Il est question dans cet article de l’évolution de l’idée de «nation» en France au cours du XVIIIe siècle. Beaucoup d’historiens pensent qu’on peut identifier les débuts de la conscience nationale française déjà au sein de la population de la France médiévale, alors que pour la plupart des sociologues la nation n’est qu’une construction intelectuelle créée par les intelligentsias européennes pendant les XVIIIe et XIXe siècles. Les protagonists de la Révolution prétendirent d’agir au nom de la Nation Française en tant (...) qu’une communauté ethnique, linguistique et culturelle. Cette conception moderne de la nation, quand et comment fût-elle née en? (shrink)

This paper sets out to examine political thinking in post-totalitarian Slovakia. Using the discourse theory and signification of Laclau and Mouffe, it considers the sign národ (a specific conception of the Slovak nation) in relation to democracy and the EU. Seeking to pinpoint political thinking amongst the general populace, it bases its analysis on an examination of newspaper articles on “Building the State” published in the 1990s. It traces the roots of the sign from the 1960s to the present (...) day and predicts that the EU signifier will impact on the content of the floating signifier of národ. (shrink)

The narod and the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia and the narod. Is this really an issue, a theoretical question for us who perceive and are conscious of ourselves as Russians? It is a horrible pain, reducing our soul to ashes; it is the sin, the cross, and the redemption of Russia. It is always very difficult to discuss such a topic, since inevitably a sense arises of how incommensurate the unparalleled tragedy of our historical path is with our vain, unending chatter (...) about it. I am more and more often tormented by the thought that we Russians always for some reason have found ourselves below the destiny determined for us from on high, that we were and will continue to be unworthy of our own history among the ranks of the world's destinies. Why it is so, is the judgment of Him Who knows the Purpose, but it is our path, and we must traverse it to the end. (shrink)

First we should define the concepts ‘narod’ and ‘intelligentsia.’ Usually the concepts ‘narod’ and ‘populace’ [naselenie] are equated, and indeed the etymology of the word ‘narod’ assumes the inclusion of all those who are born [narodivshiesia]. But this equating of narod with populace is not fully valid since it disregards the fact that a narod is not simply the aggregate of all people but a determinate whole, united not only by a common language and territory but also by a common (...) consciousness, an idea. In determining the meaning of the concept ‘narod,’ not only must it be distinguished from the concept ‘populace’ but the two must be contrasted to a certain extent. (shrink)

Gertrude Himmelfarb aims at a comprehensive analysis of the condition of American society, in respect of its dominating culture, as possible. She attempts to find the causes of this condition, to describe and explain its basic symptoms and to discover the current trends, as well as to appraise their meaning and significance. The author’s book is firmly set in the American realities. This does not mean, however, that its messages may only be of interest to Americans or Americanists. The conflict (...) between the conservative and liberal world outlooks is at present highly vital, in its various hues and on various planes, to all the societies of the ‘West’, including Poland. It for this reason that the theses articulated by Himmelfarb undoubtedly deserve profound reflection. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu jest symbolika krzyża i miecza, wyznaczająca dzieje chrześcijaństwa. Jan Dobraczyński w powieściowej biografii apostoła Pawła wskazuje, że pierwotnym symbolem żydowskiego mesjasza miał być miecz, który wyzwoli naród wybrany spod władzy cesarstwa rzymskiego. Jezus tę ideę zmienił w ideę pokoju i miłości, której zwieńczeniem była jego zbawcza śmierć za grzeszników; w ten sposób miecz został zastąpiony krzyżem. Z tego powodu chrześcijaństwo można uznać za religię krzyża,a nie miecza, w której dobrowolna ofiara zastępuje przemoc; odkąd jednak stało się ono oficjalną (...) religią cesarstwa, było wykorzystywane jako ideowe usprawiedliwienie prześladowania wyznawców kultów pogańskich. W ten sposób nie tylko wróciło do miecza, lecz wprost zastąpiło krzyż mieczem, a nawet uświęciło krzyż jako miecz. Symbolicznym potwierdzeniem takiej interpretacji dziejów chrześcijaństwa jest końcowa scena powieści Dobraczyńskiego Święty miecz, w której apostoł – chrzcząc rzymskiego żołnierza – zamiast krzyża daje mu do pocałowania miecz. (shrink)

