give a proof of the existence of nonlocal influences acting on correlated spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state which does not require any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM). (Except Stapp holds that the proof fails under a many-worlds interpretation of QM—a claim we analyse in 1.2.) Recently, in responding to Redhead's ([1987], pp. 90-6) criticism that the Stapp 1 proof fails under an indeterministic interpretation of QM, Stapp [1989] (henceforth Stapp 2), has revised the logical structure of his (...) proof including its crucial locality assumption. Our main aim is to show that this revision is a step in the wrong direction because it faces two difficulties which undermine the resulting proof's significance (3.1) and validity (3. 2). We also clarify and extend the Stapp 1 proof (1. 1) with the aid of Lewis' analysis of counterfactuals (1. 2) and causal dependence (2. 2 and 2. 3). In so doing, we are able to identify two new defects in the Stapp 1 proof (1. 3 and 2. 1) in addition to corroborating Redhead's criticism (2. 2). Also, the additional assumptions which save the Stapp 1 proof's validity are detailed (2. 3) and some new difficulties for the determinist are pointed out by exploiting a slightly extended version of the proof (2. 4). In providing this full analysis of the Stapp 1 proof, we also construct the necessary framework within which to provide a critique of Stapp 2's proof (3). *Portions of this paper were presented by R. K. Clifton to the 1988 British Society for the Philosophy of Science Conference at the University of Southampton. R. K. Clifton wishes to thank the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the Royal Commission for the Exhibition of 1851, and the Governing Body of Peterhouse at Cambridge University for support during this work. (shrink)

In a recent article under the above title (but without the question mark) Henry Stapp has presented arguments which lead him to conclude that under suitable conditions “the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time” must “depend on which measurement an experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time.” I suggest that this conclusion contains an essential ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression “statement referring only to phenomena confined to an (...) earlier time,” when such a statement talks about the outcome of an experiment that was not actually performed. As a result Stapp’s argumentation does not imply that future choices can affect present facts. But it does provide a wonderful and instructively different opportunity to reexamine a central point of Bohr’s famous reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. (shrink)

It is argued that the validity of the predictions of quantum theory in certain spincorrelation experiments entails a violation of Einstein's locality idea that no causal influence can act outside the forward light cone. First, two preliminary arguments suggesting such a violation are reviewed. They both depend, in intermediate stages, on the idea that the results of certain unperformed experiments are physically determinate. The second argument is entangled also with the problem of the meaning of “physical reality.” A new argument (...) having neither of these characteristics is constructed. It is based strictly on the orthodox ideas of Bohr and Heisenberg, and has no realistic elements, or other ingredients, that are alien to orthodox quantum thinking. (shrink)

The Bell 1964 theorem states that nonlocality is a necessary feature of hidden variable theories that reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. In view of the no-go theorems for non-contextual hidden variable theories already existing up to 1964, and due to Gleason and Bell, one is forced to acknowledge the contextual character of the hidden variable theory which the Bell 1964 theorem refers to. Both the mathematical and the physical justifications of this contextualism are reconsidered. Consequently, the role of (...) contextualism in recent no-hidden-variables proofs and the import of these proofs are investigated. With reference to the physical intuition underlying contextualism, the possibility is considered whether a context-dependence of individual measurement results is compatible with context-independence of the statistics of measurement results. (shrink)

We bring out the fact that the essential new quality implied by the quantum theory is nonlocality; i.e., that a system cannot be analyzed into parts whose basic properties do not depend on the state of the whole system. This is done in terms of the causal interpretation of the quantum theory, proposed by one of us (D.B.) in 2952, involving the introduction of the “quantum potential.” We show that this approach implies a new universal type of description, in which (...) the standard or canonical form is always supersystem-system-subsystem; and this leads to the radically new notion of unbroken wholeness of the entire universe. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of extending these notions to the relativity domain, and in so doing, we indicate a novel concept of time, in terms of which relativity and quantum theory may eventually be brought together. (shrink)

