Xunzi’s 荀子 advocacy for moral education is well-documented; precisely how his program bolsters moral development, and why a program touting study of ritual could be effective, remain subjects of debate. I argue that these matters can be clarified by appealing to the theory of learning and development offered by Lev Vygotsky. Vygotsky posited that development depends primarily on social interactions mediated by sociocultural tools that modify learners’ cognitive architecture, enabling increasingly sophisticated thought. Vygotsky’s theory is remarkably similar to Xunzi’s account (...) of how studying and practicing ritual restructures learners’ moral psychology. Specifically, both Vygotsky and Xunzi offer nonnativist accounts of psychosocial development that emphasize the centrality of sociocultural tools for learning. This comparison yields a more nuanced and empirically supported interpretation of Xunzi’s account of moral education, as well as an account that has applications in contemporary work in moral education and development. (shrink)

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence that they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi’s position, we contend that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. (...) Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of the moralization of anger have not, to date, substantively engaged classical Chinese thought. This is unfortunate, given the abundance of appeals to moral anger in the classical literature, especially among the Confucians, and the suppression, expression, and functionalization of anger. Accordingly, this essay engages in two general projects: one interpretive, one applied. The interpretive project examines the manner in which classical Confucian thought regards anger as having both destructive and constructive aspects, how these aspects are unavoidable human (...) experiences, and how they can (and should) be regulated or recruited by ritualized social forms. Specifically, while the early Confucians at times depict anger as a precarious feeling to be assuaged, there are circumstances in which anger is not only understandable, but morally warranted. In this tradition, adherence to ritual prescriptions is a primary means by which problematic anger is alleviated while moral anger is effectively expressed, achieving prosocial ends without producing undue harm. This understanding and analysis of anger from a Confucian perspective gives rise to an applied project that considers how even contemporary, non-Confucians can ritualize and deploy anger for positive moral and political ends. In particular, I examine how forms of reconciliation, etiquette, and protest can be construed as rituals through which moral anger is effectively channeled. (shrink)

The ancient Confucians developed a particular notion of ritual and placed it at the center of their moral cultivation program. This book examines the Confucian ritual method through the lens of modern developmental theory and creates a theoretical framework for deploying ritual as an invaluable tool in contemporary moral education pursuits.

While the early Confucians were largely content to maintain the rituals of ancient kings as the core of moral education in their time, it is not obvious that contemporary humans could, or should, draw from the particulars of such a tradition. Indeed, even if one takes ritual seriously as a tool for cultivation, there remains a question of how to design moral education programs incorporating ritual. This essay examines impediments faced by a ritualized approach to moral education, how they might (...) be overcome, and how a ritual method could be developed in modernity. I contend that a Confucian notion of ritual, particularly as elaborated in the Xunzi, is both compatible with modern moral education and capable of making a distinct contribution to moral education in terms of how rituals can be used to structure and inculcate a shared climate of respect and humaneness both in- and outside the classroom. Specifically, the ritual education method includes emphases on inculcating moral fluency via symbolic practices and distinctions, training and appropriately associating promoral dispositions, enhancing moral imagination, and developing awareness of other minds. The model is thus a multifaceted approach to moral education through (meta)cognitive development. (shrink)

How much injustice and oppression must be tolerated before a revolution is justified? In theory, the United States’ political structure, by design, makes the question of revolution obsolete: by putting political power into the hands of the people via democratic mechanisms such as voting, the division of power among separate branches of government, and representative influence and control, there should be no need for revolution because everything the government does either has the consent of the people or is (relatively swiftly) (...) checked by their dissent. In practice, the United States’ political structure has failed to bring about such democratic justice. Given structural, systemic failures of justice (which promise to be ongoing), it is worth asking when, if ever, a revolution in the United States would be justified. To begin answering this question, we first turn to three traditional theories of revolution prominent in Western political theory, all of which have serious theoretical and practical problems, many of which are exacerbated by the contemporary American context in which our discussion is situated. We conclude that, if the aim of revolution is to bring about justice more equally enjoyed by all, then classic Western justifications of revolution are deeply flawed and possibly untenable. We propose a Confucian-inspired account of revolution, which promises to provide criteria for engaging in revolution that are neither solely directly democratic nor completely rights-based. This relational, virtue-theoretic account of revolution enables us to take into consideration not only the role of government, the nature of the ruler, and the nature of the governed, but also the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the governed. We contend that our proposal provides more, and better, resources for thinking through when, and under what conditions, a revolution would be justified in the contemporary United States. (shrink)

Intelligence remains ill-defined. Theories of intelligence and the goal of Artificial Intelligence have been the source of much confusion both within the field and among the general public. Studies that contribute to a well-defined goal of the discipline and spread a stronger, more coherent message, to the mainstream media, policy-makers, investors, and the general public to help dispel myths about A.I. are needed. We present the preliminary results of our research survey “Defining Intelligence.” Opinions, from a cross sector of professionals, (...) to help create a unified message on the goal and definition of A.I. (shrink)

Recent events have directed public attention to the issue of whether there should be so-called “statutes of limitations” on oppressive transgressions committed in the past. We ask: in such cases, is sociopolitical forgiveness (or “forgetfulness”) owed to transgressors? We detail two moral-political narratives that might help address this issue: one constructed around the values and perspectives of justice, rights, and autonomy-based views (the JRA approach), and another oriented around the values and perspectives of care ethics, virtue ethics, and relationality, drawing (...) additionally on several non-Western traditions including Buddhist and Confucian thought (the CVR approach). We maintain that while each approach has strengths, their essential tenets lead to serious shortcomings, such that neither is able to provide a wholly satisfactory solution to this pressing sociopolitical question. The resulting stalemate should be taken as a call to action for new theorizing by social and political theorists. How should we, as a society, handle the fact that people can do oppressive things at one age and then either forget about them or sincerely regret them at another age? Is there another approach out there that might solve this problem? (shrink)

Despite increasing studies and applications of Vygotsky’s theory of learning and development, little has been written connecting Vygotsky specifically to moral education. The most comprehensive attempt at formulating such an account is given by Mark Tappan. I critically evaluate Tappan’s account before raising several problems for his approach. I then offer suggestions for resolving these issues by turning to research in socialization theory and recommending additional sociocultural artifacts that can supplement moral education.

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind (...) of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others. (shrink)