This new annotated translation of Chapter Six of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_, the joint product of a group of scholars that included H. S. Harris, George di Giovanni, John W. Burbidge, and Kenneth Schmitz, represents an advance in accuracy and fluency on previous translations into English of this core chapter of the Phenomenology. Its notes and commentary offer both novice and scholar more guidance to this text than is available in any other translation, and it is thus well suited for (...) use in survey courses. (shrink)

Many of you may be familiar with what is today called the “Gaia hypothesis.” It consists in the thesis that the earth is a super-organism that exhibits specific properties of life: It regulates its own temperature, “excretes” waste, combats poisonous “infections,” and the like. In a word, it maintains homoeostasis. The hypothesis has supposedly been established by using a scientific method: the proposal of a hypothesis putatively based on observation and the reasonable explanation of the data. It was offered ostensibly (...) as the only viable explanation for a vast host of natural phenomena, of which the actual processes and mechanics are not truly understood. I will note just a few of these. (shrink)

This volume contains eleven essays dealing with the question of how to face the current challenges of globalization. The essays included in this volume were originally presented at the Renvall Institute for Area and Cultural Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, on the occasion of the Sixth World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue (ISUD) Presents Keynote addresses or prize-winning papers from the Congress Central theme explores the need to rethink our concepts of nature, culture, and freedom in an (...) age of increased globalization Topics examined range from global justice, international law, and human rights to ecoterrorism, cultural relativism, and the challenges of autonomy. (shrink)

This paper considers Hegel’s treatment of the dispute between modern philosophy and faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit. The paper shows that Hegel is concerned with this dispute as part of his systematic program to advance the true philosophical concept of self and world, but, by so doing, he supports ahumanistic reconciliation between Christianity and the secular values of the Enlightenment. The paper contains extensive discussions of Hegel’s views on the French philosophes, and it shows how he used their writings (...) in his criticism of the popular notions within denominational religion. It also shows why Hegel did not fully support the philosophes’ assumptions, but, instead, he was willing to accept Christian notions of the incarnation and redemption. (shrink)

In the section called “Observation of Nature” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel considers and criticizes a particular form of methodology which seeks final purposes by analogy. Through this methodology what is essential for thought is the recognition and demarcation of differentiae, which are imputed to natural objects as qualities by which things maintain their distinct and separate character - what Hegel calls their “being-for-self.” By these differentiae, then, the objects are categorized into types, or “natural kinds,” which, in turn, (...) are interpreted by natural philosophers according to a projected teleological system. Hegel’s critique is not aimed primarily at the categorization of objects, but at the method of interpretation used to characterize these categories as purposeful. In particular, Hegel is not criticizing the use of analogy as discussed in the biological writings of Aristotle, but the use of analogy by the transcendental idealists, especially Kant, who employs this method in the Critique of Judgment. (shrink)

There has been significant disagreement about Hegel’s view of Christianity in the “Revealed Religion” section of the Phenomenology of Spirit. This paper attempts to show that his view encompasses the breath of the Christian experience that incorporates both orthodox and heretical teachings. It covers three doctrines: the Trinity, which features Sabellian modalism; Creation, which incorporates both Neo-Platonism and Christian Gnosticism; the Incarnation, which shows a conceptual conflict in how the Son is portrayed as both the servant of faith and the (...) naturalistic lord of the world. (shrink)

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) was supposed to be the introduction and first part of the Jena System III, and as such it was to introduce us to the other parts of the project. Most commentators on Hegel’s Phenomenology , however, do not consider how the Phenomenology relates the other parts, and some discount Hegel understanding and commitment to the natural philosophy of his day. This paper attempts to make the connection between the Phenomenology and the Natural Philosophy of 1805-06 (...) explicit; to show where and how the connections are made; to identify how Hegel uses the natural sciences of his day in creating his system. By showing this I hope to prove that his concept of Spirit is born within his natural philosophy. It is part of his cosmology. (shrink)

This paper considers three modern objections to Anselm’s argument on atonement in book I of ’Cur Deus Homo’. The objections are from Friedrich Nietzsche, R. C. Moberly, and Hastings Rashdall; each one makes the case that Anselm’s argument is fallacious. Each one interprets Anselm’s position as requiring that someone innocent suffer punishment in order to acquit guilt. I contend that these objectors do not offer a strong case against Anselm’s argument, principally because they have not examined it completely and have (...) misunderstood his reasoning. In fine, Anselm’s case is (a) the Son’s obedience to the Father suffices for atonement, (b) the Son is an advocate for Adam and his heirs and stands in for them because of his blood ties to humanity, and (c) the Son is the advocate for the Father in the latter’s attempt to end human estrangement from justice. Being both an advocate of the Father and an heir to Adam, the Son’s Incarnation itself prepares the way of reconciliation and the life of. (shrink)

Hegel's understanding of why the state should be founded on religious values but not itself be influenced by religious piety or congregations is explored. There is some discussion of the tension between his philosophy and Prussian authorities in Berlin. Hegel's political liberalism appears to have compromised by both civil and religious authorities of his day.