To, co może interesować, w dramatopisarstwie Stanisława Wyspiańskiego „historyka-socjologa” zajmującego się ideami politycznymi dotyczącymi kwestii kondycji i perspektyw narodu w drodze ku niepodległości oraz narodu, dla którego nowoczesność jest warunkiem koniecznym żywotności w ramach ekumeny europejskiej, zawrzeć można w pięciu tezach. Są to tezy odzwierciedlające krytycyzm dotyczący „tego, co polityczne” i wskazujące na skłonność do pesymizmu antropologicznego. Teza pierwsza: Kompetencje merytoryczne i kwalifikacje moralne polskich elit politycznych stanowią problem społeczny, który obecny jest w dziejach państwa polskiego z dawien dawna. Próby (...) rozwiązania tego problemu nie powiodły się. Tym gorzej, że nie powiodły się w czasie, gdy naród polski znalazł się w sytuacji powinności „wybicia się na niepodległość”. Teza druga: U ludzi, którzy wchodzą w skład elity politycznej/kandydują do elity politycznej w narodzie polskim, silna skłonność do prywaty łączy się z silną skłonność do megalomanii. Często i gęsto wydzieranie swej „działki” z tego „postawu sukna”, jakim jest Polska, łączy się z autoreklamą umiejętności męża stanu i ofiarności sługi ludu. Teza trzecia: Dobór do elity politycznej i zmiany w jej składzie nie przebiegają wedle reguł, w których na miejscu pierwszym stawia się interesy i aspiracje narodu. Praktyki świadczą o posługiwaniu się nieodpowiednimi standardami i kryteriami. Teza czwarta: Amatorszczyzna socjotechniczna i powszechność posługiwania się demagogią, w połączeniu z brakiem myślenia strategicznego w mentalności i behawiorze ludzi polskiej elity politycznej, przynoszą niebywałe szkody staraniom o polską racje stanu. Teza piąta: Narodu polskiego nie można nazwać wspólnotą polityczną kierowaną przez odpowiednią/właściwą elitę. Jest to naród którego nauczycielami są liczni szarlatani, demagodzy, kombinatorzy polityczni – naród, który jest źle kierowany przez osobników, którzy nie nadają się do odgrywanych ról i naród, który nie potrafi zbuntować się i pro domo sua wyłonić z siebie elity alternatywnej, skutecznie dbałej o tożsamość i żywotność narodu jako wspólnoty politycznej w ramach ekumeny europejskiej. […]. (shrink)

One of the dominant tendencies in the history of mankind throughout the entire course of its development has been the struggle between two opposing principles-democracy and tyranny. The very concepts, born in antiquity, reflected the clash and constant rivalry of two principles in the organization of the political order of the states of antiquity. In the narrow sense democracy was understood to mean a form of the state based on the recognition that the people [narod] are the source and at (...) the same time the bearers of power, which they realize by implementing their civil rights and freedoms. Tyranny was taken to mean a form of state power that was established through force and based on one-person rule. An important peculiarity of the genesis of tyranny is the circumstance that it arose in a transitional period in the struggle of the people against the ancestral nobility and found support in the people for a struggle against the aristocratic opposition. Scholars see the social purpose of the power of tyrants in the implementation of reforms aimed at improving the situation of the demos, developing a new social hierarchy, and forming a strong state. The authors of antiquity-Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius-who drew a clear distinction between democracy and tyranny, nonetheless saw the possibility of one form of rule turning into the other. They therefore considered both these forms of rule imperfect or even as the worst of all possible forms, and instead they saw the ideal to lie in a mixed form of government that theoretically eliminates the flaws of each of the extreme or pure forms. (shrink)

Rad se bavi pojmom Drugog/bliznjeg/brata u pravoslavnom hriscanstvu i u raznim aktuelnim kontekstima kao sto su odnos medju ljudima, medjureligijski dijalog i dijalog o proslosti na prostoru bivse Jugoslavije, sa naglaskom na postkonfliktni period. U osnovi rada je analiza neprihvatanja Drugog i drugacijeg, straha i mrznje prema drugom, sto se ne zadrzava samo na coveku kao pojedincu, vec se reflektuje i na citav narod. Razmatra se i dijalog kao neizbezan cinilac odnosa sa Drugim, suzivota i pomirenja na prostoru bivse Jugoslavije. (...) Postavlja se pitanje moguceg doprinosa pravoslavlja mirnom suzivotu i ocuvanju mira medju narodima na pomenutom prostoru danas. (shrink)

