1. Fol au Christ universel. (F68-7177)--2. Vision cosmique el christique. (F68-7177).

Il est communément porté au crédit de saint Thomas d’Aquin d’avoir renouvelé et enrichi la compréhension de la personne grâce à la notion jusqu’alors inédite de « relation subsistante ». Le présent article se propose de replacer cette découverte dans sa perspective propre, celle d’un théologien chrétien qui, sans prétendre épuiser conceptuellement un mystère reçu dans la foi, s’efforce néanmoins de rendre raison de la distinction réelle des personnes divines au sein de l’indivise Trinité. On examine d’abord comment saint Thomas (...) a su reprendre, éclairer et nouer par intégrations successives chacun des éléments de la célèbre définition de la personne léguée par Boèce. On est alors en mesure de suivre pas à pas la démarche d’analogie, aussi rigoureuse qu’audacieuse, qui permit à l’Aquinate de discerner, dans cette ratio commune et si humaine de la personne, l’éclat incomparable d’un nom divin. Mais, si l’on désire approcher de plus près le distinctif propre de la personne en Dieu, il n’est d’autre voie que de pénétrer dans la révélation trinitaire qui oblige et qui seule autorise à transcender la frontière du relatif et de l’absolu pour penser enfin, avec Thomas, la « relation comme subsistante », prérogative unique et bienheureux secret de la tripersonnalité divine.Thomas Aquinas is often given credit for having renewed and enriched the concept of personhood, thanks to the previously unheard of notion of « subsisting relation ». This paper proposes to place this discovery in its proper perspective, that of a Christian theologian who, without pretending to exhaust conceptually a mystery received in faith, endeavors nevertheless to provide an account of the real distinction between the divine persons of the undivided Trinity. We begin with an examination of how St. Thomas was able to take up, clarify and shape by successive integrations the famous definition of personhood left by Boethius. This places us in a position to follow step by step the analogical approach, as rigorous as it is audacious, that allows Aquinas to discern, in this common and so human ratio of « person », the incomparable radiance of a divine name. Yet if one desires to draw nearer to the distinctiveness of personhood in God, there is no other way than to penetrate divine revelation, which requires and which alone authorizes transcending the frontier between the relative and the absolute, to think finally, with Thomas, about « relation as subsistent », a unique prerogative and happy secret of the divine tri-personality. (shrink)

St. Augustine of Hippo wrote the ’De Trinitate’ to explain to critics of the Nicene Creed how the Christian doctrine of the divinity and coequality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is present in Scripture. He also wanted to convince philosophers that Christ is the Wisdom they sought. Augustine’s third purpose was to correlate the biblical truth that all human persons are created to image God, a Trinity, a communion of love, with the first two Commandments of the Old (...) and New Testaments. Augustine succeeded in showing the need for combining faith and reason for a greater understanding of Scripture as well as for a greater understanding of the true nature and destiny of human persons. Augustine emphasized the scriptural revelation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and used reason to convince philosophers that the one and three-Personed God is philosophically and logically defensible. He concluded that the likeness of human persons to Christ and to the Trinity is accomplished not onl. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Augustine’s account of sense cognition in book 11 of De Trinitate. His discussion in this context focuses on two types of sensory state—what he calls “outer vision” and “inner vision,” respectively. His analysis of both types of state is designed to show that cognitive acts involving external and internal sense faculties are susceptible of a kind of trinitarian analysis. A common way to read De Trin. 11, is to interpret Augustine’s account of “outer” vision (...) as an analysis of sense perception and his account “inner” vision as an analysis of occurrent sensory memory and imagination. I argue against such a reading of De Trin. 11, however. Insofar as we take perception to be a phenomenally conscious mode of sensory awareness, outer vision cannot, I claim, be the equivalent of ordinary sense perception. For, on Augustine’s view, the deliverances of outer vision only reach the threshold of consciousness, when outer vision occurs in conjunction with inner vision. Hence, on my analysis, sense perception turns out to be a complex, hybrid state—one that involves both outer and inner vision. If I am right, acts of sense perception turn out not to be directly susceptible to trinitarian analysis. Even so, the account is interesting and nuanced for all that. (shrink)

