The article reveals the peculiarities of the functioning of the canonical structures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in the USSR during the era of the collapse of the totalitarian system - 1970-1980.

The Russian Orthodox Church, the biggest centralized religious institution in the post-Soviet space, has been going through major changes in the 2000s. These are connected to qualitative changes in the composition of believers and clergy as well as legal registration of rights on church property obtained from the government in the 1990s. This has led to substantial changes in internal policies, particularly a sharp decrease in the influence of fundamentalists, which had been rising over the previous (...) decade. Moreover, the years of Putin's rule were years of failure in the church's relations with the government, which consistently denied the ROC's most important requests. In this paper we will examine the principal social developments that have been taking place within the Church in the first years of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Besides other changes that have taken place in the Russian Federation in our times, the process of constitution of an ideology, which is accompanied by different competing value-systems, is one of the crucial tendencies. This process also occurs in the area of the development and construction of religious institutions and religious consciousness. Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church has had a dominant position among the other religious institutions in the country. Unfortunately, it has not and does not (...) serve the role of promoting a democratic change, but is rather an “echo” of the authoritarian and totalitarian past of the Russian history. In my paper I will analyze different factors that contribute to these characteristics of the Orthodox Church, and their influence on the political culture of Russia. (shrink)

This article assesses the role of an important Russian public institution, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), in shaping the religious discourse on bioethics in Russia. An important step in this process was the approval of ‘The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church’ (2000), one chapter of which is devoted to bioethics. However, certain inadequacies in the creation of this document resulted in the absence of a clear position of (...) the Russian Orthodox Church on some end-of-life issues, reproductive technologies, embryo stem cells, and other topics.Using the example of reproductive dilemmas, the author researches how the ROC clarifies its teaching on issues relating to bioethics. In the 2010s the ROC introduced a new method of taking into account the views of believers and the articulation of the church’s position. This article examines the extensive public discussion of a new document, ‘Ethical issues Associated with In Vitro Fertilization’. (shrink)

The study of the cultural activity of the Spiritual missions of the Russian Orthodox Church in various regions of Russia is one of the urgent tasks in the context of the problematic field of the theory of regionalism, cultural studies and socio-philosophical knowledge. Russian settlements on the territory of the Yenisei River basin and the entry of ethnic groups and territories of Yakutia and Buryatia into the Russian Empire has become one of the most (...) important stages of the integration of the ethnic groups of Siberia into a single statehood. The Irkutsk Spiritual Mission received a more perfect organization, institutionalized by increasing the number of missionary camps, which for successful Christian activities carried out among pagans allowed the formation of school educational institutions for the education and upbringing of a new Buryat generation of children in the doctrinal Orthodox canons, and Russian cultural traditions. In this regard, one of the key tasks of the missionaries was to establish a rational view of further life in new Christian-type formations, which was realized in socio-cultural activities: providing medical care to sick representatives of other ethnic groups, a friendly attitude to people of a different faith and a sincere desire to guide them on the path of righteousness, etc. It should be noted that the largest share of foreigners in this territory belonged to Buddhists, which was reflected in the influence of lamas on doctrinal issues, including economic ones. Since Buddhism in the Russian Empire belonged to the section of tolerant religions, direct (administrative) pressure on it was impossible. There remained funds of an exclusively spiritual nature, to which Orthodox missionary work was directed. Today in the Russian Federation, Buddhism, as well as Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, as well as some other faiths belong to the category of traditional religions, which organizationally operate within the framework of the modern Russian Constitution. (shrink)

Religion has an essential effect on the development of any society since it impacts religious norms and models of behaviour, establishes priorities and values, influences gender relations, predetermines gender roles, and influences the establishing of certain traditions, laws, and customs. This article is a review of the historic position of the Russian Orthodox Church – the dominant religion in Russia – its past and current status in Russia, and the issues relating to women in (...) class='Hi'>Russian socio-cultural and religious community. While there is a lack of research on the Russian Orthodox Church and its influence on Russians and, particularly, Russian women, the increased religiosity in Russia within the last decade requires us to study the Russian Orthodoxy and its impact on people’s lives and its attitude to gender. This article provides a deep analysis of the impact of the Russian Orthodox Church on the image of women in Russia. It has been argued that Russian national character and heritage was formed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the existing gender stereotypes in Russia have been significantly impacted by the Russian Orthodox Church and have mainly been derived from the interpretation of the New Testament by the Russian Orthodoxy and its clergy. Particularly, gender roles and the perception of family, and marriage are understood to be in compliance with the values of the Russian Orthodox faith. For the faith the most important purpose of marriage is the birth and raising of children and the chief responsibility and duty of a woman is to care for her husband and children as these are considered as a way of the woman’s service to society and to God. (shrink)

