© The Author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] starting point of the book is the assessment of discrimination against Muslim immigrants in French society. The first part presents the results from several surveys that illustrate the negative opinions as well as the discriminatory practices against Muslim immigrants. The second part reviews the characteristics of Muslim immigrants that fuel the discrimination and negative opinions, mainly (...) their religious practices, their gender relations, and their poor competence with the French language.Although this kind of investigation is needed, it rests on two main ideological assumptions that severely weaken its relevance. First, why do the authors claim an investigation into Christian-heritage countries, when the focus is on France? The particularity of French laicity... (shrink)

The paper offers a running commentary on ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense Perception (composed ca. 80 BCE), with the aim to provide a clear description of Hellenistic/post-Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology. Through an analysis of the process of knowledge and of the faculties that this involves, ps-Archytas presents an original epistemological theory which, although grounded in Aristotelian and Platonic theories, results in a peculiar Pythagorean criteriology that accounts for the acquisition and production of knowledge, as well as for the specific competences of (...) each cognitive faculty. (shrink)

ExcerptIn 1929, at the height of the conciliation process between the Italian State and the Catholic Church, sealed by the Lateran Treaty, Pope Pius XI referred to Mussolini as the man “sent by providence.”1 Conversely, in 1938, right in the middle of the clash between the Holy See and the Fascist government over the racial problem, Pius XI would say: “Today there is a mutual declaration of war between the Prime Minister and us. Mussolini might even win on some battlefields, (...) but one day he will be considered just like those peoples who won a battle but lost the war.”2. (shrink)

The paper proposes the notion of “Two-Worlds Model” (TWM) as a theoretical framework in order to analyse some currents in the contemporary debate on technologically mediated experience. According to this model, technologically mediated experience—especially immersive experience—can be described as a form of “digital metempsychosis”—a feeling of being elsewhere. The paper argues that this model is not new in the history of philosophy, and that it is a very common theoretical and cultural strategy, often used to reduce medial differences—differences in the (...) way of being or of experiencing something—as objectual difference. By analysing some specific topics—the most common accounts of immersive experience, the relation between immersivity and presence, and the notion of “cyberspace”—the paper aims at showing the limits of the TWM, in particular when it is used in order to describe technologically mediated experience. (shrink)

Cet article vise à comprendre si une quelconque notion d’“intermédiaire” joue un rôle dans le système de Speusippe. Je commence en étudiant cette question vis-à-vis des objets mathématiques. Étant donné que je souscris au modèle épisodique du monde de Speusippe, je propose que la seule signification possible de μεταξύ dans son système est celle d’une simple position. En effet, dans un monde épisodique, la distinction ontologique radicale qui délimite chaque couche de réalité demande une signification de μεταξύ qui n’indique rien (...) de plus que l’emplacement d’un élément dans un classement d’êtres. Cette conclusion nous fournit cependant un candidat inhabituel pour le rôle d’“intermédiaire” : l’âme. En effet, la notion d’“intermédiaire”, si elle est prise comme un concept heuristique, nous permet de voir l’âme de Speusippe sous un jour différent. Plus précisément, étant donné que l’âme est une substance spécifique, je soutiens que son caractère intermédiaire ne repose ni dans sa composition ontologique mixte ni dans son statut d’objet ontologique intermédiaire. Au contraire, l’âme peut être considérée comme un intermédiaire dans la mesure où elle est ce qui confère aux êtres humains leurs fonctions cognitives par une interaction avec le corps. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Λ7 1072b30–1073a3, Aristotle introduces a Speusippean theory according to which ‘what is most beautiful and best is not en archēi’. Through a detailed analysis of the passage, I argue that Aristotle’s refutation of Speusippus’ thesis is favoured by the introduction of the seed example, which conflates both ontological and temporal priority. The elements gathered from the analysis of Aristotle’s polemical strategy will support a broader conclusion: Speusippus’ reason not to characterise his principle(s) as (the) good is related to (...) the problematic relationship Forms and sensibles had within Plato’s account, or, in other words, participation. (shrink)

ExcerptIn 1938, when anti-Jewish Racial Laws were passed in Italy, Pope Pius XI and Mussolini went through a long confrontation on the racial problem: for the Duce of Fascism, anything related to racial policies fell within the competence of the Italian government and had nothing to do with religion, hence the Vatican had no authority to intervene; conversely, for the Pope, racism was a dangerous heresy and, as such, had to be condemned by the Catholic Church. This confrontation was harsh (...) and would continue until the death of Pius XI in February 1939. But did the Italian Church sustain the…. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

This book offers new critical perspectives on the relationship between the notions of speculation, logic and reality in Hegel's thought as basis for his philosophical account of nature, history, spirit and human experience. The systematic functions of logic and pure thought are explored in their concrete forms and processual progression from subjective spirit to philosophy of right, society, the notion of habit, the idea of work, art, religion and science. Engaging the relation between the Logic and its realisations, this book (...) shows the internal tension that inhabits Hegel's philosophy at the intersection of logical speculation and concrete analysis. The investigation of this tension allows for a hermeneutical approach that demystifies the common view of Hegel's idealism as a form of abstract thought, while allowing for a new assessment of the importance of speculation for a concrete understanding of the world. (shrink)

Jacopo Zabarella’s Opera Logica was published in Venice in 1578. It immediately gave rise to widespread discussion and argument before becoming a highly popular work not only in Italy but also, and above all, in central and northern Europe, in particular in the «reformed» Protestant universities. This essay is the first in a research into the doctrine of logic in Paduan philosophy, which has already rise to another, already published, study. It is the author’s intention to develop the latter further, (...) but in the meantime the theme discussed here is the «genus» of logic in question. It is a fundamental theme that Zabarella was the first to tackle. He began by asserting that the «definition of the thing» was so obscure that many men of letters, philosophers and logicians had ignored it. The very reason why he proposed to study the «proximate genus » of logic, which can be ascertained by examining the various forms of knowledge. This revealed the existence of five intellectual «habits»: science, prudence, art, intellect and erudition. Analysis of the «habits» and then the «concepts» and «names» enabled him to establish that logic was neither a «science» nor an «art» and certainly could not be confused with «dialectics». Its true nature, in fact, was that of an «instrument of science». This entailed acknowledging its «independence», though one conditioned by the Aristotelian distinction between the world of necessary and immutable «things» and that of human action and endeavour. (shrink)