This article shows that the conspicuous and consistent idiosyncrasy of Grotius's Biblical interpretation is an important part of his revolutionary effort to secularize natural law. In De iure praedae and related works, Grotius systematically deployed a range of exegetical techniques in order to demonstrate that the Bible, like all texts, is open to multiple interpretations and susceptible to hijacking by rival agendas. This strategy aimed to render the Bible inadmissible as evidence in legal disputes and political legitimacy claims. (...) The consistent instrumentality of Grotius's use of the Bible in IPC cannot be dismissed as mere legalistic opportunism or described as an atheistic move. Rather, Grotius's exegetical strategy was motivated by pacifism and a desire to protect religion from politicization. The article positions this secularization strategy in the intellectual environment of the Leiden Circle, and shows how competing Catholic, Calvinist, and Mennonite political readings of the same key biblical passages during the Dutch-Iberian conflict provided the immediate occasion for writing IPC. In order to construct a natural law theory that was independent from, and therefore acceptable to, all religious sides, it was necessary to ensure that the Bible have no final word in law or politics, lest its invocation link disagreements to belief and thereby render them impossible to resolve. (shrink)

This contribution aims at reconstructing the system of legal sources as it can be recognised in all its clarity in the De iure praedae. After pointing out that Grotius applied in this work the mathematical method, it is observed that the law has a clear voluntaristic character: 'voluntas universorum ad universos directa lex dicitur'. Even the 'first notion', quoted in Regula I, that is the lex aeterna, has this specific character: 'Quod Deus se velle significarit, id ius est'. (...) Interesting is also the way in which the issue of the ius naturae is developed. Actually, natural law is consistent with Regula I precisely because it is bound to God as a manifestation of his will: 'Dei voluntas non oraculis tantum et extraordinariis significationibus, sed vel maxime ex creantis intentione apparet'. Thus, the creation of the ius gentium primarium and ius gentium secundarium follows the same pattern: it is always a voluntas that splits into a cascade like a 'baroque fountain'. At the end of the same argument we find finally the ius civile: 'Quidquid respublica se velle significavit', as Regula V states. In conclusion, the system of legal sources in De iure praedae is based on premises that differ in many respects from the legal sources of De iure belli ac pacis. (shrink)

This paper aims at showing that all scholars writing on De iure praedae should refer to the extant manuscript of the work, or to the new electronic edition when it becomes available, to check the passages they use in their arguments. The printed text as edited by Hamaker, though generally reliable as a nineteenth-century edition, must now be considered outdated because of its suppression of all previous stages of the text, as well as its replacement of the original (...) punctuation with a new one, which more than once does affect the meaning of the text. Moreover, Hamaker's edition gives no authentic image of the sources of Grotius's thought. Secondly, signalling a need for more detailed textual research on IPC, the present paper calls attention to Grotius's extensive changes in chapter 10, and to the contribution which philological approaches might make to answering questions such as that regarding IPC's intended audience. (shrink)

This paper explores Richard Tuck's account of Grotius as the key innovator in the history that leads to the invention both of the free individual, protective of his or her rights, and of the modern liberal state, respectful of individuals' rights. Contextualism as a method for dealing with texts is discussed by way of a recent interview given by Tuck's teacher, Quentin Skinner. The attempt is made to see contextualism in context.

The present article explores the historical sections of Grotius's De iure praedae Commentarius bearing the following fundamental but very important questions in mind: What did Grotius actually know about the Portuguese Estado da Índia at the time of drafting the treatise between 1604 and 1606/8? What did he know about the Luso-Asian trading regime or Asian trading practices at large? Using the published correspondence of Grotius, archival documentation, manuscript fragments as well as unpublished reading notes and drafts, a (...) case will be made that he had in fact few sources at his fingertips. This insight serves fundamentally to refute older assumptions, expounded notably by Robert Fruin and C.H. Alexandrowicz, that the young Grotius conducted independent research in the VOC company archives, or had immersed himself with Asian maritime codes or commercial practices. (shrink)

Sixteen essays discuss _De iure praedae_ – Hugo Grotius’s 1604-1605 commentary on booty –, its sources, circumstances and consequences, and explore how Grotius the humanist, the theologian, the jurist and the politician concur in this his first exercise in natural law and rights.