This article uses the personal diaries and memoirs of Archpriest Sergius (Sergei) Bulgakov to examine the circumstances of his expulsion from Bolshevik-occupied Crimea in late 1922. At the time, he was rector of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Yalta. The expulsion of Fr. Sergius was part of a large-scale operation to expel the humanist intelligentsia, who did not fit within the ideological contours of the new government. We will examine the political aspects of the condemnations of Fr. Sergius’s doctrine of (...) Sophia, the theological development of which he began in exile. We will also examine aspects of Fr. Sergius’s attitude to monarchy and his belief in the “white tsar,” noting that Bulgakov’s position as an émigré could hardly be characterized as monarchical. Sophiology may be the political equivalent of ecclesiastical democracy, of faith in the ecclesiastical people and the Christian community, which was alien to the conservative monarchism of Orthodox believers abroad, centered in Serbia’s Sremski Karlovci. We will examine the circumstances of the church’s condemnation of Fr. Sergius, which took place against the context of canonical uncertainty, and we will touch upon some aspects of the contemporary reception of Sophiology in Russia in a political context (V. Bibikhin, O. Kirichenko). (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the mission and education of the Korean Orthodox Church in the process of migration and settlement of Koreans in the Primorsky Krai from the 1860s to the 1910s and to discuss the historical background and sociocultural significance of it. This study summarizes the history of Korean maritime migrants in chronological order in the late 19th century. In this study, Russian, Russian-Korean bilingual and Korean translation used by the (...) class='Hi'>Russian Orthodox Church were discussed. At the time of the 19th century, the Russian Orthodox Church was the ideological background of the ruling Russian emigration. The Russian orthodox education that Koreans received was the first Western-style education acceptance of Koreans. The Orthodox Church conducted missions and education for Koreans through Russian language education, Korean-Russian bilingual education, and Korean-speaking Korean missions. Koreans accepted sophistication for survival and adjustment in Russia, or spiritual influence, and expressed enthusiasm for education. Russian Orthodox was bilingual, reflecting the dialect used by Koreans in Russia, and standard Korean of Seoul area. Although the educational environment was poor and the political situation was always changing rapidly, the role of the Orthodox Church was great in that it provided opportunities for Koreans to play an active role in the Primorsky Krai by finding out the talents of Koreans through education and by knowing their potentials themselves. (shrink)

It has been said that the Second World War saved the Russian Orthodox Church from extermination. Ever since the Revolution of 1917, the religious peoples of Russia were constantly persecuted by Soviet ideologists and politicians. Prior to Operation Barbarossa, in 1941, it seemed that the days of the Russian Orthodox Church, the largest religious institution in the Soviet Union, were numbered. However, the unique climate of the Second World War forced the Soviet government (...) to end its war against the church. The Kremlin soon saw the Church as a useful tool to help aid in the re- occupation of Eastern Europe. (shrink)

The main milestones, means, methods and consequences of the practice of «cleansing rituals» faithful Uniate diocese of Chelm during the 1830's - mid 1870's. As an important part of government measures to its incorporation into the Russian Orthodox Church.

The trial of Galileo remains a representative example of the alleged incompatibility between science and religion as well as a suggestive case study of the relationship between them from the Western historical and methodological perspective. However, the Eastern Christian view has not been explored to a significant extent. In this article, the author considers relevant aspects of the reception of the teaching of Copernicus and Galileo in Russian culture, especially in the works of scientists. Whereas in prerevolutionary Russia (...) Galileo was considered a symbol of the unity of science and religion, in the Soviet period his name and especially his trial was largely used for atheistic propaganda purposes. The author discusses the most recent debate in the Russian Orthodox milieu. The second part is dedicated to the presence of Galileo in Russian religious philosophy, especially in the thought of Gregory Skovoroda, Ivan Kireyevsky, and Sergey Glagolev. Finally, the relation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the teaching of Galileo is considered. (shrink)

One of the interesting aspects of Russian self‐definition in opposition to the West is its attitude toward Western science. Russian distrust of scientific and technological progress in the West is an important force shaping contemporary Russian identity. This article touches on these issues in four parts. The first section characterizes two main conservative circles that are active in today's disputes over the significance of scientific development for Russian identity. The second demonstrates certain Russian contemporary concerns (...) related to scientific and technological progress, which will enable us to explain the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. The third section presents the political, religious, and identity context for the suspicion toward science expressed by Russian conservatives. The final section, on the other hand, discusses the way in which Russian Orthodox neoconservatism uses Orthodox anthropology to raise suspicion toward scientific and technological achievements. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are different. (...) Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

In a span of twenty years, two of the autocephalous churches of the Orthodox Christian world released documents addressing the social realities of contemporary life: the Russian Orthodox Church's Basis of the Social Concept (2000) and the Ecumenical Patriarch's For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church (2020). This article offers a side-by-side comparison and analysis of the documents’ treatments of matters of birth and death, including childbirth, abortion, (...) miscarriage, end-of-life care, euthanasia, suicide, and a vision of a good death. Detailed comparison demonstrates remarkable accord between the two churches on many of these matters. Differences of omission and emphasis appear to be indicative of contrasting demographic and historical situations, with the exception of one, notable divergence between the churches, all of which are discussed. The striking degree and depth of consonance between the documents offers potential for cooperation and unity as the two churches negotiate their conflicts while also seeking to guide their flocks and offer Orthodox Christian witness in an increasingly desacralized world. (shrink)

