Clinical Ethics. It focuses upon ethical arguments that seek to exclude two categories of human beings from the usual protection of human life: those described as ‘non-persons’ and those ‘designated for death’. The article argues that, while the protection offered to life by means of the right to life is far from (...) absolute, the right remains applicable to all human beings, irrespective of their life expectancy or mental capacity. (shrink)

Introduction: human rights in healthcare -- A right to treatment? the allocation of resouces in the National Health Service -- Ensuring quality healthcare: an issue of rights or duties? -- Autonomy and consent in medical treatment -- Treating incompetent patients: beneficence, welfare and rights -- Medical confidentiality and the right to privacy -- Property right in the body -- Medically assisted conception and a right to reproduce? -- Termination of pregnancy: a conflict of rights -- Pregnancy and freedom of choice (...) -- The right to life at the end of life -- The law and ethics of assisted dying: is there a right to die? (shrink)