A comparison between the Prolegomena of Chapter II of De iure praedae and the Prolegomena of De iure belli ac pacis leads to the conclusion that the ideas of Grotius on legal systematization have changed considerably between 1604 and 1625. Whereas Grotius starts in IPC with general principles with a rather unclear distinction between leges and regulae, in IBP he gives first the philosophical and theological basis of international law, intertwined by a concise set of general legal (...) rules , mostly derived from Roman law after its reception in Western Europe. The general outlines of legal systematization in the early-modern period are expounded. In the attempts of legal systematization the concept of subjective rights is essential. These subjective rights are not, as is sometimes assumed, a medieval renewal of legal technique, but can be found essentially already in classical Roman law of the first centuries AD. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the printing history of Hugo Grotius's Mare liberum . It examines the political circumstances which prompted the pamphlet's publication, but then seemed to conspire against it, and relates these to Grotius's revision of chapter 12 of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library, the one surviving copy of De iure praedae . While preparing chapter 12 for the press, he made a serious effort to tone down its bellicose rhetoric, erasing, for example, all references to (...) the Spanish claims to the Americas. His aim was to placate the French envoy Pierre Jeannin and his own political patron Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the driving forces behind the negotiations for the Twelve Years' Truce . In the context of these negotiations, Grotius was at pains to downplay his radical rights theories. The subjective right of punishment only received a mention in the conclusion of Mare liberum, for example. Yet a discarded outline for the pamphlet's preface shows that the argument of De iure praedae remained uppermost in his mind, witness the outline's denunciation of the 'poisonings, perfidy and crimes of the Portuguese'. Both De iure praedae and Mare liberum had been commissioned by the Dutch East India Company for the express purpose of influencing political developments in its favour. Yet neither treatise had the impact originally intended by Grotius and the VOC directors. Ironically, these occasional writings became classics of international law instead. (shrink)

Roman property law and Roman contract law as well as the property centered Roman ethics put forth by Cicero in several of his works were the traditions Grotius drew upon in developing his natural rights system. While both the medieval just war tradition and Grotius's immediate political context deserve scholarly attention and constitute important influences on Grotius's natural law tenets, it is a Roman tradition of subjective legal remedies and of just war which lays claim to a foundational role with (...) regard to his conception of subjective natural rights. Grotius made use of Roman law and Roman ethics in order to submit a normative case for a rights-based just war in the East Indies. His conception of a law of nature was originally conceived to apply a theory of compensatory justice to the high seas of Southeast Asia, envisaged as a natural state lacking political authority. Eventually, however, this argument was to reveal its anti-absolutist implications, and contributed—by virtue of its applicability to individuals, private entities and commonwealths alike—to the emergence of a rights-based constitutionalism. This article discusses Grotius's early treatise De iure praedae commentarius and its offshoot Mare liberum, which already contained an inchoate version of subjective natural rights, as well as the elaborate natural rights doctrine which can be found in Grotius's early Theses LVI and in the Defensio capitis quinti maris liberi, a defense of the fifth chapter of Mare liberum, written around 1615 and directed against the Scottish jurist William Welwod's attack on Mare liberum. (shrink)

This essay discusses some of the ways in which De iure praedae may be understood to constitute a republican text. It is my argument that the 'Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty' should be firmly located within the over-arching republican discourse of the juvenilia, although the text's republican content is not immediately apparent. On close examination, a republican sub-text is detectible through the author's treatment of the discursive object of the text, the Dutch East India Company (...) , a corporate body. By attempting to legitimate the VOC's natural right to wage just war, Grotius invests a private entity with a public mark of sovereignty. This investiture of a non-state actor with public international legal personality forces a careful reappraisal of two central characteristics of seventeenth-century republican thought: the divisibility of sovereignty, and the fluid demarcation between the 'public' and the 'private' spheres. I conclude that the VOC may be accurately denoted a 'corporate sovereign', an entity whose legal personality is derived from the corporatist principles that underlined early republican and federalist theory. (shrink)