The views on in vitro fertilization within Russian Orthodox Christian society are diverse. One reason for that variation is the ambiguity found in “The Basis of the Social Concept,” the document issued in 2000 by the Russian Orthodox Church and considered to be the primary guidelines for determining the Church’s stance on bioethics. This essay explores how the treatment of infertility reconciles with the Orthodox Christian faith and what methods of medical assistance for (...) infertility may be appropriate for Orthodox Christians. The focus here is on IVF because it is among the most widely used methods to overcome childlessness, and the permissibility of IVF is the object of disagreement among Orthodox. The article defines criteria that can help to discern what is absolutely wrong and must be avoided from what only falls short of the mark, but not very far, for Orthodox Christians. If treatment of the underlying causes of infertility has failed or promises no hope and a husband and a wife do not feel able to carry the Cross of infertility, then from pastoral dispensation they might be blessed to use ethically acceptable variants of IVF. IVF has many variants that are different in their spiritual influence on a person. Orthodox Christians pursuing IVF should seek spiritual guidance and a blessing to pursue IVF. They must not form more embryos than will be transferred in the same cycle. Freezing, discarding, or reduction of embryos is forbidden. Infertile couples ought to use only their reproductive cells. The use of donor gametes is unacceptable. Any embryo formed ought to be transferred into the wife’s womb, and the use of surrogates is impermissible. Only a husband and wife who are able to maintain their marital union and where the wife is still of childbearing age should be blessed to use IVF. (shrink)

Eastern Churches in Russia and Ukraine are facing the fratricidal war caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These Churches maintain closeness in faith and liturgy. The similarities of these Churches’ teachings on war are juxtaposed with actual manifestations of their hierarchs’ hostility. The analysis will be carried out from the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church, which is in close unity with the Eastern Churches and understands the context of faith but is not a party to the (...) conflict, which makes it easier to remain objective in examining the phenomenon of fratricide. The first part of the article analyses the doctrinal and historical context. It helps to isolate the factors influencing the existence of enmity between doctrinally close Churches. The second part presents the biblical inspiration of Cain and Abel's story in a search for new ways to counteract this phenomenon. (shrink)

Fake news is created as ordinary news stylistically but it consists of deliberate disinformation or hoaxes. The text is generally constructed to cause negative emotions and feelings in readers: fear, panic, distrust, and paranoia. It is done to manipulate the opinion and consciousness of a large number of people and eventually leads to changes in the values, ideas and attitudes that already exist in the public awareness. The result is a schism that has already gone beyond the usual spiritual strife. (...) Moreover, its expansion has weakened the defining feature of Russian Orthodoxy which lies in trust and support of the state and authorities. The Russian Orthodox Church has to deal not only with public health crisis but also with profound differences within its ranks over the churchgoers’ behavior in the conditions of a pandemic. The article analyzes legal regulations and mechanisms for countering fake news about the Russian Orthodox Church, and provides examples from the judicial practice. It also determines the mechanisms of the worshippers’ reaction to the fake news involving the Russian Orthodox Church. Using semiotic methodology, the author reveals re-encoding of the symbolic meaning of such signs as “Russian Orthodox cross” and “red cross”. The connotative meaning of these signs leads to contradictions in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

The sources of religious tolerance but also of religious nationalism in post-soviet Russia can be found basically in the group identification of nationality and religion. In crisis situations, the historical religion of the Russian society - Orthodoxy - becomes the criterion for identifying the national identity. However, despite the fact that the majority of Russians in our times consider themselves Orthodox, many of them are not believers. The observable effect of the “external belief” results in the fact (...) that the religion tends to become a matter of personal choice and an individual value. It assumes a nationalistic function and to become an ideology. As a result, the political elite considers religion as a means of achieving different non- religious purposes. The Russian Orthodox Church, the official church, is compelled to take this fact into consider- ation and even support it. This is why religious intolerance and religious nationalism in modern Russia are often directed towards religion. (shrink)

One of the most interesting phenomena of our religious-political life is the considerable difference in attitude toward religion between the popular masses and the political elite. In our survey of public opinion, the respondents had to express their attitude to two alternative statements: "There are national, traditional religions in our country. They should have more rights than representatives of religions that are new to our country "; and "All religions should have absolutely equal rights." Only 9 percent agreed with the (...) first statement, while the vast majority agreed with the second. Even among the Orthodox, adherents of the Moscow patriarchy, only 13 percent were supporters of special patronage by the state for the traditional religions, while those who advocated an equality of religion made up 69 percent. Thus, the idea of a state church is alien to the contemporary popular consciousness. The evolution of mass consciousness is toward an even greater amorphousness and indefiniteness with regard to religion and further away from the idea of a national, state church. The data confirming this have already been presented. Let me just recall that the percentage of persons who approved of the church's participation in political life decreased from 74 percent to 48 percent from 1990 to 1991. (shrink)