I show how an almost exclusive focus on the simplest case - the case of a single particle - along with the commonplace conception of the single-particle wave function as a scalar field on spacetime contributed to the perception, first brought to light by I. Bloch, that there existed a contradiction between quantum theory with instantaneous state collapses and special relativity. The incompatibility is merely apparent since treating wave-function values as hypersurface dependent avoids the contradiction. After clarifying confusions which fueled (...) the perception of a paradox, I elaborate on an analysis of the wave function due to Wayne Myrvold to show that nothing special, or ad hoc, is required in treating wave-function values, even in the single-particle case, as hypersurface-dependent; rather, the hypersurface dependence of these values is the natural development of nonlocal entanglement in the context of the relativity of simultaneity. Properly understood, what Bloch's paradox reveals is that the combination of nonlocal entanglement together with a hypersurface-dependent process of state collapse conflicts with the thesis of spatiotemporal separability and, in particular, with the idea that chances are local matters of fact. (shrink)

Limited distribution phenomena related to negation and negative polarity are usually thought of in terms of affectivity where affective is understood as negative or downward entailing. In this paper I propose an analysis of affective contexts as nonveridical and treat negative polarity as a manifestation of the more general phenomenon of sensitivity to (non)veridicality (which is, I argue, what affective dependencies boil down to). Empirical support for this analysis will be provided by a detailed examination of affective dependencies (...) in Greek, but the distribution of any will also be shown to follow from (non)veridicality. (shrink)

This chapter describes how the core principles of generative linguistics, which were outlined by Chomsky in the 1950s and 1960s, yielded a research methodology whose core features guarantee quick and fruitful syntactic research. Although generative linguistics is predominantly a syntax‐focused program, the methodology is intended for use in all linguistic subfields. The discovery that the establishment of a nonlocal dependency rests on hierarchical relations between words and phrases rather than on linear relations represents a watershed moment for generative syntax. (...) The ubiquity of gaps in natural language has prompted extensive research into the precise status of gaps and whether all gaps have the same status. The chapter also discusses the enduring discoveries made about the hierarchical syntactic structures on which nonlocal dependencies are instantiated. It focuses on so‐called gaps or empty categories, which frequently feature as members in nonlocal dependencies. (shrink)

This unique volume explores what ethics has to offer the practicing physician, nurse, and allied health care worker. The authors introduce the basic vocabulary of ethics and present and discuss the most commonly used ethical theories, using case studies to illustrate how ethics work within the context of health care. Newcomers to the field will learn what ethics is all about and how it relates to the pragmatic concerns of the health care professional. Those who already have a working knowledge (...) of the field will find a new approach to ethical theory--personalism--which the authors believe can make the practical use of ethics more effective and reliable. (shrink)

Previous research has established that people can implicitly learn chunks, which do not require a memory buffer to process. The present study explores the implicit learning of nonlocal dependencies generated by higher than finite-state grammars, specifically, Chinese tonal retrogrades and inversions , which do require buffers . People were asked to listen to and memorize artificial poetry instantiating one of the two grammars; after this training phase, people were informed of the existence of rules and asked to classify (...) new poems, while providing attributions of the basis of their judgments. People acquired unconscious structural knowledge of both tonal retrogrades and inversions. Moreover, inversions were implicitly learnt more easily than retrogrades constraining the nature of the memory buffer in computational models of implicit learning. (shrink)

Stapp’s counterfactual argument for quantum nonlocality based upon a Hardy entangled state is shown to be flawed. While he has correctly analyzed a particular framework using the method of consistent histories, there are alternative frameworks which do not support his argument. The framework dependence of quantum counterfactual arguments, with analogs in classical counterfactuals, vitiates the claim that nonlocal (superluminal) influences exist in the quantum world. Instead it shows that counterfactual arguments are of limited use for analyzing these questions.

Deutsch and Hayden have proposed an alternative formulation of quantum mechanics which is completely local. We argue that their proposal must be understood as having a form of ‘gauge freedom’ according to which mathematically distinct states are physically equivalent. Once this gauge freedom is taken into account, their formulation is no longer local.