A comparison between the Prolegomena of Chapter II of De iure praedae and the Prolegomena of De iure belli ac pacis leads to the conclusion that the ideas of Grotius on legal systematization have changed considerably between 1604 and 1625. Whereas Grotius starts in IPC with general principles with a rather unclear distinction between leges and regulae, in IBP he gives first the philosophical and theological basis of international law, intertwined by a concise set of general legal (...) rules, mostly derived from Roman law after its reception in Western Europe. The general outlines of legal systematization in the early-modern period are expounded. In the attempts of legal systematization the concept of subjective rights is essential. These subjective rights are not, as is sometimes assumed, a medieval renewal of legal technique, but can be found essentially already in classical Roman law of the first centuries AD.The institutional system is not yet visible in De iure praedae, it might be different for De iure belli ac pacis. Significant here are possibly the expressions ius ad bellum and ius in bello. (shrink)

In this introduction, the meaning and relevance of the study of De iure praedae, as one of the juvenilia of Grotius, is discussed and the contending approaches are described. A survey of the volume is provided.

In this introduction, the meaning and relevance of the study of De iure praedae, as one of the juvenilia of Grotius, is discussed and the contending approaches are described. A survey of the volume is provided.

The use of patristic texts was tightly bound up with the needs of the contemporary discussion which provided Grotius with sources for his patristic citations. His use of ancient texts especially in Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae pietas proved to be highly controversial.Grotius's advocacy of tolerance with respect to various forms of Christianity determines his use of patristic texts as well. He looks for examples of moderation in the Early Church and by this accomplishes a significant shift of perspective. He points (...) out the diversity of expressions in the Early Church and therefore replaces questions of dogmatic definition with the question of how to handle orthodoxy and heresy in society. In doing so, he implies requirements for the proper reading of patristic texts in his own times. Grotius's notion of Christian liberty is connected to awareness of context and intrinsically linked to a historical understanding. In his writings, contextualisation involves both religious-historical comparison and the integration of general sources from antiquity. With regard to early Christian sources, this means that Grotius understands them as deeply rooted in the broader ancient context. This approach to early Christian literature is already visible in De Iure Praedae. His sensibility for cultural variation, his comparative method and historical interest in ancient institutions are outstanding, and Grotius has these characteristics in common with legal humanists like François Baudouin. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

Grotius’s ideas on proportionate and limited liability, as mentioned in the Inleidinge and De iure belli ac pacis, were novel in comparison to the civilian doctrine of his time. Grotius drew from sources of local law and statutes regarding maritime law but was nonetheless original in his interpretations. Grotius proposed to consider the liability of co-owners of ships (reders, exercitores), who acted as organizers of maritime expeditions, and of others that were participating in these expeditions, as broad. At the (...) same time, their liability was limited to the maximum of the value of the ship and cargo. In this regard, Grotius’s conceptions hinged on a view of a ship’s voyage as engendering a community of risk among all stakeholders. However, in spite of the underlying connections, Grotius did not eradicate all inconsistencies which the originality of his combinations brought forward. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

The idea of free trade in Grotius's Mare liberum and his legal opinion De iure praedae has a strong theological basis. Grotius called the right to travel and trade freely a ius sanctissimum, a 'sacrosanct law'. He also perceived the Freedom of the Seas as being a direct result of the will of God. This theological background was strategically necessary because Grotius developed the Mare liberum and the De iure praedae to argue against Spanish-Portuguese claims to (...) a trade monopoly that also had theological underpinnings. But the theological aspect of Grotius's theory was also emphasized by the references he made to the Dominican friar Francisco de Vitoria's ius communicationis. This precursor to Grotius's Freedom of the Seas, which Vitoria had developed in his De indis, is connected to the legal justification of Christian mission and so has a clear theological connotation. In Grotius's work, Vitoria's concept of a universal right to Christian mission supervised by the pope was transformed into a theologically supported right to free trade. With this transformation of the ius communicationis into the principle of the Mare liberum, Grotius develops a theological basis not for politics but for economics. One can speak therefore, following Giorgio Agamben, of an 'economic theology' in regard to Grotius, a term that is, in turn, derived from Carl Schmitt's notion of 'political theology'. (shrink)