The article is updated by several circumstances, which the authors reflect on. In their opinion, there are 1) obvious and external threats — violations of freedom of conscience in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, which arose as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and 2) internally hidden and potential dangers for freedom of religions of Ukrainian citizens. The well-known examples of discrimination of believers of certain faiths in the so-called DPR-LPR and Crimea given by the authors are (...) constantly updated. Relevant monitoring and analytical reports are prepared by both Ukrainian and international experts. They submitted these reports to international human rights organizations, including the rights for Freedom of Religion and Belief. Despite such convincing documented materials, separate accusations have recently appeared against Ukraine, which allegedly violates freedom of religion in the territory under its control. Some are trying to prove that Ukraine, taking advantage of the war situation and referring to the spiritual dangers for Ukraine from those religious organizations whose centers are in the aggressor country, threatens some churches, thereby violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience, which guarantee for all citizens, regardless of from their religious affiliation, freedom of religion. The authors refute these narratives lashed out by Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. Such negative conclusions, which express concern about the situation in Ukraine regarding freedom of conscience and religion, influence on the world public, experts on issues of freedom of conscience, religious organizations, spoil the image of Ukraine as a country with high level of freedom of conscience even among European countries. Religious freedom, as the authors conclude, needs protection today, but they call for separating real threats from imaginary ones and clearly defining who persecutes, whom he/she persecutes and where persecutes. Ukraine is consistent in its intentions to protect the rights of people and communities, to protect the freedoms of believers and their organizations. (shrink)

The article is devoted to philosophical anthropology in the works of Russian religious thinkers of the 20 th century during their period of emigration. The author conducts a comparative analysis of the main approaches to understanding human nature and its image in the philosophy of Russia abroad. The article identifies a common direction in the development of anthropological concepts, despite individual differences in the views of Russian religious philosophers. The review and analysis begin with the personalism of (...) N.A. Berdyaev, who considered the problem of man to be central to philosophy. In his work The Fate of Man in the Modern World, Berdyaev offered a personal understanding of the new epoch of the 20 th century and proposed his own project of Christian anthropology. His intellectual ally, B.P. Vysheslavtsev, in the book The Ethics of Transfigured Eros, developed an interpretation of anthropological ideas based on an original understanding of the conscious and unconscious in man. Vysheslavtsev extended his ethical framework by introducing the concept of self-knowledge, which he considers the essence of a creative personality. The article further examines the book Reality and Man by S.L. Frank, which provides a comprehensive view of this philosopher’s anthropological beliefs. The foundation for Frank’s anthropology is the idea of personal being, which has been substantiated and developed in Christian thought. L.P. Karsavin developed anthropology from the perspective of the philosophy of all-unity, understanding individual personality as dependent on higher (“symphonic”) personalities. He fully incorporated the doctrine of personality into the metaphysics of all-unity, in which the Trinity serves as the main principle in the development of the entire created world. The last section of the article delves into an analysis of anthropological ideas as presented in the works of V.V. Zenkovsky. In his work Principles of Orthodox Anthropology, Zenkovsky built his argument on the image of God found in human consciousness and justified an anthropological ideal grounded in church doctrine and Orthodox theology. According to the author of the article, all the considered thinkers of Russia abroad recognized the significance of philosophical anthropology and the need for its further substantiation in the context of the Christian worldview. (shrink)

Since the late 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church and several mainline Western Protestant churches have been at odds over homosexuality to such an extent that it has turned into a church-dividing issue. This article aims to find new openings for the ecumenical dialogue by examining how the ROC’s negative attitude toward same-sex relations has been influenced by cultural and historic factors. The analysis focuses on the affective dimension of the ROC’s discourse on homosexuality in important social (...) documents and public speeches. The methodology applied is taken from affect studies. The rhetoric of the ecclesial texts recalls ‘shadows from the gulag’ and frightening memories of the chaos of the 1990s, and functions to create an imagined national, moral and religious community – the ‘Russian Christian civilization’ – which is characterized by masculine heterosexuality. Religious concepts tend to become subordinate to the affective politics of the discourse. In conclusion, the author proposes that ecumenical partners continue with a profound theological discussion on human sexuality in all its diversity and complexity, and clarify to each other how understandings of basic theological notions such as human dignity and freedom have also been shaped by formative historic experiences. Furthermore, ecclesiological debates should address, at a fundamental level, the relationship between Christian community and the freedom ‘to be different.’. (shrink)

Svitlana Shkil’s article «Reception of meeting Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis in the information space of the Russian Orthodox Church» examined reaction to a meeting of religious leaders in Havana speakers of the three trends in Russian Orthodoxy - conservatives, fundamentalists, liberals. This unprecedented event caused a wide resonance in the Russian information space of the church, caused a broad discussion on the future of Russian Orthodoxy.

The sequence and escalation of Russian–Ukrainian political and military conflicts since 2014, culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, have reopened interest in and debates on just war theory and practice in general and specifically in historic and modern Eastern Orthodox cultures and Orthodox-majority states. These debates have significant repercussions in areas like church–state and church–military relations in these cultures; ecclesial involvement in these conflicts has varied from war-justification rhetoric (in the case (...) of the Russian Orthodox Church) to reiterations of the inherited traditions of ecclesial pacifism/condemnation of all violence (the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, a number of Orthodox Churches, clerical and theological networks, etc.). The Russian ecclesial involvements in the justification of war/military necessity and formulation of just war narratives have triggered divisions and antagonisms in the Eastern Orthodoxy. The development and course of the ecclesial conflicts involving Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches and parishes (and other Orthodox ecclesiastic bodies) will show whether Orthodox religious actors may begin to play a more significant role in the articulation and application of newly emerging trends in areas like the theology of just peace, just peace-making and Christian realism, Orthodox social ethics and the dynamic praxis of just peace-making. (shrink)