Following some methodological remarks, the article first demonstrates the possibility of determining indirectly Augustine’s patristic sources in De Trinitate, while it also takes into account the author’s indications of his sources in other of his writings. The presence of Marius Victorinus in Books 5-7 is also underscored. The second half of the article, while acknowledging a certain Neoplatonic philosophical influence behind similitudo mentis, nevertheless attributes Augustine’s first awareness of this concept to Victorinus. In addition, the psychological analyses found in (...) Books 9-10 are traceable principally to the theory of oikeiosis present in Latin authors, in primis, Cicero. (shrink)

In De Trinitate XII Augustine refuses the idea that a family could be the image of God. This is curious, because the theologian that in De Trinitate elaborates a “communitarian model” of the Trinity – the Lover, the Beloved and the Love – at the same time does not see the image of God in the first natural community, the family. The purpose of this paper is to show the deeper reasons for this refutation. After the exposition of (...) Augustine’s argument, the paper identifies Augustine’s polemical reference to a part of the Eastern Tradition, which used the example of the first family (Adam, Eve and Abel/Seth) in order to express the mystery of the Trinity. It examines also how the example of the first family was used by Gregory of Nazianzus in his fifth theological discourse (which some scholars identify as the possible source of the idea of the family as the image of God for Augustine) in a trinitarian way. This study then considers two aspects of Augustine’s argument: that his refutation is not justified by the association of the Holy Spirit with the mother and the bride; that the real reason for it is exegetical, and dependent upon Augustine’s reading of Gn. 1:26. Finally the paper shows that the view of gender differences as merely corporeal is what prevents the Doctor of Grace from reading Gn. 1:27 in a relational-dialogical way to express the intimate communion of the Trinity. (shrink)

Le problème classique des « origines » du concept de Trinité conduit traditionnellement ou bien à des approches confessionnelles qui supposent l’existence de ce concept déjà dans le texte biblique, ou bien, au contraire, à la recherche d’influences extérieures à la tradition juive ou chrétienne, dans les « triades » polythéistes. En réalité, les premiers textes chrétiens dans lesquels s’élabore réellement la doctrine trinitaire – ceux des « apologistes » du ii e siècle – montrent que 1) la source essentielle (...) est philosophique : les premiers développements de théologie trinitaire s’inscrivent dans une tradition médioplatonicienne de lecture de la « Lettre 2 » attribuée à Platon, et les affirmations de l’Écriture sont relues à la lumière de la triade platonicienne ; 2) l’idée de Trinité n’est pas apparue dans la tradition patristique comme un « mystère », mais au contraire comme une doctrine parfaitement rationnelle, et supposée même démontrer, parmi d’autres arguments, le caractère philosophique des croyances chrétiennes. La « mystérisation » de cette doctrine est un développement ultérieur. (shrink)

A careful historical analysis of the methods and contents of the 'De Trinitate' of Boethius and the 'Expositio' of Aquinas which aims to provide a higher level of understanding of the structure of "Expositio" than is possible with mid-20th ...

My first article, back in 1989! Thanks, forever, Ralph McInerny. Here I take issue with John F.X. Knasas, a strong supporter of the existential Thomism of Etienne Gilson and Joseph Owens. Knasas's desire to sequester Thomas away from allowing the discipline of natural philosophy to arrive at a fully immaterial reality through its proper demonstrative methods seemed to me to be at odds with Thomas's text.