Most commentators who consider Hegel's treatment of the female principle (Weiblichkeit) in the Phenomenology of Spirit only believe that it refers to "True Spirit" and is limited to a brief discussion of Sophocles's character Antigone. This is not actually true. The paper deals with both with the broader question of who represents the female principle and also goes into detail on the first appearance of Antigone in chapter five and on her final appearance in chapter seven, Reason. The female principle (...) returns in Religion as an aspect of Absolute Being. The female goddesses, especially the mother goddess and the Erinyes, embody this principle. Antigone reappears as offering prophetic wisdom for their mission, which is Divine Law and justice. (shrink)

This work focuses on Hegel’s development concerning his philosophy of religion, beginning with his school days at Stuttgart, and ending with the publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The first half of the book is devoted to Hegel’s thought prior to the composition of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the second half is devoted to a reading and interpretation of those chapters in the Phenomenology which concern religion. Unlike other interpreters of Hegel’s development, Crites is concerned principally with understanding Hegel’s (...) views and arguments on Christianity. He tells us, for instance, “I am concerned in this study with shedding light on the interpretation of Christianity in the works of the mature Hegel”. By “mature” he means Hegel’s Jena writings; there is only passing discussion of the post-Jena writings. For those scholars of Hegel who are interested in a solid introduction to Hegel’s religious thinking during his early period, this is an important volume. The chapters on the Bern and Frankfurt periods are especially enlightening. Crites does an excellent job especially in chapter 2, “The Problem of the Positivity of the Gospel in Hegel’s Early Writings,” and I found his discussion on the difference in Hegel’s thought between Folk Religion and Private Religion very insightful. (shrink)

The 91st annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, took place in Chicago this spring at the Palmer House. To the delight of many, Hegel topics were present and Hegelians were in good attendance. There were two fine discussions of Hegel’s works and ideas.

The 93rd annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, in Chicago, April 26–29, 1995, had two papers that related to Hegel directly, and one that related to him indirectly. The first, given by Robert Wallace, entitled “Mutual Recognition and Ethics,” claimed that Hegel in the mutual recognition sections of Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit replies to Kant’s argument that someone, in order to be autonomous, must be moral. Hegel responds to Kant’s position by showing that self-conscious (...) autonomy is a feature of two processes. The first process Wallace called “vertical integration,” in which an agent seeks unity and identity through the recognition of the self by another, and the second process he called “horizontal individuation,” in which the unity of the individual is a product of desire satisfaction. Kant speaks of autonomy only on the basis of rational autonomy, which ignores the dual processes of self-consciousness. Hegel, by showing how autonomy truly comes about, demonstrates both the deficiency of Kant’s argument and how morality could be based on the satisfaction and recognition of the individuals. In reply to Wallace, William Schroeder commented that Wallace’s argument is not Hegel’s argument. Hegel’s argument must be viewed in relation to the conditions of life, which Hegel discusses in the preceding section of “Self-Certainty,” and to the condition of master and slave, which succeeds those sections of recognition. Schroeder also pointed out that in Wallace’s account the notion of “mutual” recognition was strangely absent. Wallace believed that the “other” could be oneself, and that the recognition may occur in only one direction. Schroeder noted that Hegel’s argument clearly holds to the notion that two self-conscious individuals are present, and the recognition is reciprocal. The comments from the audience echoed Schroder’s comments. Robert Williams of the University of Illinois at Chicago gave a short appraisal of Hegel’s argument, and contended that Wallace had not done it complete justice. (shrink)

This book covers Schelling's development from the Early Writings through to his System of Transcendental Idealism, and finally Schelling's Philosophy and Religion and Philosophy of Art. Schneider traces Schelling's "way of thinking" beginning with his attempt at a transcendental philosophy centering on the Ego as the primordial principle for the cognition of being, through his explication of the unity of being and thinking in an intellectual intuition, to finally, Schelling's highest achievement in the conception of thinking as art. Art is (...) here considered as the organon or "vehicle" for a philosophy of religion. Schneider contends that this development is a consistent, continuous one devoid of the contradictions that several of the modern commentators attribute to Schelling. Schneider points out that as early as 1794 Schelling saw the central problem in transcendental philosophy as explicating the "eternal in us" and how it can be brought to light through a philosophical methodology. However, Schneider further contends that it was not until Schelling established his philosophy of identity in the System of Transcendental Idealism that he found the method for uncovering the eternal dimensions within consciousness. This discovery was made possible because intellectual intuition, which for the first time was fully worked out in the System, is seen as the apprehension of the invariable unity within the plurality and variability of temporal consciousness. The form of the invariable is the absolute "I" or the primordial self, while that which presents itself in time is the empirical "I" with its content of thought, namely, sensuous intuition. Cognition is accomplished at the point of unity wherein the world in its finitude is "framed" by the transcendental unity of the "I" in pure act. (shrink)