G. E. Morton’s attempt to defend libertarianism against my claim that it relies on an implausible secularization of ideas of divine sovereignty fails. It is not true that morality itself entails human sovereignty, as witnessed by the moral theories of theological voluntarists and of consequentialists. Nor is it true that sovereignty can be conceptually transferred from God to equal human individuals, since they would have no legitimate way to legislate over each other short of a unanimous “general will.” Nor, finally, (...) does the idea of first possession rescue libertarian philosophy, since it is as applicable to animals and children as to adult human beings. (shrink)

ABSTRACT G. E. Morton tries to defend libertarianism against my claim that it relies on an implausible secularization of ideas of divine sovereignty. But it is not true, as he claims, that morality itself entails human sovereignty: witness the moral theories of divine‐command theorists and philosophical consequentialists. Nor is it true that sovereignty can be conceptually transferred from God to equal human individuals, since they would have no legitimate way to legislate over each other, short of a unanimous “general will.” (...) Nor, finally, does the idea of first possession rescue private property rights, since it is as applicable to animals and children as to adult human beings. (shrink)

This paper applies aspects of Hugo Grotius's theologically informed theory of property to contemporary issues concerning access to the human DNA sequence and patenting practices. It argues that Christians who contribute to public debate in these areas might beneficially employ some of the concepts with which he worked--notably "common right," the "right of necessity," and "use right." In the seventeenth century, wars were fought over trading rights and access to the sea. In the twenty-first century, information and intellectual property are (...) the issues of the day. Grotius's writings serve to correct the overemphasis in modern liberalism on individual rights, and have practical application to the debate concerning the reduction of the human genome to the status of private property. (shrink)

Se estudian las nociones de ‘uso’, ‘dominio’ y ‘propiedad’) en el pensamiento franciscano por dos motivos. Por un lado, la Escuela de Salamanca, que en cierto modo actúa de síntesis y proyección de las tesis clásicas y medievales y las conecta con el pensamiento moderno, aporta una interesante respuesta en torno al dominio para responder a lo que denominaremos “cuestión franciscana”, así se ve especialmente claro en Domingo de Soto y los autores de dicha Escuela que siguen principalmente su pensamiento. (...) Por otro lado, la particular visión de los autores franciscanos sobre la libertad, el valor de la riqueza y la pobreza para la vida humana y su fin trascendente, y las polémicas políticas en que se vieron involucrados en el siglo XIV, fue significativo para el desarrollo de varias tesis políticas que prepararán las ideas modernas sobre los derechos humanos. The notions of 'use', 'dominion' and 'property' are studied in Franciscan thought for two reasons. First, the School of Salamanca, contributes an interesting answer regarding the dominion to answer the “Franciscan question”. So it is especially clear in Domingo de Soto and the authors of that School that mainly follow his thought. Second, the Franciscan authors' particular vision of freedom, the value of wealth and poverty for human life and its transcendent end, and the political polemics in which they were involved in the fourteenth century, was significant for the Development of several political theses that will prepare modern ideas on human rights. (shrink)

En Alejandro de Hales, el dominio es una realidad necesaria para el ser humano porque deriva de la relación natural y originaria que tiene con la realidad, de la que es fin y en la que realiza su misión mediadora de cumplirla llevándola a su origen. Por ello, ese dominio siempre es un dominio que va acompañado a una particular misión, y en la que se refleja la constitución y finalidad específica del ser humano, su dignidad y su función. En (...) Hales tanto el dominio común sobre los bienes como la apropiación son de ley natural, distinguiendo en ella tres niveles, el de lo debido, lo bueno y lo justo en la necesaria comunicación y comunidad que marca la relación del ser humano con los bienes, con los otros y con Dios. In Alejandro de Hales, dominion is a necessary reality for the human being because it derives from the natural and original relationship that it has with reality. Human being is an end for the reality, and in it he performs a mission as a means, allowing the creation to return to its origin. Therefore, this dominion is accompanied by a particular mission, which reflects the constitution and specific purpose of human beings, their dignity and their function. In Hales both the common domain over property and appropriation are of natural law, distinguishing in it three levels, that of the necessary, the good and just in the necessary communication and community that marks the relationship of the human being with goods, with others and with God. (shrink)

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) [Hugo, Huigh or Hugeianus de Groot] was a towering figure in philosophy, law, political theory and associated fields during the seventeenth century and for hundreds of years afterwards. His work ranged over a wide array of topics, though he is best known to philosophers today for his contributions to the natural law theories of normativity which emerged in the later medieval and early modern periods. This article will attempt to explain his views on the law of nature (...) and related issues while simultaneously providing some broader assessment of his place in the history of ideas. (shrink)