Autorka u clanku rekonstruise kompleksnu sliku Franca Suberta koju je stvorio Teodor Adorno u nekoliko osvrta na ovog kompozitora, a najvise u clanku?Subert? iz 1928. Adorno je te, 1928. godine doziveo Suberta kao tragicnog kompozitora cija muzika obitava u oblasti htonskih bogova, a da ipak otkriva radost?putujuceg naroda, opsenara i cudotvoraca?. Ipak, nije objasnio kako ova radost moze da prezivi u paklenim pejsazima Subertove htonske muzike. Tek kasnije Adorno je bio spreman da u Subertu prepozna, zahvaljujuci njegovom?habitusu?, i kafanskog sviraca, (...) ne pominjuci vise?putujuci narod, opsenare i cudotvorce?. Te dve predstave Suberta-Subert kao osluskivac htonskih bogova i Subert kao kafanski svirac-pokazale su se kao zanimljiv par vredan dalje teorijske elaboracije koju Adorno, nazalost, nikada nije sproveo. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 177019: Identiteti srpske muzike u svetskom kulturnom kontekstu. (shrink)

This study contributes to the definition of populism as a significant current of thought in modern China through a focus on the development of the populist ideas of Liang Shuming . It provides an avenue to understanding a major thinker and social activist of modern China. At the same time, through a comparison with Russian Narodism, it develops populism as a general sociohistorical concept, denoting a constellation of ideas which emerges in a specific historical environment and includes a concern with (...) rural society and a critique of the modern West in the context of questions of the moral nature of progress. ;The dissertation describes the origins and development of Liang's ideas, presenting them against the background of major intellectual tendencies of the times. After an early urban, Westernizing focus, Liang arrived at a populist approach relatively late. A persisting habit of thought, involving a metaphor of mind, informed his early concerns, his attention to the ambiguities of progress and to the appeals of socialism, and his later foci on a critique of the West, an historical approach, and a particular concept of the psyche. The events of the 1920's provided the context in which Liang was able to reconcile his disparate concerns and develop a mature populist theory in which the villages provided a practical intersection of individual subjectivity and history. ;In the evolution of his ideas, Liang Shuming shared with other Chinese, Zhang Taiyan, Zhang Shizhao, Li Dazhao, and Mao Zedong, affinities which help define populism as a broad current of thought still important in China. A critique of the West and desire to skip over capitalism on the way to the future have more weight in Chinese populism than does a focus on rural society. In the absence of a specifically populist political movement, the historical importance of Chinese populism has derived from its interpenetration with Marxist ideas. One potential of the legacy of Chinese populism is to provide a self-conscious orientation toward the future from the perspective of a critique of both the Western present and the Chinese past. (shrink)

The paper enters contemporary discourse concerning the examination of history of Russian philosophy, which initiates a new reading of the Russian thinkers’ works. These contemporary examinations problematize the phenomenon of so called intellectual doubles as well. The contribution proceeds from the definition of these issues which was published in journal Problems of Philosophy by M. A. Maslin in 2013. In this work, Maslin mentions A. I. Herzen among the examples of intellectual doubles phenomenon, who is one of the founders of (...) the Russian Narodism. Following from this basis, the contribution shifts an attention toward issues of intellectual doubles in the context of the Russian Narodism. The work represents an endeavour to deepen the existing problematization of this phenomenon on the basis of examination the N. K. Mikhailovsky’s creative legacy. There can be found two faces in works of this Narodnik thinker. The first one can be figuratively designed as a Petersburgian and the second one as a Yaltian. These designations are borrowed from the notes of Sergey Elpatevsky, who had been Mikhailovsky’s friend. The two faces express the specificity of the problem of doubleness in Mikhailovsky and his qualitative shift in relation to contemporary examinations of the reflected phenomenon. (shrink)