We reconsider the nonlocal aspects of quantum mechanics with special reference to the EPR argument. We first confine our considerations to the correlations between the outcomes of measurements on spatially distant constituents, without worrying about the measurement problem. We pay particular attention to the relativistic aspects of the problem. Our first conclusion is that, when developed along the lines we follow, the EPR inference that quantum correlations and locality together imply incompleteness, is appropriate. We then investigate whether the other (...) common conclusion from the EPR argument, i.e. that standard quantum theory implies a spooky action at a distance, is correct. We emphasize the crucial role played by the locality assumption and we discuss the use of counterfactuals in the ‘relativistic’ reformulation of the EPR argument. We show that the above conclusion is false if understood as saying that standard quantum theory exhibits, at least with reference to possessed elements of physical reality, some sort of parameter dependence. Thus, in a sense, the coexistence of quantum mechanics with relativity is even more peaceful than commonly thought. We then go through a similar analysis by taking explicitly into account the measurement process. We point out the difficulties which one meets when confronting reduction mechanisms with relativistic requirements. This leads us to recognize the necessity of reconsidering the criteria for attributing objective properties to individual physical systems. Our final conclusion is that, in principle, it is perfectly possible to build up theories leading to the objectification of macroscopic properties which do not imply any spooky action at a distance. (shrink)

The connection between quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics has motivated in the past the representation of the Schrödinger quantum-wave equation in terms of “projections” onto the quantum configuration space of suitable phase-space asymptotic kinetic models. This feature has suggested the search of a possible exact super-dimensional classical dynamical system, denoted as Schrödinger CDS, which uniquely determines the time-evolution of the underlying quantum state describing a set of N like and mutually interacting quantum particles. In this paper the realization of (...) the same CDS in terms of a coupled set of Hamiltonian systems is established. These are respectively associated with a quantum-hydrodynamic CDS advancing in time the quantum fluid velocity and a further one the RD-CDS, describing the relative dynamics with respect to the quantum fluid. (shrink)

This book combines insights from philosophy and linguistics to develop a novel framework for theorizing about linguistic meaning and the role of context in interpretation. A key innovation is to introduce explicit representations of context — assignment variables — in the syntax and semantics of natural language. The proposed theory systematizes a spectrum of “shifting” phenomena in which the context relevant for interpreting certain expressions depends on features of the linguistic environment. Central applications include local and nonlocal contextual (...) class='Hi'>dependencies with quantifiers, attitude ascriptions, conditionals, questions, and relativization. The result is an innovative, philosophically informed compositional semantics compatible with the truth-conditional paradigm. (shrink)

Richard Healey argues that the Aharonov- Bohm effect demands the recognition of either nonlocal or nonseparable physics in much the way that violations of Bell's inequality do. A careful examination of the effect and the arguments, though, shows that Healey's interpretation of the Aharonov- Bohm effect depends critically on his interpretation of gauge theories, and that the analogy with violations of Bell's inequalities fails.

Richard Healey argues that the Aharonov-Bohm effect demands the recognition of either nonlocal or nonseparable physics in much the way that violations of Bell's inequality do. A careful examination of the effect and the arguments, though, shows that Healey's interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect depends critically on his interpretation of gauge theories, and that the analogy with violations of Bell's inequalities fails.

The elementary particles of relativistic quantum field theory are not simple field quanta, as has long been assumed. Rather, they supplement quantum fields, on which they depend but to which they are not reducible, as shown here with particles defined instead as a unified collection of properties that appear in both physical symmetry group representations and field propagators. This notion of particle provides consistency between the practice of particle physics and its basis in quantum field theory.

The best case for thinking that quantum mechanics is nonlocal rests on Bell's Theorem, and later results of the same kind. However, the correlations characteristic of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR)–Bell (EPRB) experiments also arise in familiar cases elsewhere in quantum mechanics (QM), where the two measurements involved are timelike rather than spacelike separated; and in which the correlations are usually assumed to have a local causal explanation, requiring no action-at-a-distance (AAD). It is interesting to ask how this is possible, in the (...) light of Bell's Theorem. We investigate this question, and present two options. Either (i) the new cases are nonlocal too, in which case AAD is more widespread in QM than has previously been appreciated (and does not depend on entanglement, as usually construed); or (ii) the means of avoiding AAD in the new cases extends in a natural way to EPRB, removing AAD in these cases too. There is a third option, viz., that the new cases are strongly disanalogous to EPRB. But this option requires an argument, so far missing, that the physical world breaks the symmetries which otherwise support the analogy. In the absence of such an argument, the orthodox combination of views—action-at-a-distance in EPRB, but local causality in its timelike analogue—is less well established than it is usually assumed to be. 1 Introduction1.1 Background1.2 Outline of the argument2 The Experiments2.1 Standard EPRB2.2 Sideways EPRB2.3 Comparing the experiments2.4 The need for beables3 The Symmetry Considerations3.1 The action symmetry3.2 Time-symmetry in SEPRB4 The Basic Trilemma4.1 An intuitive defence of Option III?5 Avoiding the Trilemma?6 The Classical Objection7 Defending Option III7.1 The free will argument7.2 Independence and consistency8 Entanglement and Epistemic Perspective. (shrink)