This article presents the understanding of Eurasianism as an expression of Russia’s essence in the works of N.S. Trubetskoi, P.P. Suvchinskii, P.N. Savitskii, and L.P. Karsavin. We use the cognitive category “historical collective individuality” for a more complete and deeper understanding of Eurasianism as a set of views and approaches, as well as a certain specialized social community of its representatives. The use of this category allows us to reveal Eurasianism as an area of ideas expressing the essence of (...) Russia. N.S. Trubetskoi considers Russian-Turanian unity to be just such an expression of that essence; for P.N. Savitskii, it is the circle of “European and Asiatic/Asian cultures”; for P.P. Suvchinskii, Russia’s great testament is the unification of the people and the intelligentsia under the “all-resolving dome of the Orthodox Church”; and for L.P. Karsavin, Russia’s essence consists in its development as a Eurasian subject or a collective person. In addition, the category of historical collective individuality allows us to reveal Eurasianism as a “gold reserve of life” for Eurasians in exile. Thus, the unity of metaphysics and life sought in Russian philosophy is achieved. We draw conclusions about the historicity of the Eurasianist collective individuality. (shrink)

In the 16th century, Moscow proclaimed itself to be the the third Rome and discovered the special way or Russian Orthodox Messianism doctrine. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of Russia's unique global historical role went beyond exclusively church discussions, and the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome acquired an important place in the structure of imperial ideology. Even after a break with the past, after the 1917 October Revolution, the country did not abandon the (...) idea of Messianism, which organically fitted into the structure of Soviet ideology. At the same time, reanimation of messianic moods was carried out here in the format of the doctrine of the World Republic of Soviets and/or World Revolution. Of course, some backbone elements of old Messianism underwent a significant transformation, which can hardly be called secularization. The purpose of this article is to show that the time 1917 mid-1930s may be described with the help of a peculiar dialectic, as the unity of a radical break with the past and the specifically manifested continuity with it. Subsequently, despite large-scale changes, the idea of the peculiarity of the Russian way, firstly in Soviet and then in Russian society, including the specific perception of its past, continued to remain an influential political brand. This kind of discourse should be considered highly archaic today; however, it does not become an attribute of the distant past, retaining the attractiveness and even acquiring state ideology. (shrink)

This in-depth case study examines the Russian Orthodox Church's influence on federal-level policy in the Russian Federation since the fall of communism. By far more comprehensive than competing works, The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics is based on interviews, close readings of documents--including official state and ecclesiastical publications--and survey work conducted by the author.

Orthodox ethic is inconsistent with liberal values and the spirit of capitalism. This incompatibility sets limits on the rates of economic growth in Orthodox countries and determines their backlog from the most developed Protestant and Catholic countries at the present stage. In this paper is examined the hypothesis of the decisive role of geography and some random events in the adoption of Orthodox Russia and the formation of specific characteristics of Russian mentality, in particular, the (...) messianic spirit. The adoption of Orthodoxy by Rus is viewed in accordance with concept of Akhiezer and his co-authors as a partial borrowing of foreign culture for further development of its own culture. From this point of view such borrowing was not sufficient. Unlike Germanic tribes Rus did not succeed in adoption enough to start a new period of cultural self-development. The Baptizing was a large-scale intentional action for modernization of Rus life-style through intensifying with a help of cultural borrowing. But this potential was not enough for genesis of innovations that required for further intensive development. Thus the Baptizing can be viewed as a step on the way of extensive development. In the future Russia would use same practice of adopting ‘modern, more advanced cultural resources and reproducing on their basis the same extensive paradigm‘ (Akhiezer A., Kliamkin I, Yakovenko I. History of Russia. The End or New Beginning? M., 2005). The Baptizing can be considered not only as some kind of start for Russian history but also as a choice of development pattern. This pattern would persist even in 20th century in the period when Christianity and Orthodox church would be discarded. (shrink)

The polemical literature of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, comprehensively covering the issue of unification, had already outlined most of the important issues surrounding the transition of part of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy to the union with Rome. However, their resolution raises a lot of controversy and ambiguous estimates of this controversial event. Therefore, actualization of this problem in modern science is a natural phenomenon. Today, as V. Shevchenko rightly points out, “the passionate relevance of the unified (...) issue has already acquired the importance of historical urgency”. In addition, the role of the two most influential dioceses of the Kyiv Metropolitanate, Lviv and Peremyshka, which actually defined the fate of both Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Greek Catholicism, has not yet been properly considered and objectively assessed in these processes. (shrink)

This article examines specific celebration rituals of two groups of Russian émigrés during the period of the mid-1950s to early 1960s. The groups, comprised of former officers of the Russian imperial army and of graduates of schools for noble girls, often situated their festivities within a Russian Orthodox Church building located at Madison Avenue and 121st Street in Manhattan. The celebrations, spatially enclosed and separated from the outside world within this structure,suggest their privileged and (...) exclusive nature. The staging and performance of the celebration, while acknowledging displacement and exile, re-inscribed the spatial enclosure with the Russian past through the reenactment of Russian cultural traditions and social hierarchies, thereby validating the lives and identities of the celebrants. (shrink)

