Five experiments investigated how people use categories to make inductions about objects whose categorisation is uncertain. Normatively, they should consider all the categories the object might be in and use a weighted combination of information from all the categories: bet-hedging. The experiments presented people with simple, artificial categories and asked them to make an induction about a new object that was most likely in one category but possibly in another. The results showed that the majority of people focused on the (...) most likely category in making inductions, although there was a group of consistently normative responders who used information from both categories (about 25% of our college population). Across experiments the overall pattern of results suggests that performance in the task is improved not by understanding the underlying principles of bet-hedging but by increasing the likelihood that multiple categories are in working memory at the time of the induction. We discuss implications for improving everyday inductions. (shrink)

As false information may spread rapidly on social media, a profound understanding of how it can be debunked is required. This study offers empirical insights into the development of rumors after they are debunked, the various user groups who are involved in the process, and their network structures. As crisis situations are highly sensitive to the spread of rumors, Twitter posts from during the 2017 G20 summit are examined. Tweets regarding five rumors that were debunked during this event were manually (...) coded into the following categories: rumor, debunking message, uncertainty about rumor, uncertainty about debunking message, and others. Our findings show that rumors which are debunked early and vehemently by official sources are the most likely to be stopped. When individuals participate in the process, they typically do so by sharing uncommented media content, as opposed to contributing user-generated content. Depending on the conditions in which a rumor arises, different network structures can be found. Since some rumors are easier for individuals to verify than others, our results have implications for the priorities of journalists and official sources. (shrink)

Redesigning humans -- Engaging with transhumanism -- Living "forever" : transhumanism and mortality -- "Unlimited" intelligence and well-being -- The role of the philosopher in transhumanism -- Transhumanism and Buddhist philosophy : two approaches to suffering -- Conclusion : Contesting and considering.

Right-ear advantage refers to the observation that when two different speech stimuli are simultaneously presented to both ears, listeners report stimuli more correctly from the right ear than the left. It is assumed to result from prominent projection along the auditory pathways to the contralateral hemisphere and the dominance of the left auditory cortex for the perception of speech elements. Our study aimed to investigate the role of attention in the right-ear advantage. We recorded magnetoencephalography data while participants listened to (...) pairs of Japanese two-syllable words. The amplitudes of the stimuli were modulated at 35 Hz in one ear and 45 Hz in the other. Such frequency-tagging allowed the selective quantification of left and right auditory cortex responses to left and right ear stimuli. Behavioral tests confirmed the right-ear advantage, with higher accuracy for stimuli presented to the right ear than to the left. The amplitude of the auditory steady-state response was larger when attending to the stimuli compared to passive listening. We detected a correlation between the attention-related increase in the amplitude of the auditory steady-state response and the laterality index of behavioral accuracy. The right-ear advantage in the free-response dichotic listening was also found in neural activities in the left auditory cortex, suggesting that it was related to the allocation of attention to both ears. (shrink)

It is the presumptive thesis of William Lyons that an examination of introspection, though more a historical than a current topic in philosophy and psychology, still has much substance for today's scholar. By introspection, he means the direct access to mental knowledge, as it has been written about over the centuries from Augustine to Descartes to the empiricists, and as it has been developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an experimental method in psychology by Wundt, James, (...) and Titchener. Lyons is chiefly concerned with whether introspection exists as a possible form of knowing, not with its applications. Since he finds all past attempts to demonstrate the valid existence of introspection unsatisfactory, he turns to contemporary philosophy and psychology to determine whether, even if they cannot justify introspection, they can shed light on why such a long-running conceptual illusion existed in the past and, in several guises, continues to exist. Here Lyons puts us on contemporary ground with descriptions of brain scanners, Turing machines, computer-program possibilities, behaviorist tactics, and Rylean moves. The first section bears the general title "The Dethronement of Introspection," while the second section, emphasizing the computer models of Daniel Dennett, is titled "The Mechanization of Introspection." But, unhappily, all the contemporary approaches are also judged unsatisfactory in justifying introspection. We are, however, given some hints that the illusion of introspection's existence must rest in our culture's folk psychology, "which has changed little over the last thousand years or more.". (shrink)