Observation and conceptual interpretation constitute the two major ways through which human beings engage the world. _The World Observed/The World Conceived _presents an innovative analysis of the nature and role of observation and conceptualization. While these two actions are often treated as separate, Hans Radder shows that they are inherently interconnected-that materially realized observational processes are always conceptually interpreted and that the meaning of concepts depends on the way they structure observational processes and abstract from them. He examines the role (...) of human action and conceptualization in realizing observational processes and develops a detailed theory of the relationship between observation, abstraction, and the meaning of concepts. This book provides a critical analysis of the work of various other philosophers and their accounts of scientific and ordinary-life observation and conceptualization. Radder discusses the formation and nature of concepts and demonstrates how concepts structure the phenomenal world. He then introduces and defines the notions of extensible concepts, abstraction and nonlocal meanings and explores the philosophical implications of his theory. _The World Observed/The World Conceived_ offers fresh insights in practices of observation and conceptualization, that will prove useful to many areas of scholarly study including ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, science studies, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Determinism is established in quantum mechanics by tracing the probabilities in the Born rules back to the absolute (overall) phase constants of the wave functions and recognizing these phase constants as pseudorandom numbers. The reduction process (collapse) is independent of measurement. It occurs when two wavepackets overlap in ordinary space and satisfy a certain criterion, which depends on the phase constants of both wavepackets. Reduction means contraction of the wavepackets to the place of overlap. The measurement apparatus fans out the (...) incoming wavepacket into spatially separated eigenpackets of the chosen observable. When one of these eigenpackets together with a wavepacket located in the apparatus satisfy the criterion, the reduction associates the place of contraction with an eigenvalue of the observable. The theory is nonlocal and contextual. Keywords:. (shrink)

Bogen and Woodward characterized data as embedded in the context in which they are produced (‘local’) and claims about phenomena as retaining their significance beyond that context (‘nonlocal’). This view does not fit sciences such as biology, which successfully disseminate data via packaging processes that include appropriate labels, vehicles, and human interventions. These processes enhance the evidential scope of data and ensure that claims about phenomena are understood in the same way across research communities. I conclude that the degree (...) of locality of both data and claims about phenomena varies depending on the packaging used to make them travel and on the research setting in which they are used. †To contact the author, please write to: ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society, University of Exeter, Byrne House, St. Germans Road, EX4 4PJ Exeter, United Kingdom; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The possibility of extraction across awh-island is usually assumed to be dependent on whether or not the constituent in question can undergo “long” (i.e., nonlocal) Ā-movement across the island. However, the question of how to make a principled distinction between those elements which can violate locality and those which cannot is still rather controversial. I will propose that there are no well-formed locality violations in these cases, and that the grammaticality patterns observed derive from a semantic filter on the (...) escape hatch used to bypass the island. In other words, if a phrase is extracted across awh-island, it must adjoin to the island in order to get by. This adjunction site is restricted by the interpretive component: only traces which are interpreted as variables of typee can occur in this position, while higher-order variables are not allowed. This restriction is shown to capture the known facts aboutwh-island violations, as well as some less known phenomena, such as the absence of functional (and pair-list) readings acrosswh-islands. (shrink)