"As Eastern Europe struggles to emerge from its communist past, the public moral witness of its Orthodox Churches has assumed a special importance for those seeking a truly just world order. Yet few Americans know what these vast and ancient Christian bodies stand for, especially on crucial issues of freedom, human rights, and war and peace. In this compelling look at the Orthodox Churches in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and the United States, Alexander F. C. Webster mines the (...) primary sources to reveal a story of both betrayal of the Church and fidelity to its moral tradition. He reflects on what is needed for these churches to become forceful and consistent voices of moral witness in society."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

The Byzantine influence was at the very origins of the formation of various philosophic ideas in the medieval Russia. A major factor responsible for this influence was the Orthodox Church. Thus, it was owing to Byzantium that the foundations of Russian philosophy were laid and all its subsequent developments cannot be properly understood without considering the Byzantine influence.

The article defines the nature of the Russian war against Ukraine in the context of social and state transformations of the 20th — 21st centuries. It is emphasized that this is a war of different worlds, mentalities, worldviews, ways of life, values, etc., which has been going on for many centuries in various forms (direct and mediated, open and veiled, hot and cold). The role of the religious-legal factor in the Russian war against Ukraine at various stages of (...) Ukrainian state formation (periods of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Soviet, modern) is revealed. It is emphasized that it was during the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic that the legal basis for the organization of the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, confessional differentiation and the establishment of freedom of conscience and interconfessional tolerance in Ukrainian society was created. Emphasized attention is paid to the fact that in the Soviet period, the Russian war against Ukraine continued in a new, veiled, hidden, invisible (at first glance) form with the active use of the religious factor. The results of this period have been determined, namely: rampant militant/ scientific atheism, radical extermination, Russification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, etc. Special attention is paid to the Soviet secular/political religion (Marxism-Leninism) as a key basis for the implementation of an aggressive policy regarding the historical memory and cultural identity of the Ukrainian people and a manipulative tool for the destruction of Ukrainian history, culture, worldview, nation, state and law in the information, hybrid, total, full-scale and other Russia’s wars against Ukraine. The article substantiates that improved legislation with an effective legal mechanism for its implementation, a strong civil society with developed institutions, including the institution of religion (church), adequate guarantees of religious rights and freedoms are important factors in ensuring state, national, religious security and victory of Ukraine (at the current stage) in the war waged against it by the Russian Federation. (shrink)

The paper looks into the phenomenon of criticism of the Russian World concept in contemporary Ukrainian religious, political and social discourses. It is shown that the propagandistic ideological narrative model, developed according to numerous historical analogs, is becoming a subject of critical analysis by specialists in many scientific areas. Experts' views coincide in many respects but there are also different stances on some disputable issues. The historical aspiration of Russia for domination and substantiation of its unique nature is (...) considered the root of the concept. This explains the use of such narrative constructs as "Moscow is the third Rome", "specific civilization" etc. Based on evidence of competent authorities, the author proves that the concept was most likely developed by a group of leading Russian ideologists in the late 20th century. It acquired the modern conservative and nationalist form only after it had become an object of interest of Russian clerical circles and started spreading through church resources. The symbolic figure in this respect is the current Moscow Patriarch Kyrylo who has been an active promoter of the Russian World concept from the early 21st century. After he had been voted into the Patriarch office, Kyrylo turned the Russian World into the leading church and political narrative. The wide use of the concept for political purposes was consistently criticized for undisguised militarism, aggressive and nationalistic ideas underpinning the Russian World. According to numerous experts, these ideas have no common root with Christianity, sometimes being in open contradiction with the latter. Critical studies also indicate that the basis of the Russian World is the belief that the Russian culture and language are culturally superior to historical achievements of numerous other peoples, including the Ukrainians. As historical experience shows, the use of such ideological concepts as the Russian World results in consolidation of society around one national idea and expansion of aggressive state policy to neighboring countries. (shrink)

The article explores the semantic potential of social narratives associated with the creation and constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which caused a interpretations conflict, marked by conflicting interpretations and differences in meanings that are applied in different contexts. The narrative arranges events in a certain time sequence, accumulates and translates meanings, individual and social experience. The presence of meanings in the interpretation of the narrative depends on the perspective, interpretation horizons and the subject's ability to analyze (...) information and its correct application. The social narrative accumulates a set of stories and messages that are fragmentary and disordered, constructs a coherent plot aimed at finding and defining meanings, and forming social discourse. Social narratives materialized in social structures, orientations, expectations, and stereotypes of their bearers due to everyday modification in the form of simple images, attitudes, and principles. Since each social narrative claims to be exclusive and correct in its own way of understanding events, a clash of narratives and their interpretations is inevitable. A large-scale event determines the modification of social structures, standards, and evaluation criteria, is accompanied by the transformation of everyday life, reveals deep mental layers, and opens up new perspectives. The extraordinary event that was marked by the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is accompanied by diametrically opposite assessments from the clergy, believers, politicians, experts – from the statement about autocephaly as the only opportunity to achieve unity and recognition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy to the political subtext justification of the new religious organization creation. Church circles represented by representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate claim that the state interferes in the internal Affairs of the Church. The Constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine takes place in the context of the confrontation of two social narratives – the «ukrainian world» and the «russian world». The social narrative «ukrainian world» is based on values rooted in the national soil, but the social narrative «russian world» denies the existence of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. Under the patronage of the Russian Orthodox Church, the expression of the ideas of the «russian world» is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which enshrines in the minds of believers ideologies about «the common origin of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples», «the common baptismal font», «the unity of the historical space of Holy Rus», «the identity of the East Slavic Orthodox civilization». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not support the decision of patriarch Bartholomew to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Metropolitan Onufriy did not give his blessing to the hierarchs to participate in the Unification Council, which is called «a non-canonical assembly of schismatic groups». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, according to its primate, has de facto autocephaly, so it is the only canonical local Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In the face of the conflict of public narratives, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, along with meeting the spiritual needs of believers, contributes to the formation of national identity, the formation of a worldview matrix that will determine the vision of the future development of the country. (shrink)