ABSTRACT: The objective of this article is to show Augustine’s originality in ascribing a key role to will in the cognitive activity. For him, knowledge is influenced by both will and love, and cannot be grasped without will. Grounded primarily on De trinitate, the article focuses on three kinds of knowledge that shed light on his peculiar view on will: self-knowledge, knowledge of God, and the knowledge of bodies.RÉSUMÉ: L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que l’originalité d’Augustin est (...) d’attribuer un rôle clé à la volonté dans l’activité cognitive. Pour lui, la connaissance est influencée tant par la volonté que par l’amour et ne peut être appréhenéee sans volonté. Se basant principalement sur De trinitate, cet article se concentre sur trois genres de connaissance qui mettent en lumière sa conception particulière de la volonté : la connaissance de soi, la connaissance de Dieu et la connaissance des corps. (shrink)

This article argues that De trinitate advocates a process of “reading” God through metaphor. For Augustine, as for Plotinus, human beings understand God not by analyzing him rationally but by seeing him through the metaphor of the human mind. But unlike Plotinus, Augustine claims that the imago dei, with its triadic structure of memory, understanding, and will, serves as metaphor only to the extent that it experiences Christ’s redemptive illumination. The act of metaphor is a kind of interior “reading” (...) during which the mind reads the imago dei as a mental text, interprets this text through Christ’s aid, and is simultaneously transformed into a better image. (shrink)

This article explores the conception of self-knowledge in book 10 of Augustine’s De Trinitate. Augustine starts from the worry in Plato’s Meno that one cannot search for something entirely unknown and engages with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 in developing his own understanding of the mind’s self-knowledge. He concludes that this knowledge is paradoxical in nature: it is necessary and, at the same time, futile; and it is separated from the knowledge of God. Augustine reaches this point by rejecting the Aristotelian (...) identity of the knower with the known, as well as by grounding self-knowledge in the fact of the mind’s intimate presence to itself. Ultimately, self-knowledge appears to be an ‘objectless’ knowledge, a knowledge that the mind exists rather than knowledge of what the mind is. (shrink)

The topics of Questions i-iv of St. Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius are of vital interest to the Christian philosopher and theologian. Written while Aquinas was a youthful Master of Theology, the Questions show his solidarity with Christian tradition, his wide acquaintance with Scripture and the Fathers of the Church, and his creative use of philosophy in addressing theological issues. Question i treats of the possibility of our knowing God, and the human limitations of this (...) knowledge. Question ii concerns theology as a science which reaches out to God by faith in his revealed word and uses philosophical reasoning to throw light on the contents of revelation. In Question iii Aquinas takes up the nature of faith, showing its relation to religion and its necessity for the welfare of the human race. He argues for the catholicity or universality of the Christian faith and defends the orthodox teaching of the trinity of Persons in the one God. Question iv turns to a set of philosophical problems occasioned by Boethius' treatise on the Trinity: the factors that cause a plurality in genera, species and individuals. In this connection Aquinas makes one of his most controversial statements of the principle of individuation. (shrink)

This article argues that the analogical argument employed by Augustine in De Trinitate (the soul-God analogy) is formally identical to the analogical argument employed by Plato in the Republic (the city-soul analogy). The similarities between these two analogies, however, have received insufficient attention in the secondary literature. My goal is to fill this lacuna. I first provide a summary of the analogical methodology of these two works, and I then proceed to translate these two analogies into one analogical argument (...) form, showing that they are formally equivalent. I then differentiate these two analogies from other analogical arguments by focusing on their exploratory and programmatic character. This differentiation helps to capture the uniqueness of these two analogies, to understand their function, and, ultimately, to appreciate more fully the consonance between Augustine’s methodology and Plato’s. (shrink)

Luigi Gioia provides a fresh description and analysis of Augustine's monumental treatise, De Trinitate, working on a supposition of its unity and its coherence from structural, rhetorical, and theological points of view. The main arguments of the treatise are reviewed first: Scripture and the mystery of the Trinity; discussion of 'Arian' logical and ontological categories; a comparison between the process of knowledge and formal aspects of the confession of the mystery of the Trinity; an account of the so called (...) 'psychological analogies'. These topics hold a predominantly instructive or polemical function. The unity and the coherence of the treatise become apparent especially when its description focuses on a truly theological understanding of knowledge of God: Augustine aims at leading the reader to the vision and enjoyment of God the Trinity, in whose image we are created. This mystagogical aspect of the rhetoric of De Trinitate is unfolded through Christology, soteriology, doctrine of the Holy Spirit and doctrine of revelation. At the same time, from the vantage point of love, Augustine detects and powerfully depicts the epistemological consequences of human sinfulness, thus unmasking the fundamental deficiency of received theories of knowledge. Only love restores knowledge and enables philosophers to yield to the injunction which resumes philosophical enterprise as a whole, namely 'know thyself'. (shrink)