Foundational attitudes towards quantum theory have recently thrown off much of the old philosophical baggage largely associated with Niels Bohr to which Einstein famously objected, including the central ‘collapse of the wavefunction’ concept. A ‘neo-Copenhagen’ interpretation, it is suggested, has arisen. This development is placed in its historical context and contrasted to philosophical allegations of anti-realism. The neo-Copenhagen interpretation remains wedded to Heisenberg's uncertainty and observer-dependent values of particles. However a discussion of Nick Herbert's ‘rainbow analogy’ suggests that subatomic particles (...) are emergent from a ‘nonlocal’ level of reality outside the domain of space and time. Critical realism recognizes that emergent systems have an irreducibly ontologically character, and in its combination of epistemological relativism and ontological realism, provides a basis for the proposition that realists who support Einstein's objections must now recognize that their realism must be redefined. (shrink)

We review several no-go theorems attributed to Gisin and Hardy, Conway and Kochen purporting the impossibility of Lorentz-invariant deterministic hidden-variable model for explaining quantum nonlocality. Those theorems claim that the only known solution to escape the conclusions is either to accept a preferred reference frame or to abandon the hidden-variable program altogether. Here we present a different alternative based on a foliation dependent framework adapted to deterministic hidden variables. We analyse the impact of such an approach on Bohmian mechanics and (...) show that retrocausation necessarily comes out without time-loop paradox. (shrink)

The validity of the conclusion to the nonlocality of quantum mechanics, accepted widely today as the only reasonable solution to the EPR and Bell issues, is questioned and criticized. Arguments are presented which remove the compelling character of this conclusion and make clear that it is not the most obvious solution. Alternative solutions are developed which are free of the contradictions related with the nonlocality conclusion. Firstly, the dependence on the adopted interpretation is shown, with the conclusion that the alleged (...) nonlocality property of the quantum formalism may have been reached on the basis of an interpretation that is unnecessarily restrictive. Secondly, by extending the conventional quantum formalism along the lines of Ludwig and Davies it is shown that the Bell problem may be related to complementarity rather than to nonlocality. Finally, the dependence on counterfactual reasoning is critically examined. It appears that locality on the quantum level may still be retained provided one accepts a newly proposed principle of nonreproducibility at the individual quantum level as an alternative of quantum nonlocality. It is concluded that the locality principle can retain its general validity, in full conformity with all experimental data. (shrink)

David Mermin suggests that my recent proof pertaining to quan tum nonlocality is undermined by an essential ambiguity pertaining to the meaning of counterfactual statements in quantum physics The ambiguity he cites arise from his imposition of a certain criterion for the meaningfulness of such counterfactual statements That criterion con ates the meaning of a counterfactual statement with the details of a proof of its validity in such a way as to make the meaning of such a statement dependent upon (...) the context in which it occurs That dependence violates the normal demand in logic that the meaning of a statement be de ned by the words in the statement itself not by the context in which the statement occurs My proof conforms to that normal requirement I describe the context independent meaning within my proof of the counterfactual statements in question.. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

Bell's theorem is believed to establish that the quantum mechanical predictions do not generally admit a causal representation compatible with Einsten's principle of separability, thereby proving incompatibility between quantum mechanics and relativity. This interpretation is contested via two convergent approaches which lead to a sharp distinction between quantum nonseparability and violation of Einstein's theory of relativity.In a first approach we explicate from the quantum mechanical formalism a concept of “reflected dependence.” Founded on this concept, we produce a causal representation of (...) the quantum mechanical probability measure involved in Bell's proof, which is clearly separable in Einstein's sense, i.e., it does not involve supraluminal velocities, and nevertheless is “nonlocal” in Bell's sense. So Bell locality and Einstein separability aredistinct qualifications, and Bell nonlocality (or Bell nonseparability) and Einstein separability arenot incompatible. It is then proved explicitly that with respect to the mentioned representation Bell's derivation does not hold. So Bell's derivation does notestablish thatany Einstein-separable representation is incompatible with quantum mechanics. This first—negative—conclusion is asyntactic fact.The characteristics of the representation and of the reasoning involved in the mentioned counterexample to the usual interpretation of Bell's theorem suggest that the representation used—notwithstanding its ability to bring forth the specified syntactic fact—isnot factually true. Factual truth and syntactic properties also have to be radically distinguished in their turn. So, in a second approach, starting from de Broglie's initial relativistic model of a microsystem, a deeper, factually acceptable representation is constructed. The analyses leading to this second representation show that quantum mechanics does indeed involve basically a certain sort of nonseparability, called here de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability. But the de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability is shown to stem directly from the relativistic character of the considerations which led Louis de Broglie to the fundamental relation p = h/λ,thereby being essentially consistent with relativity. As to Einstein separability, it appears to be a still insufficiently specified conceptof which a future, improved specification, will probably be explicitly harmonizable with the de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability.The ensemble of the conclusions obtained here brings forth a new concept of causality, a concept offolded, zigzag, reflexive causality, with respect to which the type of causality conceived of up to now appears as aparticular case of outstretched, one-way causality. The reflexive causality is found compatible with the results of Aspect's experiment, and it suggests new experiments.Considered globally, the conclusions obtained in the present work might convert the conceptual situation created by Bell's proof into a process of unification of quantum mechanics and relativity. (shrink)