A passage on the origin of property in Grotius, De iure praedae , pp. 226-230 [Note 1] seems to contain echoes of the controversy between pope John XXII and William of Ockham on Franciscan poverty. Grotius's note (b) on p. 227 refers to the decretals..

SummaryGrotius has a rudimentary theory of sociability. Only with hindsight has a remark about appetitus societatis been promoted to the starting point of a theory that flourished in the writings of later natural jurists. In this article, I address the issue of the appearance in Grotius's natural law of sociability [as the 1715/38 English translation of John Morrice renders appetitus societatis, following Barbeyrac's sociabilité]. Writing in the just war tradition, Grotius is first of all interested in finding out the conditions (...) for peace, and although injustice is a condition of war, it is not per se true that injustice is a perversion of society. Apparently, not all societies are perfect and the violence of war and the legal actions of peace are both instruments for achieving a greater modicum of justice in this world. Yet appetitus et custodia societatis is called the foundation of justice. Grotius achieved this context for sociability in phases, through a series of writings from c. 1600 until De iure belli ac pacis of 1625, and its revision of 1631. In this development the notion of fides plays an intriguing role, through which we can obtain a better understanding of the meaning of appetitus societatis in the later work. The present article is a sequel to a previous publication, on fides in De iure praedae. Analysing the genesis of appetitus societatis in De iure belli ac pacis, I argue that Grotius was changing his strategy over the years, without however arriving at a definitive solution to the question of what commits men to the pursuit of justice. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 61 - 94 Interchanges between political, juridical and theological thought in the early modern period have been studied extensively during the past decades. Less light has been cast on the corresponding interrelations between politico-juridical thought and biblical hermeneutics. However, this issue deserves some attention, too, as the following case study on Hugo Grotius wants to show by pointing to the mutual adjustment of juridical, theological and biblical arguments in the progress of the core (...) semantics of Grotius’s natural law theory from _De iure praedae_ to _De iure belli ac pacis._. (shrink)

This article provides new information on the publication history of the first edition of the text that, according to many scholars, laid the ground for the growth of international law: Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis. Drawing on the preliminary findings of the Grotius Census Project at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), the following pages shed light on the first three states of the typescript, (...) the sources that Grotius had access to in France while drafting the book, and the early circulation of the 1625 edition, published by Nicolas Buon in Paris. The goal of this publication is to disseminate updated information on the printing history of this key text in the history of legal and political thought, and to invite readers to come forward with more information about the location of the remaining copies of the text, in order to advance our understanding of the rise of international law around the world. (shrink)

The first edition of Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis was published in Paris by Nicolas Buon in 1625. An unauthorised second edition appeared in Frankfurt a year later, from the reputable Wechel press. After Grotius made hundreds of changes to the first and second states of the first edition, and failed to convince the publisher Nicolas Buon of the merits of printing yet another edition of the book, the Wechels’s release of a new edition sought to capitalise (...) on the high demand for the text, as copies had sold out in Central Europe by the summer of 1625. In this preliminary report on the 1626 edition, using online and card catalogues, we have located 59 surviving copies. We examined thirteen copies in person, and another three fully digitised copies online, and on the basis of this small sample we have been able to draw a number of conclusions. We hope that this research note on preliminary results will generate interest in this unduly neglected edition, and that readers will kindly bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