A partir del libro IX del De Trinitate, Agustín refl exiona sobre el modode conocerse el alma a sí misma y plantea que no puede el alma anhelarconocerse si no se conoce ya de algún modo, porque “nadie ama lodesconocido”. En este contexto hay un pasaje en el que Agustín describeexplícitamente el conocimiento que el alma tiene de sí como sustancial,comparando su modo de existir en el alma con el modo de existir el almamisma. Luego de exponer qué puede (...) signifi car el término sustancial enel De Trinitate, y cómo es posible que el alma se busque si ya se conoce,mostraremos que se puede afi rmar que el alma tiene un conocimientosustancial de sí, a pesar de la ambigüedad –en algunos casos terminológicay en otros, de sentido– de los textos. (shrink)

Dans la discussion sur l’abstraction ( Super De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3), Thomas d’Aquin donne quatre exemples de parties constitutives de l’homme. L’un de ces exemples, tel qu’il apparaît dans l’autographe de Thomas, serait « ce feu » ; toutefois cette variante n’est pas retenue dans l’édition léonine, qui opte plutôt pour la conjecture « cet ongle ». J. F. Wippel a récemment proposé de garder la variante « ce feu » ; le présent article vise à corroborer (...) la proposition de Wippel. (shrink)

This article further examines the literary relationship between the De Trinitate falsely attributed to Didymus the Blind and the works of Cyril of Alexandria, aside from their common philosophical citations. The highlighted similarities of these two authors cannot be explained by a common source; on the contrary, they indicate a direct dependence of one author upon the other. Their analysis shows that words, turns of phrase and ideas which are typical of Cyril and often occur in his writings are (...) each used only once by Pseudo-Didymus. This evidence weighs heavily in favour of Cyril’s antecedence. In fact, the anonymous author of the De Trinitate has been influenced, in addition to fourth-century doctrinal treatises, by Cyril’s De sancta Trinitate dialogi, an anti-Arian work dating from the 420s. He also assimilated several other Cyrillian features, and was even inspired by Cyril’s anti-Arian Christology in his doctrine on the Holy Spirit. Cyril of Alexandria, therefore, has priority over Pseudo-Didymus, both chronologically and theologically. (shrink)

El artículo estudia el envío del Hijo y del Espíritu Santo a los justos tal y como son tratados por Agustín en "De Trinitate" 4, 20 y 2, 5, resaltando las misiones visibles y sus diversas implicaciones, así como los capítulos 17 al 19 del Libro XV, para explicar la vinculación del Espíritu Santo al amor fraterno.