Part I Introduction -/- Passion at a Distance (Don Howard) -/- Part II Philosophy, Methodology and History -/- Balancing Necessity and Fallibilism: Charles Sanders Peirce on the Status of Mathematics and its Intersection with the Inquiry into Nature (Ronald Anderson) -/- Newton’s Methodology (William Harper) -/- Whitehead’s Philosophy and Quantum Mechanics (QM): A Tribute to Abner Shimony (Shimon Malin) -/- Bohr and the Photon (John Stachel) -/- Part III Bell’s Theorem and Nonlocality A. Theory -/- Extending the Concept of an (...) “Element of Reality” to Work with Inefficient Detectors (Daniel M. Greenberger) -/- A General Proof of Nonlocality without Inequalities for Bipartite States (GianCarlo Ghirardi and Luca Marinatto) -/- On the Separability of Physical Systems (Jon P. Jarrett) -/- Bell Inequalities: Many Questions, a Few Answers (Nicolas Gisin) -/- B. Experiment -/- Do Experimental Violations of Bell Inequalities Require a Nonlocal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? II: Analysis a la Bell (Edward S. Fry, Xinmei Qu, and Marlan O. Scully) -/- The Physics of 2 = 1 + 1 (Yanhua Shih) -/- Part IV Probability, Uncertainty, and Stochastic Modifications of Quantum Mechanics -/- Interpretations of Probability in Quantum Mechanics: A Case of “Experimental Metaphysics” (Geoffrey Hellman) -/- “No Information Without Disturbance”: Quantum Limitations of Measurement (Paul Busch) -/- How Stands Collapse II (Philip Pearle) -/- Is There a Relation Between the Breakdown of the Superposition Principle and an Indeterminacy in the Structure of the Einsteinian Space-Time? (Andor Frenkel) -/- Indistinguishability or Stochastic Dependence? (D. Costantini and U. Garibaldi) -/- Part V Relativity -/- Plane Geometry in Spacetime (N. David Mermin) -/- The Transient nows (Steven F. Savitt) -/- Quantum in Gravity? (Michael Horne) -/- A Proposed Test of the Local Causality of Spacetime (Adrian Kent) -/- Quantum Gravity Computers: On the Theory of Computation with Indefinite Causal Structure (Lucien Hardy) -/- “Definability,” “Conventionality,” and Simultaneity in Einstein–Minkowski Space-Time (Howard Stein) -/- Part VI Concluding Words -/- Bistro Banter: A Dialogue with Abner Shimony and Lee Smolin -/- Unfinished Work: A Bequest (Abner Shimony) -/- Bibliography of Abner Shimony. (shrink)

We first examine Howard's analysis of the Bell factorizability condition in terms of 'separability' and 'locality' and then consider his claims that the violations of Bell's inequality by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics should be interpreted in terms of 'nonseparability' rather than 'nonlocality' and that 'nonseparability' implies the failure of spacetime as a principle of individuation for quantum-mechanical systems. We will argue that his argument for the first claim is less than compelling and that any argument for the second (...) claim will be interpretation-dependent and, hence, not generally valid. (shrink)