: Undoubtedly, in the formation of history, relations between religious structures and political powers, which are shaped within certain principles, have an important place. The course of these relations determines the strength and domain of both sides. This form of relationship, in some cases, evolves in favor of political power, and sometimes manifests itself as a political direction of religious interests. It is possible to see politics as a direction of religion or to use it in the direction of its (...) own interests in the politics that the Soviet Union has implemented since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, which has embraced the ideology of official atheism and struggled against religious beliefs, did not stop using religion/church for conjuration in its own interests. In this context, The Soviet leader Stalin has almost reconstructed the Russian Orthodox Church, which he had been trying to destroy since the early years of the Second World War. Even, Moscow has made serious attempts to make Patriarchate the pioneer of the Orthodox world. In this article, we aim to emphasize Stalin’s church politics and reasons. We will also stress the reasons behind the Council of the Orthodox Churches, which Stalin sought to achieve through the Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Finally, we will touch on the policy of the Fener Greek Patriarch against these developments. Summary: Throughout history, politics of states have been under the influence of religion. Likewise, religions have directed political authority in the direction of their own interests. Sometimes a religion takes the state under its influence; sometimes under a state takes a religion under the influence and they try to use the other one in the interests of itself. Concepts that define religion-state relations have emerged under the influence of experiences experienced over time. Secularism is at the head of the concepts that determine religion-state relations today. What secularism is and how it is practiced is much debated in the scientific circles. Despite all these struggles, however, no binding definition has been reached for all political issues. Certainly, the subjective structure of states plays an important role in regulating religion-state relations. The political ideology adopted by this political structure and the world view varies. Sometimes political structures with official atheist ideology can break the principle of secularism. While these ideologies are ungodly in their nature, they benefit from political interests. As an example, it is possible to show the Soviet Union with an atheist ideology. Because the Soviet regime used religion in the direction of political interests between 1943-1948. The Russian Orthodox Church, which was very active and competent during the reign of Tsarist Russia, lost its power with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet regime has made the Russian Orthodox Church an illegal institution. The struggle against the church by the regime continued until the Second World War. With the Second World War, Stalin's church politics changed. There is no doubt that this political change has become more than one reason. The first is that the state has entered into a war. Stalin did not want to continue the struggle with religion while the war was going on. Another reason for pushing Stalin for a policy change towards the Church is the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the Germans. As a matter of fact, the Germans defined themselves as the savior of the Russian people. It was also alleged that Germany was waging a war against the Soviets in order to free Russian people from communism. Even brochures were taken from the airplanes in this frame. The Germans aimed to break the resistance of the Russian people with this method. Stalin acted to ward off this propaganda of the Germans. Stalin therefore had to keep an eye on church politics and stopped the oppression against the church. In this framework, opportunities were provided for the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, have been approved to organize rites in churches. The priests are encouraged to strengthen hand the people. Also closed churches have been reopened by Stalin. In this way the German propaganda has been wasted. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union. Stalin, however, continued to use the church after the war was over. So why did Stalin continue to support the church as an atheist? What were the reasons for pushing Stalin into this policy? Stalin's post-war church policy has multiple causes. The most important of these is spreading the Soviet influence over the entire Balkans and Middle East geography through the Russian Orthodox Church. Undoubtedly this is related to the long-term policies of the Soviets. Because the war has changed all the balances in the world. This has given new opportunities to the Soviets. At the beginning of these, the Orthodox world comes to the Soviet influence. It seems that the steps towards this have been started to be started from 1945. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church found important activities. For example, the Moscow Patriarch has established relations with other Orthodox Churches. Jerusalem, Athens, Cyprus, Antakya churches were visited. In the end, an attempt was made to collect the Orthodox Council. The struggle of the Western and Eastern bloc emerged after the Second World War divided the Orthodox world into two camps. In this process, the Greek, Cyprus and Jerusalem Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener Patriarchate were under American influence. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate were under Soviet influence. For these reasons, the Soviet regime, which has been fighting for the Church since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, has given up its position. It is understood from this historical fact that a regime adopting irreligion as an official ideology uses religion in its own interests as needed. This indicates that secularism is relative. This study will try to show how the Soviet Union uses the Russian Orthodox Church in its own interests despite the atheism ideology. (shrink)