Hugo Grotius’s best-known work, De iure belli ac pacis, appeared in 1625 in Paris with the author’s approval. A second unauthorised version was published in 1626 in Frankfurt. In 1631 the Amsterdam publisher, Willem Janszoon Blaeu (1571–1638), issued the third edition, this one authorised by the author – and this edition featured nearly a thousand revisions by Grotius. The purpose of this report is to analyse the context behind the publication of this third edition and the copies’ provenance records. (...) Using online and card catalogues, we have located 154 copies. We examined 52 copies in person, and another three fully digitised copies online. We hope that this research note on preliminary results will generate greater interest in this unduly neglected edition, and that readers will kindly bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

This is the fourth instalment of our census and study of the reception of the first nine editions of De iure belli ac pacis. Here we focus on the two versions that Johannes Janssonius issued in 1632, one with a copy of Mare liberum attached to it. This report outlines the place of the 1632 Janssonius edition in the context of his long-running rivalry with the printer Willem Blaeu and his firm. It then explores the typographical differences between the (...) two issues, their causes, and their significance for our understanding of the reception of the text. Finally, it provides the preliminary results of the census concerning the circulation and provenance of the fifty-three copies of this edition that we have found. We hope that this research note on the preliminary results will attract interest in this edition and that readers will kindly inform us of further copies. (shrink)

This article provides new information on the printing and readership history of the fifth edition of De iure belli ac pacis. Building on our earlier research on the way that the dispute between Willem Janszoon Blaeu and Johannes Janssonius influenced the publication of the 1631 edition of the text, this article studies how Blaeu harnessed his position to make the 1632 edition more reputable than the earlier version published by his rival. The article considers how, over four centuries, readers (...) have appreciated the quality of the production and three engaged with the text for radically different ends: Remigius Faesch, Baron von Boineburg, and Wendell Phillips. The article draws attention to the changes and continuities in reading and annotation patterns and offers preliminary insights into the themes that these influential readers focused on. We hope that it will inspire readers to bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 61 - 94 Interchanges between political, juridical and theological thought in the early modern period have been studied extensively during the past decades. Less light has been cast on the corresponding interrelations between politico-juridical thought and biblical hermeneutics. However, this issue deserves some attention, too, as the following case study on Hugo Grotius wants to show by pointing to the mutual adjustment of juridical, theological and biblical arguments in the progress of the core (...) semantics of Grotius’s natural law theory from _De iure praedae_ to _De iure belli ac pacis._. (shrink)

In this introduction, the meaning and relevance of the study of De iure praedae, as one of the juvenilia of Grotius, is discussed and the contending approaches are described. A survey of the volume is provided.

This article starts with a critical reflection on John Westlake’s reading of the history of empire and the English/British East India Company – for him, essentially, the proper concern of ‘constitutional history’ rather than international law. For Westlake, approaching this history through the prism of nineteenth-century positivist doctrine, the Company’s exercise of war powers could only result from state delegation. Against his warnings to international lawyers not to stray from the proper boundaries of international legal inquiry, the article proceeds to (...) recover Hugo Grotius’s theory of corporate belligerency in his early treatise De iure praedae. For Grotius, corporations could wage public war on behalf of the state yet, at the same time, were in law capable of waging private war in their own right. The article proceeds to reflect on the practice of corporate belligerency in the centuries separating Westlake and Grotius; it concludes with observations on the implications of Grotius’s theory of corporate belligerency today. (shrink)

In neither of his two major forays into the laws of war and peace – De iure praedae or De iure belli ac pacis – did Hugo Grotius discuss the legal institutions of reprisal – whether special or general – or privateering in their own right. His profoundly novel reading of the just war doctrine in the context of his theory of natural rights, however, gave powerful legitimisation to the practices of special reprisals, as well as of (...) privateering in times of war and of peace. (shrink)

This note studies the 1650 edition of Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis. Using online and card catalogues, we have located eighty-nine copies, thirty-seven of which we examined in person, with an additional six fully digitised copies online. We hope that this research note on the preliminary results will generate greater interest in this unduly neglected edition. The note shows how, despite the connection established in the history of seventeenth-century politics that emphasized the ties between Grotius and the (...) Peace of Westphalia, the reception of Grotius’s 1650 edition bore no relation to the debates at Osnabrück and Münster. However, this is an influential edition, cherished by collectors and authors. According to our findings, it would be reproduced in a number of later reprints. (shrink)

This research note is the eighth instalment in our series of preliminary findings on the census and study of the reception of De iure belli ac pacis. The note presents a bibliographical description of Laurentius’ 1647 re-issue of the 1631 edition by Blaeu, considers Laurentius’ motivation and methods of production, lists and maps the currently known twenty-three surviving copies, and briefly describes two notable exemplars.