Why do some Chinese local governments include informal workers in their welfare systems while others exclude them? This article argues that local officials attempt to balance multiple, conflicting, top-down career-evaluation criteria by developing different inclusion mechanisms. The central mandate to build an inclusive welfare regime incentivizes local officials to embrace welfare “outsiders”. However, other top-down policy goals and the locally defined citizenship system disincentivize the full integration of outsiders. Faced with this political dilemma, local officials have strategically incorporated different types (...) of outsiders into their welfare regimes. Their strategies depend on local labor market structures—specifically, the extent to which informal workers overlap with nonlocal workers. This hypothesis is tested using an original data set derived from thirty-one Chinese provinces, covering the period between 2005 and 2015, as well as two rounds of national-level survey data. Findings suggest that recent Chinese welfare expansion has ironically consolidated, even exacerbated, regional inequality. (shrink)

In this paper we give additional arguments in favor of the point of view that the violation of Bell, CHSH and CH inequalities is not due to a mysterious non locality of nature. We concentrate on an intimate relation between a protocol of a random experiment and a probabilistic model which is used to describe it. We discuss in a simple way differences between attributive joint probability distributions and generalized joint probability distributions of outcomes from distant experiments which depend on (...) how the pairing of these outcomes is defined. We analyze in detail experimental protocols implied by local realistic and stochastic hidden variable models and show that they are incompatible with the protocols used in spin polarization correlation experiments. We discuss also the meaning of “free will”, differences between quantum and classical filters, contextuality of Kolmogorov models, contextuality of quantum theory and show how this contextuality has to be taken into account in probabilistic models trying to explain in an intuitive way the predictions of QT. The long range imperfect correlations between the clicks of distant detectors can be explained by partially preserved correlations between the signals created by a source. These correlations can only be preserved if the clicks are produced in a local and deterministic way depending on intrinsic parameters describing signals and measuring devices in the moment of the measurement. If an act of a measurement was irreducibly random they would be destroyed. It seems to indicate that QT may be in fact emerging from some underlying more detailed theory of physical phenomena. If this was a case then there is a chance to find in time series of experimental data some fine structures not predicted by QT. This would be a major discovery because it would not only prove that QT does not provide a complete description of individual physical systems but it would prove that it is not predictably complete. (shrink)

In relativistic classical and quantum mechanics with Poincaré-invariant parameter, particle worldlines are traced out by the evolution of spacetime events. The formulation of a covariant canonical framework for the evolving events leads to a dynamical theory in which mass conservation is demoted from a priori constraint to the status of conserved Noether current for a certain class of interactions. In pre-Maxwell electrodynamics—the local gauge theory associated with this framework —events induce five local off-shell fields, which mediate interactions between instantaneous events, (...) not between the worldlines which represent entire particle histories. The fifth field, required to compensate for dependence of gauge transformations on the evolution parameter, enables the exchange of mass between particles and fields. In the equilibrium limit, these pre-Maxwell fields are pushed onto the zero-mass shell, but during interactions there is no mechanism regulating the mass that photons may acquire, even when event trajectories evolve far into the spacelike region. This feature of the off-shell formalism requires the application of some ad hoc mechanism for controlling the photon mass in two opposite physical domains: the low energy motion of a charged event in classical Coulomb scattering, and the renormalization of off-shell quantum electrodynamics. In this paper, we discuss a nonlocal, higher derivative correction to the photon kinetic term, which provides regulation of the photon mass in a manner which preserves the gauge invariance and Poincaré covariance of the original theory. We demonstrate that the inclusion of this term is equivalent to an earlier solution to the classical Coulomb problem, and that the resulting quantum field theory is renormalized. (shrink)

We discuss the possible breakdown of Lorentz invariance—at distances greater than the Planck length—from both the theoretical and the phenomenological point of view. The theoretical tool to deal with such a problem is provided by a “deformation” of the Minkowski metric, with parameters dependent on the energy of the physical system considered. Such a deformed metric realizes, for any interaction, the “solidarity principle” between interactions and spacetime geometry (usually assumed for gravitation), according to which the peculiar features of every interaction (...) determine—locally—its own spacetinie structure. The generalized theory of relativity, based on the locally deformed Minkowski spacetime, is called “deformed special relativity” (DSR). In the first part of the paper, we give the foundations and the basic laws of DSR. In the second part, we analyze some experimental data, which admit an interpretation in terms of the DSR formalism and are, therefore, candidates for displaying a breakdown of the Lorentz symmetry. They are (i) the superluminal propagation of evanescent electromagnetic waves in waveguides, (ii) the meanlife of the KS 0, (iii) the Bose-Einstein correlation in pion production and (iv) the comparison of clock rates in the gravitational field of Earth. Such analysis provides us with the explicit forms of the related deformed metrics as functions of the energy, thus putting in evidence, in all four cases (and therefore for all four fundamental interactions), departures from the usual Minkowski metric. This preliminary evidence for a broken Lorentz invariance may be regarded as the signature of possible nonlocal effects involved in the processes examined. Moreover, the corresponding deformed metrics obtained by our analysis provide an effective dynamical description of the interactions (at least in the energy range considered). (shrink)