Krizu moderne kao krizu politickog, autor vidi, pre svega kao krizu "mere" kriterija politickog odlucivanja i delovanja. Ta kriza se u prvom redu shvata kao kriza samosaznanja i prakse obicajnosti. Ovaj problem prvi je pokusao je da resi Makijaveli uvodeci pojam virtus, koji je postao temeljni princip moderne politicke filozofije. Medjutim, mnogi moderni i savremeni tumaci Makijavelijevog ucenja cesto zanemaruju socijalni i politicki konteksta u kojem je nastalo politicko ucenje Firentinskog mislioca. Naime, Makijavelijevo nastojanje da pronadje autenticnu formu politickog cina (...) kojim bi bila omogucena harmonizacija i stabilizacija tadasnjih dramaticnih politickih prilika koje su vladale u italijanskim gradovima, zahtevala je pouzdanu dijagnozu i adekvatna sredstva za uspesnu terapiju obolelog organizma zajednice. Epohalni novum u Makijavelijevoj politickoj teoriji predstavlja prelazak sa anticke teoretizacije vrline na njenu modernu operacionalizaciju. Medjutim, ova promena cesto se tumaci kao radikalno suprotstavljanje grckog pojma arete i rimske virtus, koja se grubo svodi samo na srcanosot i snagu koje su neophodne za osvajanje i ocuvanje politicke vlasti. Vazan deo puta u svojoj filozofiji politike Hegel - vise nesvesno nego svesno - ide s Makijavelijem i Selingom - posebno kad je u pitanju shvatanje neophodnosti snage i srcanosti u procesu operacionalizacije duha slobode u istoriji posredstvom "negacije" kao "moci zla". Posredovanje subjektivnosti i supstancijaliteta zbiva se, po Hegelu, u drzavi surovim krocenjem svetskog duha u kojem on zrtvuje ne samo pojedinca, vec i citave narode - prema slobodi, odnosno njenom ostvarenju u obicajnosnoj zajednici. "Nevolja vremena" posledica je razdvajanja ja i sveta (Entzweiung), i proistice iz redukovanog politickog uma koji za politicko delovanje i odlucivanje nema kriterijuma obicajnosnog totaliteta. Ovaj se um rutinizira razdvajanjem obicajnosti koja redukuje politicko delanje na ogoljenu tehniku osvajanja i zadrzavanja politicke moci. Autor na kraju razmatra krizu politickog odlucivanja i ukazuje u cemu je njen globalni i supstancijalni smisao za povesnu stvarnost na kraju XX veka. (shrink)

Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, the history of Russia has been a succession of astonishing flights and falls. The sacrifices made by the Russian narod on the altar of development are so great, and the achievements so incommensurate with the efforts expended, that a number of questions must arise: Why do things happen this way? Why does Russia not develop "normally"? And what is "normal" development? Is it possible for Russia, and under what conditions? What are the causes (...) of the oddities in Russian development? (shrink)

Aspiracija za jedinstvenim upravljanjem svetom je stara koliko i sam svet. Ona u suštini proizlazi iz naše percepcije sveta kao jednog, bez obzira na sve razlike koje se u njemu takođe vide. U naše vreme ova percepcija je pojačana utiskom o sve većoj međuzavisnosti delova sveta, kao i osećajem da su razlike, ma koliko bile velike, sve manje važne u odnosu na ono što je isto ili bar slično u različitim delovima sveta. Ovaj osećaj jedinstva je još više pojačan percepcijom (...) potrebe, ili nužde, da se o važnim stvarima u svetu odlučuje i upravlja na jedinstven način, bez kolizija koje bi proces odlučivanja učinile neefikasnim ili nemogućim. Ali jedinstvo sveta bi trebalo da u sebi sadrži ideju ravnopravnosti, i neke načelne jednakosti. Međutim, uvidom u način na koji se ovaj proces unifikacije sveta stvarno odvija vidimo mnoge probleme. Neki od njih su za očekivati – problemi reprezentacije i pristanka na svetsku vlast koja bi bila odraz jedinstvene zakonodavne volje čovečanstva. Takva volja možda uopšte ne može da se konstituiše. Umesto nje imamo volju za hegemonijom koju prati ideja nejednakosti i manihejske podele sveta na naš i tuđi deo, kao i razne vrste pokušaja ukidanja onog uslova koji svakom zakonodavstvu daje njegov legitimet – a to je sloboda. Suočavamo se sa idejom da je, kao uslov mira i demokratije (šta god da to znači, ili što će značiti u bližoj i daljoj budućnosti) potrebno uspostaviti krutu nejednakost i rigidnu kontrolu svih različitosti u jednom zamrznutom stanju podele na povlašćene i obezvlašćene, na „dobre“ i „loše“ momke, kao da se svet sastoji od „momaka“. Ključni deo ove sheme je pretpostavka o univerzalnoj samerljivosti svega što život čini vrednim. Ta pretpostavka uniformiše i simplifikuje, smanjuje, svet, negirajući relevanciju i stvarnost razlikama koji sada predstavljaju stvarnost sveta. Zakoni više ne pretpostavljaju postojanje zakonodavne volje. U toj situaciji proizvodnja ogromne količine iluzorne sreće više liči na podmićivanje svetskog lumpenproletarijata, sa rizikom da celokupno čovečanstvo postane totalno ravnodušno prema svakoj posebnosti i svakoj vrlini, sasvim primereno svojoj novoj lumpenproleterskoj prirodi. (shrink)