This research note offers a contextual overview of the printing history of Johann Blaeu’s 1646 octavo edition of Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis (ibp). The note examines the printing process of the last edition that was prepared while Grotius was still alive, though it was published after his death. The note also sheds light on the theological dimension of some readers’ annotations, and concludes by discussing the impact this edition had on the modern versions of the text.

This article constitutes the sixth instalment in our series on the census and study of the reception of the first nine editions of De iure belli ac pacis. This edition has long held a prominent place in studies and editions of Grotius’s work since it was the last published during his lifetime. The report first outlines the genesis of the edition in the context of Grotius’s relationship with Johann Blaeu (1596–1673) and Cornelius Blaeu (1610–1642), who had recently inherited the (...) Blaeu print firm from their father Willem. It then elucidates a number of crucial ways in which the 1642 edition differed from the five previous editions, especially via the addition of an extensive new series of annotations to ibp and a separate set addressed to the Epistle of Philemon. Finally, it concludes by providing the preliminary results of the census concerning the one hundred and twenty-one copies we have found. (shrink)

This article examines Grotius’s use of a Roman tradition to establish his notion of a natural and international law in his early treatise De iure praedae. It is argued that De iure praedae, on a methodological level, constituted an attempt to introduce a new doctrine of sources of law by making use of the method of classical rhetoric. On a substantive level, the treatise must be seen as growing out of a Ciceronian tradition of natural law (...) arguments in favor of just war, a tradition further enriched by Grotius with concepts taken from the property law of the Digest. These concepts afforded Grotius with the substantive framework to develop his doctrine of subjective natural rights as sketched in the hitherto unpublished early manuscript Theses LVI. An implication of this investigation of the Roman foundations of Grotius’s theory of natural law is that it challenges widespread assumptions about the “positive” character of ancient liberty. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war, since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may (...) punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae, one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio, and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis.Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war, since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may (...) punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae, one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio, and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis.Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war , since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state (...) may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae , one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio , and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis .Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

Centuries before being included in Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis and De iure praedae, the subject of reprisal was already being discussed in medieval literature. The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval and early modern practice and theory of reprisal as it developed before and during Grotius’s lifetime. Its first part investigates a number of important foundational elements, such as the issues of definition and terminology, and the common characteristics of a reprisal (...) case. In the second half, the author explores why reprisals were deemed to be a ‘perversus mos’ or ‘bad custom’ and how continued reliance on this practice was nonetheless justified by inserting it into the medieval just war doctrine. The paper does not provide a systematic study of Grotius’s own engagement with medieval reprisal sources. Rather, it should be read in conjunction with another publication in this same volume, ‘Grotius on Reprisal’ by Randall Lesaffer. (shrink)

This introduction gives a rough sketch of the context of Mare liberum's publication and the main arguments Grotius made in this pamphlet. It touches briefly on some of the latest arguments on Mare liberum and provides a survey of the contributions to this Commemmorative Issue. Moreover, it sets the stage for the contributions which elaborate on the fate of Grotian concepts - not so much by historically tracing these ideas over the past 400 years, but by offering an analysis of (...) how similar concepts are used in international law today. (shrink)

This article examines Grotius's use of a Roman tradition to establish his notion of a natural and international law in his early treatise "De iure praedae ". It is argued that "De iure praedae," on a methodological level, constituted an attempt to introduce a new doctrine of sources of law by making use of the method of classical rhetoric. On a substantive level, the treatise must be seen as growing out of a Ciceronian tradition of natural (...) law arguments in favor of just war, a tradition further enriched by Grotius with concepts taken from the property law of the Digest. These concepts afforded Grotius with the substantive framework to develop his doctrine of subjective natural rights as sketched in the hitherto unpublished early manuscript Theses LVI. An implication of this investigation of the Roman foundations of Grotius's theory of natural law is that it challenges widespread assumptions about the "positive" character of ancient liberty. (shrink)