A previous model for treating electromagnetic nonlinear wave systems is examined in the context of wave mechanics. It is shown that nonlinear wave mechanics implies harmonic generation of new quasiparticle wave functions, which are absent in linear systems. The phenomenon is interpreted in terms of pair (and higher order ensembles) coherence of the interacting particles. The implications are far-reaching, and the present approach might contribute toward a common basis for diverse physical phenomena involving nonlinearity. An intimate relationship connecting coherence, (...) class='Hi'>nonlocal interaction, and nonlinearity has been previously noticed in the physics of superconductivity. It is shown here that all these ingredients are consistently contained in the present formalism. The present theory may contribute to elucidate a controversial theory proposed by Panarella, who claims to have measured high-energy photons due to high-intensity laser radiation, which cannot be predicted on the basis of linear quantum theory. Panarella explains the new phenomena by stipulating a nonlinear intensity-dependent photon energy. It is argued here that nonlinearity, manifested in the presence of high intensity, may give rise to high- and low-energy photons, the so-called “effective” and “tired” photons, respectively. However, the present explanation does not involve ad hoc assumptions regarding the foundations of quantum theory. In analogy with the electrodynamic model, the present theory leads to particulate self-focusing in high-density streams of particles. Since such particulate beams are currently under consideration in connection with fusion reactions, this might be of future interest. (shrink)

The question is discussed whether the description of the gravitational Doppler effect as a simple energy effect is consistent with its general-relativistic description as a metric-time effect. The difference between a local description and a global one is stressed. In the local description one is permitted to ignore metric effects. The global description yields a position-dependent rate of proper time in a gravitational field, and the energy, or the frequency, of a “freely falling” photon is described as a constant of (...) motion. An experiment of nonlocal character measuring, simultaneously, the gravitational Doppler effect and the position-dependent rate of proper time may be performed by the use of a geostationary satellite. A simple general-relativistic treatment of the satellite experiment is obtained by transforming the Schwarzschild metric to a rotating frame, and describing the motion of free particles and the rates of standard clocks in the resulting metric. (shrink)

This dissertation reconsiders some traditional issues in the foundations of quantum mechanics in the context of relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT); and it considers some novel foundational issues that arise first in the context of RQFT. The first part of the dissertation considers quantum nonlocality in RQFT. Here I show that the generic state of RQFT displays Bell correlations relative to measurements performed in any pair of spacelike separated regions, no matter how distant. I also show that local systems in (...) RQFT are "open" to influence from their environment, in the sense that it is generally impossible to perform local operations that would remove the entanglement between a local system and any other spacelike separated system. The second part of the dissertation argues that RQFT does not support a particle ontology -- at least if particles are understood to be localizable objects. In particular, while RQFT permits us to describe situations in which a determinate number of particles are present, it does not permit us to speak of the location of any individual particle, nor of the number of particles in any particular region of space. Nonetheless, the absence of localizable particles in RQFT does not threaten the integrity of our commonsense concept of a localized object. Indeed, RQFT itself predicts that descriptions in terms of localized objects can be quite accurate on the macroscopic level. The third part of the dissertation examines the so-called observer-dependence of the particle concept in RQFT -- that is, whether there are any particles present must be relativized to an observer's state of motion. Now, it is not uncommon for modern physical theories to subsume observer-dependent descriptions under a more general observer-independent description of some underlying state of affairs. However, I show that the conflicting accounts concerning the particle content of the field cannot be reconciled in this way. In fact, I argue that these conflicting accounts should be thought of as "complementary" in the same sense that position and momentum descriptions are complementary in elementary quantum mechanics. (shrink)