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Aleks Knoks
University of Luxembourg
  1.  34
    Defeasibility in Epistemology.Aleks Knoks - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park
    This work explores some ways in which logics for defeasible reasoning can be applied to questions in epistemology. It's naturally thought of as developing four applications: The first is concerned with simple epistemic rules, such as "If you perceives that X, then you ought to believe that X" and "If you have outstanding testimony that X, then you ought to believe that X." Anyone who thinks that such rules have a place in our accounts of epistemic normativity must explain what (...)
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  2. Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Conflicting Ideals, and Defeasible Logic.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (6):141--74.
    Thinking about misleading higher-order evidence naturally leads to a puzzle about epistemic rationality: If one’s total evidence can be radically misleading regarding itself, then two widely-accepted requirements of rationality come into conflict, suggesting that there are rational dilemmas. This paper focuses on an often misunderstood and underexplored response to this (and similar) puzzles, the so-called conflicting-ideals view. Drawing on work from defeasible logic, I propose understanding this view as a move away from the default metaepistemological position according to which rationality (...)
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  3.  23
    Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-48.
    According to conciliatory views on the significance of disagreement, it's rational for you to become less con dent in your take on an issue in case your epistemic peer's take on it is different. These views are intuitively appealing, but they also face a powerful objection: in scenarios that involve disagreements over their own correctness, conciliatory views appear to self-defeat and, thereby, issue inconsistent recommendations. This paper provides a response to this objection. Drawing on the work from defeasible logics paradigm (...)
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  4.  65
    A Curious Dialogical Logic and its Composition Problem.Sara L. Uckelman, Jesse Alama & Aleks Knoks - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1065-1100.
    Dialogue semantics for logic are two-player logic games between a Proponent who puts forward a logical formula φ as valid or true and an Opponent who disputes this. An advantage of the dialogical approach is that it is a uniform framework from which different logics can be obtained through only small variations of the basic rules. We introduce the composition problem for dialogue games as the problem of resolving, for a set S of rules for dialogue games, whether the set (...)
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  5.  23
    Conciliatory Views, Higher-Order Disagreements, and Defeasible Logic.Aleks Knoks - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).
    Conciliatory views of disagreement say, roughly, that it’s rational for you to become less confident in your take on an issue in case you find out that an epistemic peer’s take on it is the opposite. Their intuitive appeal notwithstanding, there are well-known worries about the behavior of conciliatory views in scenarios involving higher-order disagreements, which include disagreements over these views themselves and disagreements over the peer status of alleged epistemic peers. This paper does two things. First, it explains how (...)
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  6.  11
    Moral Principles: Hedged, Contributory, Mixed.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - In Deontic Logic and Normative Systems 2020/21.
    It's natural to think that the principles expressed by the statements "Promises ought to be kept" and "We ought to help those in need" are defeasible. But how are we to make sense of this defeasibility? On one proposal, moral principles have hedges or built-in unless clauses specifying the conditions under which the principle doesn't apply. On another, such principles are contributory and, thus, do not specify which actions ought to be carried out, but only what counts in favor or (...)
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