The article is devoted to almost unknown monastery of the Russian Orthodox Church, a Holy Trinity Zosimo-Savvatievskaya Novo-Solovetskaya Krasnokholmskaya poustinia that was one of the important pilgrimage places of the royal family in the 17th century. Despite the fact that the monastery was founded in the reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, it is an important link in the historical and cultural development of our Fatherland, primarily because the extant architectural monuments of outstanding artistic qualities. That is why (...) the architectural ensemble of the monastery occupies a prominent place in the history of Russian culture. In addition, Novo-Solovetskaya poustinia is an important historical object providing data on the development of Russian spiritual and artistic culture of the late seventeenth century. The question of cultural-historical and social roles that Orthodox monasteries played in the history of Russia is still not sufficiently studied is. The modern development of the Russian state cannot be complete without the restoration of the positive legacy that has been lost in our culture and morality. In this regard, the study of development and formation of the Orthodox monastic culture may fill this gap. Historical development of the Zosimo-Savvatievskaya Novo-Solovetskaya Krasnokholmskaya poustinia, its architecture can contribute to the restoration of our historical memory, which is an important factor in the revival of our national identity. The author of the article also tells about the history of monastery in tough years of godless power and about the people, who died for their faith and who are called now the new martyrs. (shrink)

Many Slavists will be familiar with Pål Kolstø as a scholar of nation-building and ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet space. Heretical Orthodoxy represents a return to his early, doctoral research...

The article considers the features contemporary transformations narratives official Russian Orthodoxy in the years 2015-2016. At the end of 2015 and in 2016 narrative "Russian world" Patriarch and his entourage tried to upgrade using the ideal of "solidarity." The ideas of "solidarity" in the XX century evolved differently in Catholic social teaching and fascism. Spokesman of the Russian Orthodox Church sees the embodiment of the ideals of solidarity in the best manifestations of Soviet mentality. "Solidarism" (...) in the rhetoric of the Patriarch and his entourage are a means of legitimizing Russian nationalism and revanchism. According to the Patriarch of core values and "Russian world" is "faith, state, justice, solidarity and dignity." These values must be an alternative to liberal values - freedom, rights, human rights. According to Patriarch values should determine the policy, and especially value the unity of the Russian people and state. This means that the patriarch claim to symbolic power over the politicians of Russia and neighboring countries. Іn rhetoric of patriarch the West, with its core value of freedom, embodies evil. Russia tempted by Western values, and this is the cause of many crises. The role of savior in this narrative belongs to the church and its leadership. Present rated as the culmination of the struggle between good and evil. The future victory of good patriarch linked not only to preserve the unity and uniqueness of Russia, but the triumph of traditionalism in Europe, the adoption of the values of solidarity society. (shrink)

Many Slavists will be familiar with Pål Kolstø as a scholar of nation-building and ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet space. Heretical Orthodoxy represents a return to his early, doctoral research...

This article analyzes Orthodox influence on developing national identity in modern Ukraine. The authors state that the factor of national specificity of Christianity is evident if we consider nations, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, Christianity influences the development of national cultures and has acquired the national characteristics of a particular community. Also, the war in Ukraine, which was started by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, has significantly impacted socio-cultural processes in Ukraine, the functioning (...) of national identity, and the religious situation, especially regarding the Orthodox churches. Authors pay attention to the reference to the topic of national identity in the documents and sermons of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to show how the Orthodox hierarchies treat these issues. In addition, they study the ideologies that the Russian Orthodox Church creates and tries to impose through the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church churches of the Moscow Patriarchate as a dominant cultural, religious, and political discourse. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia (...) may seem unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia (...) may seem unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears. (shrink)

The problem of religious tolerance is of supreme importance in the contemporary world. Just as, a few centuries ago, many wars were provoked by religious motifs, so today clashes on religious grounds provoke military conflicts that have long overgrown the walls of churches and mosques and keep growing in spite of the sacred traditions of the religions themselves. Orientation to love fails to work, and the ìneighborî becomes an enemy if he does not confess the same religion. Where shall we (...) search for the reason behind religious hostility? What is the history of intolerance? Who was the first to throw the stone that shook the foundations of peaceful coexistence of particular families and whole states? We propose to turn to the following themes: 1. World religions and relations between them (on the question of Christian- Judeo-Islamic dialogue) 2. Relations inside world religions (on the example of Christian confessions) 3. Interrelations between world religions and new religious movements. (shrink)

What is happening now in Ukraine is, in essence, the further implementation of the Stalinist plan to deprive Ukrainians of their historical memory, the continuation of the "Stalinist-Bolshevik" ethnocide. Not surprisingly, monuments began to appear in us as "the leader of the peoples", and the holiday of the Victory Day became a public holiday "the triumph of Stalin's ideas" and the Communist Party ideology "united and indivisible". Instead, dates such as the Day of Unity of Ukraine, the Day of Remembrance (...) of the Victims of Holodomor and political repressions are, to put it mildly, unpopular to the authorities. (shrink)