Luigi Gioia provides a fresh description and analysis of Augustine's monumental treatise, De Trinitate, working on a supposition of its unity and its coherence from structural, rhetorical, and theological points of view. The main arguments of the treatise are reviewed first: Scripture and the mystery of the Trinity; discussion of 'Arian' logical and ontological categories; a comparison between the process of knowledge and formal aspects of the confession of the mystery of the Trinity; an account of the so called (...) 'psychological analogies'. These topics hold a predominantly instructive or polemical function. The unity and the coherence of the treatise become apparent especially when its description focuses on a truly theological understanding of knowledge of God: Augustine aims at leading the reader to the vision and enjoyment of God the Trinity, in whose image we are created. This mystagogical aspect of the rhetoric of De Trinitate is unfolded through Christology, soteriology, doctrine of the Holy Spirit and doctrine of revelation. At the same time, from the vantage point of love, Augustine detects and powerfully depicts the epistemological consequences of human sinfulness, thus unmasking the fundamental deficiency of received theories of knowledge. Only love restores knowledge and enables philosophers to yield to the injunction which resumes philosophical enterprise as a whole, namely 'know thyself'. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 256-257 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate" Johannes Brachtendorf. Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate." Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. Pp. viii + 335. Cloth, DM 128,00. "The Trinity" is arguably Augustine's (philosophically) most demanding work. Yet (...) it is precisely its philosophical quality that is nowadays sometimes called in question for its apparent lack of argumentative coherence. H. I. Marrou has even expressed the view that this may have been intended, as the text is designed as an exercitatioanimi, a spiritual-mental exercise; i.e., the argumentative gaps are deliberately left open to be filled in by whoever undergoes the exercise. This would mean that "The Trinity" lacks any philosophical or theological position or doctrine in particular, and that it must not be judged by the standards of philosophical discourse, even those of Augustine's own day and age. Brachtendorf sets out with a revision of that view. Augustine, he argues, does indeed formulate a particular position. The impression that there may be gaps in his arguments could well stem from a misunderstanding of some of them. Augustine, Brachtendorf reports in his first chapter (1), developed his teaching of the triune God in close contact with the philosophy of Plotinus. However, he distanced himself from Plotinus by analyzing the process of cognition not by taking as an example the divine nous, but the menshumana. Apart from that he developed an ontology of the Trinity (2) and only then analyzed the human mind in analogy to it (3-4). He also looked into the relationship of mind and language ("word") (5) and developed further some aspects of this relationship such as the trinitarian structure of the human mind (6), the relationship of knowledge and wisdom (7), the human mind as the image of God (8), the self-reflection of the human mind (9), language as an expression of that self-reflection in the image of God (10), and the concept of the "inner word" (11).Brachtendorf concludes with an appeal not to read into Augustine's link of notitia and amor that he was interested in the analysis of self-knowledge merely for ethical reasons. Amor, he argues, expressly includes operations of the intellect. Augustine's interest was therefore genuinely theoretical and intellectualist. Amor, for Augustine, was a force that creates knowledge as such, no matter what the content. Its impact is practical and theoretical. Referring to the works of Charles Taylor, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hannah Arendt, Brachtendorf demonstrates how influential Augustine was with this aspect of his thought in the development of "Subjekt"-centered philosophies in the twentieth century. Yet, as influential as this approach may have been in this particular field, arguing, as it did, for the ontological character of human subjectivity (i.e., that the human mind was naturally structured in a trinitarian way, but had to make its natural intelligence explicit in thought through the learning of language) it did not revolutionize [End Page 256] the understanding of language. In consequence it did not impress the philosophers of the linguistic turn, and that is probably why today the argument of "The Trinity" is so often found wanting.Pointing back to the source Brachtendorf's study is a welcome contribution to the subject and a useful guide for all who now--hopefully, and encouraged by this work--set out for themselves to have a (closer) look at the original. Josef Lössl Catholic University Leuven... (shrink)

Boethius can be considered as the ideal middleman between the Greek Roman classical world and the medieval one. His influence in the western thought is difficult to gauge. In the article we point out the continuity of thought between Aristotle, Boethius, and successively Thomas Aquinas, in a very important epistemological question: the division of the speculative sciences. Boethius addresses the topic on two occasions: in the first commentary to Porphyry's Isagoge, and in the brief treatise De Trinitate. After presenting (...) both texts, and verifying the different philosophical contexts in which they are, we tackle the disputatio that arose over the illegitimate interpretation of some authors of the text of De Trinitate, based on the doctrine of the degrees of abstraction. (shrink)

In Novatian’s De Trinitate there is a passage which, while it makes a reference to an “invidia mortalitatis”, has been to some extent the torment of editors and of translators. On the one hand, the genitive tends mostly to be read as objective, on the other, the text is manipulated at times (even in recent editions) on the basis of a lectio facilior derived from conjecture. The article summarizes the history of criticism relative to the above-mentioned passage, highlighting some (...) of its limits. From there it searches for historical-philological bases of a reading of the passage in which the genitive is understood as subjective. The evidence gathered seems to point to an Origenist source, and that would lean us toward welcoming the invitation, already formulated by Manlio Simonetti, to new research inNovatian and his sources. (shrink)