In November 2010, the Library of the Peace Palace in The Hague acquired a copy of Hugo Grotius’s seminal study on the law of war, De iure belli ac pacis (Paris: Nicolas Buon, 1625). The purchase represents the very rare first state (issue or printing) of the first edition, item no. 565-I in the well-known bibliography of Grotius’s works by Jacob Ter Meulen and P.J.J. Diermanse. This article is an adapted version of a speech held in the Peace Palace (...) on 21 February 2011, when the copy of De iure belli ac pacis was presented to the public. After a short survey of the genesis, printing history and early reception, the article goes into the differences between the three states of the first edition and their significance for the interpretation of Grotius’s work. A provisional checklist of copies in public libraries is added in an appendix. (shrink)

The possible Stoic origins of the natural rights and natural law theories of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) has been a subject of scholarly debate in recent years. Yet discussions about Grotian sociability tend to focus exclusively on the meaning of appetitus societatis in De Jure Praedae (written in 1604–1608) and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), with little reference to the historical context. Insufficient consideration has been given to the intended audience(s) of these works, Grotius’ purpose in (...) writing them, and the possible correlation between his overarching argument and his working methods. This article examines Grotius’ use and abuse of Seneca's philosophical works in De Jure Praedae, commissioned by the directors of the Dutch East India Company (or VOC) in autumn 1604. The brutal murder of Sebald de Weert on the island of Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) in June 1603 is analyzed from a Stoic perspective in Chapter 15 of De Jure Praedae. Following his refusal to hand over Portuguese prisoners, De Weert and his crew were butchered on the beach of Batticaloa by Wilama Dharma Suriya, the ruler of the island's interior. Grotius blamed the victim. VOC commanders in monsoon Asia should suppress any residual loyalty which they might feel towards Christendom. It was imperative to conclude alliances with native rulers against the Iberian colonial powers, regardless of the rulers’ (lack of) faith or their horrific treatment of prisoners. As Grotius noted in Chapter 8 of De Jure Praedae, Seneca distinguished between “two kinds of commonwealth, the world state and the city state.” Spanish and Portuguese violations of the natural law – freedom of trade and navigation in particular – deserved condign punishment for the sake of both the fellowship of mankind and, naturally, the VOC and Dutch Republic. In assessing the uses of Stoicism in De Jure Praedae, much can be learned from the physical characteristics of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library, its sole surviving manuscript copy. Seneca's philosophical works are not cited at all in the original text of Ms. BPL 917, which Grotius copied out in 1604–1605. Instead, quotations from De Ira, De Clementia and De Beneficiis appear in the top and bottom margins of folio-pages or on inserted sheets of paper, which can be dated to 1607–1608. These quotations serve to flesh out an existing argument about the VOC's just war(s) in the East Indies. A case in point is the heavily rewritten Chapter 2. Grotius added quotations from De Clementia at the same time as he reformulated two natural laws on f. 8–9, a folio sheet inserted in or after January 1607. This was no coincidence. Revenging the past misdeeds of the Portuguese, which Grotius had described in great detail in Chapter 11, could no longer be considered the main or only priority of the VOC. Instead, Grotius contended on f. 8–9 that “evil deeds must be corrected” so as to achieve, in Seneca's words, “universal security.” Acting as a kind of global police force, the VOC should punish transgressors of the natural law on account of “that world community” envisioned by the Stoics. The practical consequences were felt during the Twelve Years Truce (1609–1621). Despite a cessation of arms in Europe, the VOC continued to engage in hostilities in the East Indies. The author of De Jure Praedae supported the Company on this. Like Cicero before him, he had successfully harnessed the Stoa to the cause of empire. (shrink)