v. 1. Religija Njegoša. Besede pod gorom -- v. 2. Reči o svečoveku. Indijska pisma. Iznad istoka i zapada. Srednji sistem. Niče i Dostojevski. Šekspir--svečovek -- v. 3. Homilogija. Simboli i signali. Rat i biblija. Carev zavet. Vasionik. Rahabilitacija tela. U harmoniji sa beskrajnim. Pravoslavna crkva u uzročost u svetu -- v 4. Omilije -- v. 5. Omilije -- v. 6. Nove besede pod gorom. Iznad greha i smrti. Oče Naš. Rajska piramida. Ljubostinjski stoslov. Misli o dobru i zlu -- (...) v. 7. Tesdul. Kroz tamnički prozor -- v 8. Misionarska pisma -- v. 9. Srpski narod kao Teodul. Divan. Emanuel. Kasijana. Zemlja nedođija -- v. 10. Molitve na jezeru. Pesme molitvene. Molitve. Žetve Gospodnje. Ledini čovekoljubac -- v. 11. Vladika Nikolaj u službi Bogu i rodu. Život svetog Save. Članci, besede i poslanice. Sveri srbi. Blažena Stojna -- v. 12. Kosovo i vidovdan. Dobrovoljci. Mudra igumanija Ljubostinjska. O srpskom patriotizmu. O znamenitim ličstima. Konkordatska borba 1937. godine -- v. 13. Ustanak robova. Srbija u svetlosti i mraku. O istoriji. Duhovni preporod Evrope. O Evropi. Agonija crkve. O zapadnom hrišćanstvu -- v. 14. Biblijske teme. Jevanđelske teme. Egzegeza. O vrlinama. Eseji -- v. 15. Bogomoljački pokret. Duhovne pouke. O ekologiji -- v. 16. Besede -- v. 17. Knjiga o Isusu Hristu. Vera obrazovanih ljudi. Vera svetih. Prvi zakon božji. Molitva gospodnja. Misli o dobru i zlu -- v. 18. knj. 1. Ohridski prolog -- v. 19. knj. 2. Ohridski prolog -- v. 20. knj. 3. Ohridski prolog. (shrink)

The article investigates the philosophical views of the Ukrainian scholar S. Rudnytsky, who justifies the Ukrainians’ right to establish their own national state on the basis of his analysis of historical development, geopolitical situation of Ukraine, and the idea of natural right of the nation to have its own state.

t. 1. Optimistichna teoriia za nashiia narod. -t. 2. Bit i dushevnost na nashiia narod.

Razmatrajuci mesijansku ideju u novovekovnom judaizmu, autor se usredsredjuje na sabatajski pokret. On ispituje drustveno-istorijske i psiholoske razloge koji su omogucili masovno prihvatanje Sabataja Cvija za mesiju, kao i ostajanje vernim tom uverenju cak i kada je on izneverio velika ocekivanja, neocekivano presavsi u islamsku veru. Mladi rabin Natan iz Gaze, oslanjajuci se na Lurijinu kabalu, ne samo sto je ubedio jevrejski narod u to da je Sabataj Cvi dugo ocekivani mesija nego je i ponudio teorijsko opravdanje njegove navodno prividne (...) izdaje. Opravdanje sablaznjivog ponasanja Sabataja Cvija, koji je bio manijakalno-depresivna osoba, vodilo je kod ekstremnih sabatajaca do uverenja o svetosti greha, cime je mesijanska ideja u novovekovnom judaizmu izoblicena do krajnje grotesknosti. (shrink)

https://ojs.zrc-sazu.si/filozofski-vestnik/article/view/4533.